by B Krishna
In M. N. Roy’s view, “In 1938, Subhash Bose could have made history, for good or evil. His weakness plus the Sardar’s iron-will frustrated his ambition and saved the Gandhian Congress.”27 In Sarat Bose’s view, Patel was “the shining light” of the ruling coterie.28 Even a defeated Subhash Bose acknowledged that “the Gandhian wing had this tactical advantage that it was the only organised party within the Congress, acting under a centralised leadership”.29 Such leadership lay in the hands of Patel as chairman of the Congress Parliamentary Board.
4
ADMINISTRATIVE UNIFIER
Formation of Indian Administrative Service
Patel had no compeer as an administrator. Philip Mason, a distinguished British member of the ICS, called him “a natural administrator who did not seem to need experience”. Everything came to him instinctively, instantly, and intuitively. H. V. R. Iengar, his home secretary, once said of him:
I often used to wonder where exactly lay the strength of the Sardar. There he was, mostly conducting his business from his sick-bed or lying reclined on a chair in his drawing-room, always exquisitely polite and never once raising his voice. His politeness was really impeccable. I believe the truth of the matter was twofold. The first is that he listened patiently to all sides of a case before making up his mind, but once he made up his mind nothing would shake him from his decision. The other is that he had the capacity to say “No” to requests which he felt should not be accepted . . . the Sardar was absolutely firm.1
Patel’s great assets were a clear vision, a judicious mind, an inflexible determination, and a will that did not allow events to overtake him. This was apparent in October 1946. He was only a home member in Viceroy Wavell’s interim government when a communication from the secretary of state conveyed his decision to stop further recruitment to the ICS, suspended during the war years, with indication of the possible termination of his connection with the Services earlier than the date of constitutional changes.
The secretary of state’s reported decision had serious implications. In a conflict-torn political situation, a breakdown in administration would have made transfer of power neither smooth nor trouble-free. Patel foresaw administrative chaos descending, but had the boldness to say: “The sooner the Secretary of State’s control is ended and the present structure wound up, the better.”2 Patel decided to act on two levels: First, to win over the loyalty of the Indian members of the ICS, and second, to order formation of a new service—the Indian Administrative Service as successor to the ICS. Each was to serve in two different ways: the ICS as implementor of the transfer of power on behalf of the inheritors—the Congress; and the IAS to keep the country bound together, post-independence, through administrative unity of a vast country.
Within two days of the secretary of state’s communication, Patel called a conference of chief ministers (then called prime ministers) and announced the formation of the Indian Administrative Service. Patel’s decision was not to the liking of the chief ministers who included Gobind Ballabh Pant of United Provinces (later Uttar Pradesh), a leading member of the Congress Working Committee. They favoured a provincial civil service whose members could be under their control “in order to ensure their pliability”. According to B. K. Nehru (ICS), “it was only he [Patel] who could force down the throats of unwilling and very powerful heads of provincial Governments the concept of the all-India Service”.3
B. K. Nehru opines that Patel, “with his much longer vision and his greater grasp of the essential requisites for the Rule of Law”, convinced the Constituent Assembly on 10 October 1949: “The Union [of India] will go, you will not have a united India, if you do not have a good all-India Service which has independence to speak out its mind.” Patel considered “an efficient, disciplined, contented Service . . . a sine qua non of sound administration under a democratic regime”.4
Patel was quick to act, losing no time. He addressed the first batch of IAS probationers on 21 April 1947, when transfer of power was yet nearly four months away, and no decision had yet been announced. Patel had the boldness to tell them, “The days of the ICS of the old style are going to be over”, and that the formation of the IAS in its place was “both significant and epoch-making—an unmistakable symptom of the transfer of power” from foreign to Indian hands. The IAS “marks the inauguration of an all-India Service officered entirely by Indians and subject completely to Indian control . . . the Service will now be free to, or will have to, adopt its true role of national service without being trammeled by traditions and habits of the past”. Offering them paternal advice, he said:
The days when the Service could be masters are over . . . Perhaps, you are aware of a saying regarding the Indian Civil Service—that, it is neither Indian nor civil, nor imbued with any spirit of service . . . Your predecessors had to serve as agents of an alien rule, and even against their better judgment, had sometimes to execute the biddings of their foreign employers . . . A Civil Servant cannot afford to, and must not, take part in politics. Nor must he involve himself in communal wrangles. To depart from the path of rectitude in either of these respects is to debase public service and to lower its dignity.5
