Since the armament was on the great scale we have described, the people of Eryx were awed by the magnitude of the force and, hating the Carthaginians as they did, came over to Dionysius.
Eryx was around 30km north of the main Carthaginian base at Motya, which was Dionysius’ real target, and he wasted no further time in approaching it.20
The inhabitants of Motya, however, expecting aid from the Carthaginians, were not dismayed at Dionysius’ armament, but made ready to withstand a siege; for they were not unaware that the Syracusans would make Motya the first city to sack, because it was most loyal to the Carthaginians. This city was situated on an island lying six stades off Sicily, and was embellished artistically to the last degree with numerous fine houses, thanks to the prosperity of the inhabitants. It also had a narrow artificial causeway extending to the shore of Sicily, which the Motyans breached at this time, in order that the enemy should have no approach against them.
The causeway that Diodorus mentions could be crossed at low tide, but the Motyans destroyed as much of it as they could before the siege began as part of their very hurried preparations. They also sent messengers to the Carthaginians asking for military aid, and were evidently confident of its arrival; they also felt confident as to the strength of their naturally very defensible position.
Dionysius’ troops arrived and made camp to the north side of the city. The Syracusan general then took a detailed survey, along with his engineers, to look for weak points in the defences of the city. In what was an eerie foreshadowing of Alexander the Great’s siege of Tyre, Dionysius’ response to an island fortress was to begin the construction of a mole that would connect the island to the mainland and allow him to assault the walls directly.21 Dionysius also beached his fleet close to the island and constructed a defensive palisade around them. In many ways this was a curious decision, since the Carthaginians still possessed a strong fleet, and we might imagine he needed his own ships to try to prevent reinforcements and supplies from reaching the island fortress, or to blockade key ports. It also seems unlikely that he needed the manpower to build the mole given the size of his army, but that may well have been what the crews ended up doing as the army stood guard, or campaigned elsewhere.
The construction of the mole was not an engineering project that would be completed quickly, and Dionysius was not keen to stand idle whilst the preparations were underway.22
After this he left Leptines his admiral in command of the works, while he himself set out with the infantry of his army against the cities that were allies of the Carthaginians. Now the Sicani, fearing the great size of the army, all went over to the Syracusans, and of the rest of the cities only five remained loyal to the Carthaginians, these being Halicyae, Solus, Aegesta, Panormus, and Entella.
Of those cities that remained loyal to the Carthaginians, their territory was ravaged by the Syracusans:23
Hence Dionysius plundered the territory of Solus and Panormus, and that also of Halicyae, and cut down the trees on it, but he laid siege to Aegesta and Entella with strong forces and launched continuous attacks upon them, seeking to get control of them by force. Such was the state of the affairs of Dionysius.
The Syracusan offensive met with very little Carthaginian resistance, other than from the garrisons in the towns that chose to resist. They were clearly not yet ready to directly contest the control of Sicily after they had failed to prepare adequately for the inevitable war.
The Carthaginians, despite not being prepared at the very outset of the war, recovered quickly, and Himilcon (the Carthaginian general), whilst himself busy with the mustering of the army, dispatched his admiral with ten fast triremes and as many marines as they could carry with instructions to sail to Syracuse, enter the harbour at night and burn any ships left there.24
This he did, expecting to cause a diversion and force Dionysius to send part of his fleet back to the Syracusans. The admiral who had been dispatched carried out his orders with promptness and entered the harbour of the Syracusans by night while everyone was ignorant of what had taken place. Attacking unawares, he rammed the vessels lying at anchor along the shore, sank practically all of them, and then returned to Carthage.
The destruction at Syracuse did not distract Dionysius from his offensive:25
Dionysius, after ravaging all the territory held by the Carthaginians and forcing the enemy to take refuge behind walls, led all his army against Motya; for he hoped that when this city had been reduced by siege, all the others would forthwith surrender themselves to him. Accordingly, he at once put many times more men on the task of filling up the strait between the city and the coast, and, as the mole was extended, advanced his engines of war little by little toward the walls.
