Liberation of Paris : How Eisenhower, De Gaulle, and Von Choltitz Saved the City of Light (9781501164941)

by Smith, Jean Edward

  After briefing First Army, Bradley flew to Laval, where Leclerc was waiting. He arrived at 7:15 p.m. on August 22. With Leclerc was Roger Gallois, the messenger from Paris. Leclerc rushed to board the plane before Bradley deplaned. “You win,” said General Sibert. “They’ve decided to send you to Paris.” Bradley then deplaned and spoke to both Leclerc and Gallois. “The decision has been made to enter Paris, and the three of us share in the responsibility for it. I, because I have given the order; you, General Leclerc, because you are going to execute it; and you, Major Gallois, because it was largely on the basis of the information you brought that the decision was made.”14

  Bradley then laid out his orders to Leclerc in detail. “Paris was to be entered only if the degree of fighting could be overcome by light forces.” He was not to use artillery or air support inside Paris, and if he encountered heavy German resistance he should retreat and await reinforcements. Once inside Paris, he was to relieve the FFI and assume responsibility for security in the city. This should be done as soon as possible.15

  Eisenhower had made the decision to liberate Paris and Bradley was implementing it. They were further encouraged on the evening of August 23, when von Choltitz’s messengers arrived. Swedish consul Raoul Nordling had begun to organize his trip into Allied lines immediately after von Choltitz suggested he do so. That was in the morning of August 22. But that afternoon, before he could leave, Nordling suffered a mild heart attack that immobilized him. He asked his brother Rolf to take his place, which he did. In addition to Rolf Nordling, the party that left Paris on August 22 included Alexandre de Saint-Phalle as the representative of the Committee of National Liberation; Max Armoux, ostensibly from the Red Cross but actually from British Intelligence; and Erich Posch-Pastor von Camperfeld, an Austrian spy who had provided valuable information to the Allies. Von Choltitz added Emil “Bobby” Bender to the group, an intelligence agent in Paris whom he trusted to help Nordling through German lines.

  The group made it through Versailles on the road to American lines, but when they hit the village of Trappes, they were halted by German SS sentries. The captain in charge looked at the orders von Choltitz had written and then dismissed them. “Since the 20th of July we don’t obey Wehrmacht generals,” he said. Bender flew into a rage, and it was finally agreed that they would return to Versailles, where the orders could be confirmed. Bender called von Choltitz, who gave a direct order to the SS Hauptsturmführer to let them through. If the officer failed to clear the party through his lines, said von Choltitz, “I will come out and see it’s done.” The car was allowed to proceed, but soon ran into a German minefield. They were led through by a German sentry, who at the end of the field pointed west and said, “The Americans. Five hundred meters.”16

  Von Choltitz’s messengers went through the same labyrinth as Gallois. They were taken to Patton, who, as in his initial reception of Gallois, was grim. In his diary Patton wrote, “The brother of the Swedish Consul in Paris, a man named Ralf [sic] Nordling and a group of other French individuals from Paris were in camp with a proposition. I immediately thought that they might be asking for a surrender…. It turned out that these people simply wanted to get a suspension of hostilities in order to save Paris, and probably save some Germans. I sent them to see Bradley.”17

  Like Gallois earlier, they met Bradley on the airstrip in Laval. Bradley listened intently as Nordling told him that von Choltitz had “formal orders” to destroy as much of Paris as possible. He had not done so, but he was “being backed into a corner,” and if the situation didn’t change quickly, he would have to execute the orders. There was also the possibility that he would be relieved of command. What he needed was for the Allies to come as soon as possible.

  Bradley heard Nordling out. And he reacted immediately. The operation that Ike had ordered yesterday needed to be speeded up. “We can’t take any chances,” he said. Bradley told General Sibert to “tell Hodges to have the French division hurry the hell in there.” And recognizing how far Leclerc had to go, Bradley made another decision. “Tell him to have the 4th Division ready to get in there too. We can’t take any chances on that general changing his mind and knocking hell out of the city.”18

  Eisenhower on his own authority had changed plans and was going to liberate Paris. It was clear to him what had to be done. It was also clear that he had to cast this as a military issue, not a political or humanitarian one, and that he must maintain a low profile and leave it up to the French. Eisenhower’s decision to liberate Paris was one of the great decisions of World War II. And it was not without cost. By diverting supplies and fuel to the French capital, he undoubtedly prolonged the war. But he avoided another Paris Commune in return.

