by B Krishna
Nehru’s inability in wresting power from the Old Guard was obvious. Yet, he gave expression to his radical views in his address as Congress president at Lucknow on 14 April 1936. He charged the Congress with the “spirit of disunity”, which he ascribed to the “gradual divorce of its middle-class leadership from the masses”. He even observed: “The Congress must be not only for the masses, as it claims to be, but of the masses.” The peasant satyagrahas of Gandhi and Patel were, on the other hand, totally mass-based.
Gandhi and the Old Guard were upset for another reason too. At the Lahore Congress, Nehru had declared himself a Socialist and Republican; while at Lucknow, “he reached the logical fulfillment of Socialism—namely, Communism”.6 According to Congress historian Pattabhi Sitaramayya, “the address pleaded for pure Communism in a country which had had its own traditions built up through at least a hundred and thirty centuries of progress”.7 In a letter of 30 April 1936 to Agatha Harrison, Gandhi wrote: “Jawaharlal’s way is not my way. I accept his ideal about land, etc. But I do not accept practically any of his methods. I would strain every nerve to prevent a class war.”8
Gandhi wrote to Nehru on 29 May 1936: “Your statement . . . has given much pain to Rajen Babu, CR and Vallabhbhai. They feel, and I agree with them, that they have tried to act honourably and with perfect loyalty towards you as a colleague. Your statement makes you out to be the injured party.”9 Gandhi wrote again on 15 July: “They have chafed under your rebukes and magisterial manner, and, above all, your arrogation of, what has appeared to them, your infallibility and superior knowledge. They feel that you have treated them with scant courtesy and never defended them from the Socialists’ ridicule and even misrepresentation.”
Gandhi bluntly told Nehru, “You are in office by their unanimous choice, but you are not in power yet. To put you in office was an attempt to find you in power quicker than you would otherwise have been. Anyway, that was at the back of my mind when I suggested your name for the crown of thorns.”10
Gandhi’s words sobered Nehru. Consequently, the Old Guard withdrew their letter of resignation from Nehru’s working committee. They had, however, told Gandhi: “We feel that the preaching and emphasising of Socialism, particularly at this stage, by the President and other Socialist members of the Working Committee, while the Congress has not yet adopted it, is prejudicial to the best interests of the country and to the success of the national struggle for freedom . . . We feel the Congress should still follow the ideals, and the line of action and policy, which it has been following since 1920.”11 That had been laid down by Gandhi himself. The Old Guard’s apprehensions were not baseless. Nehru had drafted into the working committee Socialists like Jayaprakash Narayan, Narendra Deva, and Achyut Patwardhan, who were soon to become, though unwittingly, a shadow of the Communist Party.
Patel saw through what was going on. His shrewd sense of judgment aptly described the Congress Socialists, long before they had themselves realised, as “sappers and miners” of the Communist Party. Later, Minoo Masani and some other Socialists accepted this in their admission that “many of the gains of the Socialists would ultimately accrue to the Communists”. Patel had correctly sensed that the Communists sought entry into the Congress through the Congress Socialist Party. Their own party was banned by the government. Patel felt worried about “the respectability that the United Front [formed by the Communists and the Socialists] gave the Communists and the way it assured them a foothold in Indian politics, which otherwise would have been difficult”.
Masani writes: “Though I used to be annoyed at that time with Sardar Patel’s attacks at the Congress Socialist Party, looking back I feel that he was justified when he made the charge of the Socialists being the ‘sappers and miners’ of the Communist Party. I myself found it necessary in 1939 to resign from the Congress Socialist Party over the issue of alliance with the Communists. In 1941 Jayaprakash Narayan himself arrived at the same conclusion.”12
A changed Nehru fell in line with the Old Guard and strained himself to the utmost in the electioneering work.