As with Alexander’s later mole, Diodorus presents a picture that its construction was fairly rapid, but in reality an engineering project of this scale must have taken several months, time enough for Dionysius to conduct any secondary expeditions.
When Himilcon’s scouts reported back to him that Dionysius had grounded his fleet intentionally, he saw an opportunity to deliver a crippling blow to Syracusan naval power. Having already scored a major victory in the harbour at Syracuse, a second victory here would leave him master of the seas around Sicily, a dominant position that would make supporting the land army far easier. Diodorus even tells us that Himilcon felt that if this plan was successful be could attack Syracuse in force and transfer the war to Dionysius’ home city.26
The Carthaginians manned one hundred of his best triremes and immediately set off for Motya. They sailed during the night to Selinus, skirted the promontory of Lilybaeum, and arrived at Motya at daybreak, taking the enemy completely by surprise. He attacked immediately and destroyed a number of ships that were still in the harbour either by ramming or burning. The Syracusans could do nothing to prevent the loss of these ships; they were unprepared for such an attack and taken utterly by surprise.27
After this he sailed into the harbour and drew up his ships as if to attack the vessels which the enemy had drawn up on land. Dionysius now massed his army at the entrance of the harbour; but when he saw that the enemy was lying in wait to attack as the ships left the harbour, he refused to risk launching his ships within the harbour, since he realized that the narrow entrance compelled a few ships to match themselves against an enemy many times more numerous. Consequently, using the multitude of his soldiers, he hauled his vessels over the land with no difficulty and launched them safely in the sea outside the harbour. Himilcon attacked the first ships, but was held back by the multitude of missiles; for Dionysius had manned the ships with a great number of archers and slingers, and the Syracusans slew many of the enemy by using from the land the catapults which shot sharp-pointed missiles. Indeed this weapon created great dismay, because it was a new invention at this time. As a result, Himilcon was unable to achieve his design and sailed away to Libya, believing that a sea-battle would serve no end, since the enemy’s ships were double his in number.
Himilcon had lost a golden opportunity to strike a decisive blow against the Syracusans, and he was forced to withdraw back to North Africa with his tail between his legs. His retreat is itself interesting, as evidently his new mercenary army had either not yet arrived from Greece, or it was not yet fully equipped and ready for battle.
After defeating Himilcon’s surprise naval assault, Dionysius put greater efforts into the completion of the mole. He did this by hiring huge numbers of labourers, and most likely using the sailors from the fleet, as noted earlier. When the mole was finally complete, he moved his war machines into position and began to assault the fortress in earnest.28
. . . he advanced war engines of every kind against the walls and kept hammering the towers with his battering-rams, while with the catapults he kept down the fighters on the battlements; and he also advanced against the walls his wheeled towers, six stories high, which he had built to equal the height of the houses.
It is an interesting note that the catapults were bein
g employed to suppress the infantry on the battlements rather than to directly assault the walls; stone-throwing torsion catapults were not invented until the mid to late fourth century, probably in Macedonia. The catapults constructed by Dionysius were bolt throwers, essentially large crossbows.
The inhabitants of Motya were not cowed by the Syracusan mercenary army with its array of new weapons, or the vast number of troops at their gates. They still held out hope that the Carthaginians would arrive with their own force of mercenaries to reinforce their defences. Much like the defenders of Tyre when faced with the same situation, the Motyans were incredibly inventive in their own defence, but their efforts were ultimately futile:29
Surpassing the besiegers in thirst for glory, they in the first place raised up men in crow’s-nests resting on yard-arms suspended from the highest possible masts, and these from their lofty positions hurled lighted fire-brands and burning tow with pitch on the enemies’ siege engines. The flame quickly caught the wood, but the Sicilian Greeks, dashing to the rescue, swiftly quenched it; and meantime the frequent blows of the battering-rams broke down a section of the wall. Since now both sides rushed with one accord to the place, the battle that ensued grew furious. For the Sicilian Greeks, believing that the city was already in their hands, spared no effort in retaliating upon the Phoenicians for former injuries they had suffered at their hands, while the people of the city, envisioning the terrible fate of a life of captivity and seeing no possibility of flight either by land or by sea, faced death stoutly.
