Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

by B Krishna

  In these dealings, Mountbatten played the honest broker in three ways: First, by placing the states under Patel’s charge. Second, by telling the princes at his last conference with them on 25 July: “In India the States Department is under the admirable guidance of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel . . . You can imagine how relieved I was, and I am sure you will yourselves have been equally relieved, when Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, on taking over the States Department, made, if I may say so, a most statesmanlike statement of what he considered were the essentials towards agreement between the States and the Dominion of India.”5 And third, by securing Britain’s decision that the Indian states would not be given membership of the Commonwealth. This strengthened Patel’s hands. He could settle with the princes individually. A crestfallen Bhopal resigned from chancellorship; the chamber itself was wound up; and the dictatorial regime of British diehard residents and agents came to an end. This was Patel’s first great victory. It threw open new vistas for achieving far greater victories—one after another, in quick succession, in the next 18 months or so.

  Eastern States Patel’s first brush with the princes

  15 August 1947 was epoch-making. People saw the dawn of freedom after a lapse of over 150 years. Equally significant was the simultaneous accession of the princely states to the Indian Union. It was Patel’s personal achievement, for which he was acclaimed as the Bismarck of India. On this day Patel began his historic march towards the creation of One India through the unification and consolidation of princely states as an integral part of India.

  Patel’s first brush with the princes as a group was in December 1947, when he reached Cuttack for the proposed merger of Orissa and Chattisgarh states, numbering 41. The biggest had an area of 4000 square miles and a population of 10 lakhs; the smallest, 46 square miles and a population of 20,000. Patel was determined to iron out such absurdities— uneconomic and politically unstable. A former official of the Political Department described the position as “intractable”. Patel had been warned of the difficult and complex situation. Keeping that in view, Patel addressed the ruling chiefs’ conference most diplomatically, telling them persuasively: “I have come to Cuttack to tender friendly advice to the Rulers, not as a representative of the old Paramountcy or of any foreign power, but as a member of a family trying to solve a family problem.” He added that the safety of the rulers, as well as of their people, was in danger and that “the situation demanded immediate solution”. Orissa as “a federal unit could only thrive and progress if it was a compact whole and was not torn asunder by multifarious jurisdictions and authorities which ruined its compactness”.1

  Patel encountered rough weather, but was quick to nip the problem in the bud. When a 21-year-old prince started his speech with the words “My people want . . .” Patel snubbed him with the remark: “They are not your people, Your Highness. They are my people. Leave them to me.” Patel delivered a similar snub to a saffron-robed prince who started talking about princely duty with the remark: “Your Holiness [!] is not fit for Princely duties.” To the Maharaja of Mayurbhanja, who said he had transferred power to his ministers, Patel administered a snub by leaving him “out of the discussion” with the remark: “I will deal with Your Highness later.”2

  Addressing a public meeting in Cuttack on 14 December, Patel warned the princes with blunt words: “I have met some Rulers today, and I have told them that they cannot carry on in the manner they did in the past. They must transfer their power to the people . . . Today the people of Orissa are agitated over the Rulers. There would be no Rulers if the people as such did not recognise them. They must move with the times. Let them cease to be like frogs in the well. These are the days of democracy, and the Rulers too must put their trust in the people.”3

  The same evening Patel boarded the train for New Delhi. He was unhappy, since his success was not complete. The rulers were more worried over possible repercussions. They sent him a message that he should delay his departure. Patel agreed to stay for an hour. At the end of the hour, they signed the agreement. Two days later, when the princes met Patel in New Delhi, they adopted dilatory tactics. They put forward legal arguments to justify their demand to be left as separate entities and not merged with Orissa. They hinted at taking legal opinion. Patel retorted in anger: “Your Highnesses may consult lawyers, but I make the law.” Undeterred, the rulers then shifted their ground with the suggestion that they be allowed to form a Union of their own.

