Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  [23] “What!” some one will say, “must we choose the existence of a wild beast and live a solitary life?” No, not that of a wild beast, but rather that of a prudent man and of one who knows how to live in safety. For far safer and better is solitude than association with mankind, if only solitude be found apart from fear and devoid of solicitude for things of common interest. Just as, in my opinion, for persons making a voyage the open sea is more to their advantage than the coast, unless one be sailing in fair weather and be well acquainted with the region; for in the open sea rarely, if ever, is a ship wrecked, but it is close to the shores and near the capes that the wreckage may be seen. [24] Therefore, when storm overtakes a ship, though every landlubber longs for the land, the skipper flees from it as far as possible. Yet havens free from billows can be found, trusting which men may safely ride at anchor, however high the gale may rise. But with human beings, the most temperate are like our summer anchorages, which afford shelter for the moment only; for with men of that type also the individual is a reasonable person with regard to some one of life’s problems, but with regard to the rest he is not. In money matters, for instance, he might never wrong you — granted, of course, that a man of that sort exists — but let a fit of rage or jealous rivalry seize him and you would perhaps not find him unshaken and trustworthy.

  [25] Accordingly, one should have dealings with such persons only in so far as one is compelled to do so and extremely little at that, what is more, keeping wide awake one’s self and on guard, as the poet says of the Achaeans and Hector,

  But he, experienced in war, with shield

  Of ox-hide covered his shoulders broad and watched

  The whir of arrows and the thud of darts.

  Similarly in our life we must employ prudence and understanding as a shield and, covered by it, flee and guard against men’s villainy and the tricks and plots which they are wont to use.

  [26] But, speaking generally, it would be surprising if eating from the same table were to prove a bar to villainy, and, forsooth, drinking from the same mixing-bowl and seeing the same lamp, when, on the other hand, seeing the same sun and being nourished by the same earth does not enter into the reckoning of any rogue; why, the tavern or, by Zeus, any other house made of stones and timbers mixes human beings together and can bring them together in friendship, just as Odysseus thinks is proper:

  Respect the house; we’re underneath thy roof.

  Thus he thinks that the hut — a hut, too, built of wood grown on hostile soil — is worthier of respect than the men themselves. Yet the whole sky, beneath which we all have been from the beginning, is of no avail toward producing concord, neither is our partnership in the universe, a partnership in things divine and majestic, but only, on the contrary, our partnership in things which are petty and worthless.

  [27] Again, every man’s own father — often an ineffectual old man — is a great force for righteousness to prevent those of the same family from plotting against each other; while the common father of all, of “both men and gods,” he from whom we all have our being, not a creature such as Laches or Simon, cannot check or prevent the unrighteousness of men! Indeed, that one could not trust mere words about friendship — for this is the only point remaining — is no doubt clear. [28] For it is absurd that, when lending money to one’s neighbours, no one would lightly put faith in word alone, but instead requires witnesses and writings — and many do violence to even these — [and, on the other hand, that the mere profession of friendship should suffice].

  “What!” somebody objects, “did not the men of former times have any friends? For instance, what would you say of these demigods that are on the lips of all: Orestes and Pylades, Theseus and Peirithoüs, Achilles and Patroclus?” Well, if one were to admit that the popular belief about these is true, there would be three friendships that had occurred in a period of time so extensive that in it one could say that the sun had gone into an eclipse quite a number of times.

  THE SEVENTY-FIFTH DISCOURSE: ON LAW

  On stylistic grounds this Discourse has been assigned to the sophistic period of Dio’s career. It is an encomium such as is familiar in sophistic literature, and it exhibits both the merits and the defects of that form of composition. Careful attention is paid to matters of detail connected with rhetorical effect, but one misses the note of sincere conviction to be found in many other writings of our author.

  The topic chosen for eulogy is νόμος. As is well known, that word covers a wide range, meaning at one time usage sanctified by long tradition, at another divine ordinance, and at another statutory law. Dio treats all three varieties impartially, passing lightly from one to another and back again. The opening phrase, ἔστι δέ, suggests that our Discourse was preceded by an introductory composition no longer extant.

  The Seventy-fifth Discourse: On Law

  The law is for life a guide, for cities an impartial overseer, and for the conduct of affairs a true and just straight-edge by which each must keep straight his own conduct; otherwise he will be crooked and corrupt. Accordingly, those who strictly observe the law have firm hold on safety; while those who transgress it destroy first of all themselves and then their fellows too, providing them with an example and pattern of lawlessness and violence. Yes, just as at sea those who do not miss the beacon are most likely to come through with their lives and to find their havens, so those who live according to the law journey through life with maximum security and reach the right destination. [2] There have been, it is true, instances in which one who has used a human being as counsellor has done so to his sorrow, but not so with the law. So much more serviceable is it for our cities than their walls that many of them still remain unwalled, but without law no city can be administered.

