His [Hippocrates’] death gave Gelon his opportunity: masking his real purpose under the pretence of supporting Hippocrates’ sons, Eucleides and Cleander, in their struggle against the people of Gela, who were eager to throw off the yolk, he crushed the insurgents by force of arms, and then, robbing the two young men of the fruits of their victory, seized power himself.
Gelon was a man with a significant military reputation, which he gained commanding the cavalry of the former tyrant, and he was evidently hungry for power. Soon after seizing the tyranny of Gela for himself, he also captured Syracuse by taking advantage of internal difficulties in that great city. The slaves (Cyllyrii, as Herodotus calls them) had banded together with the lowest rungs of society in order to expel the wealthy landowners. They succeeded for a time, forcing them to flee to Casmene with only what they could carry. The slaves and the commoners had little to no knowledge of how to run or defend a major city, and they were utterly unprepared for leadership. Gelon took advantage by aligning himself with the exiles and marching on Syracuse at the head of his army of mercenaries. The commoners realized instantly that they had no chance and immediately surrendered the city. We can only imagine the retribution that would have been exacted upon them and their slave allies. Gelon, no doubt by agreement with the wealthy elite, took control of Syracuse as tyrant. This was a far more important and substantial city than Gela, which he quickly lost interest in. He appointed his brother, Hieron, to rule Gela in his name, while he set about fortifying and strengthening Syracuse, also populating it with the inhabitants of local towns, which he razed to the ground.26
Herodotus’ narrative does not give us any real insight into how Gelon used his undoubtedly large contingent of mercenaries to further his ambitions in Sicily, but his response to the delegation from Sparta (this was in 481/0, when the Persians were on the brink of invading Greece) does give us some clues as to the size of the forces he had at his disposal. Herodotus tells us of the envoys from Greece: 27
Envoys from Greece arrived in Syracuse, approached Gelon, and spoke to the following effect: ‘We have been sent by the Spartans and their allies to obtain your help against the foreigner. You are, of course, aware of what is coming to Greece; that a Persian is about to bridge the Hellespont and to march against us out of Asia with all the armies of the east at his back, and that his true purpose, which he veils under the pretence of an attack on Athens, is the subjugation of the whole of Greece. Your power is great; as lord of Sicily you possess no inconsiderable portion of the Greek world; we ask you, therefore, to help us, and to add your strength to ours in our struggle to maintain our country’s liberty . . . Do not imagine that if the Persians defeat us in battle they will not afterwards visit you.
Gelon was not impressed by the plea from the Spartan envoy. In response, he noted that when he had been in a similarly difficult situation at the mercy of the Carthaginians he had made a similar plea to the Greeks for assistance, and was ignored. He was left to deal with the foreign invader himself. He also noted that he had been ultimately successful in that endeavour, and that he was now in a very strong position, and further pointed out that the tables had turned.
Gelon was, however, a great political opportunist and said to the envoys: 28
Though you treated me with contempt, I will not imitate your conduct. I am willing to help you by a contribution of 200 triremes, 20,000 hoplites, 2,000 cavalry, 2,000 archers, 2,000 slingers and 2,000 light horsemen; and I undertake to provision the entire Greek army for as long as the war may last. My offer, however, is subject to one condition–that the supreme command of the Greek forces against the Persians shall be mine. On any other terms I will neither come myself nor send troops.
One can imagine the Spartan response; they were singularly unimpressed by the terms of Gelon’s offer. They desperately needed the Sicilian troops, but there would be no possibility of the Spartans allowing their own troops to be commanded by a Sicilian tyrant. They did recognize them as fellow Greeks, but the Spartans would certainly not have seen them as equals. The Spartans evidently realized that they were in a very difficult position, but their pride (or arrogance) impelled them to reject Gelon’s offer.
It is easy to see why Gelon would have made such an offer; his successes in Sicily were complete, and he was looking for further opportunities. He would have imagined a major military success on the mainland, which would have led to inevitable territorial expansion, but his demand for command was a step too far.
