German Artillery in Combat

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by Bob Carruthers


  The Employment of Field Artillery

  Military Intelligence Service, Special Series No. 8, December 20, 1942

  The division artillery commander is a special advisor to the division commander on artillery employment, replacement, and ammunition; he is also commander of the artillery regiment, which includes the medium howitzer battalion, the sound-and-flash battalion, and such artillery as may be attached. He orders artillery concentrations, counterbattery, and harrassing fire in cooperation with the general scheme of maneuver and in support of the infantry.

  The artillery battalion is the fire unit. The battalion commander indicates definitely to his batteries such matters as the following: targets, aiming points, amounts of ammunition to be fired, time for opening fire, location of positions, ammunition supply, routes, types of fire, and kinds of ammunition. Firing data are obtained for the battalion by ranging shots, map computations, operations of the observation battalion (sound-and-flash), and references furnished by friendly troops. In very wide sectors or when operating in terrain of restricted visibility, it may be necessary for certain batteries to obtain firing data individually according to their tactical missions.

  ORGANIZATION

  Part of the artillery, usually the light howitzers, has the principal mission of providing direct support to the infantry. The remainder is employed in counterbattery, harassing fires and preparations, concentrations, and interdictions. Close connection with the sound-and-flash battalion is maintained. Disposition must be kept flexible to permit quick shifting of battery positions, missions, and targets. The employment in general is determined by these considerations: (a) number and kinds of guns available; (b) combat plans of the command as a whole; (c) terrain and weather; (d) hostile artillery; (e) ammunition available.

  Figure 1. Artillery in a division attack.

  LOCATION IN THE ATTACK

  In general, in the attack the artillery is located immediately in rear of the infantry line, just beyond range of hostile small-arms fire. Figure 1 shows a typical arrangement, with the observation battalion (sound-and-flash) operating directly under the artillery commander.

  If reconnaissance and combat intelligence have given definite information about hostile dispositions, then a preparation may be fired, continuing 10 to 30 minutes, and depending upon the ammunition available, the surprise effect, and the situation. In the case where practically no information on the enemy is available, the artillery preparation is omitted; the infantry launches the attack, drawing fire from hostile heavy weapons and artillery, upon which, once located, the friendly artillery can thereafter fire.

  LOCATION IN THE DEFENSE

  Artillery in the defense is organized the same way as in the attack. The only difference in dispositions is that the direct support weapons (light howitzers) are located slightly farther to the rear, and the general support guns (medium howitzers) are in a central location where they can interdict at long ranges to force an early deployment of approaching enemy formations.

  COOPERATION WITH INFANTRY

  Time and space must be carefully coordinated by both the infantry and the artillery. It is essential that the artillery observers be at all times alert, not only to locate targets and hostile forces but to follow closely the movements of friendly troops, particularly the infantry. To facilitate this close contact, it devolves upon the infantry to seize and hold terrain which offers excellent observation for the artillery. Communication is effectively maintained. Close contact between infantry and artillery officers is absolutely essential. The division commander indicates, as promptly as possible, the plan of maneuver to the artillery commander so as to permit the latter the maximum freedom in planning the role for the artillery.

  In the advance the artillery renders immediate support to the infantry when contact with the enemy is gained. This is accomplished by the artillery observers, who accompany the foremost infantry elements, or observe from balloon or airplane. In the attack the artillery must neutralize the hostile resistance and open the way for the advance of the infantry. Rapid reconnaissance and prompt deployment for action contribute to the success of this mission. It is generally advantageous for the infantry to wait for the support of the artillery. It is also important for the infantry to understand the limitations and capabilities of the artillery.24

  Artillery Command in the German Army

  Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 29, July 15, 1943.

  In the German Army all artillery apart from the relatively small divisional allotment belongs to the GHQ pool (Heerestruppen). Units are allotted from this pool to army groups or armies according to the estimated needs. They may be sub-allotted to corps or divisions. The commander of the divisional artillery regiment, Artillerieführer or Arfü, commands the divisional artillery when it is not reinforced from the GHQ pool.

  When GHQ artillery units are attached to the division, the Arfü is usually subordinated to an Artillery Commander, Artilleriekommandeur, abbreviated Arko, who with his staff is likewise from GHQ. An Arko may also be assigned to command an allotment of GHQ artillery to a corps. When no GHQ artillery has been assigned to an army group or army, an Artillery General Stabsoffizier der Artillerie, abbreviated Stoart, advises the army group or army commander on artillery matters. When GHQ artillery units have been attached to an army, a Higher Artillery Commander, Höherer Artilleriekommandeur, abbreviated Höh Arko, is assigned to the army. A recent report from British sources gives some interesting details as to the powers and duties of a Higher Artillery Commander of an army, and of an Artillery Commander.

  a. Powers and Duties of a Higher Artillery Commander of an Army

  The Higher Artillery Commander of an army is directly responsible to the army commander. He is at the disposal of the army commander for the supervision of the employment of artillery, for ground reconnaissance, and for any special tasks. He supervises artillery training within the army command and keeps an eye on the state of repair of artillery equipment. He is the commander of all army artillery directly under command of the army; as well as any of the army artillery units placed at the disposal of the Army High Command or the Army Group.

