Mercenaries in the Classical World- To the Death of Alexander

by Stephen English

  Arrian shows little interest in the Persians, with the exception of the Greek mercenary infantry and of the Cardaces, who he describes as hoplites, clearly believing them to be heavy infantry. Arrian states clearly that the Cardaces were stationed to either side of the Greek mercenaries and numbered 60,000.26 Given the limitations of space in the plain, and the large mass of cavalry by the sea, it seems highly unlikely that Arrian could be correct that the Cardaces were posted to either side of the Greek mercenaries. The Cardaces are highly likely to be associated with the peltasts of Callisthenes. These peltasts were stationed along the middle section of the Pinarus River, between 1.6km and 3.5km from the coast.

  The Persians then deployed their heavy cavalry on the extreme right, commanded by Nabarzanes, screened by a group of slingers and archers. Next to these were the Greek mercenary infantry in their prepared defensive position as mentioned above. Next to these were the Cardaces of an unknown number, perhaps 20,000 strong or slightly more given the size of their frontage, commanded by Aristomedes, a Thessalian mercenary. Next to these were detachments of Hyrcanian and Median cavalry, along with a group of unspecified Persian cavalry and a detachment of javelin men and slingers deployed in front of them. The Persians also employed a reserve line behind the front, 40,000 strong in Curtius. Arrian is cautious about giving the total number of Persian troops at 600,000, reporting it as hearsay, although Plutarch gives the same figure.27 Diodorus and Justin report 400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry, whilst Curtius gives the lowest estimate: 250,000 infantry and 62,000 cavalry.28 All of these estimates may be too high, but it is likely that Alexander was, as usual, heavily outnumbered.

  Alexander drew up his heavy infantry facing the Persians, with the Companion Cavalry to the right of the infantry. A strong flank guard was assigned to the right wing, where the Persian line overlapped his own; on the left it seems that he sent the mercenary troops, along with the Peloponnesians and the rest of the allied cavalry. A curious decision, as they were essentially hoplites assigned to the sandy area next to the sea, terrain most suited to a charge by the Persian cavalry. Alexander seems to have soon realized his error and sent the Thessalian cavalry to the left wing. What then happened to the mercenaries is unclear: they could have occupied a position between the Thessalian cavalry and the Macedonian heavy infantry, similar to the role played by the hypaspists on the right of the line. They may have occupied a position on the far right of the line, equally unlikely, or they were withdrawn from the front to form part of a second line. The sources do not provide us with enough information to answer this directly; the confusion results from Arrian’s use of the word epitasso, which can mean ‘station’, either alongside or behind.29 The context of the passage would seem to make it clear that here it has to mean that the mercenaries were placed behind everybody else. The other interpretation would have the mercenaries, a medium-heavy infantry division, on the extreme left of the whole army, where it was Alexander’s practice to put his Thessalian cavalry and some light infantry support. It seems certain then that Alexander used a second line, what some may call a tactical reserve, at the Battle of Issus.

  The role of the allied infantry supplied by the League of Corinth, and the Balkan allies, is more difficult to ascertain. They are not mentioned in any of the sources as forming the second line at Issus or Gaugamela, along with the mercenaries. They were surely far too numerous to have been left behind to guard the baggage train, however. Arrian’s order of battle is not exhaustive for this campaign; the Odrysian cavalry and Balacrus’ javelin men are not mentioned either. The absence is no doubt an omission by Arrian, and not some deeper mystery that could have us inventing another campaign or some elaborate tactic simply to explain away their absence. The mercenaries and allies, therefore, seemed to form a tactically important second line. It should be realized that by ‘second line’ I mean something distinct from the front line, not simply a group of troops that attached themselves to the back of the heavy infantry taxeis, but an entirely separate line with a distinct tactical role.

