(1) The Framework.—The actual form of framework, of course, varies with the ground. The main position is formed around the field artillery. Regiments are placed with their batteries in depth so that attacks from any direction will meet with an equal reception. A diamond formation often is considered the best solution. The positions of the guns are laid out so that the zones of fire interlock and at the same time so that the whole gun area can be covered with fire. Dead ground within the position is covered by antitank guns, normally drawn from those included in the composition of the field artillery regiments.
An outpost position in front of the main position toward the enemy is often required to prevent observation of the main positions. These outposts are formed of antitank guns, normally drawn from the infantry antitank companies, with the close escort of infantry, as mentioned above. The outpost dispositions are in depth, the front edge being placed on or just over the crest in front of the main position; and the antitank dispositions are coordinated with those of the main positions so that the whole area forms one complete net. The field artillery may be unable to carry out its secondary role (covering fire) if this outpost position is not provided.
A reserve of mobile antitank guns is held within the position. From this reserve, guns can be sent to give close support to batteries attacking from the "pivot," to extend the flanks of the outpost position if an enemy threat develops from an unexpected direction, or to strengthen the outpost line or the main position if the force is thrown temporarily on the defensive.
(2) In the attack.—The British consider that there are only two legitimate tasks for antitank guns in the attack; (a) to form the framework after a successful attack, and (b) to protect the flanks of attacking infantry tanks.
The antitank gun mounted on its portee is not a tank, and any attempt to use it as such by requiring it to accompany the leading waves of a tank or infantry attack inevitably results in severe losses. Every effort is made to place antitank guns in position at the objective as soon as it is captured.
The commander of the antitank guns detailed for consolidating the objective when captured is therefore given a free hand to move his guns as he thinks fit. Often it proves best to move the guns in bounds as the attack progresses. The antitank commander himself accompanies the commander of the unit that he is supporting, and on arrival at the objective makes a plan of the framework of the consolidation defense. If an enemy tank counterattack is launched before the consolidation framework is made, the antitank commander places his guns on or near the objective as soon as possible, and then uses them from the portees, taking advantage of any cover that can be found. Speed is essential, and it is for that reason only that he uses his guns as if they were tanks. If the consolidation framework has time to get into position, its object is to destroy counterattacking tanks. In this case, therefore, the antitank guns are used on the ground, concealed to the utmost, and dug in as thoroughly as time will permit. They are taught not to reveal their positions prematurely by opening fire at long range. Their fire is held until the enemy tanks are within the range20 at which their armor will be pierced by the 2-pounder. Nearby infantry protection is provided with the guns, and snipers are placed to pick off enemy forward artillery observers who push in close with the object of spotting the antitank guns.
In protecting the flanks of attacking tanks or infantry, the object of the antitank artillery is to keep the enemy at a distance. Then the gun is used from its portee and opens fire at longer ranges. But since it is seldom possible to forecast the direction of an enemy attack, the guns are not normally committed to any positions at the outset. The antitank commander therefore keeps his guns mobile, and, together with representatives of his sub-units, carries out continuous reconnaissance of the area for which he is responsible, noting especially any ground in which hull-down positions are available: If an enemy flank attack develops, he moves his guns to meet it, either dropping into position on the ground to lie in wait when the enemy has to pass a defile, or fighting portee and using his mobility to prevent the enemy from closing the range.
(3) In the defense.—In the defense, the antitank gun has one object—to kill tanks. The enemy will, of course, do all that he can to spot and knock out the guns of a defense before he launches his tanks. Every effort is made, therefore, to prevent the positions from being disclosed until the enemy tanks advance to the attack and are within range of the antitank guns. The range must be short enough to enable the shell to pierce the armor. Harassing and bombardment tasks are carried out by the 25-pounder guns that are situated in covered positions.
The efforts to avoid observation are directed toward concealment and protection. Scrub ground, or other rough ground, is chosen wherever possible, and digging is done with great care. Movement of all personnel is rigidly controlled.
Guns are placed so as to give effect to the principle of concentration of fire. This is necessary, as the German tanks usually attack in a mass, which cannot be engaged effectively by single guns.
Guns are, therefore, normally sited by troops. The four guns of the 2-pounder troop are spread over an area of about 400 yards square, and they must, of course, be mutually supporting. The four guns of the 25-pounder troops also adopt this formation if employed in a purely antitank role; but if the troop has a secondary role (covering fire) as well, it adopts a more concentrated formation in order to obtain fire control. For this purpose an arrangement roughly the shape of a half-moon, with intervals of about 70 yards between guns, has been found satisfactory. Depth within the field artillery regiment is obtained by siting the troops in diamond formation, 800 yards between troops, all troops being mutually supporting.
f. Effect of Artillery on Tanks
The following is the German teaching on the effect of field artillery on the tanks which they have encountered in the desert:
Armor of 60-mm or less is penetrated at ranges up to 600 meters by the 105-mm gun-howitzer 18 with angle of impact from normal to 30° using charge 5 or 6. The 105-mm gun, model 18, penetrates all thicknesses of armor encountered at ranges up to 1,500 meters with medium charge and armor-piercing shell. Direct hits from the 150-mm howitzer, model 18, with HE percussion fuze (instantaneous) projectiles have set enemy tanks on fire, or put them out of action by destruction of the drive mechanism. Thus, when engaging tanks with the heavy field howitzer, the bursts should not be largely over as when firing armor-piercing shells, but should be evenly distributed, some over, some short. Concentrations of artillery fire have been very effective against tank assembly points.