  Eisenhower’s political skill, like that of General Grant, set him apart from most military commanders. It was long-standing and had been carefully developed. At West Point, he was the most popular cadet in his class. In the early twenties in Panama under Fox Conner he had learned how to command, and directly underneath MacArthur from 1931 until 1939 he learned how military commanders deal with their civilian bosses. In fact in 1938 a group of Philippine legislators had sought to abolish MacArthur’s job and leave Eisenhower in charge.IV Marshall recognized Ike’s political skill when he brought him to Washington after Pearl Harbor, and in North Africa Eisenhower not only brought the American and British military forces together, but also carefully overturned the State Department and FDR’s attempt to manage liberated French territory through Vichy agents. His ties to de Gaulle trace to that, and Eisenhower understood the need to play this situation close to his chest.

  I. The Eisenhower apartment was owned by the Comtesse de Villefranche, the doyenne of one of France’s most distinguished families, and was on the premier floor at 68 Quai d’Auteuil. It contained a large vestibule, two sitting rooms, a dining room, three bedrooms, an immense kitchen, and quarters for the help in the attic. It was elegantly furnished, and as Mamie once said, as far from typical army quarters “as were Peary and Amundsen when they reached their respective poles.” Alden Hatch, Red Carpet for Mamie (New York: Henry Holt, 1954), 150.

  II. Following the fall of the Bastille on July 14, 1789, France experimented with a constitutional monarchy for three years. Louis XVI remained on the throne with his power curtailed. But in 1792 he was deposed and executed, and the First Republic was established. Napoléon overthrew the Republic in 1799 and proclaimed the French Empire. The Bourbon Monarchy was restored in 1814, and was overthrown by the constitutional monarchy of the duc d’Orléans, Louis-Philippe in 1830. The Revolution of 1848 toppled the Orleanist monarchy and established the Second Republic, which ruled France until 1852, when Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte (Napoléon’s nephew) mounted a coup and established the Second Empire. Napoléon III (as he was styled) ruled France until Germany’s 1871 victory in the Franco-Prussian War. A period of instability ensued, dominated by the Paris Commune of 1871, a legendary benchmark for the Marxist Left. The provisional government of Adolphe Thiers followed, and the Third Republic was ushered in in 1875. The Third Republic, which Eisenhower was familiar with from the twenties, was always under attack from the monarchist Right and the antidemocratic Left, heirs to the spirit of the Commune.

  III. Major Xenophon Price, Pershing’s executive officer, gave Eisenhower a final efficiency report of “satisfactory.” (His previous reports had all been “superior.”) Price said that Ike “was not especially versitile [Price’s spelling] in adjusting to changed conditions.” It was Eisenhower’s lowest efficiency rating since 1917. After the war, when Eisenhower became chief of staff, he inquired what had happened to Price. It turned out he was still on active duty with the Corps of Engineers, in the rank of lieutenant colonel. Eisenhower was shocked. “Why was he only a lieutenant colonel,” Ike asked. “Bad judgment” came the reply. “Hell, he’s not that bad,” said Eisenhower and ordered him promoted to colonel. Letter, John S. D. Eisenhower to JES, March 10, 2008.

  IV. “I was familiar with the detail
s,” said General Lucius D. Clay. “A group in the Philippine legislature decided Eisenhower was doing all the work and that he was being paid only $10,000 a year, whereas MacArthur was being given a beautiful penthouse apartment in the Manila Hotel and being paid a much more substantial sum. This little group of Filipino congressmen prepared to introduce a bill that would abolish the top job—MacArthur’s job—and leave Eisenhower in charge. When Eisenhower heard about it, he went to them and told them that if they ever introduced such a bill he would immediately ask to be returned to the United States. That under no circumstances would he be a party to it. But General MacArthur found out about it. From that moment on he had no more use for Eisenhower. And it was absolutely unfounded, although I am sure there were people who deliberately tried to convince MacArthur that Eisenhower was trying to knife him in the back.” Lucius D. Clay interview, April 21, 1971, in Jean Edward Smith, Lucius D. Clay: An American Life (New York: Henry Holt, 1990), 80–81.

