Using these mercenaries as settlers was a very clever ploy by Psammetichus. He could not possibly afford to pay them, even during times of peace, so another method needed to be found to keep them close in case of further difficulty, either from without or within.
He could not allow large numbers of mercenaries to wander freely around Egypt; the damage they could cause (in terms of plunder) was immense. Neither could he casually dismiss them and send them back to Greece. These men were mercenaries, if not at the start (when they were basically pirates) then certainly later; they needed employment and they could very easily seek employment from the Assyrians or any number of other potential or real threats to Egypt. Given the lack of good quality Egyptian infantry (a situation that never really improved), Psammetichus would have likely felt that settling these men was a no-lose situation. If there was a further invasion or uprising then these men could be brought out of retirement to conduct a final campaign. He also likely hoped that they would help to train the young people in the towns where they were stationed, generally improving the ability of the citizen soldiers. Perhaps the mercenaries did this to an extent; and it is very interesting that they do not appear to have resisted the decision. Psammetichus appears to have ultimately been proved right, as:7
A mixed race of professional soldiers grew up whom the Pharaohs employed on their campaigns against Syria and Ethiopia.
Having significant numbers of Greeks, be they mercenaries or not, was not uniformly considered positive by the native Egyptian population. As the influx of Greeks continued (because this was the only regular area of recruitment in the Archaic period for Greek mercenaries), the native Egyptians became restless. During the reign of Apries, for example, there were perhaps 30,000 Greek mercenaries in Egypt; Herodotus tells us:8
Learning of this, too, Apries armed his guard and marched against the Egyptians; he had a bodyguard of Carians and Ionians, thirty thousand of them, and his royal palace was in the city of Saïs, a great and marvellous palace.
Despite their numbers, however, there was something of a popular nationalist uprising, during which Apries, who was seen as the person responsible for this massive influx of foreign troops, was overthrown and replaced by Amasis. The new ruler was well aware of the importance and potential usefulness of having a well-trained, equipped and loyal army of 30,000 Greeks at his disposal. After his victory, he did not dismiss the Greeks, but did seek to remove them a little from the popular consciousness. He acted to physically relocate them from the strategically important delta region (with its large numbers of native Egyptians) to Memphis, where they were employed as his bodyguards. Again, Herodotus notes:9
The Ionians and Carians lived for a long time in these places, which are near the sea, on the arm of the Nile called the Pelusian, a little way below the town of Bubastis. Long afterwards, king Amasis removed them and settled them at Memphis to be his guard against the Egyptians.
The expression ‘guard against the Egyptians’ is particularly interesting here, and implies a link between mercenaries and tyrants that we will explore in more detail later.
Greek mercenaries were also to play a key role in the end of Egyptian independence when the country fell to Cambyses of Persia in 525. During that struggle, Greek mercenaries fought on both sides, but it was a single individual who did more than any other to bring defeat to Egypt. Herodotus attributes the success of Cambyses’ attack on Egypt largely to Phanes of Halicarnassus. Phanes was evidently a high-ranking Greek mercenary in the military hierarchy of the Egyptian Pharaoh, Psammetichus III, but had ultimately become disgruntled with the conditions of his service in Egypt. Herodotus tells us that much, but fails to give any detail on exactly what Phanes’ complaint was, telling us only that:10
One of the Greek mercenaries of Amasis, a Hallicarnassian called Phanes, a brave and intelligent soldier, being dissatisfied for some reason or other with Amasis, escaped from Egypt by sea, with the object of getting an interview with Cambyses.
Whatever Phanes’ reasons for dissatisfaction, we can only assume that they must have been very serious, given his actions. We have already noted that defection was neither a common nor a desirable trait amongst mercenaries, as it led to an unwanted reputation, and ultimately would affect the employment prospects of all. We must remember too that Phanes left his sons behind in Egypt, as well making them an inevitable target of the regime after his desertion became known.
