Delville Wood
Page 9
Resistance soon stiffened as Falkenhayn had issued instructions to his men not to yield an inch. ‘Nur über Leichen darf der Feind seinen Weg vörwärts finden.’ (The enemy must not be allowed to advance except over corpses.)
When offered quarter by a body of Highlanders a German officer replied, “I and my men have orders to defend this position with our lives. German soldiers know how to obey orders. We thank you for your offer, but we die where we stand.” And they did.
One of the German artillerists in action that day, Anno Noack, 25, was a Silesian coalminer, originally from Aachen. At the time he was ADC to the commander of the German light artillery in that section of the front. His day was to begin with a shock.
“One of your bombs which rained down on us in preparation of your attack on Delville Wood smashed the entrance to my dug-out. As our battery was behind the fighting line I was sent to direct the fire of our artillery and investigate the position.
“Fortunately for us … I could report as a result of my reconnaissance that the advance of the enemy had been stopped, partly owing to the fall of night. In fact your infantry had broken through our foremost ranks.”
On the night of the 14th the German 52nd Infantry Regiment was mustered for the journey to the Somme. With them was Offizierstellvertreter Rambow, a veteran of the 1871 Franco Prussian war and then in his mid-sixties.
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Brigadier Tim Lukin’s later report to Gen Furse set out how the operation was set in motion with patrols and officer “order groups”.
“On the morning of the 14th July I received orders to move forward a battalion to report to the GOC 27th Infantry Brigade. I immediately instructed Lieut-Col Dawson, commanding the 1st SAI to report himself accordingly.
“At 1 pm orders were received by me that ‘as soon as Longueval is in our hands you will capture and consolidate the outer edge of the whole of Delville Wood; the whole of your brigade less the 1st Battalion will be at your disposal.’ I was further ordered to move my HQ to Montauban.
“The 2nd and 3rd SAI had already been ordered to move forward and the 4th SAI followed in support.
“I met the officers commanding 2nd and 3rd SAI (Lieut-Cols Tanner and Thackeray) outside Montauban and explained to them the operation which they were to carry out, giving them their written orders, copy of which attached. (Operation Order No 48.)
“I then proceeded to the HQ of the 26th Infantry Brigade in Montauban. On arriving there I ascertained that Longueval was not entirely in our hands and I accordingly instructed the officers commanding 2nd and 3rd SAI to await further orders.
“As the result of a telephonic conversation with you Operation Order No 48 was suspended.
“In the meantime I sent forward a staff officer (Lieut Roseby) to ascertain the position in Longueval, and an officer and two NCO’s from each company of the 2nd and 3rd SAI were also sent forward to reconnoitre the routes to Longueval.
“A report was received from Lieut Roseby from which it was clear that if the brigade formed up on a line west of Longueval the left half would be exposed to heavy machine-gun fire from the enemy. It further appeared from the report that as the northern portion of Longueval was not in our hands it would be impossible to advance to the attack of the wood through that portion without heavy fighting.
“At 8.30 pm you held a conference of brigadiers at the HQ of the 26th Infantry Brigade in Montauban when it was decided that the attack on Delville Wood should take place at 5 am (on Saturday 15th) and I received orders that the wood must be taken at all costs.
“In reply to a question put by me you informed me that if the 26th and 27th Brigades failed to capture the northern portion of Longueval I was, nevertheless, to attack with my brigade.
“After the meeting I met my battalion commanders and gave them their orders. I explained to them the situation as it then stood, and impressed upon them that whether or not the 26th and 27th Brigades were successful in occupying the northern portion of Longueval we were to attack Delville Wood at 5 am.
“I instructed them that if, on arrival at Longueval, they found the northern portion still held by the enemy they should attack the wood from the south-west corner, moving to the attack on a one battalion front. My battalion commanders returned to their units.”
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Sergeant Leonard Louis Arrons was attached to Brigade HQ in charge of one of the carrying parties — a vital task as the troops continually required replenishment of rations, water and ammunition. He wryly recalled the gas shelling which they were subjected to at the HQ in Montauban.
