Marine: A Guided Tour of a Marine Expeditionary Unit

by Tom Clancy

  On the other side of the ocean, British officers, studying the failure of their 1915 invasion at Gallipoli, looked for ways to cross the beach rapidly to conduct mobile operations inland. The Gallipoli landing was the idea of the former First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Winston Churchill; and when it bogged down into a bloody stalemate, it nearly ended his political career. These problems became even more urgent for Churchill in World War II, after another disastrous landing in Norway and the Nazi conquest of Europe in 1940. For all of his many shortcomings as a strategist, Churchill clearly saw the need to build ships and landing craft in vast numbers if Europe was to be liberated from Hitler.

  Even as the Battle of Britain was being fought in 1940 to fend off German invasion, the British were designing their first purpose-built landing craft, the Landing Craft, Assault (LCA, the American designation when we built them from the British design). Just over 40 ft/12.2-m long and powered by a pair of 65-hp Ford V-8 gasoline engines, they could haul thirty-five troops and 800 lb/364 kg of equipment some 50 to 80 nm/91 to 146 km. The open-topped LCA had a long, flat bottom suitable for beaching, an armored front to protect the embarked troops, and a bow ramp for rapid off-loading. LCAs could hang on a transport ship's davits, like large lifeboats. Assault troops boarded them by climbing down rope ladders and nets. The same features would appear on almost every landing craft, including the Landing Craft, Utility (LCUs), and Landing Craft, Medium (LCMs), still in use today. From the LCA design came literally dozens of specialized landing craft that would be used for the next half century. At the same time, American engineers were coming up with their own designs, such as the famous "Higgins" boat, which was based on a surf-rescue craft. Evolutionary improvements led to standard designs like the Landing Craft Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP), built in the thousands as the backbone of the landing craft fleet that helped win World War II.

  Once the landing craft had been developed, the next problem was getting the frail little boats across the oceans. Amphibious operations are fought against the elements of the ocean and the shore, as well as the enemy's defenses. The flat-bottomed assault boats, while handy in the shoal waters of beaches and atolls, needed larger "mother" vessels to move them close to their objectives. This requirement led to specialized attack transports, grouped into amphibious "tractor" groups. Early attack transports were converted freighters and passenger liners. They lacked cranes and other handling gear for hoisting out and loading embarked landing craft and troops. Later in the war, purpose-built ships were significant improvements, but they still had to run in close to the beaches to unload; and they were vulnerable to enemy coastal artillery, mines, and aircraft.

  An important development was the Landing Ship, Tank (LST--their crews said it stood for "large, slow target"). This was an oceangoing vessel that could beach itself, open its bow doors, drop a ramp, and then off-load vehicles up to the size of heavy tanks directly onto the beach. The last U.S. Navy LSTs (built in the 1960s) only recently retired from active service. Another special-purpose amphibious ship was the Landing Ship, Dock (LSD), equipped with ballast tanks and an interior well deck that allowed landing craft to load in relative safety. By flooding the well deck, the landing craft could easily float out, without the need for hoists or cargo nets to load the boats. The well deck was so successful that all thirty-six of the U.S. Navy's amphibious ships in the 21st century will have one. Other specialized amphibious ships built during World War 11 included amphibious command ships and fire-support vessels carrying rockets and guns.