  But the law is of advantage not only to mortals, but to the gods as well. At any rate the universe always preserves the same law inviolate, and nothing which is eternal may transgress it. It is for that reason, methinks, that the law has appropriately been called “king of men and gods”; for law does away with violence, puts down insolence, reproves folly, chastises wickedness, and in private and public relations helps all who are in need, succouring the victims of injustice, and to those who are perplexed about a course of action making known what is their duty. [3] Whenever, for instance, a man is confronted by a perplexing situation and is seeking to discover what is expedient for him, he need not, I believe, call in friends or kinsmen, but rather go to the laws and pose his question. For the law would not, having an eye to its own advantage, give him inferior advice, nor yet through ignorance of the better course, nor would it because of some engagement or lack of interest beg its consultants to let it be excused. For, on the contrary, it has regard for all alike, and it has leisure for the problems of all others, and for it there is no private or special interest.

  [4] Again, law is more serviceable than the oracular responses of the gods in that, while there have been some who did not understand the oracles, and, supposing that they were acting in harmony with them, have done the very opposite — which accounts, I imagine, for their having met with disaster — from the law there proceeds nothing which is tortuous or ambiguous, but, instead, it puts in simple phrases everything which is appropriate for those who are in need. Besides, though ruler and master of all things, it exercises its authority without the use of arms and force — on the contrary, law itself does away with force; nay, it rules by persuasion and governs willing subjects. For it is because it first persuades men and secures their approval that law comes into being and acquires its own power.

  [5] But so great is the power it possesses, that it is the law which assists even the gods. For example, the sacrilegious and those who violate the reverence due to the gods it punishes. Moreover, the law itself no one has the power to injure. For every one who transgresses the law harms, not the law, but himself. [6] But such is the righteousness and benevolence which pervades the law, that for the unfortunate it has proved even more helpful than their blood relatives; and f
or the victims of injustice it has proved more potent than their own might; and for fathers, more kindly than their sons; for sons, more kindly than parents; for brothers, than brothers. At any rate many, when wronged by their closest kin, seek refuge with the law. Then too, though it has experienced no kindness at the hands of any one, the law renders thanks in full to all for the kindnesses which they show to others, exacting thanks alike for fathers from their sons, for those who have in private done some deed of kindness from those whom they have benefited, and for those who display public spirit in municipal affairs from their city.

  [7] Furthermore, most beautiful are the rewards which it has established for their benefactions, having devised crowns and public proclamations and seats of honour, things which for those who supply them entail no expense, but which for those who win them have come to be worth everything. Indeed, whatever it so desires, however inexpensive it may be, the law immediately renders important and precious. It is the law which has made the wild olive so important, worth so much devoted effort, [8] just as also with the parsley, the pine, and the olive crown; it is the law which has made the three words with which each good man is publicly acclaimed more precious to many than life itself. It is the law which convenes the national festive gatherings, which honours the gods, which exalts virtue; it is the law which purges the sea, makes civilized the land, is the veritable son of Zeus, the possessor of invincible, insuperable might for it is so far superior to all else in temperance and trustworthiness that not only partnership with women but also the bloom of maidens and the prime of lads we all have entrusted to the law. Besides, though Justice is a virgin, such is his continence that Law dwells with her without a chaperon.

  [9] Law is a protector of old age, a schoolmaster of youth, of poverty a fellow labourer, a guard of wealth, to peace an ally, to war a foe. Nay, even in war itself law has the greater might. For instance, the herald who is dispatched from one’s bitterest foes the law protects and guards, giving him as a weapon more mighty than any corselet or any shield the herald’s staff — in fact, this is a symbol of the law. Because of the law the slain are deemed no longer to be foes, nor are hatred and insult wreaked upon their bodies.

  [10] Again, so much more useful is the law to our cities than rudders are to our ships that, whereas a ship which has lost its rudders would not perish unless a storm should overtake it, a city cannot be saved if the law has been destroyed, not even when no dire disaster befalls it from without. But just as each of us is governed and safeguarded by the intelligence which is in him, while its destruction entails madness and insanity, similarly, if one expels the law from his life, just as if he had lost his mind, I believe he will be brought into a state of utter madness and confusion.

  THE SEVENTY-SIXTH DISCOURSE: ON CUSTOM

  This is another sophistic exercise. Comparison with the preceding Discourse will show with what ease the sophist could shift his ground. In Or. 75 law is eulogized as a beneficent influence in human affairs; here custom has taken its place. Contradictions between the two documents abound, but perhaps none more striking than the two statements that follow: “from the law there proceeds nothing which is tortuous or ambiguous, but, instead, it puts in simple phrases everything which is appropriate for those who are in need” (Or. 75.4) and “some laws have not been clearly written, and they are often warped and twisted by the eloquence of the orators; but our customs are never ambiguous or crooked, and oratory could not get the upper hand with them” (Or. 76.4).