It gave him great satisfaction that his performance was superb. He was overwhelmed by the adulation of the masses. Hereafter, while Nehru managed the platform, Patel built up and controlled the party machine. He emerged as the party’s undisputed boss. From his new position, Patel explained to Nehru what the parliamentary programme meant to the Old Guard:
There is no difference of opinion about the objective. All of us want to destroy the imposed Constitution. How to destroy it from within the legislatures is the question . . . The question of “holding office” is not a live issue today. But I can visualise the occasion when the acceptance of office may be desirable to achieve the common purpose . . . I am no more wedded to the parliamentary programme than to the acceptance of office . . . We might in the course of events be driven to such an acceptance, but it shall never be at the cost of self-respect or through a compromise of our objective.
A mollified Nehru assured Patel: “It would be absurd for me to treat this presidential election as a vote for Socialism or against office acceptance . . . I do believe political independence is the paramount issue before the country, and the necessity for a joint and united action for its achievement is incumbent on all of us.”13
As chairman of the Parliamentary Board, Patel faced three major confrontations. Two concerned him as chairman; the third was a challenge to Gandhi. The first two were with K. F. Nariman and N. B. Khare; the third was with Bose. In 1936, Nariman, being chairman of the Bombay Provincial Congress Parliamentary Board, expected to be the leader of the legislative party, and by virtue of that, the premier of the Bombay Presidency. The party, instead, elected B. G. Kher. A campaign of vilification was let loose against Patel by the Parsi-owned Gujarati newspapers and the Parsi-owned Bombay Sentinel. The allegation was that Patel had brought to bear improper pressure on the members of the selection committee in the election of Kher.
Patel maintained complete silence in full confidence about his unassailable position. Nariman carried his complaint to the Congress Working Committee, not sparing even Nehru in person. Irritated by his unbecoming conduct, Nehru sarcastically told him that he could “go to the Privy Council or the League of Nations, or any other tribunal in which you have confidence”.14 To end the matter, Gandhi had an inquiry conducted by himself and Justice Bahadurji. Both held Nariman guilty of wrong conduct. Ten years later, Nariman apologised to Patel, and the latter, in his magnanimity, took him back into the Congress.
The Khare episode had graver implications. Nariman’s was a party affair; in Khare’s case, the British governor of the Central Provinces, of which Dr. N. B. Khare was the premier, had indirect complicity in wanting to exploit the opportunity to damage Congress prestige and power. Khare merely played into his hands. Serious differences arose between Khare and his cabinet colleagues from the Hindi-speaking part of the province, Mahakoshal. Three Ministers submitted their resignations, upon which Patel stepped in to heal the rupture. At a meeting held at Panchmarhi on 24 May 1938, the differences were ironed out and they withdrew their resignations. But Khare had some other plan up his sleeve: his intention to form a ministry, independent of the Congress, with the support of the governor.
On 19 July Khare declared his intention to resign as premier and asked his colleagues to hand over their resignations to him. The three Mahakoshal ministers refused to do so unless instructed by the Parliamentary Board. Ignoring the latter, Khare submitted to the governor his own resignation and the two resignations he had already secured. The governor called the Mahakoshal ministers at midnight, but failed in coaxing them to follow the others. On twenty-first morning he accepted the resignations of Khare and his two colleagues, terminated the office of the other three, and invited Khare to form a new ministry, which he did by taking the oath of office the same day.
Patel called a meeting of the Parliamentary Board on the twenty-second and of the Congress Working Committee the following day. Khare and all
his colleagues attended these meetings. Khare was told his conduct did not befit the high position he held. He admitted that they all had committed an error and would set it right by submitting their resignations. They did so. The Congress Working Committee advised Khare to call a meeting of the Congress Legislative Party to consider the resignations and to elect a new leader.
The working committee passed a resolution, which declared Khare “guilty of grave errors of judgment which have exposed the Congress in the Central Provinces to ridicule and lowered its prestige”. Further, his action had helped the governor to use his special powers for the first time since the assumption of office by the Congress. Khare was also declared guilty of indiscipline in accepting the governor’s invitation to form a new ministry without reference to the Parliamentary Board, thereby proving himself unworthy of holding any position of responsibility in the Congress organisation.