  These bizarre craft provided the sealift to liberate North Africa, Europe, and the Pacific. Soon after the victory they helped to win, virtually all of the landing craft and amphibious ships were sold for scrap or mothballed. The atomic bomb seemed to signal an end to amphibious warfare. This attitude would not last. The Korean War marked the rebirth of amphibious operations. Recalled from the moth-ball fleets, World War II amphibious ships provided General Douglas MacArthur with the lift for his brilliant landing at Inchon in the fall of 1950. Some of these same ships served off Lebanon when that troubled land erupted in 1958. While the amphibious vessels of the Second World War held the line in the 1950s, the U.S. Navy began to design new amphibious ships, suitable for the atomic age. The most important of these was the assault helicopter carrier (LPH), designed to carry a Marine battalion and land it by helicopter onto an enemy shore. The first LPHs were converted World War II aircraft carriers, but the purpose-built Iwo Jima class (LPH-3) was in production by the early 1960s. By the end of the decade, in addition to the LPHs, new classes were in production--the Newport class (LST-1179), the Charleston class amphibious cargo ships (LKA-113), and the Anchorage class (LSD-36), as well as new designs like the Austin class (LPD-4), which was equipped with a well deck. These ships maintained a credible amphibious lift capability through the Cold War years. Despite all this building, the tactics of assault with landing craft through the surf-line from a few thousand yards offshore had changed little since World War II. Landing craft themselves had changed little, with conventional medium (LCMs) and utility landing craft (LCUs) constructed as late as the 1980s.

  While the technology of amphibious assaults had not changed much by the close of the 1960s, the soldiers they carried would. After the experience of Vietnam, with its conscripted combat troops, military leaders were forced to accept an all-volunteer force as the basis for a new, professional military in the 1970s. This change had many consequences. One not often noted affected the U.S. Navy: Realizing that it would have to take better care of all-volunteer crews, the Navy began to improve the habitability of warships. In the 18th century, Samuel Johnson observed that serving on a warship was like being in jail, with an added chance of drowning. This was not quite true on the World War II-vintage ships of the Vietnam era, but they were hardly designed for comfort. Naval architects try to pack as many men as possible into a warship. Personnel are needed to operate a maximum of weapons, sensors, and other systems. The emergence of the all-volunteer Navy in the 1970s meant that future warship designs would need improved habitability standards.

  Another Navy goal in those days was to make warships capable of accomplishing more various missions. The results were seen in the Spruance-class (DD-963) destroyers and the Tarawa-class (LHA-1) helicopter assault ships. The LHAs were revolutionary; they were capable of operating both landing craft and helicopters, plus the new AV-8 Harrier V/STOL fighter bombers. Lessons learned from the Spruances and the Tarawas were applied to every future class of U.S. warship. Unfortunately, both types suffered rapid procurement-cost growth. The Tarawas were originally priced as a class of nine, but only five could be bought during the double digit inflation of the 1970s. The late 1970s were a bad time for the Navy in general, and amphibious forces in particular. The Administration of President Jimmy Carter took an axe to the Navy budget, particularly in shipbuilding, operations, and maintenance. And by 1979, when a series of crises broke out in Southwest Asia, the U.S. had only a minimal amphibious capability. Amphibious forces are expensive to build and tough to maintain. They are often among the first items cut in times of austerity.

  As a result of the Carter austerity, planners reconsidered the capabilities of merchant shipping to supplement the specialized 'Gator ships. The first use of containerized merchant ships for amphibious forces was to be seen in the creation of Maritime Prepositioned Squadrons to provide a mobile, floating base for Marine task forces. Three such squadrons would be created, with additional units for the U.S. Army and Air Force. During the 1982 South Atlantic War, the British employed "Ships Taken Up From Trade" (STUFT) to transport the bulk of their landing force and supplies. Both programs showed the limitations of civilian ships to support military operations.

  The inauguration of President Reagan in 1981 led to Secretary of the Navy John Lehman's ambitious plans for a six-hundred-ship Navy. This included a follow-on class of LHAs, the Wasp (LHD-1) class, and a new class of LSDs, the Whidbey Island (LSD-41) class. And procurement of a radical new landing
craft began, the LCAC (Landing Craft, Air Cushioned). LCAC was the first new technology for amphibious warfare since the helicopter; its introduction allowed the big ships for the first time to stand away from coastal landing zones. Meanwhile, amphibious warfare capabilities that had been lost after Vietnam were slowly rebuilt. Unfortunately, building ships takes time. The Reagan Administration was history, and the Bush Administration was well along before the new ships began to join the fleet. In fact, the LHD and the LSD-41 building programs continue, more than fifteen years after they were started.