In terms of what Gelon offered, we can safely assume that many of the hoplites would have been mercenaries, although this is not explicitly recorded. We do know that Hippocrates had a large body of mercenaries, and that part of the reward he offered for service was citizenship, also that a number were settled in Gela. Upon seizing the throne, Gelon continued the policy of settling mercenaries after a period of service; Diodorus notes that 10,000 were settled in Syracuse alone. Gelon would also have made good the losses in numbers by hiring many more mercenaries to replace those who were no longer on active duty. Some of those mercenaries would have been amongst those troops promised to the Greek cause, whilst still retaining a greater force than that which he proposed to send to Greece.
With hindsight, it may have been fortuitous for Gelon, and indeed Sicily as a whole, that the Spartans had rejected his offer of assistance against the Persians, as the Carthaginians chose this moment to become more actively involved in the affairs of Sicily, by supporting a northern alliance against a southern alliance of Syracuse and Acragas. The Carthaginian invasion that soon followed this supporting of the northern alliance was a significant one and required every resource Gelon had available to repel it, including an unspecified but presumably significant number of his mercenary troops.
The decisive action came when the Carthaginians were besieging Himera. Gelon marched to the aid of the Himerans with 50,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry; the size of the Carthaginian force is not recorded.29 Diodorus tells us:
Gelon, who had likewise held his army in readiness, on learning that the Himerans were in despair set out from Syracuse with all speed, accompanied by not less than fifty thousand foot-soldiers and over five thousand cavalry. He covered the distance swiftly, and as he drew near the city of the Himerans he inspired boldness in the hearts of those who before had been dismayed at the forces of the Carthaginians.
The Carthaginians were caught surprisingly unawares by this move, as many of their force were away from the main army plundering the surrounding countryside for booty. Gelon’s cavalry easily rounded them up in droves as they were ‘without military order’; more than 10,000 of them according to Diodorus.
The capture of so many Carthaginians gave the Syracusans a great deal of confidence, and led Gelon to attempt a bold act of deception that would end the invasion, if it worked.
Gelon’s strategy was to have his cavalry circle round to the far side of the Carthaginian camp, and at a preordained time to ride up to the Carthaginians and act as though they were allies just arrived from Selinus. Once admitted by the guards, they were to find and kill Hamilcar, the Carthaginian general. Most armies in the ancient world struggled to maintain any real cohesion when their general died, and Gelon intended to attack the Carthaginians in force once news of Hamilcar’s death was relayed to them.
This was a remarkably simple yet bold strategy, and it is perhaps even more surprising that it succeeded. The cavalry were admitted to the Carthaginian camp as though they were newly arrived allies. They immediately saw and then rode for Hamilcar and killed him whilst he was making a sacrifice of his own. Diodorus describes the events for us: 30
At sunrise the cavalrymen rode up to the naval camp of the Carthaginians, and when the guards admitted them, thinking them to be allies, they at once galloped to where Hamilcar was busied with the sacrifice, slew him, and then set fire to the ships; thereupon the scouts raised the signal and Gelon advanced with his entire army in battle order against the Carthaginian camp.
Gelon’s v
ictory was total, and further cemented his place as the leading man in Sicily, tyrant or not. Gelon died shortly after this high point of his career, and his successor, Hieron, continued his policy with regard to mercenary recruitment. Afraid for his position, he immediately set about recruiting a bodyguard: 31
Hieron, who became tyrant of the Syracusans after the death of Gelon, observing how popular his brother Polyzelus was among the Syracusans and believing that he was waiting to seize the tyranny, was eager to put him out of the way, and so, enlisting foreign soldiers and gathering about his person an organized body of mercenaries, he thought that by these means he could hold the kingship securely.