The resolution did not spare even the governor. He was held guilty of forcing a crisis, as “he was anxious to weaken and discredit the Congress insofar as it lay in his power to do so”.15 He was accused of “unseemly haste” in not only accepting the resignations of the ministers, but going so far as to have demanded the resignations of the recalcitrant ministers as well; and, on their refusal to oblige him, dismissing them, and, thereby, helping Khare to form a new ministry.
An anti-Congress campaign was whipped up, particularly in Maharashtra, against Patel who was accused of naked fascism. Gandhi intervened by saying that Khare “should have rushed not to the Governor but to the Working Committee and tendered his resignation. He erred grievously in ignoring or, what is worse, not knowing this simple remedy”. Gandhi declared that Khare was “not only guilty of gross indiscipline in flouting the warnings of the Parliamentary Board, but he betrayed incompetence as a leader by allowing himself to be fooled by the Governor, or not knowing that, by his precipitate action, he was compromising the Congress.”16 Gandhi was also critical of the governor’s role: “The Governor betrayed a haste which I can only call indecent”, and his action “killed the spirit of the tacit compact between the British Government and the Congress.”17
Supporting Patel’s role, Gandhi said, “The Congress must be in the nature of an army . . . the Congress, conceived as a fighting machine, has to centralise control and guide every department and every Congressman, however highly placed, and expected unquestioned obedience. The fight cannot be fought on any other terms.”18 Such centralised control Gandhi had placed in the hands of Patel, and it was Patel’s responsibility to shepherd Congress ministers and legislators.
The third confrontation Patel had was with the fiery Subhash Chandra Bose as president of the Faizpur Congress. It was in defence of Gandhi’s position. His re-election after Haripura at Tripuri was conceded by Gandhi as a defeat, not so much of Pattabhi Sitaramayya against whom he had won, but a personal defeat. Bose threw two challenges to the Old Guard in a bid to wrest party control. The first was the accusation that the Old Guard was “contemplating to come to some kind of a settlement with the British Government in regard to the Federal scheme”. The second was an attempt at reversal of the Congress policy of parliamentary programme by advocating resumption of civil disobedience on a mass scale.
Patel dispelled the confusion Bose was causing by stating: “We have not accepted office in order to carry out a few reforms. We accepted office with a view to moving towards a far greater objective—complete independence, which is the only remedy for all our ills. If by accepting office our ability to move towards that goal is increased, well and good. But if by accepting office we find that our final goal is jeopardised, we must immediately give up office.”19
As chairman of the Parliamentary Board, Patel objected to Bose’s re-election. In a joint statement with six of his working committee colleagues, he argued: “It is a sound policy to adhere to the rule of not re-electing the same President except under very exceptional circumstances . . . The Congress policy and programmes are not determined by its successive Presidents. If it were so, the constitution would not limit the office to one year . . . The position of the President is, therefore, that of a chairman. More than this, the President represents and symbolises, as under a constitutional monarchy, the unity and solidarity of the nation.”20
Bose remained defiant. In order to malign the Old Guard, he repeated his old charge: “It is widely believed that there may be a compromise on the Federal scheme between the Right Wing of the Congress and the British Government during the coming year. It is imperative in the circumstances to have as President one who will be an anti-Federationist to the core of his heart.”21 Patel was quick to nail the lie: “I can only say that I know of no member who wants the Federation of the Government of India Act. And after all, no single member, not even the President for the time being of the Congress, can decide on such big issues. It is the Congress alone that can decide . . . even the Working Committee has no power to depart from the letter and the spirit of the declared policy of the Congress . . . the matter is not one of persons but of principles, not of Leftists and Rightists, but of what is in the best interest of the country.”22 Nehru too felt that “Subhash Babu should not stand” for presidentship.