   VII

  Leclerc Moves Out

  “Gribius, mouvement immédiat sur Paris.”

  —LECLERC TO MAJOR ANDRÉ GRIBIUS, AUGUST 22, 1944

  The French Second Armored Division, which General Jacques Leclerc commanded, landed in France on August 1, 1944—almost two months after D-Day. It was assigned to George Patton’s Third Army, and Leclerc and Patton got along well. Patton spoke French and offered Leclerc the opportunity to go into battle immediately instead of waiting to liberate Paris. Leclerc jumped at the offer, and Patton assigned him to XV Corps, commanded by General Wade Haislip. Haislip had studied at the École de Guerre in Paris and was also fluent in French. Leclerc hit it off well with both Patton and Haislip, and in the battle of the Falaise Pocket, the Second Armored Division played a major role. But before the Germans surrendered, Patton sent most of Haislip’s corps eastward toward the Seine. Leclerc’s division was kept on line to contain the German forces.

  Leclerc was perplexed why his division had remained on line while most of XV Corps went eastward. He immediately sought out Patton and asked when his division could go to Paris. “It is political,” he said.1 Patton said he needed Leclerc to stay put to contain the Germans, and dismissed his query. On August 15, Patton wrote in his diary, “Leclerc came in very much excited. He said, among other things, that if he were not allowed to advance on Paris, he would resign. I told him in my best French that he was a baby and… that I had left him in the most dangerous place. We parted friends.”2 The following day Leclerc wrote Patton that everything was quiet at Argentan, and said it was probably time for him to regroup to move toward Paris. That evening he went to Patton’s headquarters to repeat his plea. General Bradley was there, and both he and Patton assured Leclerc that they would allow him to liberate Paris, but it was not yet time to do so. At this point, Haislip’s corps was on the Seine some thirty-five miles from Paris. Leclerc was understandably skeptical of their response.

  With the bulk of XV Corps on the Seine and Patton moving eastward, Leclerc found himself suddenly transferred from Third Army to First Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges. Hodges assigned the French Second Armored Division to V Corps, commanded by Major General Leonard Gerow. Gerow had commanded the landing on Omaha Beach and had been in combat ever since. Neither Hodges nor Gerow spoke French, and neither seemed to appreciate the importance Leclerc placed on the liberation of Paris and the special role his division was to play. When Leclerc pressed the point, Gerow dismissed the idea and said that Paris was no particular concern of his. The Second Armored Division would be employed just like any American division under his command.3

  On August 20, General Hodges invited Leclerc for lunch to become acquainted. Leclerc talked incessantly about Paris and argued that he should be allowed to head toward the city immediately. Hodges was not impressed and told Leclerc that he was to stay put until he received orders to move.

  The next day, August 21, the Falaise Pocket closed, and Leclerc saw no further justification in remaining so far from Paris. That evening he decided that as the sole commander of French forces in the Allied armies in France he was entitled to exercise his judgment when national issues were at stake. On his own authority he ordered a relatively small force of seventeen tanks, ten armored cars, and ten personnel carriers, under Lieutenant Colonel Jacques Guillebon, to head toward Paris. If the Allies decided to enter Paris without Leclerc’s Second Armored Division, then Guillebon was to accompany the liberating troops as the representative of the French army and the Provisional Government. Leclerc informed de Gaulle that evening of what he had done and said he could not dispatch his whole division because food and fuel were furnished by the Americans and because of his respect for “the rules of military subordination.”4

  General Leonard Gerow

  The following morning, August 22, Leclerc sent his G-2, Major Phillippe Repiton, to Gerow’s headquarters to explain what he had done. The reason Leclerc provided was that the insurrection that was taking place in Paris made it necessary for an advance military detachment to get there and maintain order until the arrival of the French Provisional Government. Leclerc further pointed out that the absence of Guillebon’s small force did not affect the ability of the Second Armored Division to fulfill any combat mission that V Corps might assign.

