Daniel S Markey
Page 35
Publicly, Pakistani leaders denied supporting the Taliban. Moreover, they
argued that Washington was asking Pakistan’s army – already overtaxed by
its fight against insurgents – to assume too heavy a burden along its western
border. They angrily asked how America was in any position to tell Pakistan to
“do more” in the fight against extremists, given the military losses and suffering
Pakistan’s own people had already endured. Yet by framing the question that
way, Pakistan’s leaders steadfastly ignored the American claim that they were
guilty of fighting some groups of terrorists, such as the Pakistani Taliban, while
actively or passively assisting others, like the Haqqanis.
Pakistan’s refusal to cut ties with the Taliban, indeed its entire policy of
supporting militant and extremist organizations, was morally reprehensible.
As explained in Chapter 2, however, it was driven by a calculation that some
of these groups still offered strategic benefits; namely, the prospect of Pakistani
influence in Afghanistan and the ability to cause trouble for India.
Those benefits came at a cost; Pakistani leaders knew they were riding a
tiger. They saw that homegrown extremists had turned against their own state.
They were well aware of the fact that state-supported groups like LeT could
cause terrible trouble. Even so, the alternative urged by the United States – to
crack down on these groups and their many sympathizers – had the potential
to be even more painful, especially in the short run.
Why? Part of the problem was that Pakistani officials never believed that
Washington was fully committed to a long-term investment in Afghanistan’s
stability.102 They repeatedly expressed doubts about U.S. strategy in Afghan-
istan, especially about Washington’s plan to build the Afghan army and sustain
it for years after most U.S. and NATO forces were scheduled to depart. Sooner
or later, Pakistanis figured, whatever fragile edifice Washington constructed
in Afghanistan would collapse. If Afghanistan fell apart after America’s with-
drawal and Islamabad had already turned against the Afghan Taliban, what
friends (and more important, what influence) would Pakistan have left there?
102 On General Kayani’s doubts, specifically about U.S. long-term investment in the Afghan security forces, see Jane Perlez, “The Fight over How to End a War,” New York Times, October 19, 2011.
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164
No Exit from Pakistan
Mixed Messages
Mixed, confusing signals from Washington reinforced existing Pakistani doubts
about U.S. intentions and commitment in Afghanistan. This was true, above
all, for the U.S. military “surge” of 30,000 additional American troops to
Afghanistan, announced by President Obama at West Point on December 1,
2009.
U.S. military commanders in the field, reacting to deteriorating security
and the growing momentum of the insurgency, had requested 40,000 more
troops.103 The surge came close. Obama’s announcement followed on the heels
of his prior decisions to more than double U.S. forces to nearly 70,000. Placing
100,000 U.S. forces in land-locked Afghanistan was an impressive commitment
of American power.
The surge made waves in Pakistan. It raised the possibility – perhaps for the
first time since shortly after 9/11 – that Afghanistan’s insurgents had finally
met their match. It is conceivable that Islamabad might have shifted its own
strategy in response. Rather than hedging its bets, the Pakistanis might have
jumped on the powerful American bandwagon. No point in backing losing
insurgents; better to push them to the negotiating table or to seek new, less
odious, Afghan proxies.
Unfortunately, strength and resolve were not the only messages the Pak-
istanis received from Washington. A series of leaks from within the Obama
administration preceded the president’s announcement of the surge. They sug-
gested deep internal doubts about the new escalation.104 Those doubts were
also reflected in U.S. policy when the president combined his surge with a pub-
lic pledge that it would only be temporary. As President Obama explained in
his West Point speech, “After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home.
These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the
Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of
Afghanistan.”105
103 General Stanley McChrystal’s request for troops was leaked to reporter Bob Woodward, who described the general’s findings in “McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Mission Failure,’” Washington Post, September 21, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/
09/20/AR2009092002920.html.
104 On the series of leaks preceding Obama’s West Point speech, starting with General McChrystal’s report and including Ambassador Eikenberry’s cables, see Laura Rozen, “The Eikenberry Memo and the Leak War: More Pushback against a Nudgey Pentagon?” Politico, November 12, 2009, http://www.politico.com/blogs/laurarozen/1109/The_Eikenberry_memo_and_the_
leak_war_more_pushback_against_a_nudgey_Pentagon_.html; also David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal (New York: Crown, 2012), p. 32. Bob Woodward’s reporting in the Washington Post and his subsequent book that described the administration’s internal debate in intimate detail also received great attention in Pakistan’s leadership circles. See Bob Woodward, “McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Mission Failure,’” Washington Post, September 21, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092
002920.html; Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon&Schuster, 2010).