Yet, Bose defeated Pattabhi Sitaramayya by 95 votes. In the Harijan of 2 February 1939 Gandhi confessed that “from the very beginning I was decidedly against his re-election . . . I do not subscribe to his facts or the arguments in his manifestoes. I think that his references to his colleagues were unjustified and unworthy. Nevertheless, I am glad of his victory. And since I was instrumental in inducing Dr. Pattabhi not to withdraw his name as a candidate when Maulana Saheb withdrew, the defeat is more mine than his.” Gandhi suggested that Bose should now “choose a homogeneous Cabinet and enforce his programme without let or hindrance”.23
Gandhi’s statement had a magical effect on the minds of the delegates to the Tripuri Congress. Most of them felt, that had Gandhi expressed himself earlier, Bose might not have been elected. To Patel, the situation appeared quite serious. Bose had posed a challenge to Gandhi, which he wanted to deal with constitutionally—primarily to avenge Gandhi’s defeat. He wanted Bose to prepare resolutions for the Tripuri Congress in consultation with his supporters and bear responsibility for the decisions taken. He also thought that Bose should be allowed a free hand in whatever he wanted to do. Bose could not attend the working committee meeting at Wardha owing to high fever. In his absence, 13 members gave their resignations, which the president-elect accepted.
Amid such an acrimonious atmosphere the Tripuri Congress was held. On arrival, Bose again took ill, and could not leave his bed. The presidential procession was taken out with his portrait placed in a chariot drawn by 52 elephants symbolising the 52nd session of the party. Owing to the resignation of its 13 members, the working committee could not meet. The session had two resolutions to consider: one by President Bose for the consideration of the AICC; the other by the resigned members of the working committee which the subject committee had accepted by a big majority.
Bose’s resolution proposed an ultimatum to be given to the government of civil disobedience to be started at the end of six months. The other resolution, proposed by Govind Ballabh Pant, was supported by about 160 members of the AICC. It proposed: “It is desirable that the AICC should clarify the position and declare its general policy. The committee declares its firm adherence to the fundamental policies of the Congress, which have governed its programme in the past years under the guidance of Mahatma Gandhi . . . the committee regards it imperative that the Congress Executive should command his implicit confidence and requests the President to nominate a Working Committee in accordance with the wishes of Gandhi.”24
A suggestion to refer Pant’s resolution to the AICC was resisted with force by Subhash Chandra Bose’s supporters. There was complete pandemonium, “paralysing all proceedings for well nigh an hour”. It was “one that had not been witnessed since Surat [1907] or even at Surat”.25 However, Sarat Bose’s appeal restored
order. Pant’s resolution was withdrawn, and the session was postponed. With a view to avoiding repetition of such unseemly scenes, the following day’s proceedings were held by keeping visitors out. Finally Pant’s resolution was passed.
Subhash Chandra Bose felt “angry and bitter against the Sardar”. He had faced many challenges and had to address the issues before him. First: Was he to submit to Gandhi in the selection of his new working committee? Second: How was he to face the prospect of the president’s powers being curtailed and those of Patel as chairman of the Parliamentary Board strengthened as per the principle laid down in an AICC resolution of June 1938? The resolution stated that “in administrative matters, the Provincial Congress Committee should not interfere with the discretion of the Ministry, but it is always open to the Executive of the PCC to draw the attention of the Government privately to any particular abuse or difficulty. In matters of policy, if there is a difference between the Ministry and the Provincial Congress Committee, reference should be made to the Parliamentary Board.”26 Third: Gandhi’s Congress had categorically rejected Bose’s policy of hastening the fight with the government and coming “to grips with the British straightaway”.
For nearly a month Bose did not appoint a new working committee. And when he convened a meeting of the AICC in Kolkata, rowdy scenes dominated it. Physical clashes marred the proceedings. To avoid any impression of his influencing AICC members, Patel had not gone to Kolkata. Since he failed to resolve the deadlock, Bose submitted his resignation from the presidentship of the Congress. His place was taken over by Rajendra Prasad, a protégé of Patel.
