Although something of a disaster for the campaign, the Spartans refused to contemplate abandoning the war and organized a third force to march north. This new army was commanded by King Agesipolis. Agesipolis was given a staff of thirty Spartiates, as Agesilaus had before him. The army was recruited from across Spartan society, with many wealthy perioeci volunteering. Along with these was a group of bastard children, the sons of Spartans and helot women, and a body of ‘Spartan-trained’ (that is, foreigners) who were raised in the Spartan system, as Xenophon’s own sons were. On top of these men from Sparta were contingents from some allied states and cavalry from Thessaly. 27 The new army was thoroughly familiar with Spartan society and we can assume that each man was a trained warrior. This army should have been powerful, but it ultimately fared little better, again because of the limitations imposed by leadership. The Spartans lost another commander when Agesipolis died of fever whilst besieging Olynthus. Despite incompetence, defeats and untimely death, the Spartans ultimately starved Olynthus into surrender and the Chalcidian League was dissolved temporarily.
The year 379 saw victory for the Spartan army in the north, supported by the remnants of the defeated mercenary army. It also saw the return of Pelopidas and the loss of Spartan control over Thebes and the Boeotian League. Sparta and Athens were also once again at war following an aborted attack on Piraeus by the Spartan general Sphodrias. For their mutual benefit, Athens and Thebes entered into an alliance shortly before Agesilaus attacked Boeotia with a force of 20,000 troops, many of whom were mercenary peltasts, with the intention of dismantling the Boeotian League permanently.28
Agesilaus conducted campaigns in two successive seasons, 378 and 377, although notably he and his army returned to the Peloponnese during the winter. These two campaigns saw a major development in the quality and tactical usage of mercenary peltasts. The 378 offensive began with Agesilaus occupying the high ground, including a number of key mountain passes. This way he could control the terrain and the movement of peoples. When he entered the Boeotian plain he discovered that the Thebans had not been idle. There was an extensive network of ditches and a stockade newly constructed around 20 stades from Thebes to defend it from attack.
When the Athenians heard of Agesilaus’ invasion of Boeotia, they sent 5,000 mercenary peltasts and 200 cavalry, under the command of Chabrias, to aid the Thebans.29 Agesilaus saw the combined Theban and Athenian force in a well prepared defensive position and reasoned that they would not be tempted into the plain. He therefore advanced towards the fortifications. Diodorus brilliantly narrates Chabrias’ greatest victory, and is an excellent example of the employment of mercenary peltasts: 30
As for Agesilaus, he led out his army in battle array against the Boeotians, and, when he had drawn near, in the first place launched his light-armed troops against his opponents, thus testing their disposition to fight him. But when the Thebans had easily from their higher position thrust his men back, he led the whole army against them closely arrayed to strike them with terror. Chabrias the Athenian, however, leading his mercenary troops, ordered his men to receive the enemy with a show of contempt, maintaining all the while their battle lines, and, leaning their shields against their knees, to wait with upraised spear. Since they did what they were ordered as at a single word of command, Agesilaus, marvelling at the fine discipline of the enemy and their posture of contempt, judged it inadvisable to force a way against the higher ground and compel his opponents to show their valour in a hand-to-hand contest, and, having learned by trial that they would dare, if forced, to dispute the victory, he challenged them in the plain.
Agesilaus was forced to withdraw to the plain, and Chabrias’ men demonstrated superb discipline by not following up their attack and potentially turning a victory into a disastrous defeat. The Spartans, for a while at least, were happy to content themselves with plundering the land that they could easily reach on their side of the fortifications. Over a period of several days the Spartans, after breakfast, moved their forces along the fortifications in one direction or another, and their movements were mirrored by the Theban defenders. After this had gone on for several days (or more likely weeks), Agesilaus roused his men earlier than normal and made sacrifice at dawn; he then attacked the defenders before the Thebans were ready, as they had gotten used to the Spartans taking breakfast at a regular time. The ruse worked, and the Spartans got past the defences and pillaged the land up to Thebes itself.31
But when Agesilaus had noted that it was always after breakfast that the enemy also appeared, he offered sacrifice at daybreak, led his army forward as rapidly as possible, and passed within the stockade at an unguarded point. Then he devastated and burned the region within the enclosure up to the walls of the city. After doing this and withdrawing again to Thespiae, he fortified their city for the Thespians. There he left Phoebidas as governor, while he himself crossed the mountain again to Megara, disbanded the allies, and led his citizen troops back home.
