Operation Harpoon

by Martin Bourne

  British reconnaissance planes duly detected the Italian cruisers in the early hours of June 14th, but without flares were unable to attack. Da Zara soon realised that the mysterious contact that had provoked his move was false, so he aborted the strike and sailed his force on to Palermo.

  That night two Italian submarines, the Uarsciek and the Giada, made contact with the Harpoon convoy. They launched unsuccessful torpedo attacks and then withdrew, without being detected by the British.

  The initial air attacks.

  Dawn of June 14th found Harpoon 120 miles south-west of Sardinia, well within effective range of the air bases there. Shadowing aircraft soon appeared. The first radar warning of an incoming raid was made at 1000, just as fighters from Eagle had destroyed an Italian scout plane. The first attack came in about thirty minutes later. It was made by Italian CR-42 biplanes acting as fighter-bombers. They attacked in two groups of four, one coming in from astern and the other from out of the sun, and concentrated on Argus. Bombs burst all around the carrier but she managed to escape being hit.

  The next attack reached the convoy at around 1130 and was in two well coordinated waves. While ten Cants carried out a level bombing attack, a wave of about a dozen SM-79’s and SM-84's, strongly escorted by fighters, broke through the port side screen at 500 feet. They then rounded the convoys stern, split into groups, and attacked the starboard side. The British made several emergency turns to keep their sterns to the attackers, but two torpedoes found their mark. Liverpool was hit in the engine-room as she turned to meet the attack. The second torpedo hit the Tanimbar amidships and sank her very quickly. The second wave of a dozen SM-79’s attempted the same tactic, but a heavy barrage forced them to drop their torpedoes at long range. All were avoided and several Italian planes were destroyed. The British lost three planes, one to anti-aircraft fire from their own ships.

  Liverpool was in no danger of sinking but, reduced to one shaft and a speed of 3-4 knots, she had to be taken in tow by Antelope. Escorted by Westcott, they made for Gibraltar. The little group was attacked repeatedly but managed to avoid receiving further damage, and arrived at the Rock on June 17th. Welshman took the cruiser’s place at the head of the starboard column.

  The afternoon was uneventful, but the convoy was now coming into range of the Sicily bases. At 1820 an attack by twelve JU-88's caught the defenders by surprise. Coming in high from astern, they had almost dived to a bombing position before they were spotted by the ships gunners. Fighters managed to make several jettison their bombs, but a Fulmar was lost. No ships were hit, although many of them, especially the carriers, had some very narrow escapes. One bomb landed on the port beam of Argus and dived right under her before exploding on her starboard side.

  The opening clashes. Above: Malaya swings wildly to avoid torpedo-bombers. Below: A stick of bombs just misses the Argus.

  Photographs courtesy of the Imperial War Museum.

  Just before 2000 another coordinated attack on the same pattern developed. About twenty Italian SM-79’s came in low from the north-east, circled round the stern of the convoy out of gun range, then attacked the starboard side. Simultaneously, ten German JU-88s came in high ahead and dropped bombs along the entire length of the convoy, while fifteen JU-87’s attacked the port side. The convoy countered by more emergency turns to keep their sterns to the torpedo attacks, but they were hampered by already being in some disarray. The escorts had been prosecuting a suspected submarine contact and were not in ideal positions. Most of the attacks concentrated on a group isolated two miles out consisting of Malaya, Argus, Charybdis and Vidette. A wild melee ensued, with aircraft chasing around the ships and the sky full of tracer. The powerful JU-88 proved to be a formidable opponent for the slow Fairey Fulmar. Nonetheless no damage was done, although Argus had to dodge three torpedoes.

  At 2100 four Beaufighters from Malta made an appearance. It was a heartening sight for the defenders, because the Skerki channel had been reached, and, as planned, Force W was detached back to Gibraltar. At they turned the Italian submarine Alagi attacked the Eagle but missed, then escaped undetected.

  The convoy redeployed into a single line and, under the command of acting-captain Hardy, steered south east to keep as close as possible to the Tunisian coast. At 2130, in the dusk, they were subjected to a last unsuccessful air attack.