  In the 1990s the amphibious forces of America and her allies have been busier than at any time since World War II. In addition to supporting the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, amphibious forces have been constantly engaged in crises and contingencies from Haiti to Somalia. The future of amphibious shipping is of interest to everyone from Marine privates to the President of the United States.

  The 'Gator Navy

  The U.S. Navy is divided into three distinct communities. There is a submarine navy, with its nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines. There is naval aviation, with its carriers and aircraft. And last, but not least, is the surface navy, with squadrons of cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, to escort carrier battle groups and vital supply ships. Shoehorned into a corner of the surface navy are a few dozen ships and few hundred small boats and landing craft called the 'Gator Navy. 'Gator refers to the alligator-like ferocity of the Marines when their combat power is combined with the mobility of the Navy. Like their reptilian namesakes, 'Gators can give you a nasty bite, in the water or out.

  Command of amphibious shipping was once viewed as a second-class assignment, with less prestige than command of a real warship like a cruiser or destroyer. No more. Today, officers who command amphibious ships and ARGs hold some of the most coveted assignments in the Navy. Wasp-class (LHD-1) helicopter assault ships are the largest vessels that a non-aviator can command in the U.S. Navy (only aviators can command big-deck aircraft carriers). At over forty-thousand-tons displacement, with a crew of more than 1,100, carrying almost 1,900 Marines with all of their gear, as well as over forty aircraft and helicopters, an LHD is a major warship! The other new amphibs, like the Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry class (LSD-41/99), are also very large vessels. For comparison, the biggest amphibious ships built by the former Soviet Union were three eleven-thousand-ton Ivan Rogov-class LSDs.

  Navy plans envision a force of thirty-six vessels of three different types (LHD/LHA, LSD, and LPD), organized into twelve amphibious ready groups (ARGs). These ships could deliver twelve reinforced battalions, each about 1,600 Marines. This would represent about 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) if every ship could be deployed at one time. Unfortunately, ships that stay in the fleet for thirty to forty years need periodic overhaul and maintenance. Large warships spend about one year in four out of service, "in dockyard hands." So, only about three quarters of our amphibious shipping will be available at any time. These ships are split between the Pacific and Atlantic fleets. Not much strength for any particular crisis when you consider the thousands of miles/kilometers of hostile shoreline the U.S. might have to face. For example, during Desert Storm, the Navy assembled four ARGs with a single afloat brigade from both fleets. The arithmetic demands that each and every amphibious ship constructed for the Navy must be highly mobile and sustainable. The "amphibs" are the high-value units in any naval task force-sometimes even more valuable than the big-deck carriers which often accompany the ARGs these days.

  Amphibious ships are evaluated by five different capacities or "footprints" as they are known. These include:* Troop Capacity--The number of Marines the ship can comfortably berth, feed, and support.

  * Vehicle Space--Called cargo,2 this is measured in square feet of vehicle storage, along with a little extra room for maneuvering vehicles in and out (called "turnout" space). Total area can be converted to standard vehicle dimensions, based upon the footprint of an HMMWV.

  * Cargo Space--This is a measure of storage space for packaged cargo, supplies, and equipment. Called cargo,3 it is measured in cubic feet (ft3).

  * Landing Craft Capacity--This footprint indicates how many LCAC landing craft can be carried in the vessel's well deck.

  * Aircraft Capacity--The number of aircraft that can be operated, stowed, and maintained on deck and in the hangar. The capacity is based on the CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter. An AH-1W Cobra attack helicopter only occupies about .5 units of deck space, whereas the new MV-22B Osprey will have a 1.4 equivalent.

  These five measures tell you how valuable a particular ship is to an ARG. For example, the new LPD-17 will replace four different ship classes (the LST-1189, LPD-4, LSD-36, and LKA-113) in the ARG. You can see how critical this one ship must be to future ARG commanders.