  Gaugamela provides us with the best evidence for the combat role of the mercenary and allied troops. Alexander laid out his heavy infantry, Companion Cavalry and Thessalian cavalry according to his standard plan; which is to say the Thessalians to the extreme left, heavy infantry in the centre, hypaspists to their right and Companion Cavalry to the extreme right of the line. This is the general formation that was adapted at almost every opportunity, where it was appropriate, given the terrain etc. The prodromoi and a number of other minor contingents were positioned to the right of the Companions, and Menidas’ mercenary cavalry to the extreme right of the formation, with Cleander’s mercenary infantry behind them. On the left of the formation were Sitalces’ Thracian infantry and three bodies of allied or League cavalry, along with Andromachos’ mercenary horse.

  A second line of infantry was positioned parallel to the front; it consisted of the allied troops supplied from the League of Corinth and a smaller number of Balkan allies and mercenaries not stationed elsewhere. Closing the gap between the two lines on the right were Cleander’s mercenaries, the Agrianians and archers, and the corresponding position on the left. Closing the ‘box’ that was thus formed were the remainder of the Thracian infantry, those not commanded by Sitalces. The formation that was created was therefore a box with two protrusions to the right and left. It was not a closed formation, however; it would seem that the second line only extended about halfway along the formation, starting from the left wing, resulting in the left-hand half of the front line having no troops positioned behind it. This is suggested by the fact that when a small group of Bactrian cavalry broke through the front line they met no further resistance before reaching Alexander’s camp. The mercenary and allied troops at Gaugamela were positioned in order that if Alexander’s position were turned, highly likely given the discrepancy in numbers, he would not automatically be defeated. The second line could simply turn around and fight with their backs to the front line. They were there, in short, to ensure that, if the battle did not go well, Alexander could still win. Their ability to perform this function was not seriously tested but that should not detract from the potential importance of this role.

  Colonies

  After 331 when Alexander began to enter the north-eastern parts of the former Persian Empire, his mercenary and allied troops were to become increasingly important. In this region, Alexander founded a series of colonies, although they were probably rather fewer in number than was believed a few decades ago.30 This was a move perhaps partly designed to spread Greek culture, although this argument should not be exaggerated, as this was very much a by-product of their presence in these regions and not their primary function. They were primarily designed to help pacify the outer parts of the empire, and to maintain order when the main host had moved on. It was to be hoped that these new foundations, which were, essentially, military colonies, would act as a calming influence on the always potentially rebellious natives. These colonies, then, had a largely strategic rather than a tactical function. They were also partly forced upon Alexander because he had ever-increasing numbers of troops who were past service and needed to be pensioned off. The best attested evidence for a colony that we have is Alexandria in Caucaso, the modern Bagram in the central Hindu Kush Mountains at the confluence of the Gorband and Panjshir rivers. Here Alexander established a city with a nucleus of 3,000 Graeco-Macedonian settlers, soldiers no longer fit for service, and volunteers from among the mercenaries, together with 7,000 of the local population. This becomes something of a standard pattern, a blend of native and Greek/Macedonian settlers. Alexander no doubt hoped that, if there was a native revolt, these retired troops would act to suppress it, and that as a by-product of their presence they would also spread Greek culture to the furthest reaches of the known world. This later point would be an added bonus that came with the foundation of the cities, rather than a primary purpose. These cities were essentially garrison towns and administrative centres.
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  Later evidence suggests that these Greeks were far from being the willing settlers that our sources portray them as having been. On two separate occasions, they themselves effectively revolted against Alexander. The first revolt occurred in Bactria when rumour spread that Alexander had died on the Indus. Some of the Greeks revolted under the banner of Athenodorus with the express intent of returning to Greece. This insurrection, however, fell in upon itself, with Athenodorus being assassinated by Biton, who was in turn tortured for such an act by the Greek settlers themselves. Diodorus’ account of the fate of these 3,000 rebels is obscure, but Curtius has them eventually getting home.31 This small revolt was the precursor to a much larger one that occurred after Alexander’s death; it seems the Greeks were not at all happy with being left on the edge of the civilized world. They longed for home just as the Macedonians evidently did at the Opis revolt.