  The Seventy-sixth Discourse: On Custom

  Custom is a judgement common to those who use it, an unwritten law of tribe or city, a voluntary principle of justice, acceptable to all alike with reference of that same matters, an invention made, not by any human being, but rather by life and time. Therefore, while of the laws in general each obtains its power through having been approved one and for all, custom is constantly being subjected to scrutiny. Moreover, while no law will readily be chosen by everybody — for it is by the opinions of the majority that it is ratified — yet a custom could not come into being if not accepted by all. Again, while law by threats and violence maintains its mastery, it is only when we are persuaded by our customs that we deem them excellent and advantageous.

  [2] Therefore it seems to me that we might liken the written law to the power of tyranny, for it is by means of fear and through injunction that each measure is made effective; but custom might rather be likened to the benevolence of kingship, for of their own volition all men follow custom, and without constraint. Again, we know of many laws which have been repealed by those who made them, because they judged them to be bad; but no one could readily point to a custom which had been dissolved. Nay, it is altogether easier to do away with any written ordinance you please than to do away with any custom. [3] For written ordinances, once the writing is erased, are done for in a single day; but a city’s usage it is impossible to destroy in a very long period of time. Besides, while laws are preserved on tablets of wood or of stone, each custom is preserved within our own hearts. And this sort of preservation is surer and better. Furthermore, the written law is harsh and stern, whereas nothing is more pleasant than custom. Then too, our laws we learn from others, but our customs we all know perfectly.

  [4] Again, some laws have not been clearly written, and they are often warped and twisted by the eloquence of the orators; but our customs are never ambiguous or crooked, and oratory could not get the upper hand with them. Also the laws must be kept constantly in mind if we are to abide by them; whereas a custom men cannot forget, even if they would; for such is its nature that it is constantly reminding them.

  And, speaking generally, while one might say that the laws create a polity of slaves, our customs, on the contrary, create a polity of free men. For the laws inflict punishment upon men’s bodies; but when a custom is violated, the consequent penalty has always been disgrace. Therefore the one is a law for bad persons, the other for good persons. Indeed, if all men were good, evidently we should have no need of the written laws. Furthermore, although our kings are above the laws and do many things in violation of them, even they follow the customs.

  [5] Again, of the written laws, not one is in force in time of war, but the customs are observed by all, even if men proceed to the extremity of hatred. For example, the provision that no one shall prevent the burial of the dead has nowhere been put in writing, for how could the victors obey the injunctions of the vanquished? Nay, it is custom which brings it to pass that the departed are granted that act of humanity. It is the same with the provision that no one shall lay hands on heralds, and that they alone enjoy complete security on their missions. Finally, from among those who transgress law, I believe that not one could be shown to have been punished openly by the gods; yet the Spartans, when they had transgressed the custom regarding heralds, having slain the heralds who came from the Great King, were punished by the divine power itself.

  THE SEVENTY-SEVENTH/EIGHTH DISCOURSE: ON ENVY

  In enumerating the eighty items which he found in his copy of Dio, Photius lists next in order after Or. 76 two speeches entitled περὶ φθόνου. Some support is given Photius in that connexion by our manuscripts, for UB place at the beginning of the document before us the heading περὶ φθόνου α, and, to introduce § 15, a second heading, περὶ φθόνου β, while PH have preserved for us only §§ 1-14. These facts account for the double number attached to the present Discourse in editions of our author. How it came to be viewed as two separate documents is difficult to understand, for both parts deal with the same theme, the second part follows naturally upon the first, and there is no perceptible break between them. To be sure, dialogue predominates in the first part, while in the second there is almost unbroken exposition, but that is a phenomenon noticed in other specimens of Dio’s teaching.

  Arnim assigns this Discourse to the period of Dio’s exile and regards it as a trustworthy and significant illustration of the way in which at that period he sometimes imparted inst
ruction. The dialogue begins abruptly, the opening words revealing that the discussion is already under way. Almost immediately Dio’s partner calls attention to the presence of a large company of listeners, who might find a detailed discussion irksome. Dio counters by asking if they have not assembled for the express purpose of listening to “wise words and about wise words,” and he proceeds to test the sincerity of their interest by continuing the argument. But by the time we reach § 9 we find that — possibly because he has taken to heart the warning about his audience — he begins to abandon dialectic and to launch forth into rather continuous exposition. One is reminded of the Borysthenitic Discourse (Or. 36), in which we are told that a large crowd has assembled to hear their visitor, and Dio, after a preliminary skirmish with the young Callistratus, directs his further remarks to his audience at large. The setting of our present Discourse cannot be determined with precision, but that it was delivered in some large city may be inferred from § 8. Furthermore, the size of the audience and the reference (§ 15) to a discussion which had taken place the day preceding suggest that Dio had been in residence long enough to have attracted some attention.

  The Seventy-seventh/eighth Discourse: On Envy

  Dio. Is it really for these and similar reasons that Hesiod came to be regarded as a wise man among the Greeks and by no means unworthy of that reputation, as being one who composed and chanted his poems, not by human art, but because he had held converse with the Muses and had become a pupil of those very beings? Whence it inevitably follows that whatever entered his mind he also expressed with both music and wisdom and in no instance without a purpose, as is clearly illustrated by the verse I have in mind.