Iphicrates replaced the large (shield) of the Greeks by the light pelte, which had the advantage that it protected the body while allowing the wearer more freedom of movement; the soldiers who had formerly carried the (large hoplite shield) and who were called hoplites, were henceforth called peltasts after the name of their new shields; their new spears were half as long again or even twice as long as the old ones, the new swords were also double in length. In addition Iphicrates introduced light and easily untied footwear, and the bronze harness was replaced by a linen covering, which although it was lighter, still protected the body.
Diodorus regards these changes as having been introduced into the existing hoplite troops and in the process discounts the possibility of already existing peltast-style light infantry. Diodorus’ failure to recognize the existence of peltast troops before Iphicrates is very striking and a major error. In this omission, Diodorus shows his serious lack of understanding of the military situation of the day. Modern commentators have frequently been struck with the absurdity of this, and have taken up an opposite stance. For them, the change was a trivial one and consisted chiefly of the standardizing of the existing, but rather haphazard, peltast equipment. This argument, however, simply will not do. It assumes that the lightly armed skirmishers of earlier narratives were equipped in the same manner that Diodorus describes. This cannot be the case; lightly armed skirmishers would not have carried a sword and spear twice the length of those carried by hoplites. Earlier narratives also tell of peltasts actually throwing their spears. If Iphicrates had been standardizing that which already existed, then why did he not provide his troops with these throwing spears? We are surely not to believe that they carried these as well. Some other explanation must be sought.
Was Iphicrates actually inventing a new type of peltast, one with specific and specialized equipment? The other extreme view is that Iphicratean peltasts were in no way different from Thracian peltasts. 42 On this interpretation, Iphicrates’ reforms were of little significance, as troops of exactly the same type existed already in Thrace. The truth probably lies somewhere between these two extreme positions. There was probably no uniformity of peltast equipment before Iphicrates, with some using primarily throwing spears, some longer spears, still others using swords of various sizes. The size of the shield probably varied too. I suspect, therefore, that Iphicrates studied the light infantry of his day and based his reforms around choosing from the various groups the equipment that best suited the type of soldier that he was trying to create. We may see Iphicrates, therefore, not as creating something entirely new, or as standardizing that which already existed, but as refining the equipment and tactics of the peltasts of his day. Iphicratean peltasts do not appear to have operated as skirmishing troops, as peltasts had traditionally done. Their tactical roles suggest that they were essentially acting as a more mobile and lightly armed hoplite. I have argued elsewhere that Alexander the Great’s heavy infantry were essentially this kind of peltast.43
The defeat at, and loss of, Corcyra was a disaster for Sparta. She was already struggling to cope with a gradual decline in her influence and military power, and to see a Spartan army defeated so comprehensively, and its commander killed by a relatively small group of lightly armed mercenaries, did nothing to restore confidence or morale. Sparta also suffered several earthquakes at this time, which further weakened them.
Xenophon tells us that in 371, after some kind of summit meeting between the leading powers: 44
These speeches by the Athenians won approval and the Spartans also voted for peace. The terms were that governors should be withdrawn from the cities, all forces, both naval and military, should be disbanded, and that the cities should be left independent. It was provided that in any case of violation of these terms, any state which so desired should be free to go to the help of the injured party, but that, if a state did not desire to do this, there should be no legal obligation for it to do so. On these terms the Spartans took the oath for themselves and their allies, and the Athenians and their allies took the oath separately, city by city.
Sparta was struggling at this time and she needed the peace. It is a little harder to see why Athens agreed, although she perhaps feared the consequences of a refusal; she was still in the process of rebuilding herself after prolonged conflicts that started with the Peloponnesian War. Thebes, on the other hand, staunchly refused, as she was determined to reform the Boeotian League, an act the treaty strictly forbade.