  At almost the same time the Italian 7th Cruiser squadron was sailing from Palermo with orders to intercept the convoy south of Pantellaria. The Italian cruisers were duly spotted by British aircraft, but their course was not determined. Shadowing proved to be impossible owing to a shortage of reconnaissance aircraft and the preoccupation with watching Taranto. Suspecting that Da Zara’s force might be sailing to reinforce the main Italian fleet, air patrols were instead concentrated over the straits of Messina.

  The night passed quietly for the convoy, but Curteis had plenty to think about. By the time reports of the sailing of the 7th Cruiser division reached him the two British forces were fifty miles apart. If these vessels were steering to attack the convoy Hardy's covering force would be heavily outgunned. One of the Force W cruisers could be detached to assist, and with hard steaming it would just be able to support Hardy by morning. The difficulty was that Force W would still be within range of the Sardinian airbases for most of the following day and one less cruiser would seriously weaken its AA cover. Considering the narrow escapes of the carriers earlier in the day, and the value of even these obsolete vessels, Curteis eventually decided not to split his force. It was a decision that would be questioned later.

  At dawn the convoy was 30 miles south of Pantellaria, steering south-east at 12 knots, with Malta less than 12 hours away. The merchant ships were back in a two column formation, with Cairo leading. The 12th destroyer division was deployed to port, the 11th to starboard. The minor escorts were clustered at the convoy’s rear. Air cover from Malta had arrived in the shape of four long ranged Beaufighters. Spitfires would be available from about midday. Everything seemed to be going well, but at 0620 one of the Beaufighters reported two enemy cruisers and four destroyers (actually five) just fifteen miles to the north.

  The Italians spring their surprise.

  Hoping to gain time for a Malta air strike, Hardy turned the convoy south and began to lay a smoke screen with the smaller destroyers. Da Zara's force soon hove into view dead ahead. The destroyers Gioberti and Zeno had been forced to return to Palermo, but the Italians still had a big advantage in number and calibre of guns. They opened fire at 0640, at a range of over 10 miles (18,000 yards) outside that of the British 4" and 4.7" guns. Their gunnery was extremely accurate, Cairo being almost immediately straddled. Several shells also fell amongst the merchant ships before they could be completely obscured by smoke.

  The five big British fleet destroyers, led by Commander Scurfield in Bedouin, raced out to attack the Italians. Cairo and the smaller Hunt class destroyers, armed only with 4" guns, remained with the convoy and continued to lay smoke to cover it. Da Zara responded by steering southwards across the convoy’s route to Malta, whilst continuing to fire on Cairo and the advancing British destroyers. The Italians had every reason to be cautious. Both their reconnaissance planes and ships claimed to have spotted a “Southampton” class cruiser with the convoy.

  As the Italians advanced their destroyers started to lag behind. Taking advantage of this, Da Zara ordered the two slower ones, Vivaldi and Malocello, to circle round and break through to the transports, while he pinned the escorts with fire from his cruisers. As soon as they could the British fleet destroyers returned fire. Ithuriel managed to land a hit on Eugenio at 8000 yards, although only minor damage was inflicted. The brunt of the Italian cruiser fire fell on Bedouin and Partridge, both of which were disabled within 15 minutes. Bedouin was struck amidships by a 6" shell, Partridge was hit in the stern. The 4.7" guns of Matchless and Marne hit back at Vivaldi, which came to a stop on fire and with a boiler out of action. The Italian ship was in some danger, but Malocello stayed
to give her assistance and events elsewhere prevented the British from pressing home their advantage.

  Having completed the smoke screen, Cairo and the 12th division had moved to support Scurfield’s fleet destroyers, engaging the Italians at extreme range. The patrol of Beaufighters had withdrawn for lack of fuel and their reliefs had not yet arrived. Consequently the convoy was only protected by the meagre barrage of the minor escorts when at 0700 eight Italian JU-87 Stukas dived down on them. Chant was promptly hit by a complete three bomb stick. She blew up and sank in minutes. Kentucky was disabled by a near miss. She was taken in tow by the minesweeper Hebe. About this time Cairo was hit by a 6" shell, although little damage was caused.