  He has the right to attach himself to any unit within the army area, in which case he informs the appropriate headquarters. If he is not at army headquarters or in the immediate vicinity, an officer on his staff must be detached as liaison officer to the army headquarters. In any case, there is always close cooperation between the operational section of army headquarters and the staff of the Higher Artillery Commander.

  The duties of the Higher Artillery Commander may be summarized as falling into 2 categories, namely, duties within the army area and duties within the army command. As regards all artillery within the army area his individual duties include:

  (1) Organization of the employment of all methods for artillery reconnaissance, meteorological services, etc., in cooperation with neighboring armies;

  (2) Control of artillery cooperation with the Air Force and with mapping and plotting units;

  (3) The supervision of artillery training;

  (4) Constant watch on the state of repair of artillery equipment;

  (5) Participation in the delivery and return of guns;

  (6) Submitting reports to the army high command as to experiences with artillery equipment;

  As to army artillery within the army command his duties include:

  (1) Assignment of officer personnel;

  (2) Requests for, and distribution of, reinforcements;

  (3) The control of supplies of weapons and equipment, clothing, motor transport, and tires.

  b. Powers and Duties of an Artillery Commander

  The Artillery Commander belongs to GHQ troops. He is assigned to a division or directly to a corps. He retains the right to attach himself to any artillery unit in agreement with the appropriate division headquarters. He maintains close cooperation with the higher artillery command of the army, and as regards signal matters has the cooperation of both divisions and corp
s signal battalions.

  When under command of a division, he assumes the role of the Artillery Commander of the division. The division artillery is tactically under his command, but this need not alter its allocation to units.

  As commander of corps artillery, or artillery group, he commands all artillery placed under command of the corps in accordance with the corps commander's orders. His duties include:

  (1) Preparation for the employment of support artillery;

  (2) Organization and use of support artillery;

  (3) Fire-control of individual artillery groups;

  (4) Cooperation of corps artillery with ground and air reconnaissance;

  (5) Formation of an artillery signal net;

  (6) Ammunition supplies.

  In the corps area he is responsible for giving advice on all artillery matters, and for supervising artillery methods and training in the corps area. His duties include suggestions as to:

  (1) Distribution of support artillery to divisions;

  (2) Battle orders outside the division battle sectors;

  (3) Tasks of artillery immediately under command of corps;

  (4) Limits for counterbattery and harassing fire;

  (5) Division artillery reconnaissance tasks outside the battle sectors;

  (6) Regulation of artillery air services and reconnaissance;

  (7) Regulation of artillery signal communications with the divisions;

  (8) Provision of uniform plotting boards and range tables;

  (9) Use of AA for protection of artillery;

  (10) Ammunition supply.

  Ruses for Concealing Artillery Positions

  Intelligence Bulletin, July 1944

  Some German artillery methods of countering Russian observation and sound ranging are analyzed in a recent article in the semiofficial Russian Army journal Red Star. Only those which are likely to be of interest to U.S. troops in the European theater are discussed here.

  The Russians observe that since the results of sound ranging are dependent on atmospheric conditions, the Germans always try to exploit these. At times when sound carries the farthest—for example, at night, in fog, and when there is no wind—German artillerymen try to fire as little as possible. But when sound conditions are disturbed—that is, when there are head winds, vertical midday currents, sharp falls of temperature, and so on—their activity increases. The Germans also take sound into account when they are siting their guns. In Russia, this factor has led them to display a marked preference for reverse slopes, groves, lake shores, and marshes.

  In Russia the Germans have used roving batteries extensively. These move around, firing a few rounds from each position—and occasionally undertaking more systematic fire. The Germans select positions which are a reasonable distance away from other friendly units. German batteries often are held in ambush, and for long periods do not fire at all. Almost never does a gun fire singly, lest this make it easier for Russian sound ranging to locate its position. Instead, it is a common German procedure for a number of batteries to fire together at an even tempo, so that all the sounds of gunfire merge.

  The Germans have been using special devices to imitate the sound of gunfire. These have been placed from 200 to 300 yards to one flank of a well-camouflaged German battery, or some distance to the rear of the actual gun sites. Sometimes these devices are supplemented by others, which simulate muzzle flashes.

  In line with this same principle, a German gun will register from a site 200 to 300 yards to one flank of its battery. If a gun were moved farther away, it would make the registration for the rest of the battery less accurate and, by getting out of the general area of the battery, would make the success of the ruse less likely. When the Germans are taking part in systematic fire, they wait until they believe that the opposition has located this gun. The Germans then open up with their remaining guns.

  To give their muzzle flash a background against which it will not stand out, the Germans sometimes send up rockets or set haystacks on fire. Smokeless powder and flash reducers are also used. Sometimes German engineers erect dummy structures to conceal artillery pieces, as a camouflage measure against air and ground observers.

  Employment of German Antiaircraft Artillery at Sevastopol

  Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 7, Sept. 10, 1942.