Foreign, in this context, can be taken to mean Greek mercenaries. Gelon had offered citizenship to many of his former mercenaries, and many had accepted and settled into civilian life. Even if Hieron had not been wary of his brother he likely would have continued the policy of his predecessor and recruited mercenaries to replace those that had accepted citizenship and the peaceful life.
Hieron’s lasting achievement was the founding of Etna, which was likely settled with the aid of significant numbers of former mercenaries.32 He was succeeded by one of his brothers, Thrasybulus, and the process of a major mercenary recruitment drive was undertaken again. The succession of Sicilian tyrants, and the recruitment of mercenaries that it always brought, was a major source of employment opportunities for Greek mercenaries, as well as offering the possibility of a settled life and citizenship in Sicily after a period of service, although nothing was guaranteed, of course.
Thrasybulus was evidently not like his predecessors and soon proved unpopular. In Syracuse, Gelon had settled 10,000 mercenaries, of whom 7,000 were still alive. They, and the other citizens of Syracuse, led a democratic revolt against Thrasybulus and overthrew his regime. Whilst these mercenaries were a key element of the rule of the tyrants, and vital in defeating the Carthaginians and uniting Sicily, there was an undercurrent of distrust felt towards those former mercenaries by the other citizens. Once the tyranny was overthrown, the 7,000 former mercenaries were banned from taking up any magistracy in the new government.33 These men refused to accept second-class citizenship and in turn rebelled against the new government, which they expelled from Syracuse. The former mercenaries were in turn besieged by those they had just expelled. Their experience and expertise was superior, but they were outnumbered by the besieging forces. They were ultimately defeated by forces opposing them both on land and at sea.
Syracuse was not the only city in Sicily that had difficulties of this type with former mercenaries, but in most other places peaceful agreements were reached without the need to resort to violence and bloodshed.34
The rise of democracy in Sicily saw the end of Greek mercenary service in that region, until it was again threatened by the Sicilian expedition from Athens in 415, a campaign that we will return to later in this work.
Persia
During the Classical period, Persia was perhaps the largest and most significant employer of Greek mercenaries, and although the numbers involved were much lower in the Archaic period, Persia was still a sphere in which Greeks could find occasional employment overseas.
Mercenary service in the Near East did not begin with the advent of the Persian Empire. Some Greek mercenaries were employed in Egypt (as already noted), some were employed by specific Mesopotamian cities as and when they were required, and still others found employment amongst the Lydians and would have seen service against the rising power of Persia, transferring their loyalty to the latter upon the defeat of Lydia.35
One of the reasons the Persian Empire rose to dominate was because their great wealth allowed them to hire as many Greek mercenaries as they needed. It was also becuse of the realization that Greek hoplites were simply superior to any heavy infantry that the Persian Great Kings could either train themselves or hire from other sources. It is worth noting, as we will discover later in this work, that when employed on the Greek mainland, mercenaries were almost always lightly armed; in service overseas they were almost exclusively heavily armed hoplites.
In the next chapter, we will examine the mercenaries of the fifth century, including those in Persian service, but for now it is sufficient to note that the Persians employed troops from a wide range of geographical areas; their armies were truly multinational. With this employment of professional mercenary soldiers, the Persian army gradually lost its militia origins and became a more professional force itself. Indeed, it is true to argue that the very history of the mercenary soldier is the history of the rise of professionalism on the battlefield.