Agesilaus had retired early in the campaigning season, and Phoebidas, feeling confident after seeing a Spartan army devastating Theban lands, maintained the pressure on Thebes by continuing the raids. With the Spartans having withdrawn, the Thebans felt they could free themselves of this quasi-siege. They gathered together their heavy infantry, and a detachment of cavalry, and marched into Thespian territory.32
But when they were within the territory of Thespiae, Phoebidas pressed them close with his peltasts and did not allow them to stray at any point from their phalanx; so that the Thebans in great vexation proceeded to retreat more rapidly than they had advanced, and their mule-drivers also threw away the produce which they had seized and pushed for home; so dreadful a panic had fallen upon the army.
Xenophon gives an excellent description of the impotence of heavy infantry when faced by light infantry if the hoplites are unsupported and the peltasts are well-commanded and disciplined. The Theban hoplites were too slow to charge the peltasts, and if they tried they likely would expose the flanks of the charging troops and leave themselves vulnerable. Much the same was true of the cavalry; there were likely too few of them to charge the peltasts successfully. The peltasts could not directly engage the hoplites, but could continue to harry them. The vulnerability of unsupported hoplites was becoming a common feature of Greek warfare, and the rise of the peltasts saw the end to exclusively heavy infantry engagements.
Phoebidas pressed his advantage and moved forward, with his peltasts in front and hoplites behind, following the line of retreat of the Thebans. During the retreat the Theban cavalry had become separated from the infantry and found themselves trapped against a ravine. The Thespian peltasts, apparently relatively few in number and well in advance of the hoplites, closed on them. Having little option, the cavalry charged the Thespians, who were quickly routed. They fled in disorder back down the road to their city, many peltasts being killed in the retreat, along with Phoebidas himself. Along the way they encountered the supposedly stout hoplites, but these also turned and fled, thus ending the Thespian ambitions on Thebes, for that year at least. The Thespian forces had fallen into the all-too-common trap of pursuing a seemingly defeated enemy, and doing so without maintaining any discipline or cohesion, the exact opposite of what we saw from the superior troops of Chabrias.
For some time the Spartans had been accepting financial contributions from their allies in lieu of troops. This financial clout allowed Sparta to hire mercenary armies when required, without greatly worrying about the cost; it was recoverable from her allies after all. The year 377 saw another sizeable invasion on Boeotia by Agesilaus and a largely mercenary army, but the actions were on a small scale and indecisive. The main impact of the second invasion was the devastation, once again, of Theban farmland. The result was that for two consecutive years they could gather no crops.
This Boeotian campaign is interesting partly because of Chabrias’ brilliant action of 378, and partly because of the increasing reliance upon mercenary forces. Sparta and Thebes hi
red large numbers of mercenary peltasts for the campaign, as did both Athens and Thespiae. There was seemingly never a shortage of mercenaries available at short notice anywhere in Greece. The increasing demand was easily met by the readily available supply. It is further interesting that even small states like Thespiae could afford to hire mercenaries in reasonable numbers, implying that they were readily available, but also that they were an inexpensive option. Mercenaries were becoming the preferred option when city-states had available finances and did not wish to risk the lives of their own citizens. Their increasing professionalism was also starting to set them apart from the citizen soldier. We can reasonably assume that Athenian citizens would not have had the training or discipline to act as Chabrias’ men had done.
