Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

by B Krishna

  Mr. Jinnah paid a handsome tribute to the correctness of my policy and admitted that it was I who had put the ex-Premier of Kashmir (Pandit Kak) in touch with him when he came to Delhi.

  Mr. Jinnah next referred to the statement which he had issued to the Press that day and enlarged on his difficulties in not being able to have any reasonable conversation, either personally or through representatives, with the Maharaja or even with his Prime Minister; and that, not only had the Maharaja brought his troubles upon himself by this attitude, but had greatly aggravated them by the massacres to which he had incited his Dogras against innocent Muslims. He said that even today at Jammu 90,000 Muslims were in danger of being massacred.

  I told Mr. Jinnah that Pandit Nehru had expressed horror at the massacres that had taken place and had issued stringent orders that everything possible was to be done to stop them. Only the night before I had supplemented those instructions myself through an Indian Brigadier who had just returned from Kashmir and who fully agreed with the necessity for stopping any further killing of Muslims.

  I informed Mr. Jinnah that we already had a Brigade Group of 2,000 men in Srinagar; that a 4th Battalion would be flown in that day, and a 5th Battalion within the next two days. I said that we should have no difficulty in holding Srinagar and that the prospect of the tribes entering the city in any force was now considered remote.

  Lord Ismay suggested that the main thing was to stop the fighting; and he asked Mr. Jinnah how he proposed that this should be done. Mr. Jinnah said that both sides should withdraw at once. He emphasised that the withdrawal must be simultaneous. When I asked him how the tribesmen were to be called off, he said that all he had to do was to give them an order to come out and to warn them that if they did not comply, he would send large forces along their lines of communication. In fact, if I was prepared to fly to Srinagar with him, he would guarantee that the business would be settled within 24 hours.

  I expressed mild astonishment at the degree of control that he appeared to exercise over the raiders.

  I asked him how he proposed that we should withdraw our forces, observing that India’s forces were on the outskirts of Srinagar in a defensive role; all the tribes had to do was to stop attacking. I also pointed out that we could not possibly afford aeroplanes to fly the Indian troops back. Lord Ismay suggested that they should march back via Banihal Pass.

  I asked Mr. Jinnah why he objected so strongly to a plebiscite, and he said he did so because with the troops of the Indian Dominion in military occupation of Kashmir and with the National Conference under Sheikh Abdullah in power, such propaganda and pressure could be brought to bear that the average Muslim would never have the courage to vote for Pakistan.

  I suggested that we might invite UNO to undertake the plebiscite and send observers and organisers in advance to ensure that the necessary atmosphere was created for a free and impartial plebiscite. I reiterated that the last thing my Government wished was to obtain a false result by a fraudulent plebiscite.

  Mr. Jinnah repeated that he and I were the only two who could organise a plebiscite and said that we should do it together. Lord Ismay and I went to great trouble to explain that I was a constitutional Governor-General and a Britisher, and that even if my Government would trust me sufficiently to see this through, I was sure that Mr. Attlee would not give his consent.

  Mr. Jinnah complained bitterly that after the extremely generous gesture on the part of the Government of India in accepting his invitation to come to discussions at Lahore, the illness of one man should have prevented some other Minister from coming to conduct the negotiations; why, for example, could Sardar Patel not have come? It was a matter of the greatest urgency to get together on this problem, and he asked me how soon Pandit Nehru could come to Lahore.

  I countered by saying that it was now his turn to come to Delhi since I had come to Lahore, and I invited him cordially to stay as my guest, when I would take him to see Pandit Nehru in his bedroom. He said that this was impossible. I pointed out that I had been to see Pandit Nehru personally in his bedroom and that I had now been to see his Prime Minister [of Pakistan] in his bedroom, and that I failed to see what was improper in this suggestion. He assured me that it was not a question of going to anybody’s bedroom, but that he was so busy he simply had no time to leave Lahore while his Prime Minister was on the sick list.

  I asked him afterwards if there was any single problem more serious or urgent than Kashmir. I pointed out that when one was so busy one had to arrange work in order of priority. If he admitted that Kashmir was top priority, then all other work should stand aside for it and he should come to Delhi at once. He said he regretted that this was impossible, for the whole burden of events was on his shoulders at Lahore. I explained that he need only be gone for the inside of a day and that I was anxious to return his hospitality. He said, “I would gladly come a hundred times to visit you; I just cannot manage it while my Prime Minister is ill.” I asked him to come as soon as his Prime Minister was well enough to travel, and he said, “We shall have to see.”

  Lord Ismay pointed out that the best way to stand well in world opinion was for him now to come and return my visit and discuss Kashmir with Pandit Nehru. Mr. Jinnah said that he had lost interest in what the world thought of him since the British Commonwealth had let him down when he had asked him to come to the rescue of Pakistan.