Once the Syracusans broke into the city the defenders did not give up; the Carthaginian defenders knew they would likely suffer badly at the hands of Dionysius, and the Motyans equally feared the consequences, and besides were fighting for their homes. Diodorus gives us a vivid description of the hand-to-hand fighting, of running battles that were street by street, but once the besiegers were inside the walls the fate of the city was sealed. The Syracusans greatly outnumbered the defenders, and the mercenaries and Sicilian Greeks alike took out their frustrations on the defenders of the city, unleashing the full horrors of warfare upon the citizen population. Dionysius tried to stop the worst excesses, not out of some humanitarian sympathies, but because he viewed the city as now belonging to him, and therefore they were destroying his property. On top of which, he also wanted to sell the surviving inhabitants into slavery and raise funds to pay for his mercenaries.
In the days after the capture of the island fortress, once the dust had settled and the fires had been extinguished, Dionysius left Biton in charge of what remained of the city with a garrison of Sicel mercenaries. On top of these would likely have been a detachment of engineers and labourers who would endeavour to rebuild the defences in case the Carthaginians counterattacked. Along with Biton was Leptines with 120 warships, with orders to oppose any further attempt by the Carthaginians at crossing from Africa to Sicily. Leptines was also charged with the continued sieges of Aegesta and Entella. Having successfully captured Motya, Dionysius then marched his mercenary army back to Syracuse.30 Diodorus notes that the campaigning season was coming to a close, but why a standing army of mercenaries needed to retire to Syracuse at this point is an oddity. They could easily have continued the war against the remnants of the Carthaginian forces still in Sicily whilst they had the advantage.
At the time, the Syracusans would have seen the capture of the main Carthaginian base on Sicily, coupled with the defeat of their naval forces in the area, as a major victory. In reality, however, it solved little.
Dionysius did not sit back and await the Carthaginian response to his capture of their key strategic towns, but in the following year:31
In the year [396] Dionysius, the tyrant of the Syracusans, set out from Syracuse with his entire army and invaded the domain of the Carthaginians. While he was laying waste the countryside, the Halicyaeans in dismay sent an embassy to him and concluded an alliance. But the Aegestaeans, falling unexpectedly by night on their besiegers and setting fire to the tents where they were camped, threw the men in the encampment into great confusion; for since the flames spread over a large area and the fire could not be brought under control, a few of the soldiers who came to the rescue lost their lives and most of the horses were burned, together with the tents. Now Dionysius ravaged the Carthaginian territory without meeting any opposition, and Leptines his admiral from his quarters in Motya kept watch against any approach of the enemy by sea.
Dionysius, after a winter’s rest and recuperation, was again trying to drive the Carthaginians out of Sicily. The Carthaginians had done little in reality to oppose the Syracusans to this point, save for the naval operations. This seems to be because they were inexplicably unprepared for the Dionysian offensive. This time, however, they had spent their time wisely:32
Consequently, lawfully according Himilcon sovereign power, they gathered armaments from all Libya as well as from Iberia, summoning some from their allies and in other cases hiring mercenaries. In the end they collected more than three hundred thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry in addition to chariots, which numbered four hundred, four hundred ships of war, and over six hundred other vessels to convey food and engines of war and other supplies. These are the numbers stated by Ephorus. Timaeus, on the other hand, says that the troops transported from Libya did not exceed one hundred thousand and declares that an additional thirty thousand were enlisted in Sicily.
The Carthaginians had finally gathered together a sizeable force; the mercenary recruiters had obviously returned, and their allies were providing troops rather than simply financial aid. The new Carthaginian army was comparable to that of Dionysius and perhaps somewhat stronger (even taking into account the obvious exaggerations in Diodorus regarding the size of each).