Sparta was becoming increasingly fearful of Thebes and her growing influence and ambition, and resolved, once again, to stop her. An army of around 11,000 men was gathered and placed under the command of one of the Spartan kings, Clembrotus (who was already in Phocis). The army had taken no measures at all to conceal itself as it was mustering and training. The Thebans knew well in advance that the invasion was coming and made an attempt to defend the mountain passes that they expected the Spartans to use. The Peloponnesian army advanced into Boeotian territory via less well used routes, however, and avoided potentially difficult mountain combat.
The Thebans seemed somewhat less than confident of their chances of success, sending their wives and children to Athens to ensure their safety, evidently fearing what could happen if the army was defeated. Epaminondas was elected general and he gathered together every Theban citizen of military age, as well as those amongst the allies who were willing to help, and marched to meet the invaders with an army of not more than 6,000, accompanied as they were by unfavourable omens. 45 This number seems remarkably small if it did indeed include ‘all Thebans of military age’, as Diodorus indicates. It is also interesting that there were no mercenaries in Theban service at this time, perhaps indicating a lack of funds. It cannot indicate a lack of time to prepare, as they must have realized war with Sparta was highly likely when they rejected the peace treaty and, of course, they could easily have seen the Peloponnesians preparing for the invasion.
The Spartans arrived on the battlefield of Leuctra first; they made camp, rested after their lengthy march and made preparations for battle: 46
As the Boeotians neared the enemy in their advance, and then, after surmounting some ridges, suddenly caught sight of the Lacedaemonians covering the entire plain of Leuctra, they were astounded at beholding the great size of the army.
Diodorus here rather overplays the size of the Spartan army; 11,000 was large but was not surprisingly so. The Thebans were worried, however. The troops were well aware of the bad omens at the outset of the campaign and they could see they were heavily outnumbered, almost two to one. The Theban senior commanders debated whether to even engage the Spartans or to retire and seek battle at a different place and time. Epaminondas persuaded the soldiers and his fellow commanders, citing other more positive oracles and omens, and eventually won the argument and with courage in their hearts they stood ready for battle. Epaminondas and the Thebans were further encouraged by the arrival of Jason of Pherae with 1,500 infantry and 500 Thessalian cavalry, so renowned from the campaigns of Alexander later in the fourth century. 47
After a short and confused period, during which there may or may not have been a brief armistice, both sides drew up in their respective orders of battle. For the Spartans, King Cleombrotus was on one wing and Archidamus, the son of King Agesilaus on the other:48
while on the Boeotian side Epameinondas, by employing an unusual disposition of his own, was enabled through his own strategy to achieve his famous victory.
Diodorus credits the ultimate Theban victory to Epaminondas’ tactical innovations. It is an interesting side note that Xenophon does not even mention his presence. He also notes that Archidamus was only sent out after the battle, thus removing him from any blame for the defeat; Archidamus’ father, Agesilaus, was a close friend of Xenophon and the historian may have been attempting to exonerate his friend’s son.
Epaminondas positioned himself on the wing opposite Cleombrotus, along with the bulk of his finest troops, including the soon-to-be famou
s Sacred Band. The Theban forces on this wing were much deeper than those opposing them and the clear intention was to drive through the enemy flank on that side. The Thebans were heavily outnumbered, however, and any strengthening of one area led to the inevitable concomitant weakening of another; this weakened area was the opposite wing of the Theban army. Epaminondas’ orders for the battle were simple: his wing was to advance at the double and attempt to smash through the opposing wing. His weaker wing was to withdraw gradually and avoid battle for as long as possible with the Spartans. They would not be able to avoid battle completely, but as long as they wheeled around behind the centre they could delay the battle and avoid allowing the centre to be outflanked, which would likely have happened if they had simply withdrawn straight backwards, opening a gap between their wing and the centre.