  Realising that the Italians were reluctant to penetrate the smoke screen, and that air attacks had restarted, at 0715 Hardy ordered the remaining three active fleet destroyers to pull back and reform on Cairo. Over the next thirty minutes this group and the Italian cruisers exchanged a heavy fire. Both sides shooting was accurate, but no more hits were scored. Vivaldi took advantage by managing to repair one of her engines and limp off to Pantelleria, still escorted by Malocello. At 0800 Da Zara detached his three remaining destroyers to assist.

  Commodore Pilditch, believing that the escorts were holding their own, had ordered the convoy to resume course for Malta and it was now heading slowly south-east. Hardy saw that Da Zara's cruisers had now worked across the convoy’s path and so turned north-west, so that they were on a converging course. Hardy therefore ordered the convoy to reverse course again and laid another smoke screen. This rather confused the Italians, but by 0830 they were in hot pursuit, the two sides continuing to exchange fire whenever a target loomed out of the smoke. Happily for the British, the Italian cruisers had run out of high explosive shell. This explains why another 6” shell penetrated to Cairo’s engine room but did not explode. The Italian cruiser Montecuccoli was also struck, though again little damage was done.

  The convoy was in some peril, still some way from Malta, with the powerful Italian cruisers closing in, but at 0840 Da Zara stood off to the north-east. Apparently he had come to the conclusion that the convoy was on a heading that would carry it north of a minefield. Wary of the smokescreens, he therefore headed for the gap between this minefield and Pantellaria, reasoning that the British would have to come through there in order to get to Malta. By 0930 the two sides were out of sight.

  Meanwhile Hardy was pulling the convoy and escorts back together. This took over an hour and even then progress to Malta was much slowed by the need to tow the disabled Kentucky. Partridge had repaired herself sufficiently to take the Bedouin in tow. Spitfires from Malta had arrived to cover the final approach, and at 1040 drove off some German bombers. However their low endurance meant they could not stay for long, and in between them leaving and their relief arriving another combined attack by Ju-87 and SM-79's disabled the Burdwan, around about 1120.

  Hardy decided to cut his losses. Air attacks showed no sign of abating and the Italian cruisers were known to be still in the area. Malta was still 150 miles away and the cripples were restricting his force to only 6 knots. He resolved to abandon them and concentrate on getting the two undamaged freighters to Malta. Hebe was ordered to detach her tow and sink the Kentucky, and Badsworth detailed to sink the Burdwan. Partridge, which was by now out of sight to the rear of the convoy, was given orders to abandon Bedouin, which had proved unable to repair the damage to her engines. However, this instruction was disobeyed and Partridge continued to tow Bedouin and try to catch the rest of the convoy up. When that proved impossible, the two turned and made for Gibraltar.

  Meanwhile Da Zara had been waiting in vain for the British ships to appear. He had been joined by only Ascari and Orani. Vivaldi’s engines had broken down again and she had been taken in tow by Premuda. Escorted by Malocello, the three had made for Pantellaria. At 1030 Da Zara’s force was unsuccessfully attacked by two Beauforts and four Albacores from Malta. Soon after he finally decided to steer south-west to hunt for the convoy.

  The Italian force intervenes again.

  At 1340 alarming news reached Hardy from Hebe. The task of sinking Kentucky had proved to be too much for the tiny minesweeper and she had abandoned the tanker and set off alone after the convoy. At 1255, while still 25 miles to the rear of the convoy, she had been spotted and damaged by the returning Italian cruiser force. Hardy at once gathered the remaining three active fleet destroyers and led them to the rescue.

  At 1355 the Italian force came into sight but just as Hardy prepared to engage they turned westward and opened fire on some target over the horizon from him. He realised the victim must be either Bedouin or Partridge. Pragmatically Hardy decided nothing could be done to help them. The safety of the convoy had to come first. He contented himself with gathering up Hebe and heading back to the convoy.

  The Italians were cruising around sinking the various cripples that had been abandoned. Kentucky was sunk by gunfire from Monteccuccoli and a torpedo from Oriani. Burdwan fell to the guns of the Italian destroyers. Then Da Zara's ships found Bedouin and Partridge. Partridge slipped her tow, laid smoke to cover Bedouin, and tried to draw the Italian fire. The odds were too great however, and the intervention of Italian bombers only brought the end quicker. One of them put a torpedo into Bedouin at 1425. She sank very quickly but a great many of the crew were picked up and made prisoner by the Italians before Da Zara received orders to withdraw to the Trapani area. Partridge managed to slip away and reach Gibraltar, in spite of being further damaged in an air attack.

