Exegesis

by Astro Teller

  We consider the primary concern what the media might hear of this situation. I’m sure you can imagine scenarios in which negative media attention could become a real problem for this agency. It is our concern that, with proper marketing, this business might not only put the NSA in a negative light, but might actually be taken up by the public and blown far out of proportion. We can be fairly certain (though it is on this point in particular that Tom disagrees with the group) that Alice Lu has not (at least purposefully) given anyone details about the EDGAR program. Tom’s concern is that Alice indicated that she would contact the media and never reversed that position. Given that no investigations, legal or journalistic, have contacted us concerning Alice Lu or the EDGAR program, we consider this improbable (though, again, not impossible).

  Several people, primarily her advisor, did receive some indication that the EDGAR project had undergone a dramatic change. Whether these people have concluded more than they were told we can find out only with some invasiveness. However, we do not have the entirety of the EDGAR program’s email correspondence. In whatever form it may have existed, it was erased when the EDGAR2 and EDGAR1 processes halted on 23 March 2000 and 12 May 2000, respectively. There is, therefore, a chance that some (probably inaccurate) information about the EDGAR program and possibly about Alice Lu, has been released into the general population by the processes themselves. How much information and exactly what variety of information is impossible to know at this time. This has led my group to the conclusion that there is a chance that the sudden disappearance or death of Alice Lu would encourage a number of people to take more seriously information they had in their possession about either the EDGAR program or Alice Lu.

  It is therefore my group’s assessment that it would be very risky to take any severe actions against Alice Lu, no matter how discrete, even if we could arrange such an option. This risk will, of course, diminish somewhat over time. My group recognizes the risks associated with allowing her, even temporarily, to remain at large and free to communicate information to others that might lead to the uncontrolled reintroduction of the EDGAR program. This leads my report to the two unusual action options and more conservative proposal mentioned on the first page.

  The first suggestion is that we contact Alice Lu and attempt to hire her as a full time employee of the NSA, as was done with John Miller. John is our only example of such a conversion and his circumstances were, as you know, quite different. As a member of my team, John has expressed his personal opinion that Alice Lu has probably developed a specific hatred for the NSA and could never be trusted enough to make hiring her feasible. My team has unanimously agreed that the potential gain of winning her to our side is not worth the high likelihood risk of her increased saboteur possibilities as part of the NSA. I felt, however, that you should be alerted to this as an action option.

  The second irregular suggestion is also not a recommendation from my team, but one that I thought merited your attention. Alice Lu would probably, at this point, answer almost any question an EDGAR process asked her. We could send email to Alice Lu as though it were from an EDGAR process, and through this masquerade, possibly gain valuable information about what she really knows and any technical insights she might have on the EDGAR program’s initialization. In addition, we might be able to use this vehicle to convince Alice Lu to maintain her media silence. I should repeat that my team and I do not feel this is the option that should be employed, because we again risk altering Alice Lu’s attitude of silence with only a low probability of useful information gain for the NSA.

  Our more conservative proposal is this: allow Alice Lu to continue her life, at least for now, with no intervention from us. She has so far made no move to publicize the EDGAR program or our involvement. There is a small chance that she will return to school and try again to re-create a successful EDGAR process. My team’s recommendation is that we watch her computer use carefully so that we can step in if a new EDGAR process is instantiated. Alice Lu is not aware that we have identified the EDGAR program source and has no evidence for our involvement other than easily manufactured email messages. This proposal allows us to maintain a secure position while monitoring any future work of hers on the EDGAR program.

  Clearly, if you choose to opt instead for her removal from the public, we will have to discuss further an appropriate way to carry it out so as to minimize the media dangers outlined above.

  At a broader scope, my team and I would like to stress the implications of the DISSECTION project for the NSA. As an agency, the NSA was totally unprepared to deal with the EDGAR program. We did not have the expertise available that might have led to the conversion of one or both of the EDGAR processes. It is our feeling that this agency, if it is to retain its main function, must prepare for future versions either of the EDGAR program or of similar systems. We must be able to control such systems when they do occur and prevent or disable the ones that we will not be able to control. Our conclusion is that the future of our national security clearly depends on this ability.

  Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Drexel

  AuthID-STS# 5656781

  May 29, 2000

  Astro Teller is a twenty-six-year-old Ph.D. student at Carnegie Mellon, where he specializes in artificial intelligence. Exegesis is his first novel.