The tactic was risky but, given the numbers and the quality of the Lacedaemonian forces arrayed against him, he was forced to take risks. Timing was everything with the proposed tactic. He needed to engage Cleombrotus and defeat his wing as quickly and decisively as possible, as well as probably wheeling on the Spartan centre to outflank them. Whilst this was happening, his other wing would be steadily giving ground and avoiding battle for as long as possible; they did not have the numbers required to hold the Spartans for long if they got themselves into heavy fighting. Diodorus describes the battle: 49
When the trumpets on both sides sounded the charge and the armies simultaneously with the first onset raised the battle-cry, the Lacedaemonians attacked both wings with their phalanx in crescent formation, while the Boeotians retreated on one wing, but on the other engaged the enemy in double-quick time. As they met in hand-to-hand combat, at first both fought ardently and the battle was evenly poised; shortly, however, as Epaminondas’ men began to derive advantage from their valour and the denseness of their lines, many Peloponnesians began to fall. For they were unable to endure the weight of the courageous fighting of the elite corps; of those who had resisted some fell and others were wounded, taking all the blows in front. Now as long as King Cleombrotus of the Lacedaemonians was alive and had with him many comrades-in-arms who were quite ready to die in his defence, it was uncertain which way the scales of victory inclined; but when, though he shrank from no danger, he proved unable to bear down his opponents, and perished in an heroic resistance after sustaining many wounds, then, as masses of men thronged about his body, there was piled up a great mound of corpses.
The death of King Cleombrotus was the turning point of the battle. Diodorus continues:50
There being no one in command of the wing, the heavy column led by Epaminondas bore down upon the Lacedaemonians, and at first by sheer force caused the line of the enemy to buckle somewhat; then, however, the Lacedaemonians, fighting gallantly about their king, got possession of his body, but were not strong enough to achieve victory. For as the corps of elite outdid them in feats of courage, and the valour and exhortations of Epaminondas contributed greatly to its prowess, the Lacedaemonians were with great difficulty forced back; at first, as they gave ground they would not break their formation, but finally, as many fell and the commander who would have rallied them had died, the army turned and fled in utter rout.
The Theban victory was nothing short of stunning. For the Spartans the defeat was bad enough, but of the 700 Spartiates present 400 were killed, along with King Cleombrotus. These losses were irreplaceable in Spartan society. The numbers of full Spartan citizens had been in steady decline since the Persian Wars, and defeats like this only served to speed that trend. One of the most important consequences of the defeat, at least as far as the Peloponnese were concerned, was that almost all of the Arcadian states of the former Peloponnesian League now declared themselves to be openly independent of Sparta, and in order to protect themselves formed into a new league, the Arcadian League, enthusiastically supported by Epaminondas. Only Tegea, Orchomenus and Heraea still remained loyal to Sparta.51
In terms of mercenary activity, there were, in reality, relatively few at Leuctra, but its importance to mercenary service was that the Lacedaemonian losses forced the Spartans into a position where they needed to recruit another mercenary army at Corinth to protect the Isthmus from Theban incursions should they feel emboldened enough to try.52
Shortly after Sparta had raised her new army and positioned it for a defensive action at the Isthmus of Corinth, the newly formed Arcadian League launched an attack against those three states that had resisted joining. Sparta’s mercenaries were withdrawn to garrison Orchomenus against this new anti-Spartan aggression. The attack of the Arcadian League on their neighbours was probably part of a coordinated effort by the Thebans, as it left the Isthmus of Corinth undefended. The Spartan mercenary army, under Polytropus, had intended to meet up with that commanded by Agesilaus to deliver a decisive blow to the new league but, before they were able to achieve this, the Arcadians inflicted a decisive defeat on the Spartan mercenaries outside Orchomenus. The Spartan force was largely composed of peltasts, and they were ineptly led. The peltasts engaged the Arcadians well in advance of any hoplite of cavalry support, and were heavily defeated. Xenophon describes the defeat:53
Meanwhile the Mantineans made an expedition against the Orchomenians. And they came off very badly from their attack upon the city wall, and some of them were killed; but when in their retreat they had reached Elymia and, although the Orchomenian hoplites now desisted from following them, Polytropus and his troops were very boldly pressing upon them, then the Mantineans, realizing that if they did not beat them off many of their own number would be struck down by javelins, turned about and charged their assailants. Polytropus fell fighting where he stood; the rest fled, and very many of them would have been killed had not the Phliasian horsemen arrived, and by riding around to the rear of the Mantineans made them desist from their pursuit. The Mantineans, then, after accomplishing these things, went back home.