The potential implications of such a high-ranking defection were not lost on Amasis, and he immediately attempted to track down the fleeing Greek. Phanes was ultimately tracked down and captured in Lydia, before he reached Cambyses, but he effected his escape by inducing his captors to become blind drunk, then slipped away into the night. Shortly afterwards, he reached the court of Cambyses and gained an audience with the Great King. Phanes formulated a plan as to how Cambyses could get a substantial army across the Arabian Desert and enter Egypt almost undetected, and before Psammetichus could react to stop him. Cambyses was perhaps lucky, in that, shortly prior to this, Amasis had died and his son, Psammetichus III, succeeded to the throne of Egypt. The transition between the two rulers would inevitably have led to a degree of stasis, and unfortunately for Egypt it was at exactly the wrong time.
The plan proposed by Phanes was to seek the assistance of, and ultimately befriend, the Bedouins of that region. Cambyses was, in Herodotus’ words, ‘anxious to launch his attack on Egypt’, and was evidently persuaded of the potential of Phanes’ plan.11 It appears to have taken very little time for Cambyses to organize an invasion force, and we can assume that his troops were in a state of near-readiness, as the invasion was contemplated before the arrival of Phanes. Cambyses quickly launched the attack by marching towards the Arabian Peninsula, where he did indeed receive the assistance of the Bedouins, described in detail by Herodotus, although we do not know what he gave in return for their assistance. 12
When Cambyses had successfully crossed the Arabian Peninsula, the two armies came face to face and made preparations for battle at Pelusium. Herodotus tells us:13
Before the battle the Greek and Carian mercenaries who were serving with the Egyptians contrived the following against Phanes in their anger at his bringing a foreign army against Egypt: they seized his sons, whom he had left behind, and brought them to the camp, where they made sure their father could see them; then, placing a bowl in the open ground between the two armies, they led the body up to it one by one, and cut their throats over it. Not one was spared, and when the last was dead, they poured wine and water onto the blood in the bowl, and every man in the mercenary force drank.
Once this hideous crime had been perpetrated by the Greek mercenaries in Egyptian service, battle was joined. The battle was hard fought and brutal–unsurprising, given its prologue. The Rhodians and Ionians on the side of the Egyptians were evenly matched by the Ionian and Aeolian Greeks employed by Cambyses and the Persians. Herodotus tells us nothing that would allow us an attempt at a reconstruction of the battle, save that the Greeks fighting for Psammetichus were slaughtered by their counterparts in Persian service. Whether or not Phanes survived the battle is not recorded.14
We have mentioned the figure of 30,000 Greek hoplites in Egyptian service at this time, and, given their quality and the general lack of quality of Persian heavy infantry, it seems a likely guess that the Persians would have fielded similar numbers of Greek mercenary hoplites too, but we have no positive evidence for this supposition. The victory was decisive for Persia; Egypt was under Persian control until c.404.
During each of the three main periods of Egyptian rebellion against Persian rule–first against Darius I, then Xerxes and finally Artaxerxes–Greek mercenaries fought on both sides. They were soldiers and showed no national or pan-Hellenic sentiment at all. On each occasion the fighting was vicious and no quarter was asked or given. Greek mercenaries cared little who their enemies were; they were professionals, after all.
At the end of the Persian occupation, when Alexa
nder ‘liberated’ Egypt, Greek mercenaries were still to play a significant role in the life of the country. From the very first piratical raids that resulted in mercenary service, Greeks have a history spanning many hundreds of years of continuous mercenary service, with many and various paymasters in Egypt.
Greece
Aristotle is as responsible as anyone for creating the image that tyrants relied heavily upon mercenaries to prop up their regimes. Unfortunately for the tyrants, there is actually a great deal of truth in his assertion: 15
It is also in the interests of a tyrant to make his subjects poor, so that he may be able to afford the cost of his bodyguard, while the people are so occupied with their daily tasks that they have no time for plotting.
The bodyguard that Aristotle notes were the mercenaries, apparently employed by raising taxation on the ordinary folk of a city-state. The tyrant’s priority was, therefore, maintaining his power through the employment of a bodyguard of professional mercenaries.