Patel invited about 30 to 40 members of the ICS to his residence and talked to them, much to their surprise, in a manner none had done before—utterly informal and free from the rigid mannerism of their former bosses. His talk was brief, realistic, transparently sincere, and patriotic. Prefacing his talk with a narration as to how he and his colleagues had for years worked with “only one burning desire—to serve the country”, Patel invited them “to dedicate themselves equally to the service of the country”. He did not promise them “in return anything more than the joy which he himself and his colleagues had experienced through such single-minded devotion to what they regarded as the supreme duty, and which he was certain they too would experience”. Patel offered the civil servants “equality” of consideration, “if only they too would respond and work as untiringly and unceasingly as he and his colleagues, whether in or out of Government, had been doing for the people of the country”.6 The response was instant. Patel won over their loyalty; no less their personal love and affection. An emotional bond united them to him.
Patel’s concept of the civil service emerged from the belief he held and which he once expressed to his home secretary, Iengar: “It would be a bad day if people did not look up to officials holding high positions. Ministers come and Ministers go, but the permanent machinery [the civil service] must be good and firm, and have the respect of the people.”7 Lord Macaulay had expressed identical views in the British Parliament over a hundred years ago: “The character of the Governor-General is less important than the character of the Administrator by whom the administration was carried on.”8 The British civil servants were the founders of the empire in India.
Patel realised that in the solution of administrative problems, only the civil servants could act as his faithful agents—not the politicians. Such realism has been admitted by British historian Judith M. Brown: “Patel, as Home Minister in the Interim Government, was well aware that in the turbulent days of 194647, the ICS, whatever its previous image in the eyes of Congressmen, was a bastion against chaos and the disintegration of Government.” He was “partly instrumental in persuading other Congressmen that continuity in administration must be maintained. Clearly the Service was a source of stability”.9
Patel looked upon the Services as “partners with him in the task of administration”. In his “modesty and profound commonsense”, he was ever anxious to make the fullest use of the knowledge and experience which the civil service had acquired. He “selected people, trusted them, and gave them their head, subject to overriding policy being settled by him.” He expected of them to think and act independently to the best of their knowledge and ability. On his part, he was open-minded and generous in accepting responsibility for their actions committed in good faith. Once, Iengar was forced to take a decision on a crucial matter. Patel was out of New Delhi
and so were other senior ministers, including the prime minister. The decision brooked no delay. Iengar briefed Patel on his return. Iengar writes that Patel “shook his head with evident disapproval, and said that, if I had consulted him beforehand, he would have taken a different decision . . . he patiently explained to me the reasons.” He further writes: “I was very unhappy. He asked me not to worry and said that every human being makes mistakes. When the matter subsequently came up before the Cabinet, he told them that the decision was his, and there the matter ended.”10
Patel saw to it that the civil servants were respected and listened to by those with whom they transacted business on his behalf. He once stated: “My Secretary can write a note opposed to my views. I have given that freedom to all my Secretaries . . . I will never be displeased over a frank expression of opinion.” He looked upon the civil servants as “instruments” with whose help he ran the administration; and he argued: “Remove them, and I see nothing but a picture of chaos all over the country.”11
Patel told the Constituent Assembly: “I need hardly dilate at length on the necessity of maintaining their discipline and morale, and keeping them contented. In no other circumstances we can get out of the Services loyal and efficient service except by trying to appreciate their difficulties and their work . . . It is our duty to see that the machine with which we have to work is kept in good humour and good temper.”12
Patel built such a status for the civil servants by giving them respect and independence almost as equals. Since Patel operated from his residence and not from office, his home secretary, Iengar, visited him almost daily to transact official business. Even when he had three ministries under his charge—home, states, and information—Patel seldom read a single file, no matter how important. He would hear a brief and give his judgment, which he always stood by.