105 “Obama’s Address on the War in Afghanistan,” New York Times, December 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/02/world/asia/02prexy.text.html.
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Great Expectations to Greater Frustrations
165
Firm timelines reflected the White House’s desire to avoid an open-ended
expansion of a decade-long war. They also made for good politics. Most Amer-
icans were justifiably sick and tired of the conflict, not least because it followed
on the heels of the costly and frustrating war in Iraq. Congressional Democrats
accepted President Obama’s plans to send more forces into harm’s way, but
only grudgingly. All told, the White House’s timed surge threaded a difficult
political needle at home without rejecting the core recommendations of his
generals on the battlefield.
When it came to the timetables, Obama kept his promises. U.S. troop
strength reached roughly 100,000 by the summer of 2010. A year later, he
declared that 10,000 troops would be home before 2012, that the rest of
the surge would be recovered by September 2012, and that, “by 2014 . . . the
Afghan people will be responsible for their own security.”106 Given the time
required to move thousands of troops into and out of Afghanistan, U.S. forces
were
near their peak (of between 90,000 and 100,000) for roughly eighteen
months.107
Recognizing the obvious political constraints on the Obama administration,
no one in Pakistan or Afghanistan could ever have assumed that the surge would
last forever. But announcing the timeline for military departure from the outset
was still a crucial blunder. It projected the wrong message to Pakistan, the
Taliban leadership, and the Afghans.108 It weakened the punch that the surge
delivered to the insurgency by fostering a sense that the war’s endgame was just
around the corner. It offered hope to the Taliban that if they weathered one last
storm, victory over the United States was within reach. Most important for the
U.S.-Pakistan relationship, the mixed message about American resolve relaxed
what pressure Pakistan might otherwise have felt to reconsider its own stance
toward the Taliban insurgents and get onboard with Washington’s program.
At the same time, Pakistani doubts about U.S. resolve were further com-
pounded by a diplomatic initiative out of Washington. The State Department –
first under Holbrooke’s direction and then, after his death, under the less flam-
boyant stewardship of career diplomat Marc Grossman – started to explore
what it termed a “reconciliation” agenda. Tentative at first, the goal was to
find a diplomatic compromise that could bring the Taliban in from the cold
and also end the war on terms acceptable to the United States.
106 “Text of President Obama’s Speech on Afghanistan,” New York Times, June 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/world/asia/23obama-afghanistan-speech-text.html.
107 For a chart showing monthly U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan, see Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index,” Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, September 30, 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/∼/media/Programs/foreign%20policy/afghanistan%
20index/index20120930.pdf.
108 Washington’s failure to conclude a strategic partnership agreement with Kabul until May 2012 – long after the timelines for military drawdown were announced – further hurt the credibility of U.S. claims that it would remain committed to Afghan security well after the surge was over. For the text of the final agreement, see “Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of American and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” http://www
.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf.
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166
No Exit from Pakistan
In February 2011, when U.S. forces were at their peak numbers in
Afghanistan, Secretary of State Clinton used a speech at the Asia Society in
New York to explain the decision to talk with the Taliban. She observed that
such a dialogue would proceed at the same time as the military surge as well
as intensified U.S. civilian assistance and development activities. On the diplo-
matic initiative, she remarked, “I know that reconciling with an adversary that
can be as brutal as the Taliban sounds distasteful, even unimaginable. And
diplomacy would be easy if we only had to talk to our friends. But that is not
how one makes peace. President Reagan understood that when he sat down
with the Soviets. And Richard Holbrooke made this his life’s work. He negoti-
ated face-to-face with [Slobodan] Milosevic and ended a war [in Bosnia].”109
Like Obama’s firm timelines for the surge, opening a dialogue with the
Afghan insurgents made sense in Washington. By conjuring visions of historic
diplomatic breakthroughs, it offered hope for an honorable, orderly American
withdrawal from Afghanistan. The idea held wide appeal outside the United
States as well. Many others – from the Afghan government in Kabul to Amer-
ica’s European allies – were simultaneously sending out feelers to the Taliban
to gauge prospects for a negotiated settlement.