“We removed our dump to the valley beyond Montauban, and saw the cavalry advancing on the ridge in front.
“That evening I shall not forget for many a long day. At 6 pm the Allemand sent over tear-shells, and as time went on they came over in salvoes. Unfortunately our tear-shell goggles are useless, and I can assure you we had a very trying time. The eyes water and smart, and one can hardly breathe. The best cure I found was to don a gas helmet, and soon the boys did likewise. Anyhow, they shelled us right through the night, and the work having to be done, we bucked the boys up, and I must say they worked like Trojans.
“Our reception in the valley between Longueval and Montauban was coalboxes and Jack Johnsons, blended with plenty of high-explosive shrapnel. However, the sergeant and myself began to dig in, and we had some very narrow escapes; in fact, we were quite prepared for the seemingly inevitable. We cooped ourselves up and tried hard to snatch a few hours’ sleep, but it was simply impossible.”
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The remainder of the Trench Mortar Battery moved from Talus Boise to Glatz Redoubt, remained there an hour, then continued to Montauban Alley. One platoon of the 4th SAI was detached to assist them in the move, in which each man carried one box of ammunition. Nearly every man vomited from the effect of the lachrymatory (gas) shells which were falling.
Gordon Forbes was one of the TMB men affected by the gas. “Nothing of any importance. Raining some. Leave our camp at Maricourt, proceed to Montauban through a valley where we suffered agonies as the Germans were dropping tear-shells in it. My eyes were smarting like fire and streaming tears, and was pretty well choked with the fumes of the gas. Slept a few hours in a trench in Montauban, and left at three next morning for Longueval, being exposed to shell fire the whole time.”
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Captain Patterson ensured that he could provide four teams for the attack on Longueval — then allocated others to the other battalions.
“After an intensive bombardment lasting ¼ hour the attack was launched. We were in reserve and standing by. Arranged with OC 55th Coy to have four guides from the guns in Bernafay Wood to be at Bricqueterie sunken road at 6 am to lead relieving teams to positions. Sent extra carriers to help to bring guns etc out of the wood.
“Four teams under Sec-Lieuts Birkenshaw and Willmer were attached to the 1st SAI who moved off to Montauban Alley at about 8 am.
“Two teams were ordered to be attached to the 3rd SAI so sent Sec-Lieut Cuthbert and two of his teams to Montauban Alley whence this regiment had moved.
“Nothing of importance happened till about 4 pm when the Brigade HQ moved to take up its battle position in Montauban where it occupied a dug-out.
“Just before moving off I was ordered to attach four guns to the 2nd SAI and six to the 3rd SAI. The attachment was somewhat delayed owing to the 55th MG Coy making some mistake over the relief of the guns in Bernafay Wood. However, by about 8 pm the following was the disposition of the guns: Sec-Lieuts Birkenshaw and Willmer with four guns attached to the 1st SAI, Sec-Lieut Patrick and his four guns with the 2nd SAI. Lieut Bailey and Sec-Lieuts Wood and Nicholas with six guns attached to the 3rd SAI. Sec-Lieut Cuthbert and two guns with the 4th SAI. “(One of these guns and six men were knocked out by a shell just outside Brigade HQ while they were waiting to go up to the front”.)
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Private James Simpson spent an uneventful yet uncomfortable day at Carnoy.
“The foll
owing morning the wounded Highlanders came pouring down, many on railway trolleys. They had been attacking Longueval and Delville Wood, and they got cut up, although they went right through, for nothing can stop the 9th Division. Great numbers of cavalry began to arrive and camp alongside us, waiting for the time to break through.
About 5 o’clock that evening we again moved up to No 2 trench along with the (3rd) regiment, the idea being to move up to Delville Wood just before daybreak. We were all dog-tired, and had been without anything like real sleep for four days, and to make matters worse, Fritz started sending over tear-shells.
“These shells are non-poisonous, but irritate the eyes terribly, causing tears to flow; also burn the nose and throat. We had all to wear our goggles, which give a certain amount of relief. My goggles were useless, so I had to wear my gas helmet, with combination tear-shell goggles, and that only made things more unpleasant, and the glasses became dim until I was almost unable to see.