After the defeat of the Medes in 550/49, Cyrus the Great, the first Great King of the new Persian Empire, formed a powerful standing army of both Persians and Medes. As has been noted by others, the Medes were allies rather than mercenary soldiers, but as Persian influence spread, the influx of foreign mercenaries into the Persian army grew steadily.36 Shortly after the fall of the Medes to the Persians, Croesus of Lydia launched a pre-emptive war against Cyrus. The Lydian king was evidently worried about the growing strength and unpredictability of the new power to his east.37
The Lydian army consisted largely of heavy infantry, which included Ionian Greek mercenaries from the Aegean. 38 There were, however, a significant number of heavy cavalry too; these were of excellent quality and probably were the major threat to the Persian forces. The war began with Croesus invading Cappadocia; from there, Croesus could attack the Iranian plateau or modern Azerbaijan with relative ease. 39 Cyrus did not wish to wait for the Lydian king to capture any more of his newly won territory and marched out to meet the invader shortly after news of the invasion was received; one of the benefits of maintaining a large standing army is that they can be mobilized quickly when the need arises. The Persian army crossed the Tigris near the small town of Arbela, close to the site of the decisive battle in 331 between Alexander and Darius at Gaugamela. Once safely across the Tigris, Cyrus marched into the Pteria region of Cappadocia. A battle quickly ensued, which was apparently inconclusive. Cyrus’ army outnumbered that of Croesus, and the latter attributed his lack of victory to that fact alone. Unwilling to risk a further engagement because of his numerical disadvantage, Croesus retired to the relative safety of Sardis the day after the battle.
Once he arrived in Sardis, Croesus thought he had reached safety and disbanded a significant part of his army with the intention of re-forming it some months later when he expected Cyrus to advance. This act would both save him money and reduce the strain on his logistical systems. We can likely assume that at least some of those disbanded would have been mercenary troops. It was probably standard practice to disband mercenaries and allies outside of the campaigning season with the intention of recruiting again when they were needed the following year. If that is what Croesus intended, to resume the campaign after a break, then he severely underestimated the aggressive expansionism of Cyrus. Cyrus followed Croesus back to Sardis, presumably after enough of a pause to allow for the disbanding of part of Croesus’ army. Cyrus’ arrival at Sardis took Croesus completely by surprise. Despite now being heavily outnumbered by Cyrus, he chose to fight an open-field battle rather than remain within the walls and attempt to withstand a siege.
Cyrus’ stratagem was extremely interesting and unique to this point in history. He needed a tactic that would defeat the dangerous Lydian cavalry, and he found it within his baggage train. The camels that were hauling food were pressed, temporarily, into active service. They were stationed in front of an infantry unit and advanced towards the Lydian cavalry. The sight, and in particular the smell, of the camels was too much for the horses of the Lydians and they whinnied and reared, forcing their riders to dismount and fight on foot, which they were poorly equipped to do. Cyrus’ tactic with the camels had worked perfectly. Along with this tactic, Cyrus launched a barrage of missiles from archers and slingers at the Lydian lines, causing many casualties. With the Lydians thusly softened up, the Persians attacked.40
> Croesus was quickly pushed back and took refuge within Sardis with the remnants of his once-powerful army. Cyrus immediately began what was to become a brief siege, lasting only fourteen days. After the fall of Sardis, Cyrus annexed the whole of the former Lydian kingdom, thus massively expanding his burgeoning empire. His victory was not due entirely to his employment of Greek mercenaries, but they were certainly a part of the victory, as was, conversely, the disbanding of the mercenaries by Croesus. This act robbed him of a number of professional, highly trained soldiers when he needed them most.
The Lydian Empire had made good use of mercenary troops from several different regions, Egypt and Greece being perhaps the most important. With its fall, Persia became the dominant player in the Near East and therefore became a major paymaster for mercenaries too. Following the conquest of Lydia, Babylon soon followed, as did Parthia, Bactria, Sogdiana, Arachosia, Armenia and Assyria. 41 The Ionian Greek cities of Asia Minor also followed, over a period of ten years. All of the members of the newly expanded empire were required to furnish the Great King with troops upon request, although for the purposes of this work we should consider these troops to have been allies rather than mercenaries because of the political imperative on their home cities.
Cyrus was killed before he could attempt to claim the great prize of Egypt. This was accomplished by his successor, Cambyses, who employed Ionian and Aeolian Greek mercenaries, as well as Armenian and Jewish mercenary troops, on the campaign that finally brought Egypt within the Persian sphere of influence.
Mercenaries in the Classical World- To the Death of Alexander Page 6