Islamabad, however, responded warily. This was not a surprise. Clinton
stated up front that reconciliation required a great deal of Pakistan. In her
Asia Society speech, she noted that “Pakistan also has responsibilities of its
own, including taking decisive steps to ensure that the Afghan Taliban cannot
continue to conduct the insurgency from Pakistani territory. Pressure from the
Pakistani side will help push the Taliban toward the negotiating table and away
from al-Qaida.”
These demands did not go down well with Islamabad. It sounded like Wash-
ington was asking Pakistan to put the screws to the Afghan Taliban so the
United States could secure its own face-saving way out of the war. Supposing
that strategy worked, where would it leave Pakistan? With less influence and
fewer friends in Afghanistan, that’s where.
Moreover, when it came to nuts and bolts of how to talk to the
Taliban, Pakistan found itself betwixt and between. Washington was simul-
taneously asking Islamabad to turn against the Afghan insurgents and to facili-
tate talks with them. Pakistani officials chalked up the inconsistent demands to
American hypocrisy. In September 2011, for instance, when Admiral Mullen
was haranguing Pakistan for its ties to the Haqqani network, other U.S. officials
were appealing to Islamabad for help in opening a communication channel to
Haqqani leaders.110
109 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks at the Launch of the Asia Society’s Series of Richard C. Holbrooke Memorial Addresses,” New York, February 18, 2011, http://www.state.gov/
secretary/rm/2011/02/156815.htm.
110 Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Goes after Haqqani network,” Washington Post, October 14, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-goes-after-haqqani-network/
2011/10/14/gIQAj2i6kL_story.html.
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Great Expectations to Greater Frustrations
167
It is at least conceivable that Islamabad might have stepped up to the plate in
the way Clinton asked. But the opposite was always far more likely. Islamabad
interpreted Washington’s reconciliation initiative as evidence that the United
States was desperate to find a quick exit from Afghanistan.111 Rather than
driving a wedge between Islamabad and its Afghan proxies, the reconciliation
project ended up having a contrary effect. Islamabad sought to turn Washing-
ton’s diplomatic initiative to its own advantage.112
Some influential Pakistani analysts and policymakers had long perceived a
deal with the Taliban as an opportunity for a grand diplomatic masterstroke.113
In one fell swoop they envisioned ending U.S. pressure to turn against the
Afghan Taliban, winning greater influence over Afghanistan’s future, and accel-
erating the U.S. military drawdown from the region. In meetings with Pakistani
officials from 2010 to 2012, more than a few shared their hope that America
and Pakistan might finally see eye-to-eye on the best way to win the war in
Afghanistan. To put it bluntly, they wanted the United Sta
tes to outsource the
Afghan endgame to Pakistan.
distrust and disagreement
Of course, this was never Washington’s intention. The fact that well-placed
Pakistanis believed such a deal might be on the table demonstrated just how
far apart the two sides had fallen. When the United States had tried to inspire
confidence, it sowed new doubt. When Washington attempted to signal resolve,
Islamabad perceived desperation.
These differences persisted in spite of a series of “strategic dialogues” in
which top U.S. officials attempted to explain to senior Pakistani leaders Wash-
ington’s plans for Afghanistan, the pain Pakistan would feel if it undermined
those plans, and the benefits Pakistan would enjoy if it got onboard with the
American strategy.114 Those conversations went nowhere. U.S. officials found
their Pakistani counterparts either evasive or utterly unrealistic in their demands
for American partnership. Reflecting the gulf between the two sides, the head of
111 This is undoubtedly how many Afghans view the reconciliation effort. See Amrullah Saleh,
“Why Negotiate with the Taliban?” Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2012, http://online.wsj
.com/article/SB10001424052970204136404577207500541175714.html?mod=googlenews_
wsj.
112 Some argue that Pakistan has sought to do just this, in part through its strategic arrests of various Afghan Taliban leaders like Mullah Baradar in February 2010. Others suggest that arrest was much less premeditated. See, for example, Myra MacDonald, “Pakistan’s Arrest of Mullah Baradar: Tactics or Strategy?” Reuters, February 17, 2010, http://blogs.reuters.com/
pakistan/2010/02/17/pakistans-arrest-of-mullah-baradar-tactics-or-strategy/.
113 This thesis was introduced to me most vigorously in a conversation with a senior Pakistani official in Peshawar, May 2010.
114 On U.S.-Pakistan strategic dialogues, which appear to have covered a wide range of issues without meeting the core needs of either side, see Steve Coll, “What Does Pakistan Want?”
The New Yorker, March 29, 2012, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2012/
03/classified-document-our-collective-experience.html.
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