Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  [43] Indeed you may well laugh at these doings; but in all seriousness, it has occurred to me to congratulate Agesilaüs, king of Sparta, on the stand he took, for he never thought it fitting to have either a statue or a portrait made of himself, not because he was deformed, as people say, and short — for what was to hinder the statue’s being tall, or having shapely legs, like Euphranor’s Hephaestus? — but rather because he saw clearly that one should not try to prolong the allotted span of human life or expose the body to the vicissitudes of stone or bronze. Would that it might be possible to take leave even of the body which we have!

  [44] But farewell to Daedalus and to the imitative devices of that artist; enough of Prometheus, enough of clay. In fact it is said that even the body of noble souls is foreign substance,

  For very many things do lie between

  body and soul. For the soul is not present when the body is outworn nor is it concerned for it. Cambyses was mad when, as if it were Amasis, the king of the Egyptians, he stabbed and flogged his dead body. To be sure, the Egyptians say that Amasis, having long viewed with distrust the cruelty of Cambyses, caused his own body to be hid away and another to be substituted for it, and that this was the corpse which fell in the way of Cambyses. [45] However, O ye Egyptians and Cambyses too, no matter whether it was some one else who suffered this treatment or Amasis himself, at all events it was a form sans blood, sans flesh, sans soul. This, so please you, you may drag, you may rend, you may stab, yet real Amasis you have failed to catch. Again, another man who was endowed with life and breath and feeling exclaimed, “Grind, grind the sack of Anaxarchus; for the real Anaxarchus you do not grind!” You see, this man, having been thrown into a mortar and being pounded by the pestles, declared that he himself was not being ground, but only that thing of his in which, as it chanced, he had been enclosed — just as we are told that the peers of the realm in Persia are beaten — their cloak instead of their body.

  [46] Well then, though Persians may resent so slight a chastisement, a Greek allowed his body to be pounded as if it were a cloak; and shall not I allow my statue to go to the melting-pot, even supposing it to have sensation? But as matters stand, while Anaxarchus was superior to sensation, I, in the language of Euripides’ Laodameia,

  Would not desert a friend, though void of life.

  Accordingly I wish to speak words of comfort to my friend, my statue, as to one possessing sensation: O thou mute semblance of my eloquence, art thou not visible? No more was Aristeas visible, who lived before thee. For he too had this experience, as I conjecture, the experience of being raised up by the men of Proconnesus and then being spirited away by his foes, and of having a tale disseminated by these same men to the effect that Aristeas was not to be seen, either living or dead. However, Aristeas was alive then, lives now, and will live always.

  [47] Some one, I ween, will yet remember me,

  as Sappho very beautifully says; and far more beautifully Hesiod:

  But fame is never utterly destroyed

  Which many people voice; a goddess she.

  I myself will raise thee up and place thee in the precinct of the goddess, whence naught shall tear thee down — not earthquake or wind or snow or rain or jealousy or foe; but lo! e’en now I find thee in thy station! Aye, ere now forgetfulness hath tripped and cheated sundry others too, but judgement plays no tricks on any man of worth, and ’tis because of this that thou standest upright for me like a man.

  THE THIRTY-EIGHTH DISCOURSE: TO THE NICOMEDIANS ON CONCORD WITH THE NICAEANS

  This is the first in a series of speeches by Dio dealing affairs in his native Bithynia, speeches which shed much light upon the troubles and problems referred to by Pliny the Younger in his correspondence while governor of that province. The administration of Bithynia was clearly no easy task. Besides the natural resentment of the provincial toward his Roman overlord, who in some instances seems to have been unworthy of the office, we learn of much social and economic distress and unrest, financial mismanagement, and civic bickerings. Still another source of trouble was the bitter rivalry between cities of the district such as forms the subject of the present Discourse. 1 Nicomedia and 2 Nicaea were near neighbours. While Nicomedia profited from its nearness to the sea and was the “metropolis” of the district, Nicaea lay on an important trade route and seems to have outstripped its neighbour in material prosperity. Under the Empire it appears to have enjoyed the special favour of Rome. As early as 29 B.C. Augustus established there the cults of Roma and of Julius Caesar, and at the time of our Discourse Nicaea was honoured with the title πρώτη. This title it continued to hold despite the counterclaims of Nicomedia, and that it was no empty honour seems to be attested both by coins and inscriptions and by Dio’s own words (§ 26), which seem to negative the disparaging reference immediately preceding. His efforts to establish concord between these rivals seem not to have had lasting success, for as late as the Council of Chalcedon the bishops of these two cities presented counterclaims to the right of ordaining bishops in Bithynia.