  Alexander, then, made great use of mercenary troops. This use grew in number and significance as the campaign wore on. In the early years, they were few in number and in reality did little. After 331, and increasingly until his death, mercenaries were a vital part of his empire, and I think it is true to say that Alexander could never have exerted any kind of influence or control on his empire without them. He could not entirely trust the Persian troops to garrison their own cities, not unless he wanted widespread revolts (even more than actually occurred). Nor did he have large enough numbers of native Macedonian troops to garrison the empire. He had no choice but to rely on mercenaries and, by and large, they did a very good job. We hear almost nothing of difficulties from them, nor, interestingly enough, do we hear many stories of wanton looting and pillaging by mercenaries (or anyone else). Alexander was wealthy enough, especially after 331, that he could pay them generously enough that they did not feel the need to supplement their income in a way that would be harmful to the effective governance of an empire.

  Persia

  In the final section of this chapter, we will look at Persia and the Persian response to the growing power of Macedonia. We have touched on Persia already in the chapter, but here we will examine their employment and deployment of mercenaries in a more systematic way than we did earlier, when the focus was on the Macedonian kings.

  Before Macedonia became the great powerhouse of the Greek world, the Persian Empire had been relatively stable for several decades, with only minor satrapal revolts for the Great Kings to manage. Their employment of mercenaries had, therefore, been limited to garrison duty, and parts of the standing armies of the western satraps. The year 340 was a minor watershed for Persian security. In that year, Philip was besieging Perinthus, the final obstacle to his achieving control of the Hellespontine region, and the last buffer between Persia and Macedonia. Artaxerxes could not allow the continued rise of Macedonian power to go unchallenged, and he would not allow Philip to gain control of the corn supply to Greece and create a border with Persia. To prevent this, he ordered his satraps in Asia Minor to send military aid to Perinthus. Diodorus tells us:32

  They consequently took counsel and sent off to Perinthus a force of mercenaries, ample funds, and sufficient stocks of food, missiles, and other materials required for operations. Similarly the people of Byzantium also sent them their best officers and soldiers. So the armies were again well matched, and as the fighting was resumed, the siege was waged with supreme determination.

  The mercenary force sent by the satraps was commanded by an Athenian, Apollodurus, who was employed by Arsites the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia.33 We are not told exactly how large this mercenary relief force was, but it slipped into Perinthus whilst Philip was besieging the city. The arrival of these mercenaries was a shot in the arm to the defenders, who fought on bravely and ultimately successfully, as Philip was forced to withdraw.

  The next major deployment of mercenaries against the Macedonians was that which opposed Parmenio and Attalus’ expeditionary force in 334. Memnon, with only 5,000 mercenaries–half as many as the Macedonians commanded–succeeded in reversing most of the gains made by Parmenio, so that by the time of Alexander’s invasion in 334 the Macedonians only controlled a small area. In many ways, of course, this was enough; all Alexander needed was a bridgehead to provide him with protection whilst his army was most vulnerable, as they disembarked from their ships.

  When Alexander landed, Memnon withdrew to Zelea, where he took part in the debate with the satraps as to the best course of action. Memnon offered advice that was, with the benefit of hindsight, perfectly sound:34

  Memnon of Rhodes advised against risking an engagement: The Macedonian infantry, he pointed out, were greatly superior in numbers; Alexander was present in person, while Darius was not. It would be better, therefore, to proceed at once to burn all of the crops, trample down and destroy grass and horse-feed, and even gut the towns, to prevent Alexander, from lack of supplies, from remaining in the country.

