Mercenaries in the Classical World- To the Death of Alexander

by Stephen English

  Philiscus raised a large number of mercenaries, of which he left 2,000 in the Peloponnese with their wages paid in advance. We are not told what he did with the rest, but it is a reasonable assumption that he took them with him back to Asia Minor, as was the original intention.56 These loans of mercenaries from Syracuse and Ariobarzanes, when taken together with the fact that Sparta was not hiring any of her own at this time, only serve to indicate the dire financial situation of the rapidly declining superpower.

  The largest employer of Greek mercenaries during these years was Jason of Pherae, who employed a standing force of 6,000. These were nominally on the side of the Thebans, although they may well have arrived too late to assist at Leuctra, and they argued against an all-out assault on the fleeing Spartans after that battle. They could easily have proved far more decisive in Greek history had Jason lived longer. He died an untimely death before he was able to stamp his name and authority indelibly on the Greek world. Jason’s death was a huge blow for Thessaly. He had been such an important local figure during his brief life that he had united the cities of that region under the banner of Pherae. As so often with the early and unexpected death of such a charismatic figure, the alliance fell apart. Some states appealed for help from Macedonia against Pherae, but she used this appeal as an opportunity to expand her own influence and annexed them (Larissa and Crannon). Other cities appealed to Thebes, and Pelopidas conducted a major campaign that ultimately repulsed Macedonia, defeated Pherae and brought Thessaly under the sphere of influence of Thebes from 369 to 364.

  At this time, similar power struggles were being fought out in the Peloponnese, with the Arcadian League breaking up, the northern states returning to Spartan control (or influence, at least) and the southern states siding with Tegea, and ultimately Thebes. The Thebans had generally been too focussed on their actions in Thessaly and against Macedonia to pay too much attention to the Peloponnese, but the political actions there had undoubtedly strengthened Sparta and weakened Thebes.57

  In 362, Epaminondas marched into the Peloponnese for a fourth time, this time in order to support Tegea in Arcadia against Mantinea (likely a pretext for another invasion of the Peloponnese). He had at his command ‘. . . all the Boeotians, the Euboeans, and many of the Thessalians.’58 Only the Phocians were not present, citing their alliance with Thebes as being defensive, and there was nothing in their treaty to compel them to take part in this campaign. Epaminondas had at his disposal a large army, despite the absence of the Phocians. He also knew that he would receive support from the Peloponnesian states that were still opposed to Sparta. Xenophon tells us that Epaminondas understood that he would have support from . . .59

  . . . the Argives, the Messenians, and such of the Arcadians as held to their side. These were the Tegeans, the Megalopolitans, the Aseans, the Pallantians, and whatever cities were constrained to adopt this course for the reason that they were small and surrounded by these others.

  Epaminondas set out from Thebes in great haste, hoping to catch the Peloponnesians unprepared. This was strategically sound, and could well have worked but, when he reached Nemea, he paused for what appears to be perhaps a week in the hope of intercepting the Athenians forces as they marched to the Peloponnese to the aid of their allies. He reasoned that if he could catch the Athenians, and defeat them, this would be a major blow to his opponents, whilst simultaneously being a huge morale boost to his own allies in the Peloponnese. Again, this sounds like a perfectly reasonable strategy, but the limitations of military intelligence in the ancient world are manifest in this example as he was unaware that the Athenians had changed their plans and were actually sailing to the Peloponnese rather than marching through the Isthmus of Corinth. To compound this error, his delay at Nemea had allowed the Peloponnesians time to gather their forces together to oppose his invasion. Epaminondas recovered quickly, however, and moved his troops to Tegea. Xenophon’s comments on the opening of the campaign are enlightening:60

  Now in my view this campaign of his was not a lucky one, but I must say that both for planning and audacity this man cannot possibly be criticized. In the first place, I approve of his decision to make his camp inside the fortifications of Tegea. Here he was in a safer position than he would have been outside, and also the enemy was less able to observe what he was doing. It was easier, too, for him to get whatever he needed from inside the city. And with the enemy camped outside he was able to see whether their dispositions were good ones or whether they were making many mistakes.