“I simply had to sit and wait for time to pass, and then I went on guard at 12 midnight till about 1 am. At 1.30 am we fell in, and moved off through the ruined village of Montauban, towards Longueval. On the way we saw many traces of the morning’s battle.”
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Corporal Alfred Charles Smith, 30, was a motor mechanic from Doornfontein, Johannesburg. He left his wife, Ellen, and one child to serve in the mechanical transport in SWA. In France Smith served with the SA Service Corps (Motor Transport) and was attached to the 1st SAFA. He was killed while evacuating wounded at Longueval.
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Reveille was at 3 am and the regiment was ready to move an hour later. Lukin instructed Lieut-Col Dawson to take the regiment along Montauban Alley to Longueval. At 11 am Dawson was called to the HQ of the 27th Brigade and informed that the advance was held up by snipers and machine-gun fire in the northern part of the village. Dawson was to deploy his regiment and attack this part of the village at 2 pm.
The battalion second-in-command, Major Edward Travers Burges, 38, came to South Africa from Bristol in 1896. He served through the South African War and was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal. Burges took part in the Damaraland Border and Herero troubles then was commissioned in the Cape Mounted Police.
Major Burges was mentioned in despatches for his services in SWA. He enrolled as a lieutenant in the ILH then transferred to the 9th Mounted Brigade Permanent Force and thereafter to the 5th SAMR as captain and adjutant. After joining the brigade Burges was promoted to major and given command of D Coy (Clerical Coy) of Cape Town. Burges also acted as adjutant to the battalion.
As Dawson went ahead to ascertain the position, Major Burges brought the regiment up in eight lines of sections in file. This was done without a casualty although there was a fair amount of shelling. It was difficult to recognise the objective as there had been no time for studying the ground, which had been much altered by the artillery fire, and the officers had received very elementary training in map reading.
Capt Miller of B Coy reported that he had reached what he thought was his objective, then Capt Jowett reported that A Coy had occupied a certain trench, the position of which was not clear from his report. D Coy under Major Burges was about in the centre of the village. At 6 pm Dawson instructed Capt Jenkins of C Coy to surround and capture a machine-gun post which was firing from a position called “The Chateau”. In doing so Jenkins was wounded.
Three other officers were wounded during the afternoon: Lieut Larmuth of D Coy was wounded by British artillery fire, whereas in A Company Lieut William Stanley Dent, 26, from Port Elizabeth had his right arm shattered. Lieutenant Chauncey Reid was also wounded.
At 11 pm urgent orders were received from the OC of 27th Brigade that the machine-gun holding up the advance was to be captured and that small parties were to carry this out. Three parties under Lieutenants Edwin Burgess, Walter Henry and Cron Bate left at midnight to capture the enemy posts.
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Private Charles Edward Donald Dunn, 19, was born in Cornwall in August 1896 and came to Cape Town with his father and two sisters, where he worked in the leather industry. His war-time diary records the training for trench warfare at the dreaded “Bullring” at Etaples in May. Early in July he had been partly buried by a shell while carrying a can of water in a trench.
He recollected that his first day in Delville Wood involved bringing up rations.
“I was attached to No 3 platoon of A Company, for carrying rations up to the front line of the trenches. The transport brings the rations up just behind the lines, then we have to fetch them ourselves. It was not very pleasant work to do, but it had to be done. I remember one night quite well when six of us were detailed off to take rations up to the front line; it was a black night in itself, shells were falling fast, bullets were flying about, star lights were being sent up. Yes it was lively in Delville those five days.
“This one particular night we were taking rations to the front line and we had to pass through a very dense part of the wood. It was a very dark night as the six of us were going along and we were all obliged to be continually lying down on our stomachs or to stand dead still. It was only necessary to take these steps each time star shells went up. If we did not take shelter or stand quite still, then we would stand a good chance of being shot down by the enemy.
“We managed to get the rations up to the lines all right, but as we commenced our return journey, two of us got separated from the other four, being so dark we could not see where we were going. All that we could see was the flashes from the shells, as they exploded, and also the different coloured star lights.