Iengar was once called upon to undertake an extremely difficult task. The Congress Working Committee had directed the government to take immediate steps towards the formation of a linguistic Andhra Pradesh. As home secretary, an unconvinced Iengar was in a quandary. He asked Patel, “Sir, the gentlemen who have passed this resolution include Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Azad, Dr. Rajendra Prasad and you yourself. All of you are Cabinet Ministers . . . What do you expect me to do about it?” Without a moment’s hesitation, Patel asked him: “Are you, or are you not, the Home Secretary?” “Of course, I am,” replied Iengar. Patel then said: “Do your duty as Home Secretary. Prepare a note to the Cabinet stating what exactly, in your judgment, are the implications of the proposal and how they should be further examined. It must make no difference to you who are the parties to the Working Committee resolution. You must clearly and frankly analyse the whole problem.”
Iengar did exactly that, “subjecting to a cold analysis” the decision which Patel and others had taken. As a result, the proposal to create the state of Andhra Pradesh was postponed, and could not materialise as long as Patel was alive. After the cabinet meeting, Iengar called on Patel and told him in a lighter vein: “I have succeeded in getting you as Home Minister to overrule yourself as Sardar Patel of the Congress Working Committee!” Patel admitted that the formation of linguistic provinces would “unmistakably retard the process of consolidation of our gains, dislocate our administrative, economic and financial structure, let loose . . . forces of disruption and disintegration”.13
Patel was called the great administrator by none other than Girija Shankar Bajpai, senior-most member of the ICS at the time of Partition in 1947 and secretary-general under Nehru. Presiding over the condolence meeting organised by the ICS Association on 16 December 1950, Bajpai said, “We meet today to mourn the loss and to pay tribute to the memory of a great patriot, a great administrator and a great man. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was all three—a rare combination in any historic epoch and in any country.” Bajpai referred to the “ties of trust between the Sardar and the Services”, as also to the “keenness and warmth of his personal interest in their welfare”, and said, “A smaller man might have allowed old-time prejudices to raise a curtain of suspicion between him and those who had served an alien regime . . . That we should deeply mourn the loss of one who gained freedom for us in our time, and sought successfully to impart to it the durability that comes from stable conditions and administrative strength is but natural.”14
The civil service Patel created proved a strong bond that has held together a diverse people in so many states in a country of India’s vast dimensions.
5
PARTITION
Averting Balkanisation of India
Attlee’s policy statement of 20 February 1947, and the Indian Independence Act passed by the British Parliament later in July, had grave implications for India. The former, according to H. V. Hodson, was “an open licence for Pakistan in some form or other”.1 The London Times too thought that “Muslim separatism is deriving encouragement from the White Paper”. The Indian Independence Act had even more serious implications in the provision for creation of Princestan through a “Third Dominion” by transferring power to the states simultaneously with India and Pakistan. Indian foreign secretary, K. P. S. Menon, wrote: “When the British left India, the unity even of divided India was in danger. Some 560 Princely States had been left in the air. It was open to them to adhere to India, to accede to Pakistan, or to remain independent . . . It almost looked as if India was going to be Balkanised. But this danger was averted by the firm handling of the Princes by a man of iron, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.”2
Patel did not allow events to overtake him. He acted with speed and with a decisive, determined mind—in the manner he had earlier, in October 1946, in regard to a single, unified civil service for the country. At his initiative, the Congress Working Committee, at its meeting on 8 March, passed a resolution which asked for “a division of Punjab into two provinces, so that the predominantly Muslim part may be separated from the predominantly non-Muslim part”.3 Patel’s was not a call for India’s partition, but a forewarning to the Punjabi Muslims of the consequences of the League’s demand for Pakistan.