  Despite Xenophon’s assertions of greatness, Epaminondas made a strategic error in trying to intercept the Athenians. The idea was sound, but with the benefit of hindsight his cause would have been better served if he had marched straight into the Peloponnese and attacked the Spartans whilst they were still gathering their forces and organizing themselves. The attack would likely have happened before the Athenians arrived too, thus effectively fulfilling his plan by other means.

  Whilst at Tegea, his advanced scouts informed him that the bulk of the Peloponnesian force had formed up at Mantinea, and that Agesilaus with the Spartan muster was quickly advancing towards that city to join with those already there. Epaminondas instructed his troops to partake of their lunch, and then set out on a forced march directly towards Sparta, which he believed to be undefended. By a sheer act of good fortune Xenophon tells us that a Cretan saw what Epaminondas was attempting and managed to reach Agesilaus in time for him to turn his forces around and march back to Sparta.61 Fortunately, he reached the city before the Thebans, but it must have been a close-run thing.

  Epaminondas did not attack the city immediately, but scouted for a weak point. He found it in a hill close to the city, which he believed would give him the advantage of height if he were to attack from that direction.62

  As for what happened next, one may either hold the deity responsible, or one may say that nobody could withstand desperate men. For when Archidamus led the advance with not so much as a hundred men and, after crossing the very thing which seemed to present an obstacle, marched uphill against the adversary, at that moment the fire-breathers, the men who had defeated the Lacedaemonians, the men who were altogether superior in numbers and were occupying higher ground besides, did not withstand the attack of the troops under Archidamus, but gave way.

  Archidamus’ troops saw the Thebans retreating and pressed their advantage, but, as so often, their attempt to drive back the enemy only caused them to expose themselves as they became spread out. The Thebans fought back and both sides suffered badly. A temporary truce was called to recover the dead, and the Thebans withdrew back to Tegea, having failed in their attempt to deliver a decisive blow to Sparta. Once back at Tegea, Epaminondas dispatched his cavalry towards the Mantinea region to plunder the lands of that city as far as they could with a Peloponnesian army just outside the gates. Epaminondas told his cavalry that there were plenty of people and cattle outside of the city as it was harvest time. This may imply that the cavalry were mercenaries and this action was part of ensuring they were receiving the requisite level of payment, or it could mean that the general was planning for what could potentially become a lengthy siege and he wished to deprive the Mantineans of as much as possible while he could.

  The Athenian forces, or at the very least the cavalry, reached Mantinea in the late afternoon and immediately retired to their assigned bunks to eat and rest; their forced march had been strenuous in order to reach Mantinea so quickly. Whilst the Athenian cavalry were resting and eating, the Mantinean defenders could see the approaching Theban cavalry and immediately perceived the danger:63

  And when the enemy were seen riding toward the city, the Mantineans begged the Athenian horsemen to help them, if in any way they could; for outside the wall were all their cattle and the labourers, and likewise many children and older men of the free citizens. When the Athenians heard this they sallied forth to the rescue, although they were still without breakfast, they and their horses as well. Here, again, who would not ad
mire the valour of these men also? For although they saw that the enemy were far more numerous, and although a misfortune had befallen the horsemen at Corinth, they took no account of this, nor of the fact that they were about to fight with the Thebans and the Thessalians, who were thought to be the best of horsemen, but rather, being ashamed to be at hand and yet render no service to their allies, just as soon as they saw the enemy they crashed upon them, eagerly desiring to win back their ancestral repute.