  I ended the meeting, as I had started it, by making it quite clear that I had come unbriefed and unauthorised to discuss Kashmir, since I had not had a chance of seeing Pandit Nehru after he had informed me he would be unable to accompany me. I told him I was speaking not as Governor-General of India but as the ex-Viceroy who had been responsible for partition and was anxious to see that it did not result in any harm coming to the two Dominions. He said he quite saw this but hoped that I would be able to discuss the various proposals which we had been talking about with Pandit Nehru and send him a firm telegram. I undertook to convey this message to Pandit Nehru.

  Round about 5.00 p.m. it was obvious that we were going to be too late to go and see Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan again, so Lord Ismay left the room to telephone our apologies to him. I took the opportunity of Lord Ismay’s absence to “tell off ” Mr. Jinnah. I told him that I considered it was unstatesmanlike, inept and bad mannered for him to issue a statement which directly accused the Government of India of “fraud and violence” in Kashmir a few hours before he expected the Prime Minister of India to come and discuss this very question in a friendly manner; and that had he been feeling well enough to come, such a studied and ill-timed insult would have been enough to send his temperature up again. I finally pointed out that Pakistan was in my opinion in a much weaker position than India, not only from the obvious military point of view, but I was sure, the world would think they were in the wrong; and that this form of abuse before a discussion commenced could only put Pakistan even deeper in the wrong.

  At the end Mr. Jinnah became extremely pessimistic and said it was quite clear that the Dominion of India was out to throttle and choke the Dominion of Pakistan at birth, and that if they continued with their oppression there would be nothing for it but to face the consequences. However depressing the prospect might be, he was not afraid; for the situation was already so bad that there was little that could happen to make it worse.

  I pointed out that war, whilst admittedly very harmful for India, would be completely disastrous for Pakistan and himself.

  Lord Ismay tried to cheer him up out of his depression but I fear was not very successful. However, we parted on good terms.

  Postscript: According to Auchinleck’s biographer, John Connell, prior to Mountbatten’s departure for Lahore, there was “strong resistance to the whole idea” (of his visit) at the Cabinet meeting held on the afternoon of 28 October, when “comparisons were made with Neville Chamberlain’s visit to Hitler at Godesberg in 1938. Vallabhbhai Patel, in particular, made his opposition clear to the Governor-General”. Mountbatten was presiding over the
meeting. Patel was courageous and outspoken in his attempt to safeguard India’s interests.

  12

  COMMUNAL REPRESENTATION

  Patel’s Views in the Constituent Assembly

  New Delhi, 27 August 1947

  Sardar Patel, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Minorities, Fundamental Rights etc, today in the Constituent Assembly (while submitting the reports of the committees) congratulated the various minorities who had taken a correct perspective of the problems and helped in arriving at unanimous conclusions on many items.

  In considering his report, Sardar Patel appealed to the House to eschew heat and bitterness, to recognise the present state of affairs in the neighbouring areas and avoid the raising of controversies which would have unfortunate reactions elsewhere.

  Despite bitter controversy on occasions, the Sardar said he was happy to note that the report he was presenting was the result of a general consensus of opinion among the minorities themselves and between the minorities and the majority. It was not possible to satisfy all, but the House would see that the recommendations were practically agreed ones. The Committee had taken into consideration the points of view, sentiments and feelings of the minorities, big and small, and as far as possible tried to meet their wishes.

  There was a complication and there were conflicting interests among the minorities themselves. There was a minority within the minority. The committee did not take advantage of such differences, and saw to it that the minorities, instead of dividing themselves, presented a united front. Such difficulties which arose were sought to be solved without bitterness and controversy. He hoped the House would deal with the reports in a friendly atmosphere and with goodwill.

  Referring to joint versus separate electorates and representation in legislatures, the Sardar said those issues had been discussed for over a decade, produced so much of controversy and they had suffered and paid heavily for it. But today fortunately they had been able to deal with them in an amicable manner and there was unanimity on the point that there should be no more separate electorates and they should have joint electorates.

  On the question of weightage, they had agreed that there should be no weightage and the various communities should be represented according to the proportion of the population. They had thought it fit to agree to reservation of seats in proportion to the population of minorities. Some of the minorities had gladly surrendered their rights. They desired neither separate electorates, nor reservation, and wanted to merge into the nation and stand on their own legs. He congratulated those who had taken that stand.

  Referring to the position of the Anglo-Indians, Sardar Patel said that that community at present enjoyed certain privileges and concessions in certain services as the railways, posts and telegraph etc. To ask them to surrender these concessions at present would put them in a difficult position. They might not be prepared for it now, and sufficient time should be given to them to adjust themselves.

  Congratulating the Parsis for the stand they had taken, Sardar Patel said that the Parsis had voluntarily abandoned any claims for concessions. Though small, the Parsis were a very powerful community, and perhaps most wise. They knew that concessions would do more harm than any benefit, because they could make their way anywhere and in such a way that they would get more than they would secure by reservations and other methods.

  Dealing with the questions of representation in Services, the Sardar said that the main consideration should be that posts must go by merit. If they were to dilute the principle, the general administration would suffer.

  There remained, however, Sardar said, one matter of controversy and that was on behalf of the Muslim League and the Scheduled Castes. A point was raised that members of those communities should poll certain percentage of votes of their community to be declared successful in the elections. The matter was discussed and the Advisory Committee rejected the suggestion by a large majority.