  Patel firmly put down this with the remark: “I am prepared to leave each of Your Highnesses as a separate unit, but will not allow Your Highnesses to form a Union. Remember, if any of Your Highnesses wants my help to deal with your people, I will not come to your help.”4 That dampened their spirits, and reduced them to submission.

  The governor of Orissa, Dr. K. N. Katju, called the merger of eastern states “a great epoch-making change ushered in in the Indian States by the vision and statesmanship of Sardar Patel. On 14 December 1947, in the Government House at Cuttack, he first set his hand to the wheel of this great revolution”.5 Patel himself looked upon this as “a dramatic beginning”, however small, in distant Orissa, which “gradually swept over the whole of the subcontinent”. Mountbatten compared Patel’s achievement with that of Napoleon in his letter of 23 December 1947: “I personally have for long thought that the principle of mediatisation of States, which was adopted by Napoleon in the Central European principalities in the beginning of the last century, is the right answer for the small and uneconomic States.”6

  Patel had won his first unique victory—so quick and so non-violent was the surrender! His mind went back to the glorious past of the region, and, filled with justifiable pride, Patel reminded his countrymen: “Centuries ago, it was the proud privilege of Kalinga to arouse awakening in a great monarch . . . Few had dreamt, and none had imagined, that it would be the same land that will usher in a revolutionary change which would achieve for India the same measure of unity, strength and security which India had once attained under that distinguished ruler—Ashoka.”7

  The merger of the eastern states, as Patel correctly claimed, “electrified the whole atmosphere… the Indian States could not long remain citadels of autocracy. The bastions gradually began to give way”.8

  Unification of over 560 princely states took around 18 months. It moved fast with the speed of a soft whirlwind, gently drawing the princes into its warm embrace, hurting none. Patel was watched with wonder and admiration for redrawing the map of India: first with accession, followed by merger of neighbouring states, and, finally, formation of large, viable unions on par with the provinces.

  Greater Rajasthan Maharana Pratap’s dream fulfilled

  The formation of the Union of Greater Rajasthan in March 1949 was “momentous and historic”. Not only did it integrate a divided Rajasthani people, but it was no less strategic from the viewpoint of national security. Rajasthan lay on the Pakistan border and nursed bitter memories of how Jinnah had nearly succeeded in Jodhpur’s accession to Pakistan. The occasion was momentous in Patel’s unifying into a single, strong block, the states of Bikaner, Jaipur, Jodhpur, and Udaipur by diplomatically overcoming the princes’ sensitivities as proud, high-strung, status-conscious, and independent rulers. And it was historic in its being, as Patel claimed, “the fulfillment of the desires and aspirations of Maharana Pratap”1 who had put up a brave fight for Rajasthan’s freedom against the mighty Mughals.

  K. M. Panikkar, who had witnessed the whole drama of states integration unfolding itself from close quarters as diwan of Bikaner, paid a most handsome tribute to Patel when he said: “How all these grand and grandiose title-holders were swept under the carpet of history in the twinkling of an eye! Many are amazed that Vallabhbhai Patel was able to sweep them away in so short a time. The Puranas say that Parasurama fought twenty-one battles before he could exterminate the Kshatriya princes, but the new Parasurama needed no battle to make a clean sweep of kingship in India. One by one they queued up to sign their Instruments of
Accession, collected their pensions and left with good grace.”2

  Travancore First to revolt

  C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, the non-Travancorean diwan, was the first to have raised the banner of revolt. He declared as early as 9 May 1947 that if it was not possible to frame a constitution for the country as a whole without dividing it, Travancore would have “no alternative but to declare herself a free and independent State, and to take all necessary steps for it”.1

  CP was a stalwart who had occupied centre-stage in politics during the Home Rule movement. He was secretary to its founder, Mrs. Annie Besant, in 1916-17. The seriousness of his revolt lay in Travancore’s strategic position: a premier Hindu state at the southernmost tip of India with a sizeable seaboard and ancient maritime tradition. According to K. M. Munshi, CP’s “intransigence gave a new ray of hope to those Princes who had been dreaming of evolving a ‘Third Force’ out of the States”.2 They were “dreaming of a States League and looking to the wizard of Travancore, who at least has a seaboard for the export of his coconuts and uranium”.3