  Gerow, who had been alerted earlier about the movement of Guillebon’s force, was incensed at what he considered Leclerc’s insubordination. Before Major Repiton could speak, Gerow presented him with a letter for Leclerc that he had just written. “I desire to make it clear to you that the 2nd Armored Division (French) is under my command for all purposes and no part of it will be employed by you except in the execution of missions assigned by this headquarters.” He went on to order Leclerc to recall Guillebon.5 Gerow, unlike Eisenhower, saw the liberation of Paris purely in military terms.I

  Leclerc may have been unique among Allied commanders in Europe. The offspring of minor nobility in Picardy, he cultivated an air of mystery. A devout Catholic who received the Eucharist daily, he exhibited a mulish streak that often angered his superiors.6 This was such an occasion. Rather than obey Gerow’s order, he immediately flew to General Bradley’s headquarters in Laval to appeal. When he arrived, he learned that Bradley was conferring with Eisenhower on Paris, and was expected to arrive shortly. Leclerc decided the best thing for him to do was to await Bradley’s arrival. And when Bradley arrived, it was a new ball game. By Eisenhower’s order, Paris was to be liberated and Leclerc’s division was to lead the way. Leclerc was not only off the hook for his disobedience to Gerow, but he would lead the Allied advance. An overjoyed Leclerc returned immediately to his division. It was almost dark on the evening of August 22 when he arrived. He jumped from the plane and shouted to his waiting operations officer, Major André Gribius, “Gribius, mouvement immédiat sur Paris.”7

  The Second Armored Division was at Argentan in Normandy. Paris was 122 miles away. With 16,000 men, 200 Sherman tanks, 4,000 other vehicles, and more than 250 artillery pieces, Leclerc planned to be in Paris in two days. That evening he prepared for the move out, which he scheduled for dawn. To his men he said, “I demand, for this movement which will lead the Division to the capital of France, a supreme effort which I am sure to obtain from you all.”8 General Gerow called later that evening and instructed Leclerc to leave that night, but Leclerc, who was well aware of the route, decided it would be best to wait until daylight. The relationship between Gerow and Leclerc had been strained from the beginning. Gerow considered Leclerc his subordinate; Leclerc believed his commanders were Bradley, Eisenhower, and de Gaulle.

  Leclerc’s Second Armored Division set out at 6 a.m. on August 23. It split and took two routes. The northern route went through Sées and Mortagne to Rambouillet; the southern through Alençon, Chartres, and Limours. The bulk of the division, plus some American reconnaissance and engineer troops, and four howitzer battalions from V Corps artillery, took the northern route. The forces on the southern route consisted of a French combat command,
Gerow and V Corps headquarters, and the U.S. Fourth Infantry Division. Both groups made good progress, reaching points roughly twenty-five miles from Paris by nightfall. No German units were encountered, and in every village the population turned out to see the troops advance. Veterans of past wars stood at attention snapping salutes, while cheering civilians tossed flowers and apples to the passing troops. Colonel David Bruce, the head of the OSS in France, said the troops “were offered beer, cider, white and red Bordeaux, white and red Burgundy, champagne, rum, whiskey, cognac, Armagnac, and calvados—enough to wreck one’s constitution.” Bruce, who later became President Truman’s ambassador to France (May 1949–March 1952), admired Leclerc for his command style. “He is tall, spare, handsome, stern-visaged, and a striking figure…. Like the Scarlet Pimpernel he is said to have been seen here, there, and everywhere.”9

  At Rambouillet, Leclerc met de Gaulle, who had arrived somewhat earlier, and was ensconced in the Château de Rambouillet, a former residence of the kings of France. Leclerc was changing plans slightly and moving on Paris from the south, not through Versailles as Gerow had directed. Leclerc believed that the wide Orléans-Paris highway would be easier to navigate and would speed up his time of arrival. De Gaulle listened carefully and approved. He ordered Leclerc to establish his command post at the Gare Montparnasse when he arrived. “I would join him there in order to settle what to do next. Then, observing this young leader already at grips with the demands of battle, and whose valor was confronted with an extraordinary series of well-prepared circumstances, I murmured, ‘How lucky you are.’ And I also thought how in war the luck of the generals is the honor of governments.”10