  Frank Anthony paid a tribute to the far–sighted statesmanship of Sardar Patel whose realistic approach to the question had made agreement possible in the committee . . . The findings of the report were a happy augury for the future. By being generous, the majority community had assuredly harnessed the loyalty of the minorities to the tasks of nation-building facing the country. Every minority should look forward to the time, sooner or later, when it would take its place not under communal or racial label, but as part and parcel of the whole Indian community.

  Chaudhury Kaliquzzaman pleaded for granting of separate electorates for the Muslims. Addressing Sardar Patel, he said, “You have become the final arbiter of the fates of the minorities. If you grant us separate electorates, what is the harm if the Muslim community feels it will help in determining their true representative character? After all they will appeal to you and not to any Third Power—not even to Pakistan— for redress of their grievances. I beg of you to consider the new situation in which this question is now being discussed.”

  Earlier referring to the new factor that has emerged, namely, the disappearance of the Third Party, he said that in the light of that, if the country really visualised the situation existing today in its true perspective, much of the suspicion that hung around separate electorates would disappear. There was no longer any Third Party to whom the Muslims could go and appeal. There was no doubt that if things untoward happened anywhere, they must now go to Sardar Patel.

  Replying to the debate, Sardar Patel said he was surprised that there should have been such a debate on the motion . . . His mind (the Sardar said) went back to this day when the question of separate electorates was first discussed. Many eminent Muslims had recorded their view that communal electorates were a serious flaw in the body politic. Many Englishmen had also admitted that the country had to be partitioned today because of separate electorates.

  The Sardar said, “When Pakistan was conceded, at least it was assumed that there will be One Nation in the rest of India and that there will be no attempt to thrust the Two-Nation theory here. It is no use saying, we shall ask for separate electorates, but will abide by your decision. We have heard this for many years . . . Do you still want there should be two nations? Will you show one free nation which has a religious basis? If this unfortunate country is to be again oppressed by this, even after its division, then woe betides it. It is not worth living for.”

  Chaudhury Khaliquzzaman had said that the British had gone and, therefore, we must forget past suspicion. The British had not expected to go so soon. They had left enough mischief behind: we did not want to perpetuate that mischief. That British had introduced communal electorates for easy administration, but the legacy left behind must be liquidated.

  “You say you want to be loyal to the nation. May I ask you, is this loyalty?”

  Sardar Patel said he had not intended to speak, but apparently there was something still wrong in the land. “If you want peace in this land—you can do nothing either here or in Pakistan without peace—I appeal to you at least at this stage to show that everything is forgotten. I appeal to you to withdraw your amendment and pass this clause unanimously so that the world outside may understand that we have forgotten.”

  The Times of India, 28 August 1947

  New Delhi, 28 August 1947

  Speaking in the Constituent Assembly, Sardar Patel said that so far as the amendment moved by the representatives of the Muslim League was concerned, he found he was under a mistaken impression. Otherwise he would have agreed to no reservation at all.

  “When I agreed to reservation on population basis, I thought that our friends in the Muslim League will see the reasonableness of our attitude and accommodate themselves in the changed circumstances after the separation of the country.

  But I now find repetition of the same methods which had been adopted when separate electorates were introduced in the country. In spite of ample sweetness in the language used by the speakers, there is a full dose of poison in the methods adopted.”

  Quoting the analogy of the young
er brother making suggestions to an elder brother used by a speaker, the Sardar said, “The last speaker (Naziruddin Ahmed) has said we will lose the affection of the younger brother if we do not accept the amendment. I am prepared to lose it because otherwise it would prove the death of the elder brother.”

  The formula suggested by the amendment had a history behind it, the Sardar said. It was known as the Mohammed Ali formula. The formula had been evolved by nationalist Muslims to prevent separation of the communities from each other. But now separation was complete and the country was divided, he did not understand the demand for its introduction.

  Sardar Patel said, “If the process that was adopted in the past, which resulted in the separation of the country, is to be repeated, then those who want that kind of thing can have a place in Pakistan, not here. We are laying the foundation of one nation. And those who think of dividing again and sow the seeds of disruption will have no place and no quarter here.

  “You must change your attitude and adapt yourself to changed conditions, and do not pretend to say our affection is very great for you. We have seen the affection. Let there be no talk about it. Let us face realities. The point is whether you really want to cooperate with us, or want to adopt disruptive tactics. I appeal to you to have changed hearts, and not merely change your tongues, because it would not pay.

  “If you think this is going to pay, you are mistaken. I know how much it costs me to protect Muslim minorities here in the present conditions and in the present atmosphere. I appeal to you to forget the past. You have got what you wanted. And remember, you are the people who are responsible for Pakistan, and not those who live in Pakistan. You led the agitation. What is it you want now? We do not want the country to be divided again.

  “I sincerely tell you there will be no injustice done to you. There will be generosity towards you, but there must be reciprocity. If it is absent, then you take it from me that no soft words can conceal what is behind the words. Let us forget the past and let us be one nation.”