  The Athenian cavalry fought a very vigorous action against the combined Theban and Thessalian forces and ultimately drove them off, with heavy losses on both sides. We may have assumed the Athenian cavalry would be mercenaries, but the way Xenophon describes them we can probably assume they were Athenians (from the desire to recover their dead, for example). For the Thebans, the cavalry were also nationals and allies from Thessaly.64

  Epaminondas realized that he would need to depart within a few days, as the time set for the campaign had expired. We don’t know exactly what timescale had been agreed, but there are several possibilities. Most likely is that there was a time limit placed upon the campaign by the Theban government, or perhaps in negotiation with the allies, both members of the Boeotian League and the Thessalians. Epaminondas did not want to leave the Peloponnese at this time as the invasion would have been a disaster. He had essentially been defeated at Sparta, his cavalry had been driven back at Mantinea, and if he left now his enemies had a large force already organized that would surely be used against the allies of Thebes in the Peloponnese. Therefore, the invasion would have done nothing more than galvanize his enemies and lose his friends in the region. Given that withdrawal was not an acceptable option, and with time running short, Epaminondas marched his army towards Mantinea. Epaminondas did not march directly at the Lacedaemonians, however:65

  But when he had led them forth, thus made ready, it is worth while again to note what he did. In the first place, as was natural, he formed them in line of battle. And by doing this he seemed to make it clear that he was preparing for an engagement; but when his army had been drawn up as he wished it to be, he did not advance by the shortest route towards the enemy, but led the way towards the mountains which lie to the westward and over against Tegea, so that he gave the enemy the impression that he would not join battle on that day. For as soon as he had arrived at the mountain, and when his battle line had been extended to its full length, he grounded arms at the foot of the heights, so that he seemed like one who was encamping. And by so doing he caused among most of the enemy a relaxation of their mental readiness for fighting, and likewise a relaxation of their readiness as regards their array for battle. It was not until he had moved along successive companies to the wing where he was stationed, and had wheeled them into line thus strengthening the mass formation of this wing, that he gave the order to take up arms and led the advance; and his troops followed.

  Epaminondas’ movements were a brilliant ruse to lull the Lacedaemonians into thinking that he was attempting to take up a better defensive position in the foothills. The respective dispositions are only described by Diodorus.66 Of the Lacedaemonians, he tells us that the right wing was occupied by the Mantineans and Arcadians. Next to these, between the wing and the centre, were the Lacedaemonians. In the centre were the Eleians and Achaeans, along with the weaker of the remaining forces. The Athenians occupied the left wing. For the Thebans, Epaminondas and his Theban troops occupied the left wing (which was strengthened before the advance, as noted by Xenophon), with the Arcadians forming the link between the flank and the centre. On the right wing were the troops from Argos. In the centre were the remainder of the Boeotian forces, notably those contingents from Euboea, Locris and Sicyon, along with the Malians and Aenianians. Both opposing armies also stationed detachments of cavalry beyond either wing.

  These respective dispositions tell us much about the thinking of each commander. Epaminondas stationed himself and the best of his troops on his left wing, reinforcing this sector. He clearly hoped to break through here and to force a victory by then wheeling on the enemy centre. The Peloponnesians stationed quality troops on their right too, clearly to counter this likely tactic from Epaminondas. That the Lacedaemonians (Spartans) formed a cohesive link between the right and centre also tells us they knew their wing may be pushed back, and they feared the centre being flanked. Both sides appear to have placed their weakest troops in the centre; the battle would evidently not be won and lost there. Exactly which troops among those present were mercenaries is not attested and is difficult to say. We do know that Thebes was not hiring significant numbers of mercenaries at this time, and Sparta could not afford them. If mercenaries were present, it is likely to have been from the smaller states, Arcadia and Achaea. Despite the detailed dispositions given by Diodorus, he hides the fact that, although the Peloponnesians were roughly in the battle order, they were resting, as they did not expect the Thebans to attack.67

  Now as soon as the enemy saw them unexpectedly approaching, no one among them was able to keep quiet, but some began running to their posts, others forming into line, others bridling horses, and others putting on breast-plates, while all were like men who were about to suffer, rather than to inflict, harm. Meanwhile Epaminondas led forward his army prow on, like a trireme, believing that if he could strike and cut through anywhere, he would destroy the entire army of his adversaries. For he was preparing to make the contest with the strongest part of his force, and the weakest part he had stationed far back, knowing that if defeated it would cause discouragement to the troops who were with him and give courage to the enemy.