Since Gandhi had not been consulted or forewarned, he felt “as if an abyss had suddenly opened under his feet”.4 He asked Patel for an explanation. Patel’s reply was terse and matter-of fact: “It is difficult to explain to you the resolution about Punjab. It was adopted after the deepest deliberation. Nothing has been done in a hurry, or without full thought. That you had expressed your views against it, we learnt only from newspapers. But you are, of course, entitled to say what you feel right.”
Even Nehru bluntly told Gandhi that the resolution was “the only answer to Partition as demanded by Jinnah”.5 This amounted to calling for Gandhi’s non-interference in crucial national affairs. Patel’s fears soon proved true. At his meeting with Mountbatten on 1 April, Gandhi made “an astonishing proposal . . . to dismiss the present Cabinet [interim government] and call on Jinnah to appoint an all-Muslim administration”.6 Gandhi ignored what Jinnah had said in May 1946: “India stands on the brink of a civil war.”
Attlee’s statement suffered from lack of transparency. It was not a clear-cut plan of action at least in two respects: First, “to whom the powers of the Central Government in British India should be handed over . . . whether as a whole to some form of Central Government . . . or in some areas to the existing provincial Governments.” Second, it said, “HMG do not intend to hand over their powers and obligations under Paramountcy to any Government of British India. It is not intended to bring Paramountcy, as a system, to a conclusion earlier than the date of the final transfer of power.”
Patel seemed determined not to let the past come in his way, especially at a time when freedom was around the corner. In the early 1920s, Gandhi had given precedence to Khilafat over India’s independence by stating: “I would gladly ask for postponement of swaraj if thereby we could advance the interests of Khilafat.” This time, in March 1947, the story seemed to be repeating itself. To Gandhi, India’s unity seemed dearer than India’
s freedom from the British. That was not acceptable to the realist in Patel. He preferred partition to the unity of India as envisaged in the grouping scheme of the Cabinet Mission.
Patel’s analysis of the situation seemed identical to that of Penderel Moon (ICS), an experienced civil servant from Punjab, who has written: “Even if constitution-making had begun, it could hardly have got very far . . . a weak, easily divisible Union of India . . . the price which the League would exact for preserving unity would be too high . . . a weak Federal Centre which would be paralysed by its own internal communal divisions.”7
Patel had two reasons to influence his decision. First: “the Congress being pledged to non-violence, it was not possible for it to resist Partition.” Second: “if Partition were not accepted, there was bound to be long drawn-out communal strife in cities, in some rural areas, and even regiments [of the army] and police forces would be torn by communal dissensions.”8 Further, if not acted upon promptly, prospects for early independence would have receded, and a return might not have been possible for many years to come. Above all, their 30-year freedom struggle was in danger of being reduced to ashes. Patel wanted to grasp the opportunity that appeared within his reach.
Since the Cabinet Mission parleys of mid-1946, Patel had watched with dismay the Congress gradually losing ground to Jinnah. The mission’s grouping scheme was a virtual gift to him, with two “Pakistans” on either side of India: Group B comprising undivided Punjab, Sind, and the NWFP on the west, and Group C comprising the whole of Bengal and Hindu majority Assam on the east. In the proposed weak Group A comprising India, Jinnah would have dominated with the support of the Indian Muslims who had been more loyal to him than the Muslims from Punjab, Sind, and Bengal. In their passionate desire to be part of Pakistan, they would have launched another struggle for wresting power in India in order to form Greater Pakistan. Such a hope, the Muslim migrants from India to Pakistan had expressed in the slogan: Hass ke liya Pakistan, lar ke lenge Hindustan (we got Pakistan easily; we shall fight for Hindustan). Additionally, Jinnah could have banked upon, as was later proved, the support of some of the Indian princes.