  Dio does not provide a clue as to the precise date of our Discourse, but both his choice of theme and the spirit in which he deals with it indicate with some clearness that it belongs to his philosophic period. With what appears to be false modesty, he professes not to know why he, a native of Prusa, some sixty miles distant, should have been honoured with citizenship in Nicomedia. Possibly it had been the first city of the province so to honour him. However that may be, in his address before the people of Apameia (Or. 41.2) he states in no uncertain terms that such marks of distinction had become for him a common experience “wherever I have been, not only cities in general, but even, I may say, most of those which are of standing equal to your own, have presented me with citizenship, with membership in the Council, and with their highest honours without my asking it, believing me to be not unserviceable to themselves or unworthy of being honoured.” Although loyal to his birthplace and ambitious for its advancement, Dio’s long exile had fostered in him wider sympathies, and he seems to have been sincerely concerned for the welfare of Bithynia at large. It was only to be expected that the cities of the province should welcome the opportunity to enlist in their support a man with such an outlook, to profit by his wisdom, and to shine by his reflected glory.

  The Thirty-eighth Discourse: To the Nicomedians on Concord with the Nicaeans

  Men of Nicomedia, when I undertake to compute the reasons why you gave me citizenship, I am at a loss; for I do not see that I have great wealth such as to warrant my believing that I have been sought after by you for mercenary reasons, nor am I conscious of having an attitude for flattering the masses; so you do not seem to want me even for the purpose of readily serving your every whim. No, the fact is that I am not even good company at a banquet or a sociable person at gatherings of that sort, so as to be able at least to afford pleasure for the populace from that quality. However, if I do not wholly mistake your purpose regarding me, and also if I am cognizant of all the matters in which I am capable of serving you, the only thing left to account for my having been made a citizen by you is naught else than that, perhaps to a greater degree than others, I have both the desire and the ability to give advice on the interests of the commonwealth. [2] However, if such is not the case, then not only have you been misguided in your interest in me but I too, it would appear, was rash in heeding your call in the hope of proving useful to your city in the future, since you are not making that use of me for which alone I am adapted. If, on the other hand, all cities, or rather the great cities, need not only the men of wealth, both to finance the public spectacles and liberally to provide such customary expenses, and flatterers to afford pleasure by their demagogic clap-trap, but also counsellors to provide safety by their policies, I myself shall not shrink from aiding the city to the best of my ability by giving advice on matters of greatest importance.

  [3] Well now, there are indeed some other things in your city which deserve correction, and one after the other I shall appl
y my treatment to them, provided I win your confidence by speaking the truth about the greater matters. But for what strange reason or with what purpose do I not first give advice about the smaller matters and in those matters test the willingness of the people to be persuaded, instead of choosing to jeopardize my reputation at the start by offering advice on the weightiest matter of all? It is because it seems to me far easier to persuade men concerning the weightiest matters than concerning those which are slighter or trivial. For while one may actually scorn the harm resulting from these minor matters, a man who, when it is a question of policies apart from which it is impossible for him to be saved, has refused to be persuaded regarding these things is clearly a man who will not even listen concerning the minor matters.

  [4] So then, if you will endure my advice with patience, I am indeed very confident you will be persuaded by me in the matters about which I am here to advise you. What then? It is a hard task to get you to view my remarks upon the subject which I have in mind as neither tiresome nor superfluous nor untimely. In order, therefore, that I may not at the outset encounter such objections on your part as: “But why do you offer advice in matters about which, to begin with, we are not even deliberating?” “But why do you accord yourself the privilege of the floor, when we have not bestowed it on you?” “But for what reason, when so many have been active in politics in our city, native-born and adopted, orators and philosophers, old and young, has no one ever presumed to give us this advice?” — to forestall all such objections, [5] I wish to make this very special request of you, men of Nicomedia — and do me the favour of being patient — that you listen to a speech which is superfluous and untimely and which may not convince you. Moreover, I do not consider it a great favour I am asking either; for if you are persuaded by my words, it is worth your while to have listened to one who tells you what is to your advantage; while, on the other hand, if you reserve your acquiescence, what is there unpleasant in having allowed a friend to take the floor who is willing to speak to no avail?”

  Very well, what is this subject on which I am about to offer advice, and yet am reluctant to name it? The word, men of Nicomedia, is not distasteful whether in the home or the clan or in friendly circles or cities or nations; [6] for concord is what I am going to talk about, a fine word and a fine thing; but if I proceed to add forthwith concord with whom, I fear lest, while you may be convinced that concord of and by itself is fine, you may believe that being concordant with those persons with whom I claim you should be concordant is impossible. For what till now has set you at your present enmity one toward another, and has prevented the establishment of friendship, is the unreasoning conviction that concord is impossible for your cities. Nay, don’t raise an outcry when I make a fresh start but bear with me.

  [7] What I say, men of Nicomedia, is that you must achieve concord with the Nicaeans; but hear me out and don’t get angry yet before I state my reasons. For neither is the sick man angry with his physician when he prescribes his treatment, but, though he dislikes to hear him say he must submit to surgery or cautery, still he obeys; for his life is at stake. And yet why have I said this? For my remedy, the one I offer your cities, is a most pleasant remedy, and one without which no man would wish to live, if he has good sense.