“Not knowing what was best to be done, we both lay down behind a big hedge in the wood with the intention of waiting for daylight to come. It was not very pleasant lying there listening to the awful din of the guns, whistling of bullets, and to see shells bursting all round you. Luckily, we did not have to lie there very long. I think we had only been lying there for one hour when we heard footsteps coming along through the trees. Who was it? is what we thought.
“It happened to be our officer. I am sure it was a stroke of luck that he should come along, for we were simply shivering in our boots, whether from fear or cold, I can’t remember — I should think it was the latter though. He was kind enough to put us on the right road back to where we started from. We were not very sorry to crouch into our little dug-out to sleep for the rest of the night, not a peaceful sleep though.”
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The company commander, Capt George John Miller, 35, was born in London. He served in the South African War and remained afterwards at Ladybrand, OFS. He became a well-known journalist on “The Friend” newspaper in Bloemfontein.
He was married in Kimberley in November 1914, then served as a lieutenant in the 1st Bn Kimberley Regt in SWA where his company bore the brunt of the Trekkopjes fight.
Miller was an excellent public speaker and recruited for the brigade in Kimberley. He joined the brigade as second-in-command of C Coy (Kimberley Company), 1st SAI, but was transferred to command B Coy in France. His wife, Mary, moved to Norfolk, England, to be closer to him.
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Private Henry Sherman took part in the street-to-street fighting in the village.
“On the Friday we cleared a village (Longueval) and many a Port Elizabeth boy was hit, but not any of our lucky platoon. In No 5 Percy Allen was shot above the heart and soon afterwards died. Port Elizabeth loses a footballer in him.
“Several others were wounded, including an old school mate Maynard Atkinson, shot through the arm and leg and some other part.
“Well, we were chasing all over the village, some sections bombing the Huns out of the houses, others doing all sorts of murderous jobs.
“In the evening we advanced into Delville Wood, without a casualty again. When we entered Delville Wood the Germans withdrew and in my estimation we should have followed them and there would have been no Delville Wood tragedy.
“But we had to stop there and dig ourselves in in slit trenches two
or three feet deep. That night the Germans came over but we managed to hold them with rifle and Lewis machine-gun fire.
“I was attached to the machine-gunners, and two were killed alongside me. One poor Cape Town lad was shot in the eye whilst aiming his gun — of course, stone dead. I slept soundly that Friday night.”
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Sergeant Stanley Griffiths, 19, was the company’s instructor on the Lewis gun and prided himself on personally siting each gun in the front line. When he and his two brothers Grif, 22, and Eric, 20, had enlisted the year before at Uitenhage, the recruiter had drily commented that as the enlistment age was 21 (without parents’ consent) he had not been aware that they were triplets.
During the attack that morning Stan Griffiths picked up a man who had been shot and lay in the road. As he carried him to safety the soldier mumbled, “Sergeant, I think you’re a sergeant! … this will never be forgotten!”
A fellow Uitenhager, Charles Ingram, 20 had volunteered for active service in August 1914 and served with Prince Alfred’s Guard until July 1915, then enlisted in the brigade the following month.
He was well aware of the importance of their objective.
“The South African Brigade was detailed to capture Delville Wood and hold it at all costs. The wood was a very strategic position on high ground commanding the view of the surrounding country. By the time we arrived at a position on 14 July to attack the wood we had lost 450 men.”
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Geoffrey Lawrence accompanied his company in the dawn attack.
“We were up at 2.30 am the next morning, 14 July (Bastille Day), and moved off at dawn. We made our way up through a valley alongside a light railway line passing on the way streams of Highlanders wounded in the taking of Longueval at daybreak.
“Higher up the valley we saw a fine and unusual sight, a squadron of Bengal Lancers mounted on horses, their long lances at the ready and the metal tips glinting in the sun. Understandably they were soon spotted by the enemy observation balloons, heavily shelled and dispersed with a number of losses. Even to us it seemed a wasteful and misguided appreciation of the stubborn enemy defences held in strength behind wire ahead of them.