  Memnon was more of a pragmatist than the Persian high command: he could see the potential in Alexander, and more specifically, I think, in the Macedonian army. And as Arrian notes, he was painfully aware that the Persian army was lacking in quality infantry, especially when compared to the Macedonian host. This kind of scorched-earth policy was adopted by the Persians in the run-up to the Battle of Gaugamela in 331, and there it did force Alexander to change direction as he advanced towards Darius, but it did not stop the Macedonians and only barely slowed them down. If it had been attempted here, it may have met with more conclusive results. Alexander was painfully short of funds and needed a quick victory; he would also likely have been short on supplies, and was to an extent living off the land. The Persian satraps, however, would have none of it. They accused Alexander of being a beardless youth, hardly worth running away from, and questioned Memnon’s loyalty (he was Greek after all). Arsites, who appears to have been in overall command as the events were occurring in his satrapy, made the decision to oppose Alexander and marched towards the Granicus.

  At the battle, the Persians set up their cavalry, 20,000 in number, along the banks of the river with the Greek mercenaries, also 20,000 in number, and the only infantry the Persians had, some distance back from the river on top of a hill. There are a number of competing theories as to how the battle proceeded (Diodorus and Arrian present completely different pictures), but, whatever happened, the mercenaries took little or no part until the Persian cavalry had already retreated.35 They were too far away from the riverbank to influence events and had orders to maintain their positions. Perhaps Arsites did not want the glory of victory to go to a Greek of dubious loyalty. When Alexander had routed the Persian cavalry, he did not pursue them for long, and therefore their losses were limited. Arrian tells us:

  About 1,000 were killed–not more, because Alexander soon checked the pursuit of them in order to turn his attention to the foreign mercenaries, who had remained in their original position, shoulder to shoulder–not, indeed, from and deliberate intention of proving their courage, but simply because the suddenness of the disaster had deprived them of their wits. Ordering a combined assault by infantry and cavalry, Alexander quickly had them surrounded and butchered to a man, though one or two may have escaped notice among the heaps of the dead.

  Despite Arrian’s claim that they were butchered to a man, we know this was not the case, since the survivors that were captured were sent to a hard labour camp in Macedonia, and Memnon with several thousand slipped away to reappear several months later defending Halicarnassus. Alexander felt entirely justified in his actions because the League of Corinth had decreed that no Greek should take up arms against another Greek. His action against the mercenaries after the battle was won was a statement to the rest of the Greek world, and every unemployed mercenary, as to what would happen if they took the Great King’s coin.

  After the Granicus, for the next year, Alexander fought little else than Greek mercenaries in the employ of the Great King acting as garrisons in a variety of cities down the west coast of Asia Minor. The major engagement w
as at Halicarnassus, where the remnants from the Granicus defended the city admirably, led by Memnon and Ephialtes, but were ultimately unsuccessful.

  Darius’ next stand against Alexander was at Issus in 333 (the first time the two had met on the field of battle), which we examined in some detail above, and there is no need to do so again here. Of the perhaps 30,000 mercenaries Darius commanded at Issus, only one contingent decided to follow the Great King into the interior of Persia and formed part of the army that resisted Alexander again at Gaugamela in 331, by that time only 2,000 in number.36 The remainder made their escape via the coast. At Gaugamela, the Greek mercenaries were again placed in the centre of the Persian line, but by that time they were far too few in number to have any impact on the battle. The decline in numbers was no indication of Darius’ lack of faith in his mercenaries; he would have been desperate to recruit more, but evidently found it almost impossible. As Alexander conquered the western empire, Darius had little or no access to the recruiting grounds of Greece, and, even if a recruiter with sufficient funds made it to Arcadia (or somewhere similar), there was little hope that a large hostile mercenary army could reach Darius without being engaged by Alexander, even if Antipater allowed them to escape the mainland. On top of this, of course, was the fact that Darius was simply not an attractive paymaster, given Alexander’s conquests. As a mercenary, it was probably much more attractive a proposition to take up employment with the Macedonians in a nice secure garrison somewhere in the growing empire.