By 374, Theban influence was growing; she had regained, by various means, a number of cities that had been former members of the Boeotian League. Athens was also regaining some of her former confidence and was wining over allies. Sparta, on the other hand, was finding it increasingly difficult to maintain her position of pre-eminence in the Greek world. This is amply demonstrated by Athens’ attempt at a show of power by sailing her fleet, commanded by Timotheus, around the Peloponnese in order to reach her new western ally, Corcyra. They ensured that they were constantly within view of the land, a demonstration to Sparta if ever there was one.33
Sparta was far from a spent force, however, and she quickly manned her own fleet under the command of Nicolochus and sailed out to meet Timotheus. The naval battle that ensued is not described in detail in the sources, but Nicolochus was initially defeated and withdrew. Once he had received reinforcements that arrived too late for the initial engagement, he again sailed to meet Timotheus, who this time elected not to sail out to meet the Spartan admiral. Perhaps the Athenian fleet was more damaged than we realize, and they had no reinforcements to bolster their numbers. Either way, a second naval engagement was avoided.
The following year, the Spartans used a convenient oligarchic pretext to support Zacynthus against the Athenians, and similarly dispatched a fleet to Corcyra in order to liberate it from Athenian control. Diodorus tells us that: 34
The Lacedaemonian, aware of the great importance that Corcyra had for the aspirants to sea power, made haste to possess themselves of this city.
Xenophon adds that the Spartans also sent an embassy to Dionysius of Syracuse pointing out that it would not be in his interests for the Athenians to possess Corcyra either, although we have nothing recorded as to his response.
The Spartans appointed Mnasippus as the commander of the fleet and the expedition. He had at his disposal an unspecified number of Peloponnesians (probably allies or emancipated helots) and ‘at least’ 1,500 mercenaries. They landed on Corcyra unopposed, and apparently had free reign to plunder at will. Xenophon gives an excellent description of the destruction wrought by a mercenary army:35
Now when he had disembarked he was master of the country, laid waste the land, which was most beautifully cultivated and planted, and destroyed magnificent dwellings and wine-cellars with which the farms were furnished; the result was, it was said, that his soldiers became so luxurious that they would not drink any wine unless it had a fine bouquet. Furthermore, very many slaves and cattle were captured on the farms.
Corcyra was a mercenary’s paradise; it was wealthy and undefended, and the Spartans seemingly gave their mercenaries free reign. Members of the expedition of the 10,000 dreamed of a situation like this one, rather than what they actually saw in Asia. The Lacaedemonian forces, after pillaging the land and outlying farmsteads and mansion houses, retired to a hill overlooking both the city and the harbour. From that vantage point they could control access to both the city and the island as a whole. The city of Corcyra was effectively under siege without the Spartans needing any special siege equipment, and without any Peloponnesian loss of life.
The Corcyrians were worried, and they evidently possessed no significant army (and did not have the transport capacity to reach a mercenary recruiting ground with any amount of cash). They had to content themselves with being under a state of siege, and as the food began to run out they approached Athens for aid. The Athenians agreed that they needed to pursue the matter vigorously. Ctesicles with a force of 600 mercenaries was sent to the island, landed under cover of darkness and immediately made their way to the city to strengthen the garrison. They were a mixed blessing, since they were extra mouths to feed but were not enough to defeat the Peloponnesians. 36 The Athenians also attempted to man a fleet, but could not find enough sailors in Athens. She sailed some vessels to the islands under her control in a recruitment drive; the result was that the navy was largely manned by mercenaries. The fleet was commanded by Iphicrates.