  At 1520 the Italian squadron was attacked by a final Malta air strike of three Albacores, which they beat off with the aid of land-based fighters.

  The convoy reaches Malta.

  Cairo and the rest of the escort rejoined the convoy about 1530, and it was further augmented two hours later by Welshman, which had successfully unloaded her cargo at Malta and sailed to join. The convoy was attacked twice more from the air, once at 1910 and again at 2040, by about a dozen bombers each time. By this time the convoy was under considerable protection by Malta Spitfires, and neither attack ever looked like having any success. However there was to be one last trial.

  Originally it had not been intended to dock Cairo or the destroyers at Valetta, but the heavy fighting had exhausted their anti-aircraft ammunition and they had to enter the harbour. Due to a combination of their own disordered state and a signalling error the convoy moved into an unswept stretch of sea ahead of the minesweepers. The destroyers Badsworth, Kujawiak and Matchless, the minesweeper Hebe and the transport Orari duly exploded mines, and in spite of all efforts Kujawiak eventually sank. Fortunately the others only received minor damage and were able to make the Grand harbour at Valleta. The two transports between them delivered 20,000 tons of badly needed supplies to scenes of wild excitement.

  Aftermath.

  Cairo and the four remaining undamaged destroyers, together with the indefatigable Welshman, sailed again on the 16th to rejoin Admiral Curteis. They were attacked mercilessly from the air from 1200 until dusk at 2030, most of the bombers concentrating on Ithuriel. None of the ships were damaged further, and managed to rejoin Curteis the following day. Brown Ranger, which had stood exposed for several days on its own, also managed to disengage successfully. Matchless and Badsworth were confined in Valleta’s battered dockyard for repairs.

  The result of Harpoon was not entirely satisfactory for either side. Tactically the Axis had undoubtedly had the better of it. The British had lost three freighters, two destroyers and a tanker. One cruiser, three more destroyers and a minesweeper had been seriously damaged, and several other ships had received minor damage. The only heavily damaged Italian ship had been Vivaldi, although all the others involved had taken a few minor hits. In the air the Fleet Air Arm had lost eight aircraft, one being an Albacore torpedo bomber from Malta. Axis air losses are notoriously difficult to estimate, but were probably about 30 planes. The key to the Axis success was the coordinated use of air and
surface assets, a combination they used all too infrequently in the Malta convoy battles. Da Zara put in a workmanlike performance, but a little more aggression might have brought the entire convoy to disaster. As it was, by delaying it and drawing off the escorts, he had created conditions for the deadly Stukas and Ju-88s to deal heavy blows.

  Strategically Harpoon was a minor success for the British. Their idea of running two convoys simultaneously from each end of the Mediterranean was sound enough, but in the event the Axis had proven to have enough resources to deal with both. The sister convoy “Vigorous” had been a disaster. It had suffered heavy casualties in both merchants and warships, and confronted by the Italian surface fleet had been forced back to Alexandria. The arrival of only two freighters and 20,000 tons of supplies hardly broke the siege, but it did give the British enough time to mount another, larger, convoy operation.

  Admiral Curteis' decision not to reinforce Force X was questioned in an official enquiry. The Admiralty concluded that if a cruiser had been detached Burdwan, Kentucky and Bedouin might very well have been saved. However they also accepted Curteis' contention that he had to balance the safety of the convoy with that of the carriers.

  The experiences of Harpoon paved the way for the “Pedestal” convoy in June of 1942, possibly the greatest convoy battle of them all. The Harpoon/Vigorous experience had shown that a convoy from Alexandria was just not feasible under the existing conditions. It also pointed up the need for more modern carriers with better fighter direction. “Pedestal” was allocated no less than four carriers, and another was provided for an extended training session in fighter direction before the operation commenced. Harpoon also showed that a heavy anti-aircraft barrage was essential. Not because it destroyed many enemy planes, but because it forced them to release their weapons at long range. The 6” battery of Malaya in particular seems to have caused many SM-79’s to drop their torpedoes far to early.