  [8] But I want to break up my address, and first of all to speak about concord itself in general, telling both whence it comes and what it achieves, and then over against that to set off strife and hatred in contradistinction to friendship. For when concord has been proved to be beneficial to all mankind, the proof will naturally follow that this particular concord between these particular cities is both quite indispensable for you and quite profitable as well. I shall not, however, refrain from telling also how concord may endure when once achieved; for that problem, indeed, I see is bothering many. [9] But I pray to all the gods, both yours and theirs, that if what I now say is said because of goodwill to you alone and not in pursuit of any personal glory or advantage to be devoted from your reconciliation, and above all if it is destined to be of advantage to the state — if this is true, I pray that the gods may not only grant me such eloquence as is worthy of my cause, but that they may also make you willing to take my advice in the matters which are to your advantage.

  [10] Well then, concord has been lauded by all men always in both speech and writing. Not only are the works of poets and philosophers alike full of its praises, but also all who have published their histories to provide a pattern for practical application have shown concord to be the greatest of human blessings, and, furthermore, although many of the sophists have in the past ventured to make paradoxical statements, this is the only one it has not occurred to them to publish — that concord is not a fine and salutary thing. Therefore, not only for those who now desire to sing its praises, but also for those who at any time would do so, the material for their use is abundant, and it will ever be possible to say more and finer things about it.

  [11] For example, if a man should wish to delve into its origin, he must trace its very beginning to the greatest of divine things. For the same manifestation is both friendship and reconciliation and kinship, and it embraces all these. Furthermore, what but concord unites the elements? Again, that through which all the greatest things are preserved is concord, while that through which everything is destroyed is its opposite. If, then, we human beings were not by nature a race of mortals, and if the forces which destroy us were not bound to be numerous, there would not be strife even in human affairs, just as also still not in things divine. However, the only respect in which we fall short of the blessedness of the gods and of their indestructible permanence is this — that we are not all sensitive to concord, but, on the contrary, there are those who actually love its opposite, strife, of which wars and battles constitute departments and subsidiary activities, and these things are continually at work in communities and in nations, just like the diseases in our bodies. [12] For in fact, though we know full well that health is the greatest of human blessings, still many times we ourselves plot against it to our own undoing, some yielding to the seduction of pleasures and some shirking labours which are healthful and habits which are prudent. On the other hand, if the greatest of our evils did not have for their support the pleasure of the moment, they would have no power at all to harm us; yet as it is, Nature has given that to them, and so they can deceive and delight their victims.

  [13] Moreover, what might actually make one most indignant toward mankind is this — that all the evils afflict them though knowing well their nature. At any rate, if one were to question a single person, or a company of persons, about the terms themselves, asking in what category are to be placed such terms as wars, factions, diseases, and the like, no one would hesitate a moment to reply that these are classed among the evils, and that they not only are so but have been so considered and are called evils. [14] And as for their opposites, peace and concord and health, no one would deny that they likewise both are and are called goods. But though the conflict between the evil things and the good is so manifest, yet there are some among us — or rather a good many — who delight in the things which are admittedly evil. And take, for example, a ship — though all on board are well aware that the one hope of reaching port in safety lies in having the sailors on good terms with one another and obedient to the skipper, but that when strife and mutiny arise in it, even the favourable winds often veer round to oppose the ship’s course and they fail to make their harbours, even when close at hand, still the sailors sometimes foolishly quarrel, and this works their ruin, though they know the cause of their destruction.

  [15] Again, take our households — although their safety depends not only on the like-mindedness of master and mistress but also on the obedience of the servants, yet both the bickering of master and mistress and the wickedness of the servants have wrecked many households. Why, what safety remains for the chariot, if the horses refuse to run as a team? For when they begin to separate and to pull one this way and one that, the driver is in
evitably in danger. And the good marriage, what else is it save concord between man and wife? And the bad marriage, what is it save their discord? Moreover, what benefit are children to parents, when through folly they begin to rebel against them? And what is fraternity save concord of brothers? And what is friendship save concord among friends?

  [16] Besides, all these things are not only good and noble but also very pleasant, whereas their opposites are not only evil but also unpleasant; and yet we often prefer them instead of the most pleasant goods. For example, there have been times when people have chosen wars instead of peace, despite the great differences between the two, not under the delusion that fighting is better or more pleasant and more righteous than keeping the peace, but because some were striving for kingly power, some for liberty, some for territory they did not have, and some for control of the sea. And yet, though the prizes await the victor are so rich, many have laid war aside as an evil thing and not fit to be chosen by them in preference to the things of highest value. [17] But, the waging of war and fighting even without occasion, what is that but utter madness and a craving for evils which is occasioned by madness? Now the chief reason why we human beings hate wild beasts is that remorseless warfare exists between them and us for ever; yet many even of us treat human beings too as wild beasts and take pleasure in the conflict waged with those of our own kind.