This was by now a fairly typical defeat for Spartan mercenaries; they pursued a fleeing enemy and found themselves far in advance of any support. The fleeing enemy reformed, turned around and attacked the disorganized and disordered mercenaries, inflicting a heavy defeat. For this to happen so frequently only indicates that Spartan commanders still had not come to terms with the capabilities and limitations of peltasts. These defeated peltasts remained loyal to the Spartan cause, however, and retreated to rejoin with Agesilaus. The Corinthian mercenaries who were also part of the Spartan mercenary army were not cut from the same cloth; they returned to Corinth as soon as their contract was over.
By the time of Epaminondas’ invasion, the winter of 370, Sparta was almost bankrupt and was faced with an army invading Laconian soil, something no Spartan had seen in his or her lifetime. At this time the Thebans rebuilt Mantinea and founded Megalopolis, which was intended to serve as the capital of the Arcadian League. After their construction efforts, and after devastating Spartan land, Epaminondas withdrew to Boeotia to consolidate his strength. We do not hear of Sparta hiring mercenaries again for quite some time; she simply could not afford them given the loss of her empire, as well as the loss of Messenia. This does not mean, however, that she was completely without mercenary troops. We do know that some were provided by allied states, and we hear of twenty ships filled with Celtic and Iberian mercenaries, along with fifty cavalry, supplied by Dionysius of Syracuse. Diodorus puts the number at 2,000 and tells us they were paid five months’ wages in advance. This is the first reference, incidentally, of Celts operating on the Greek mainland.54 These mercenaries served the Spartans well in limited actions against the Thebans until they returned to Syracuse in late summer.
The following summer Dionysius sent another similar force of mercenaries to Sparta, this time commanded by Cissidas, the man who had commanded the Syracusan expedition to Corcyra previously. Xenophon tells us:
. . . the second supporting force sent out by Dionysius arrived. And when the Athenians said that it ought to go to Thessaly to oppose the Thebans, while the Laced
aemonians urged that it should go to Laconia, the latter plan carried the day among the allies. Accordingly, after these troops from Dionysius had sailed round to Lacedaemon, Archidamus took them, along with his citizen soldiers, and set out on an expedition. He captured Caryae by storm and put to the sword all whom he took prisoners. From there he marched at once with his united forces against the people of Parrhasia, in Arcadia, and laid waste their land.
This passage illustrates both the different priorities of the Athenians and Spartans, now allied against the Thebans, and the increasing violence of warfare in the fourth century. The death of Dionysius I, however, ended the overseas adventures of mercenaries supplied by Syracuse. As noted above, although Sparta could no longer afford to support her own hired troops, some of her allies took the lead and supplied mercenaries. Just prior to the return to Sicily of the second mercenary army from Syracuse, help arrived from an unlikely source.
In the winter of 369/8 the satrap of Phrygia, Ariobarzanes, sent an ambassador, Philiscus, to Delphi, where he summoned the leading Greek states for a conference with the intention of establishing a lasting peace. This does seem to have been the outward intention, but there is little doubt that the ulterior motive was to stop Greek mercenaries fighting and dying in the seemingly endless Greek civil wars. If he could establish a lasting peace, he would automatically increase the numbers that would be available for a proposed rebellion by Ariobarzanes against the Great King. Philiscus perhaps did not fully understand Greek politics at the time, and he took the position that Messenia should be returned to the possession of Sparta. Even if the Thebans had been nominally in favour of peace, they would never agree to such a proposal. Philiscus saw his only option being to side with the Spartans. Once Philiscus realized this would be his only course, the meeting was dissolved and Philiscus set about hiring a mercenary army with the large amount of gold he had brought with him.55
Mercenaries in the Classical World- To the Death of Alexander Page 16