  Being a super-egoist, CP had isolated himself from major Hindu states, including his neighbour, Cochin, whom Patel had won over earlier. The Maharaja of Cochin had said on 27 April: “The States are subservient autocracies and helpless under the subjugation of a Superior Power.” His advice to his brother princes was to play a useful part in the country’s future “by willingly assuming the role of constitutional Rulers”.4 But CP derived his inspiration from Bhopal and Conrad Corfield, secretary of the Political Department. In spite of such a discouraging situation, it was diplomatic of Patel to have written to CP a short but sweet letter on 31 May, breathing friendliness, and to time it with CP’s visit to New Delhi to see Mountbatten prior to the announcement of the 3 June plan.

  Patel wrote: “It is in my nature to be a friend of the friendless. You have become one by choice, and I shall be glad if you will come and have lunch with me tomorrow at 1 p.m.” CP replied: “I appreciate your letter, and the kind thought underlying it. It, however, so happens that the ‘friendless’ person referred to has an engagement with a person for lunch today, and he cannot, therefore, avail himself of your generous invitation. Hoping for better luck later on, and renewing my thanks for the friendliness displayed by you.”5 The person CP was lunching with was Mountbatten.

  At the States Negotiating Committee’s meeting with Mountbatten on 3 June, CP “pleaded for a loosening or lapse of Paramountcy before the transfer of power, in order to strengthen the bargaining power of the States and enable them to negotiate on equal terms with the prospective Dominion Governments”. CP had felt somewhat encouraged by Mountbatten’s reply that he would consider “the premature lapse of Paramountcy in special cases if it could be proved that its continuance was a handicap to negotiation”.6

  On 10 June, CP boldly announced Travancore’s decision to declare itself independent on 15 August. He asked the people of the state to stand “solidly by His Highness” on “a matter of life and death”. He urged them “to cogitate and decide whether they wished to cherish their freedom and independence, or preferred to be submerged and absorbed as an adjunct to a Dominion in a divided India, or be a colony or dependency.” Travancore, he said, was “destined to be the saviour of South India”.7 CP raised the slogan “Travancore for the Travancoreans”, even when he himself was not one. He told them, “The future for the next hundred years, at least of Travancore, is in the making . . . The Maharaja does not act, has not acted, will not act as an autocrat. He conceives himself as the trustee and the spearpoint of Travancore’s activities and of Travancore’s will, and I am making this appeal on behalf of the Maharaja and with his special permission, and on behalf of the dynasty he represents.”

  He asserted: “There is no question that Travancore is ever going to enter the Constituent Assembly. There is no question that Travancore is now going to join the Indian Union. Travancore will be an independent State, and will function as an independent State from 15 August . . . from the 15 August no power on earth, short of an open war for which we are prepared, can prevent Travancore from declaring its independence . . . from 15 August Travancore will be an international entity.”8 CP even announced his intention to appoint a trade agent in Pakistan.

  Jinnah was quick to lend his support to CP by stating, on 17 June, that “constitutionally and legally, the Indian States will be independent sovereign States on the termination of Paramountcy and they will be free to decide for themselves to adopt any course they like; it is open to them to join the Hindustan Constituent Assembly or the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, or decide to remain independent . . . Neither the British Government, nor the British Parliament, nor any other power or body, can compel them to do anything contrary to their free will and accord”.9

  R. K. Shanmukham Chetty, a former diwan of Cochin, voiced his grave concern over CP’s stand on 22 June, stating:

  The most disquieting feature of the Indian political situation is not so much the fact of division or the potentialities of communal troubles, but the declaration of some of the Indian States that they intend to remain as independent sovereign States on the termination of the British Paramountcy . . . the creation of the separate State of Pakistan may not be a damaging blow to India’s prestige or influence . . . The real danger to the unity and prestige of India is the attitude of certain Indian States. If a considerable number of Indian States choose to follow the example of Travancore and Hyderabad, it would mean the Balkanisation of India.