SMOKE
Smoke, although not used extensively, has been employed occasionally in Libyan operations, and in these smoke operations the artillery has been one method of releasing smoke.
Conditions naturally vary, but observers report that smoke can often be used effectively. Some difficulties with the use of smoke are caused by desert winds, which are sometimes quite variable. Different sizes of whirlwinds which veer and change direction constantly make it difficult to estimate the wind when laying a smoke screen. Smoke has, however, many possibilities in connection with operations by armored formations.
a. Characteristics
Three main factors affect the use of smoke in the desert as elsewhere:
(1) The force and direction of the wind.
(2) Turbulence (which is the gustiness of the wind) and the effect of the bright sun on air currents.
(3) Humidity.
These factors do not remain constant, the force and direction of the wind being particularly liable to sudden change. Moreover, air eddies caused by the configuration of the ground may make the force and direction of the wind different at the spot where shells land and at the gun position. It is therefore impossible to specify particular weather conditions in which smoke will be effective. A decision on this point is reached usually by a method of trial and error, for which time must be allowed.
In desert areas high-explosive shell produces a substantial cloud of dust, and it may theref
ore often be practical to mix HE with smoke and so produce a satisfactory screen when conditions are not entirely suitable for the use of smoke alone. This fact also makes it possible to economize in the use of smoke shell and bombs, only limited quantities of which are usually carried.
b. Tactical Employment
All antitank guns depend on direct observation to obtain fire effect. If they can be deprived of their observation, their fire is automatically neutralized. In this fact lies the greatest value of smoke, particularly to armored divisions.
In attacks smoke has been used for the following purposes:
(1) To conceal local preparatory moves by supporting weapons such as antitank guns, machine guns, and mortars.
(2) To screen a forward movement preparatory to assault.
(3) To screen tanks from the observation of antitank guns and artillery observation posts on the flanks of the attack.
(4) To provide a smoke barrage on the front of the attack.
(5) To indicate the objectives to tanks.
Smoke screens required during the preparatory stages of the attack and during the advance to the objective are usually provided by the artillery. Assistance is sometimes given by infantry mortars when other tasks and the range permit. For a smoke barrage on the front of the attack, a crossing wind is necessary, and particular attention is paid to timing to insure that the attacking tanks are not placed in the dilemma of having either to wait for the barrage to lift, or to pass through it with the risk of being silhouetted against it on the far side.
In any attack some guns are either not located or not destroyed. In such situations some advantage has been obtained by smoke clouds laid down over the whole area,21 for the lack of visibility usually hampers the guns more than the tanks. This smoke is not used to form a screen, for it is considered more effective to form a pall of smoke over the enemy defensive area.
In defense situations smoke is used to blind attacking enemy tanks. When used for this purpose, a smoke screen is put down beyond the effective antitank range. Otherwise it will merely assist the enemy by depriving the antitank guns of essential observation. The provision of a smoke screen of this kind usually is a task for the artillery.
German tanks in a hull-down position at over 2,000 yards' range are not only difficult targets, but also beyond the effective range of antitank guns. Much of the Axis fire is by direct laying. In many cases, therefore, the best method of dealing with Axis fire has been by a smoke screen. Care is then taken that this smoke screen is well clear of the British front lines, for if it is too close, it will merely serve as cover for the German advance.
While the smoke is in place, Axis unarmored troops are attacked by fire. Observation posts well out to a flank are found to be necessary, and every opportunity is taken to disorganize and cause casualties to the enemy while he is assembling for the attack.
Another use of smoke in the defense has been the blinding of the enemy's close-support tanks and other supporting weapons by interposing a smoke screen between them and the enemy assault tanks. This task may be within the power of both the defenders' close-support tanks and artillery. When smoke was used for this purpose care was taken to avoid assisting the enemy by providing him with cover behind which he could move forward infantry detachments in support of his assaulting tanks.
For covering a disengagment or a withdrawal, all types of smoke-producing weapons are used, smoke screens at the longer ranges being put down by the artillery, medium range screens by close-support tanks, and short range screens by the use of special dischargers and 2-inch bomb throwers. Tanks capable of producing tail smoke have also been used effectively for this purpose by both the Germans and the British.
SUPPLY METHODS
The outstanding characteristic of supply in the desert is the vulnerability of supply lines caused in large part by the fluidity of operations. The British have relied on supply dumps to a greater extent than the Germans, who use supply trains. The artillery plays an important role in the defense of both dumps and columns.