  Amphibious ships are nothing without people. Life for the sailors in the amphibs is a mix of high technology (like satellite communications and navigation) and old-style seamanship (like small-boat handling and the ancient skills of knotting lines). It is also long, hard work. Marines love to practice their exciting tasks in the wee hours before and around dawn. So, whenever the ARG is conducting operations, the ships' crews go on a fatiguing round-the-clock schedule. The work is hard; but when you talk to the sailors, they tell you that it's exactly what they joined the Navy to do. 'Gator sailors love their jobs. Senior chiefs tell you it's like the "old" Navy they grew up in. They frequently see the 'Gator Navy as a refuge from the "political correctness" that seems to infect today's U.S. Navy. For officers, life in the amphibs is a chance to truly test themselves in their chosen profession.

  Navigation and warfighting in the littoral zones is demanding and dangerous. Inshore operations present all kinds of natural and man-made hazards to the sailor. Consider the cruise of the assault carrier Tripoli (LPH-10), which was mined while operating in the Persian Gulf during Desert Storm. The ship survived, albeit with heavy damage. As we have seen, the British Royal Navy learned even harder lessons during the invasion of the Falkland Islands in May 1982. Also, nature is not kind to sailors working near shore. Everything from rogue waves to hurricanes can foil an amphibious assault. D-Day, originally planned for June 5th, 1944, had to be delayed twenty-four hours because of storms in the English Channel. Like flying, amphibious landings are unforgiving, and only a complex combination of planning, skill, experience, and equipment can make them successful.

  One quick note before we begin. There are many different ways to interpret warship specifications and statistics, and "official" sources often disagree. On matters of fact, I defer to A.D. Baker III's superb biannual work, Combat Fleets of the World (U.S. Naval Institute Press). For over two decades, Dave Baker has made this book his life's work, and all of us who write about defense matters are in his debt. I ask your patience in my use of tables. Amphibious ships are number-intensive! Now, let's go aboard!

  USS Wasp (LHD-1)

  It is the largest and mightiest amphibious ship ever built. At over forty thousand tons, it is the largest man-made object to ever move across the land (so says the Guinness Book of World Records). The landing helicopter dockship USS Wasp (LHD- 1) is the lead ship of a seven-ship class that represents the best America's shipbuilding industry can produce. The largest combatant in the U.S. Navy aside from the supercarriers, it is a virtual one-ship task force that can probably take down a small nation by itself. The story of Wasp and her sisters is the story of the Navy's amphibious force after the blight of the Vietnam War and the move to an all-volunteer force. It is also the story of a contractor that saw the future and decided to remake itself.

  At the end of World War II, the Marine Corps began to examine ways of avoiding amphibious frontal assaults against fortified enemy shores. The losses suffered in taking Japanese island fortresses like Iwo Jima and Peleliu left a lasting impression on Marine and Navy leaders. Out of all this thinking came the concept of vertical envelopment using the new technology of the helicopter. The father of the current Commandant, Victor "Brute
" Krulak, was quick to support the concept. And by the mid-1950s, several World War II aircraft carriers had been converted into experimental helicopter assault carriers. Designated LPH (for "Landing Platform, Helicopter"), they proved successful, though their size and large crews made them expensive to operate. The first conversion, USS Block Island (LPH-1, ex-CVE-106), was never completed. But several others, including USS Boxer (LPH-4, ex-CV-21), USS Princeton (LPH-5, ex-CV-37), USS Thetis Bay (LPH-6, ex-CVE-90), and USS Valley Forge (LPH-8, ex-CV-45), were converted from surplus aircraft carriers during the 1950s and 60s. Even before these conversions were completed, plans were underway for an LPH designed from the keel up. The idea was to pack a Marine battalion and a reinforced helicopter squadron into the smallest hull possible, so that the ship would be cheap to build and efficient to operate. Crew and passenger (i.e. Marine) comfort would be minimal.