  Epaminondas’ tactic was simple enough, and much the same as that he used at Leuctra in 371: drive through the enemy wing and wheel on the centre. He also, apparently, like Leuctra, held the weakest parts of his line back from the battle for as long as possible, lest they cause his defeat. Epaminondas also formed his left wing cavalry into a wedge to charge the Peloponnesian right, with infantry support. He also stationed troops in some foothills opposite the Athenians in order to prevent them moving to their right ring to bolster that sector. He planned to win or lose the battle on the Theban left.

  Epaminondas’ plan worked perfectly; he smashed though the Lacedaemonian right wing, and the rest of the enemy army, still suffering from a measure of confusion after the sudden attack, melted away once the flank had been defeated. Although Epaminondas’ left wing won a famous victory, he died during the encounter.68

  When, however, he had himself fallen, those who were left proved unable to take full advantage thereafter even of the victory; but although the opposing phalanx had fled before them, their hoplites did not kill a single man or advance beyond the spot where the collision had taken place; and although the cavalry also had fled before them, their cavalry in like manner did not pursue and kill either horsemen or hoplites, but slipped back timorously, like beaten men, through the lines of the flying enemy. Furthermore, while the intermingled footmen and the peltasts, who had shared in the victory of the cavalry, did make their way like victors to the region of the enemy’s left wing, most of them were there slain by the Athenians.

  Mantinea should have been a stunning victory for the Thebans; the Spartans and their allies were again defeated and, if not for the death of Epaminondas, the Spartans would likely have suffered just as badly as at Leuctra. As it turned out, from the Theban perspective, the battle could be considered a bloody tie at best, a nominal defeat at worst, given the loss of their charismatic general. Xenophon reports that the whole of Greece was on one side or the other and it was widely expected that this climactic battle would settle the issue of who was to rule; the defeated would become subordinate. The indecisive nature of the battle is illustrated by the fact that both sides erected a trophy for victory, and neither side tried to stop the other.

  The death of Epaminondas was a huge blow to Thebes, but it did not entirely end their brief period of hegemony in Greece; they were still ambitious into the 350s and were finally exhausted
by the Sacred War. Sparta was also profoundly weakened by her two major battles against the Thebans, and the loss of her league and the financial muscle that it brought. Ironically, the Athenians probably came out of the civil war in the best shape, having not suffered badly on land, whilst regaining some of their former Aegean possessions, including in the Hellespontine region. Athens also recaptured Euboea in 357 without much opposition. She did not have it all her own way, however. The maintenance of a large fleet was financially draining, as were the mercenary garrisons that she imposed on her overseas allies/possessions. In order for the mercenaries to remain disciplined, they needed regular payments, and Athens was not able to provide that. She was able to raise contributions from her allies, but some were suspicious of her motives and believed that she was attempting to create another empire. Some of her larger allies, particularly Corcyra, Chios, Rhodes, Byzantium and Cos, abandoned Athens and increased her financial difficulties. Athens tried to increase the taxes on the states that remained loyal, and also resorted to piracy in the Aegean. Her mercenaries stationed as garrisons in allied cities were not paid regularly, with the inevitable result that they started to raid neighbouring states to gain plunder. This obviously led to a spiralling of mistrust of Athens.69

  However, she did not take the secession of some of her former allies lightly. By gathering together a substantial fleet led by Chabrias, and a mercenary army led by Chares, she began what was to become known as the Social War (357–5). Diodorus tells of the first engagement:70