Aristotle does draw the distinction between tyrants at different periods in history. Those of the fourth century, and indeed those in Sicily, were undoubtedly military demagogues, whereas their earlier counterparts were men who generally came to pre-eminence in their cities because of civil or economic strife within their respective cities, and they, generally speaking, had a positive impact upon their respective states, even if some did maintain small mercenary bodyguards. 16
The early tyrants, those of the seventh and sixth centuries, did not employ armies of mercenaries. They sometimes employed a bodyguard, as noted above, but even that was not a general rule. These mercenaries were few in number and were never asked to participate in territorial expansion in the same way as those in Sicily or in fifth-century and (to a greater extent) fourth-century Greece.
In order to judge the picture with regards to mercenaries propping up the rule of tyrants, we should examine some specific examples. Timagenes of Megara, Cypselus of Corinth, Pisistratus of Athens and Dionysius the Elder of Syracuse all came to power, according to Aristotle, by acting as populist politicians and taking action against the wealthy in their respective city-states. 17 The result being that they were popular rulers and had a bodyguard voted to them. Whether or not they were mercenaries does not survive, but is often assumed.
Cypselus of Corinth and his son Periander in the seventh and sixth centuries were the first two tyrants of Corinth, and their rules demonstrate a significant development in terms of style, in many ways a forerunner of what we see from Pisistratus in the later sixth century in Athens. Cypselus was one of those seventh-century tyrants who rose to prominence, and remained so because of his popularity with the populace. We are also explicitly told that he did not keep a bodyguard. Periander, on the other hand, changed the character of the Corinthian tyranny somewhat, and he was aided in this by the maintenance of a mercenary bodyguard of some 300 strong. This force was entirely directed towards maintaining his powerbase; it was not large enough to be used for territorial expansion. 18
The early tyranny in Sicyon is another example of one in which mercenaries were not hired as a bodyguard to support the regime. Aristotle describes the government thus:19
For the longest-lived was the tyranny at Sicyon, that of the sons of Orthagoras and of Orthagoras himself, and this lasted a hundred years. The cause of this was that they treated their subjects moderately and in many matters were subservient to the laws, and Cleisthenes because he was a warlike man was not easily despised, and in most things they kept the lead of the people by looking after their interests.
Tyranny and despotism are not the same thing, as noted earlier. It seems from this passage that tyrants can maintain a dynasty without the use of mercenaries; this was not the attitude of the Pisistratids in Athens, however. Pisistratus began his reign in Athens in the sixth century with a bodyguard that was voted to him of citizen club-bearers only. Even after his return from the first period of exile the situation changes little. 20 After his second exile, enforced because of a scandal between himself and his wife, the daughter of Megacles, his return to power was a different affair. Herodotus tells us:21
Pisistratus, learning what was going on, went alone away from the country altogether, and came to Eretria, where he deliberated with his sons. The opinion of Hippias prevailing, that they should recover the sovereignty, they set out collecting contributions from all the cities that owed them anything. Many of these gave great amounts, the Thebans more than any and in course of time, not to make a long story, everything was ready for their return: for they brought Argive mercenaries from the Peloponnese, and there joined them on his own initiative a man of Naxos called Lygdamis, who was most keen in their cause and brought them money and men. So after ten years they set out from Eretria and returned home.
Pisistratus returned to Athens as commander of a significant force of mercenaries, which he used to first seize, and then secure, power. This was a policy continued by his sons during their tyrannies in Athens. The career of Pisistratus is a microcosm of the changing attitude of tyrants, and indeed their attitude to, and use of, mercenaries to prop up their regimes. Pisistratus began his rule by popular consent with a bodyguard of citizens voted to him; after his second period of exile, he ruled as a military dictator at the head of a significant force of mercenaries.