On Corcyra the Spartan commander, Mnasippus, was on the verge of victory. Every day deserters from the city were approaching the army in the hope of receiving food. Some he captured and treated as slaves, but when the numbers deserting became too high he drove them back to the city with whips. The inhabitants of the city refused to allow them back in, believing them to be little better than slaves themselves, and many died between the two forces. With victory in sight Mnasippus began to treat his mercenaries rather less favourably. He dismissed some from service and withheld payments from the others so that some were owed up to two months’ wages. This was not because of a lack of funds; many of the allied states of the Peloponnesian League had offered money rather than troops. Rather, this was an act of greed and an example of remarkably poor generalship.37
The mercenaries defending the city, either getting desperate or seeing an opportunity, made a sortie against Mnasippus and killed some of his men, capturing others. The Spartan ordered his men to form up to counter-attack the Athenian mercenaries: 38
And when some captains replied that it was not easy to keep men obedient unless they were given provisions, he struck one of them with a staff and another with the spike of his spear. So it was, then, that when his forces issued from the city with him they were all dispirited and hostile to him. There can be no worse state of mind for men going in to battle.
As the Peloponnesians approached the city they formed up into a standard battle line. The Athenians had set up a rear guard to protect their retreat, and Mnasippus attacked these with the troops he had stationed in the centre of his formation and drove them back. This only served to draw the Spartans on towards the walls of the city and into the graveyard where the defenders were occupying the tops of the tallest memorials, hurling stones and javelins down on the attackers. While the Spartans were thus under pressure, more troops came streaming out of the city to attack the end of the Spartan line, where the attackers were only eight ranks deep. Mnasippus could see his flank struggling and he attempted to wheel it around behind the rest of the line. As soon as they began to move, however, the defenders assumed they were retreating and redoubled their attacks. This forced the Peloponnesians to stop their defensive manoeuvre and to stand and fight. What was worse for the Spartans, the troops posted next to those on the wing began to break.39
As for Mnasippus, while he was unable to aid the troops which were hard pressed, because the enemy was attacking him in front, he was left with an ever smaller number of men. Finally, all of the enemy massed themselves together and charged upon Mnasippus and his troops, which were by this time very few. And the citizens, seeing what was going on, came out to join in the attack. Then after they had killed Mnasippus, all straightway joined in the pursuit. And they probably would have captured the very camp, along with its stockade, had not the pursuers turned back upon seeing the crowd of camp-followers, of attendants, and of slaves, imagining that there was some fighting ability in them.
With rumours rife of the impending arrival of Iphicrates, Hypermenes, the second in command of the Peloponnesian forces, gathered up what ships he could, loaded as much booty and as many slaves as they would carry, and abandoned the forces’ defensive position in considerable haste and confusion.
Iphicrates proce
eded cautiously towards Corcyra, taking possession of a number of cities in Cephalenia along the way. He had been informed of the death of Mnasippus, but was unsure of the validity of the tale, and so constantly sailed in battle order, expecting an ambush at any moment. He reached Corcyra and heard the truth of what had happened. He also heard that ten ships were approaching from Syracuse that were intended to support the troops from Sparta. Iphicrates set sail once again and captured all ten Syracusan ships and their crews, the latter of which he ransomed and returned to their home city.
Iphicrates then hired his troops out, without the permission of Athens, to the Acarnanians for their war against their Thyrian neighbours. He maintained his army by hiring it out, extorting money from allies on the mainland and activities that can only be described as blackmail. The nature of Iphicrates’ campaign is indicative of the changing nature of warfare in the fourth century. Generals were now the commanders of largely light-armed mercenary contingents, rather than a body of citizen hoplites as previously. They were also experiencing the same general changes as their troops in that they were becoming increasingly professional. Typically, generals were no longer politicians who had been elected to a position, often one to which they were unsuited. The increasing complexity and variability of warfare in the fourth century meant that specialists were needed to command troops, individuals who understood strategy and tactics, as well as possessing the necessary leadership qualities.40
In terms of a study of mercenaries, Iphicrates was not only a fine exponent of their use; he was also a major reformer of light-armed troops. The exact dating of the reforms is not relevant here; it is their nature and consequence that most interest us. The primary sources of information that we have for Iphicrates’ reforms are Diodorus and Nepos, both of whose accounts are very similar in reality. Xenophon tells us little that is of value in this regard. According to them, the most significant changes were as follows:41
Mercenaries in the Classical World- To the Death of Alexander Page 15