Dionysius began his campaign of 396 with a march towards Aegesta. He was not prepared for their bold counter-attack, however, and many of his tents and most of his horses were lost. The setback was minor, however, and he continued on to pillage the territory of Panormus and Soluntum, no doubt keeping his mercenary forces happy. The Syracusans met no further resistance during this time.
Himilcon and the Carthaginians did not sail until late summer. In an intriguing episode, the king gave sealed orders to his naval captains that were only to be opened when they had set sail, for fear that Greek spies would uncover his strategic plans and communicate them to Dionysius. Their destination was likely to be one of two places: Syracuse, for a bold surprise attack as they had attempted previously, or the largest of the surviving Carthaginian bases in Sicily, Panormus. The latter was the chosen destination. When the Carthaginians came within sight of Sicily, Leptines sailed out to oppose them, as were his orders.33
The wind continued favourable, and as soon as the leading vessels of the transports were visible from Sicily, Dionysius dispatched Leptines with thirty triremes under orders to ram and destroy all he could intercept. Leptines sailed forth promptly and straightway sank, together with their men, the first ships he encountered, but the rest, having all canvas spread and catching the wind with their sails, easily made their escape. Nevertheless, fifty ships were sunk, together with five thousand soldiers and two hundred chariots.
Leptines accomplished more than Dionysius could realistically have hoped with only 30 triremes. The loss of 5,000 soldiers was a significant blow to the Carthaginians. Although we do not know of their origins, the impact on morale would likely have been far from negligible. Once the remainder of the fleet reached Panormus, Himilcon disembarked his army and immediately marched out to engage the enemy. As already noted, it was late in the campaigning season and he could not afford to waste any more time. He first captured Eryx by treachery, but his ultimate goal was the recapture of the iconic island stronghold of Motya. We know very little of the Carthaginian campaign against Motya, but they appear to have recaptured it without the struggle Dionysius had had. This is likely because the mole was already constructed and the walls were probably still in a poor state of repair. The garrison of Sicel
mercenaries also evidently did not put up a particularly heroic resistance.
Fearing the length of his supply lines, Dionysius did not march to engage Himilcon, but withdrew back to the vicinity of Syracuse. Himilcon had no such defensive strategy in mind. He made plans for the capture of Messene; its harbour was one of the largest on Sicily and capable of housing the whole of his 600-vessel fleet. It would also control the potential supply of aid to Syracuse from both southern Italy and the Peloponnese. Before he marched on Messene, Himilcon made an alliance with the Himeraeans and those defenders of the fort at Cephaloedium, 15 miles east of Himera. The Carthaginians also captured the island of Lipara and exacted a tribute of 30 talents that would be most welcome to the treasurers of the army.34
Then he set out in person with his entire army toward Messene, his ships sailing along the coast beside him. Completing the distance in a brief time, he pitched his camp at Peloris, at a distance of one hundred stades from Messene. When the inhabitants of this city learned that the enemy was at hand, they could not agree among themselves about the war. One party, when they heard reports of the great size of the enemy’s army and observed that they themselves were without any allies–what is more, that their own cavalry were at Syracuse–were fully convinced that nothing could save them from capture. What contributed most to their despair was the fact that their walls had fallen down and that the situation allowed no time for their repair. Consequently, they removed from the city their children and wives and most valuable possessions to neighbouring cities.
The Messenians were determined to resist the invaders, and appear to have received no help from Syracuse in this. They marched out to face the Carthaginians, presumably greatly outnumbered. Himilcon, however, rather than simply engaging the enemy, with the inevitable loss of life that that would entail, instructed 200 of his ships to sail around the coast, land troops near Messene and capture the city whilst their troops were on campaign. Some Messenians made it back in time to help the defence of the city, but the attacking force was too strong, and the Messenian walls too weak to resist. Himilcon easily captured the city by a brilliant tactic that involved minimal loss to his army, or to the city. Diodorus preserves a vivid description of the chaos at the fall of the city to the Carthaginians:35
Mercenaries in the Classical World- To the Death of Alexander Page 24