By the end of the sixth century it was commonplace for tyrants to employ a bodyguard, and it became exceptional for them not to do so. The age of tyrants was, however, coming to an end in Greece. This change in political outlook also had a major impact upon the Greek mercenary. The city-states were becoming more prosperous and more stable; they both needed their citizens and could find meaningful employment for them. The hardships that had driven many to seek out the life of the mercenary as (in their eyes perhaps) the only means they had of feeding themselves and their families were now ending. Simply put, mercenary service was less attractive. The city-states themselves were becoming more stable entities too, less in need of relying upon a strong individual for leadership, and less willing to tolerate such individuals when they arose. The end of the sixth century and the beginning of the fifth, therefore, saw both the end of tyranny in Greece and the (temporary) end of mercenary service on the mainland. These political changes were not mirrored in Sicily, however.
Sicily
Sicily was a major area of employment for Greek mercenaries throughout the Classical period. The zenith of recruitment was in the fourth century, but even during the Archaic period the numbers were surprisingly large by comparison to the numbers employed on the mainland. The earliest mention of Greek mercenaries in Sicily has been questioned, largely because the reference is only in Polyaenus (second century AD), and secondly because of his poor use of specific terminology:22
Panaetius first stirred up the poor and the infantry against the wealthy and the horsemen on the grounds that the latter benefited from wars whilst the former lost a great deal . . . he had 600 peltasts ready for his attempt to take power.
The first part of the quotation is entirely in line with what we have seen of the early tyrants in Greece. Their bids for power were made using the image of themselves as representatives of the poor against the rich (generally speaking), and in my view this lends a certain credence to the passage as a whole. The main legitimate criticism is of Polyaenus’ use of the word πελταστααi (peltasts); Thracian peltasts had not yet reached Sicily, and therefore Polyaenus appears to have been using the incorrect term. This could, however, be nothing more than a later historian not fully appreciating that the term ‘peltast’ was the incorrect one in this context. He was perhaps using the term in a more generic sense, to refer to light-armed troops. I do not believe that the rejection of this evidence for early tyranny in Sicily is justified solely on the grounds of Polyaenus using an incorrect term in his work.
Other than the potential for the above reference, the first tyrant in Sicily for which we have sound evidence is Hippocrates of Gela. 23 Hippocrates not only employed mercenari
es within his bodyguard, but he is the first recorded example of a tyrant employing Sicel mercenaries (the indigenous peoples of Sicily); barbarian mercenaries were to become relatively common in the fourth century in Sicily, but were unknown before Hippocrates. It is not recorded why Hippocrates chose to employ barbarian mercenaries over Greeks; the Greeks employed in Sicily and elsewhere had acquitted themselves adequately over the years and it does not, therefore, appear to have been an issue with quality. There could conceivably have been supply issues, or perhaps the Sicels were a cheaper option to a tyrant who needed significant numbers of mercenaries (given his aim of conquering the whole of Sicily). It is also possible that the Sicels were specialists in some fashion, in the same way that Thracian peltasts or Cretan archers became highly desirable troops in the later fifth and fourth centuries. There were probably two reasons for this. The first is that these Sicel mercenaries would have had inside knowledge of their own city and region, vital for Hippocrates given his intention to campaign against them. The second was that the more Sicels he hired, the fewer he would meet in battle in the coming campaign. The decision to hire these barbarian mercenaries was not, therefore, a cultural or political choice, indicating a change in public opinion in some way, but a deliberate strategic attempt to denude their city of able-bodied warriors as far as he could. Herodotus tells us of Hippocrates’ fate:24
Hippocrates was the tyrant of Gela for the same length of time as his brother Cleander (seven years), and died attacking Hybla during a campaign against the Sicels.
The tyranny of Hippocrates, and perhaps tyranny generally, was very unpopular in Gela. Upon the death of the tyrant the people tried to ‘throw off the yolk of tyranny’ and to install a more popular form of government, but the power of the tyrant was still strong. Hippocrates’ two sons, Eucleides and Cleander, gathered together the forces loyal to their father and attempted to crush the popular uprising. Herodotus tells us that neither man succeeded Hippocrates, but that: 25
Mercenaries in the Classical World- To the Death of Alexander Page 5
