Of the Messenians, some were slain as they put up a gallant fight, others fled to the nearest cities, but the great mass of the common people took to flight through the surrounding mountains and scattered among the fortresses of the territory; of the rest, some were captured by the enemy and some, who had been cut off in the area near the harbour, hurled themselves into the sea in hopes of swimming across the intervening strait. These numbered more than two hundred and most of them were overcome by the current, only fifty making their way in safety to Italy.
Himilcon moved his entire army into the city and made camp there. He detached groups of mercenaries to reduce the forts that were in the vicinity, but these were all strongly held and well situated and he made little headway. Not wishing to lose troops unnecessarily, he retired to the city again to gather his forces for the final push on Syracuse. Again, it is noticeable that Dionysius made no move to arrest the advance of Himilcon, or to aid any of the cities and fortresses in his path. Some well-timed and directed aid could have caused the Carthaginians significant losses and made any future battle or siege that much easier for the Syracusans, but the opportunity was missed. Himilcon separated his forces for the final stages of the advance, with Magon commanding a fleet of some 500 ships, whilst the land army marched towards Syracuse. Leptines, still the commander of the Syracusan fleet, sailed to meet Magon. Initially, Leptines attacked with only thirty handpicked ships.36
Leptines advanced with his thirty best vessels far ahead of the rest and joined battle, in no cowardly fashion, but without prudence. Attacking forthwith the leading ships of the Carthaginians, at the outset he sank no small number of the opposing triremes; but when Magon’s massed ships crowded about the thirty, the forces of Leptines surpassed in valour, but the Carthaginians in numbers. Consequently, as the battle grew fiercer, the steersmen laid their ships broadside in the fighting and the struggle came to resemble conflicts on land. For they did not drive upon the opposing ships from a distance in order to ram them, but the vessels were locked together and the fighting was hand to hand. Some, as they leaped for the enemy’s ships, fell into the sea, and others, who succeeded in their attempt, continued the struggle on the opponents’ ships. In the end, Leptines was driven off and compelled to flee to the open sea, and his remaining ships, attacking without order, were overcome by the Carthaginians; for the defeat suffered by the admiral raised the spirits of the Carthaginians and markedly discouraged the Sicilian Greeks.
In an action more reminiscent of a land battle, the Carthaginians followed the retreating Syracusan ships and destroyed many more ships that had been held in reserve. Magon also stationed his smaller vessels along the coastline with orders to kill any enemy sailors or marines who tried to swim to shore. Diodorus tells us the losses on the Syracusan side were over 100 ships and 20,000 men; exaggeration of course, but the losses would have been significant.37 The Carthaginians had not only succeeded in disabling a major part of the Greek fleet, but they also towed into port any damaged Greek ships that they had partially sunk or otherwise captured, and repaired them, bolstering their own fleet in the process.
The Greeks must now have expected a lengthy siege, but Dionysius’ advisors urged him to march out against the Carthaginians, partly to save the city from the privations of siege warfare, and partly because they felt Himilcon would not be expecting a direct assault, given the Syracusans’ unwillingness to engage the enemy to that point. Dionysius initially was persuaded by this, but ultimately refused for fear Magon would simply sail into the harbour and capture the city while the army was away. Dionysius did not have the strength to leave a major proportion of his mercenary forces in Syracuse to defend against that possibility, and still have a large enough land army to defeat Himilcon. Dionysius was aware that the Carthaginians had captured Messene with little bloodshed precisely because their army ill-advisedly marched out to meet the enemy host; he would not make the same mistake.
Himilcon paused in his advance upon Syracuse at Catane, where he beached his ships to protect them from a storm. Whilst here, he sent an embassy to the Campanian mercenaries in Dionysius’ employ at Etna in an attempt to ferment rebellion. He told them of the other Campanian mercenaries already in his army, and of the good treatment that they had received. The Campanians appear to have been open to these advances, but ultimately remained loyal because of the hostages that Dionysius had taken, and also to ensure the safety of their countrymen currently stationed with the Syracusans.
Seeing the Carthaginians inexorably approaching, evidently intent now on forcing a conclusion with Syracuse, Dionysius sent his brother-in-law, Polyxenus, as ambassador to the Italian Greeks, and then onto the Peloponnese and Corinth, requesting aid against the common enemy. Whilst Polyxenus was attempting to garner the support of allied states, others were sent to the Peloponnese with funds sufficient to recruit another large mercenary army. There they were told to ‘enlist as many soldiers as they could without regard to economy.’38
Himilcon’s navy now sailed into the harbour of Syracuse, to some an act reminiscent of the Athenian expedition during the Peloponnesian War.39
Himilcon decked his ships with the spoils taken from the enemy and put in at the great harbour of the Syracusans, and he caused great dismay among the inhabitants of the city. For two hundred and fifty ships of war entered the harbour, with oars flashing in order and richly decked with the spoils of war; then came the merchantmen, in excess of three thousand, laden with more than five hundred . . . and the whole fleet numbered some two thousand vessels. The result was that the harbour of the Syracusans, despite its great size, was blocked up by the vessels and it was almost entirely concealed from view by the sails.