  Shanmukham Chetty regretted: “It is one of the ironies of fate that the Diwan of Travancore, who has been the champion of pure Indian nationalism and a strong Central Government, should now make an alliance with Jinnah.”10

  Gandhi too expressed his concern: “If the Travancore Diwan were allowed to have his way and his example were followed by others, India would be split up into several States— a disaster too dreadful to contemplate. Those many States would need an Emperor, and the Emperor who was leaving might even return with redoubled force.”11

  Patel was more categorical in his statement: “So long as the Congress continued to have a foothold in Travancore, there is no question of independence and sovereignty.”12

  CP indulged in sabre-rattling again on 23 June and continued doing so almost throughout July. K. P. S. Menon, India’s foreign secretary, thought that CP had declared Travancore independent “in a moment of megalomania”, especially when “he expressed his intention to establish diplomatic relations between Travancore and Pakistan, and even selected a retired police officer for the post of ambassador of Travancore in Karachi”.13

  On 10 July, Pattom A. Thanu Pillai, president of the Travancore State Congress, cabled Patel: “Terrorist organisations composed of goondas formed throughout State under control of police and other Government agencies to wreck public meetings and assault public men . . . Life of public men in danger. Members of [these] organisations parade public streets armed with lathis, knives and other weapons . . . Life and property insecure . . . Conditions rapidly degenerating into widespread violence . . . Travancore subjected to unbridled dictatorship by an irresponsible non-Travancorean Diwan.”14

  With CP’s “rogue elephant politics” getting worse, Keralite K. M. Panikkar felt emotionally stirred and decided to jump into the fray to fight CP face to face. Patel stopped him with the advice that there was no need for him “to do any such thing and he would solve the Travancore problem himself ”.15 Patel was “furious and determined, if necessary, to deal severely with Travancore”. He directly telephoned the Maharaja and asked him in a voice that was soft, firm but blunt, “Who’s standing in your way?” The Maharaja felt rattled. He communicated to Mountbatten his decision to accede to India. Simultaneously, on 25 July, there was an attempt on CP’s life by the Communists, whose party workers had been brutally treated in their struggle in Punnapara and Vayalas. This rattled CP. Realising his time was up, he resigned from diwanship. A mollified CP wrote to Patel on 11 November from his retirem
ent at Ootacamund: “May I take this opportunity to convey to you my sincere felicitations over the forthright and unequivocal policy adopted and maintained by you during the present time of crises and momentous decisions. I have differed from you on several occasions, but cannot refrain from paying my tribute to the consummate talents of leadership manifested by you and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru at this juncture.” With his characteristic magnanimity, Patel replied: “We both know how much we have differed in the past. But, in spite of those differences, I have always regretted that we could not make use of your undoubted talents in a wider sphere of activities.”16

  CP’s praise for Patel increased as time passed. He wrote to Purushottam Tricumdas on 27 March 1948: “Generally speaking, all the great Kshatriya rulers—descendants of the Sun and Moon—behave like mendicants and sycophants, and have no more spirit than a parcel of frightened rabbits or sheep. They deserve [their] fate, and I congratulate Patel on the brilliant results of his downright policy”.17

  The United State of Travancore and Cochin was inaugurated on 1 July 1949 in Trivandrum. Patel could not attend the function owing to ill-health. But his message described the union as “the culminating point of the policy of consolidation of States which was inaugurated not more than eighteen months ago; and which, with the cooperation and assistance of the Rulers and the support and consent of the people of the States, has been my proud privilege to implement”. He further said, “It has also been my unique pleasure to find among the Princes and the people a willingness to make sacrifices in the cause of the country.”18