Supply trains are close up to maintain the momentum of the attack by supplying fuel and ammunition as required. Recovery crews go into battle with their units.
The Germans usually advance to the line of departure under cover of darkness in the early morning hours. They may give battle early in the morning, pause about midday for refueling and maintenance, and give battle again before dark. Return to bivouac is made after dark; hence the location of his bivouac area is difficult to discover. Whenever possible, tank attacks are made with the sun low behind the German tanks. Movement in the advance is fast—at least 20 miles per hour. The normal distance between halts, if no combat occurs, is about 40 miles. Refueling, replenishing of ammunition, and maintenance are carried out under the protection of artillery, antitank weapons, infantry, and overhead fighter protection. These operations are accomplished in full view of the enemy.
New German Heavy Artillery
Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 10, Oct. 22, 1942.
Indications that the Germans have recently introduced two new specialized heavy artillery weapons are found in photographs and captions appearing in a recent number of the German magazine Signal. The two accompanying sketches have been prepared from these photographs.
a. Heavy Mortar
The mortar piece labelled "Thor" is stated in the caption to have been used in the Sevastopol siege operations. Other photographs appearing in the same number of the magazine depict this mortar mounted on a caterpillar tractor, from which it is being fired. An examination of this photograph by U.S. artillery and ordnance officers resulted in a consensus of opinion that the caliber of this mortar was probably between 500-mm and 600-mm. It will be remembered that at the time of the Sevastopol siege, both the German and neutral European press printed stories that the Germans were employing successfully a mortar of 560-mm caliber.
The development of a weapon of this type is to be ascribed to the ever-growing difficulties the Germans are encountering in mastering the Russian permanent fortifications. Forts and pillboxes are becoming stronger and stronger with the passing of each month; in consequence the attacking force is being required to use ever more powerful weapons of offense.
The mortar pictured has evidently a very short range, certainly not over 5,000 yards and possibly much less. In consequence, its usefulness is very limited.
Nevertheless, so important a role are modern fortifications playing in the fighting now raging in Russia, notably at Stalingrad, that it would appear probable that, as the war continues to develop, all armies, including our own, will find a need for artillery mortars of this approximate type in order to cope with the problem of destroying permanent land fortifications.
b. Railway Gun
The other type of German weapon portrayed in Signal is a very powerful railway gun. The caption in Signal suggests that this gun is mounted along the French Channel Coast. The question of the caliber of this weapon presents some difficulties. Photographs of the shell appearing elsewhere in Signal indicate, however, that it is at least of 16-inch caliber, but more probably between 20 and 22 inches. It is quite possible that this is the same weapon which has been reported on by British sources as follows:
"It has been established that 61.5-cm howitzers, probably on rail mountings, were used at Sevastopol. This weapon is reported to have 112 grooves in the rifling, and to fire a base-fuzed 'anticoncrete' shell (Betongranate) which weighs about 4,400 lbs, is 6 ft 9 in long, and has a copper driving band 2.76 in wide."
The range of this gun is not known, but is doubtless very great. The German purpose in mounting such a gun in France is not at all clear. It would seem quite possible that it is primarily intended for the bombardment of London and other inland British cities rather than for fire against channel shipping.
New German 105-mm Gun-Howitzer
Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 30, July 29, 1943.
The standard German light field artillery piece is the 105-mm gun-howitzer, ge
nerally similar in appearance to the U.S. 105. It weighs about 5 1/2 tons, fires a projectile weighing about 32 pounds, and has a maximum range of about 11,000 yards. The German designation for this gun is "10.5-cm L.F.H. 18."22 A few months ago, however, what appears to be a modification of this weapon was captured in Africa; it is believed to be the "10.5-cm L.F.H. 42." The "42" may also exist as a self-propelled gun; if so it is the first German field artillery piece so mounted.
In external appearance the most apparent difference in the two guns is the muzzle brake on the "42", a feature not known to be included in the "18", though it has been reported that there is an "18" with a muzzle brake which may possibly be designated "10.5-cm L.F.H. 18M."23 The muzzle brake is of the standard double-baffle type, quite similar to the muzzle brake on the 50-mm antitank gun.
While the wheels of the "18" are made of a light alloy (current models may be of wood) the "42" has wheels at least partially constructed of wood; both types are rimmed with solid rubber tires as is usual in German artillery guns.
The main differences between the "18" and "42" are as follows:
The "42" with its longer bore and chamber would appear to have a higher muzzle velocity than the "18." This seems to be borne out by the fact that captured "42's" are provided with a muzzle brake and have range table corrections painted on the shield of the gun. These tables, giving corrections for various charges, vary from minus 2 mils for an elevation of 100 mils to minus 70 mils for an elevation of 750 mils; presumably no range tables for the "42" exist or were available and it was necessary to use the "18" range tables with the above noted corrections to compensate for the greater muzzle velocity of the "42" gun. In addition to these necessary corrections it is also of interest to note that a special table for charge 6 (hollow charge ammunition) was also painted on the shield as follows:
German Artillery in Combat Page 15