At the same time as the Carthaginian navy were occupying the harbour, the land army advanced upon the city in what was no doubt a deliberately coordinated act. It made camp close to the city, and soon after advanced towards the walls in battle order in a challenge to the defenders. The Syracusans did not march out to meet them; if they were struggling for manpower (hence the diplomatic and recruitment missions) then they would have been foolish indeed to sacrifice the advantage of their walls for a set-piece battle. The Carthaginians retired to their camp and spent the next thirty days ravaging the countryside, gathering as much plunder and supplies as were available.40 During this time, Himilcon allowed his mercenaries to virtually run riot over the local area, and he appears not to have made any attempt to siege the city, other than to blockade it. As the blockade entered its second month:41
Himilcon seized the suburb of Achradine; and he also plundered the temples of both Demeter and Core, for which acts of impiety against the divinity he quickly suffered a fitting penalty. For his fortune quickly worsened from day to day, and whenever Dionysius made bold to skirmish with him, the Syracusans had the better of it. Also at night unaccountable tumults would arise in the camp and the soldiers would rush to arms, thinking that the enemy was attacking the palisade. To this was added a plague which was the cause of every kind of suffering. But of this we shall speak a little later, in order that our account may not anticipate the proper time.
The act of looting the temples was again likely because of the need for plunder to swell his coffers, to allow him to pay for his huge mercenary army. This is probably also the reason that he allowed them to plunder the locality of the city with impunity. The ‘tumult’ of which Diodorus speaks is perhaps some form of internal dissent, but we know nothing of the causes, if it even existed at all.
The sorties of the Syracusans were starting to have an impact upon the Carthaginians, not in terms of the losses they inflicted, as the host was large enough to deal with minor losses, but upon the morale of the besiegers. To defend his troops, Himilcon built a wall around their camp using materials salvaged from the tombs of the area, among them that of Gelon (the former tyrant) and his wife Demarete. He also built three forts in the area to strengthen the blockade of the city. Himilcon also made every effort to gather grain and as much water as he could
, both from the surrounding areas and by sending merchantmen back to North Africa; a rare glimpse into the logistics of an ancient army. Whilst Himilcon was strengthening his stranglehold by land, Polyxenus arrived back with thirty warships from the Peloponnese commanded by a Lacedaemonian called Pharacidas. We do not hear of any further mercenary reinforcements arriving with these ships; the recruiting mission was evidently going slowly. The Carthaginian fleet must have withdrawn from the immediate vicinity of the harbour, but where they were stationed is not mentioned.
The Syracusans were themselves running short of supplies, but merchantmen were still prepared to attempt access to Syracuse, despite the presence of a major Carthaginian fleet. Dionysius himself, along with his admiral Leptines, left the safety of the harbour with a part of the fleet to escort a supply convoy back to Syracuse. The Syracusans were temporarily left under the command of an unnamed subordinate of the tyrant, but the leading citizens clearly felt they had an opportunity to act independently and to attempt to influence events.42
The Syracusans, who were thus left to themselves, seeing by chance a vessel approaching laden with food, sailed out against it with five ships, seized it, and brought it to the city. The Carthaginians put out against them with forty ships, whereupon the Syracusans manned all their ships and in the ensuing battle both captured the flag-ship and destroyed twenty-four of the remainder; and then, pursuing the fleeing ships as far as the enemy’s anchorage, they challenged the Carthaginians to battle. When the latter, confused at the unexpected turn of events, made no move, the Syracusans took the captured ships in tow and brought them to the city. Elated at their success and thinking how often Dionysius had met defeat, whereas they, without his presence, had won a victory over the Carthaginians, they were now puffed up with pride.
Dionysius was still implementing his policy of not arming the citizens, but had been forced to temporarily relax the rules because of the siege. The citizens now saw something of an opportunity to make a break for freedom, as they were armed and Dionysius was away from the city escorting the transport vessels. As they were contemplating a coup, however, Dionysius sailed back into the harbour with the supply ships. Recognizing the mood, Dionysius held an assembly meeting where strong views were expressed as to his abilities and the likelihood of his wining the current war. Amongst the stinging criticism, we are told:43
Because of him [Dionysius] Gela and Camarina were subdued, Messene lies in total ruin, twenty thousand allies are perished in a sea-battle, and, in a word, we have been enclosed in one city and all the other Greek cities throughout Sicily have been destroyed. For in addition to his other malefactions he sold into slavery Naxos and Catane; he has completely destroyed cities that were allies, cities whose existence was opportune. With the Carthaginians he has fought two battles and has come out vanquished in each. Yet when he was entrusted with a generalship by the citizens but one time, he speedily robbed them of their freedom, slaying those who spoke openly on behalf of the laws and exiling the more wealthy; he gave the wives of the banished in marriage to slaves and to a motley throng; he put the weapons of citizens in the hands of barbarians and foreigners. And these deeds, O Zeus and all the gods, were the work of a public clerk, of a desperate man.