  The account given below describes an interesting example of the employment of antiaircraft guns in the battle for Sevastopol. This article appeared in the German press in the middle of June, and shows clearly that 88-mm antiaircraft guns have been used against ground targets by the German troops in Russia just as they have been by the Afrika Korps of Field Marshal Rommel.

  "The battle for Sevastopol is among the hardest of the war. Here the German Command was confronted with a narrow front barricaded completely with concrete, steel, and guns. But however heavy the barrage from the massed Soviet artillery, our antiaircraft guns succeeded in pushing through on several occasions and knocking out pillboxes at very short ranges so that our infantry could advance again. The initiative of the antiaircraft gun crews in the battle for Sevastopol was outstanding, and one particular instance has been singled out as an example.

  "A lieutenant in charge of an antiaircraft combat detachment, who had been especially prominent in the fighting on the northern sector of the Sevastopol front, was ordered to support the infantry attack with one heavy gun and a light antiaircraft section, firing from a gully. The tasks of these antiaircraft combat detachments are almost always extraordinarily difficult. While the field artillery remains stationary for long periods in each position, the guns of the antiaircraft combat groups move close behind the first wave of the infantry, and engage over open sights and at very short ranges those pillboxes and other enemy centers of resistance which the infantry cannot overcome. Since the antiaircraft groups move normally without cover, they tend to draw the fire of all the enemy artillery. Such was the case here--and, in addition, the Soviet defenders had registered every yard of the ground.

  "At first the task seemed impossible to the lieutenant. There was no field of fire for his gun from the gully, and the violent fire of the defenders made it impossible to advance. All alternative routes to the enemy pillboxes were also under heavy fire.

  "Thereupon; the lieutenant decided on a bold gamble. Despite the intensive Soviet fire, he rushed his gun to a suitable position and opened fire immediately. By constant change of position and by taking cover momentarily when things became too hot, he was able to maintain an almost continuous rate of fire against his targets. In this way he succeeded in knocking out six pillboxes and, in conjunction with the light antiaircraft section, silenced a number of field works, machine-gun nests, and gun positions.

  "Similar antiaircraft combat groups were employed on a number of other sectors. In practically every instance they are the first heavy weapons to follow the infantry. Although the way is first cleared for them by the engineers, it nevertheless requires skill and coolness to take the gun through the narrow gap in the minefields, where the slightest deviation may bring disaster. Furthermore the terrain at Sevastopol is extremely difficult. The long hillsides are covered with thick undergrowth and bushes, and bristle with pillboxes and weapon-pits. Concealed Russian snipers will permit the antiaircraft elements to pass unmolested and then ambush the supporting units as they come up. The German infantry, following its own artillery screen on a front of a few hundred yards, is subjected to continuous Soviet attacks, supported by artillery, from the flank. In these circumstances the situation has often been saved solely by the initiative of the antiaircraft combat groups and by the high rate of fire of their guns."

  COMMENT: The above account appears to indicate that the Germans, at any rate at Sevastopol, used antiaircraft guns to give close support to the infantry. The high velocity and heavy shell of the 88-mm antiaircraft gun make it a formidable weapon against pillboxes and similar types of concrete defenses.

  Artillery in Combat in Wooded Areas

  Tactical
and Technical Trends, No. 33, September 9, 1943.

  The following personal critique by a German artillery officer on artillery in combat in wooded areas is taken from a translated German document.

  * * *

  a. Example 1

  An infantry regiment, reinforced by my light field-howitzer battery (probably 105's) horse-drawn, received orders, late in the afternoon, to push forward toward the east through extensive forest region, turn off to the right at a crossroad, and relieve the left flank of the neighboring division by making an attack.

  It was nearly dark before the column of march advanced. The deep sand of the road and the necessary reconnaissance, caused the column to halt more than once. Tall trees alternated with those of recent growth. There were a few small clearings along the roadside but no large, completely cleared areas. The battalion to which the light field-howitzer battery was attached marched close behind the battalion forming the advance guard.

  In the meantime, it had grown dark. The first shells burst over the point, more than a mile from the crossroad. Everyone halted and then the order rang out: "Antitank troops forward!" and "Artillery will fire!" The commander of the infantry regiment, who marched behind the point, turned to me and asked "Can you fire?" A fire mission! thought I. In a forest! At night! The enemy red-green map on a scale of 1:100,000! Our own position? The enemy? "Can you fire?"

  One must try anything.

  I hastened back and found a partially cleared place where one could fire fairly well between the trees. A gun commander was instructed to place at least one gun in position as quickly as possible. This took some time, for the infantry's moving of baggage and supply trains with the advance guard battalion barred the way of the guns. The din of battle grew ever stronger. While we were searching for gun positions, the gun commander asked me somewhat diffidently how he should lay and fire the gun with the map he had. I asked him in return, "Where is the most combat noise?" "There", he said. "Then aim your guns at that place! I estimate that the distance to our point is 800 yards. For safety's sake, begin to fire at 1,200, and fire two high bursts, then lower your gun and begin to use percussion fuzes. Bring your fire back to the target. Establish a forward observation post near the infantry."

 

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