The speaker goes on to say that they had previously been guarded by a multitude of mercenaries, almost reduced to slavery in their own city because of Dionysius’ policy of refusing to allow them to carry (or own) arms, a policy that did not apply to the mercenary soldiers.44 Since they were now armed, however, the speaker urged the citizenry to remove the tyrant, allowing them to be free, although not taking into account the enormous mercenary army at their gates.
At the end of the anti-Dionysian speeches, the Lacedaemonian admiral spoke to the assembly, stating that he had been sent to aid Syracuse and Dionysius, not to overthrow him. At this the mercenaries which Dionysius had no doubt stationed close by rushed to surround the tyrant to protect him lest the assembly turn violent. The citizenry made no move against the tyrant, save for the shouting of abuse. Worried the situation could descend into violence, and fully aware the city was under siege, Dionysius dismissed the assembly and resumed his position, backed as always by his mercenaries.
Whilst the Carthaginians were fortifying their camp with building material from the desecrated Greek tombs, a plague began to take hold in their camp. Diodorus tells us that the siege was occurring at the most prolific time of year for diseases to take hold, that it had been particularly warm, and that with so many men in close proximity it spread more quickly; very astute observations.45 The plague spread quickly and the Carthaginians were overwhelmed by the casualties. The plague caused death in the fifth or sixth day after contracting the disease, and people were dying faster than their bodies could be disposed of. Even those handling the corpses while carrying them to the funeral pyres were contracting the disease.46
When Dionysius heard of the disaster that had struck the Carthaginians, he manned eighty ships and ordered Pharacidas and Leptines the admirals to attack the enemy’s ships at daybreak, while he himself, profiting by a moonless night, made a circuit with his army and, passing by the temple of Cyane, arrived near the camp of the enemy at daybreak before they were aware of it. The cavalry and a thousand infantry from the mercenaries were dispatched in advance against that part of the Carthaginian encampment which extended toward the interior. These mercenaries were the most hostile, beyond all others, to Dionysius and had engaged time and again in factional quarrels and uproars.
The situation Dionysius was trying to control was not an easy one. His citizenry were prepared to take every opportunity to try to overthrow him, and his position was only maintained by his mercenary forces. Even these, however, were not a coherent, disciplined unit; there was factional infighting amongst them too. In a remarkable act of betrayal, Dionysius:47
had issued orders to the cavalry that as soon as they came to blows with the enemy they should flee and leave the mercenaries in the lurch; when this order had been carried out and the mercenaries had been slain to a man, Dionysius set about laying siege to both the camp and the forts. While the barbarians were still dismayed at the unexpected attack and bringing up reinforcements in disorderly fashion, he on his part took by storm the fort known as Polichna; and on the opposite side the cavalry, aided in an attack by some of the triremes, stormed the area around Dascon.
After the capture of two of the Carthaginian forts, Dionysius ordered a general assault by land and sea. The Carthaginians were depleted by the plague and utterly unprepared for a fight. The Syracusan navy, supported by land forces, attacked the compound where Himilcon had stationed his triremes; some were set on fire, others rammed and sunk. On the day of the attack there was a strong wind which fanned the flames, spreading them quickly from ship to ship. After victory over the troops guarding the Carthaginian ships, and against those ships that had managed to put to sea, Dionysius was unable to contain the plundering that followed:48
Forthwith elated by the Syracusan successes, both the oldest youths and such aged men as were not yet entirely incapacitated by years manned lighters, and approaching without order all together made for the ships in the harbour. Those which the fire had ruined they plundered, stripping them of anything that could be saved, and such as were undamaged they took in tow and brought to the city. Thus even those who by age were exempt from war duties were unable to restrain themselves, but in their excessive joy their ardent spirit prevailed over their age. When the news of the victory ran through the city, children and women, together with their households, left their homes, everyone hurrying to the walls, and the whole extent was crowded with spectators.
With the loss of their fleet, the Carthaginians sued for terms. They offered Dionysius 300 talents if the army were allowed to return to North Africa unmolested. Dionysius could not agree to these terms, but he did agree to allow the Carthaginians to escape, but only the Carthaginian nationals. The mercenaries and any other allies were to remain behind. The payment o
f 300 talents was also to be paid. Diodorus argues that Dionysius was happy to allow the Carthaginians to escape to ensure there was still an enemy, and thus a focus for the citizens of Syracuse. He worried that if they were to experience a prolonged state of peace, a revolt might be more likely. He ordered his troops to withdraw from the crippled Carthaginian fleet, and several days later, during the night (as agreed), the Carthaginian nationals made for their ships and sailed back to North Africa with as much as they could carry, having first deposited 300 talents with Dionysius’ representatives. To keep up appearances, Dionysius led his army out of Syracuse in a belated attempt to stop the fleeing Carthaginians, but they succeeded in allowing them to escape as per the agreement between Himilcon and Dionysius. This left the Carthaginian camp populated by the mercenaries who had so far survived the plague. Without their paymaster, and without any offer of employment from Dionysius, they fled immediately. For the time being, the war against the Carthaginians was over.
The Carthaginians recovered slowly from their defeat, and the deprivations of the plague, but by 392 they were ready for another attempt to exert their influence over Sicily. This time their invasion force consisted of:49
Mercenaries in the Classical World- To the Death of Alexander Page 25
