Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  [134] κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἔθος ἀεὶ συμβαίνει. καὶ μὴν εἰ δοκεῖ δυσχερὲς τὸ ἀφαιρεῖσθαί τινος ἐξουσίας τὴν πόλιν, καὶ ὑμεῖς ἀφαιρεῖσθε τὴν ἐξουσίαν τοῦ φυλάττειν βέβαια τὰ δοθέντα τοῖς λαβοῦσιν. ὅτῳγὰρ ἂν ὑμεῖς δῶτε τὴν τιμήν, οὐκέτ᾽ ἔστ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὑμῖν τὸ ἐᾶν ἔχειν αὐτόν: ἀλλ᾽ εἷς ἀνὴρ ἀεὶ τούτου κύριος, ὁ στρατηγῶν. καίτοι χεῖρόν ἐστι τὸ ἔθει μὴ ἐφ᾽ ὑμῖν εἶναι τοῦ κατὰ νόμον κεκωλυμένου. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀφῄρηνται τὴν ἐξουσίαν τούτου τρόπον τινά, ὃ πράττειν ἑαυτοὺς νόμῳ κεκωλύκασιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπέστησαν ἑκόντες διὰ

  [134] Besides, if it appears vexatious that your city should be deprived of any power, it is you your own selves who are depriving it of the power to guarantee for the recipients the security of its gifts. For whenever you confer this honour upon a man, it is no longer in your power to allow him to keep it; on the contrary, one official always has this in his control, namely, the chief magistrate. And yet, it is worse for you to lack this power owing to custom than to be estopped by law. For in the one case men in a certain sense have not been deprived of the control of that which they have by law renounced their right willingly because of the advantage thereby gained.

  [135] τὸ συμφέρον. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔθους οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι αὑτούς, εἴπερ ἄρα, ἀφῄρηνται τοῦθ᾽ ὑπὲρ οὗ μήτε ἔκριναν μήτε ἐβουλεύσαντο. καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖ γε παραμυθίαν τινὰ ἔσχον τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἴσον καὶ κοινόν, ἁπάντων ὁμοίως ἀφαιρουμένων τὰς ἀτελείας, παρ᾽ ὑμῖν δὲ ὃς ἂν τύχῃ τῆς εἰκόνος ἀφῄρηται καὶ πολλάκισὁ βελτίων. ἔτι δὲ ἐκεῖ μὲν οὐχ ἵνα ἄλλος λάβῃ, τὸν ἔχοντα ἀφῃρεῖτο ὁ νόμος: παρ᾽ ὑμῖν δὲ τούτου χάριν γίγνεται, ὃ τῷ παντὶ λυπρότερόν ἐστι τοῦ μόνον ἀποστερεῖσθαι.

  [135] But when we have to deal with a custom, one cannot even say that men have deprived themselves — if deprived they have been — of a thing on which they have neither passed judgment nor deliberated.

  And although in Athens the people had some consolation — in that the measure was impartial and general, since all alike were being deprived of their exemption from public burdens — here it is only the recipient of the statue who has been deprived of it, and often he is the better man. Moreover, in Athens it was not in order that another person might receive the exemption that the law proposed to take it away from the possessor, but in your city that is precisely why it is done, a thing that is altogether more distressing than merely to be dispossessed.

  [136] καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖνό γε οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ δήπουθεν, ὅσῳ δοκεῖ χαλεπώτερον τὸ δι᾽ ἄλλον τι πάσχειν τοῦ δι᾽ αὑτόν. οὐκοῦν ἐκ μὲν τοῦ νόμου συνέβαινεν, ἵναμή τινες ἔχωσι τὰς ἀτελείας, περὶ ὧν ὡς ἀναξίων ἔλεγεν, ἀποδοῦναι τοὺς λοιπούς: ἐκ δὲ τοῦ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν ἔθους, ἵν᾽ ἄλλοι λάβωσι,

  [136] Furthermore, no one, I presume, is unaware how much more grievous it seems to suffer any harsh treatment on account of another than it is to suffer it on your own account. So, whereas it was the intention of the Athenian law to divest all others of their privilege of exemption in order to prevent certain men, whom it designated as undeserving, from retaining theirs, the result of your custom is that the owners of statues are robbed of them in order that others may receive them;

  [137] τοὺς ἔχοντας ἀποστερεῖσθαι γίγνεται. τῷ παντὶ δὲ τοῦτο τοῖς πάσχουσι βαρύτερον. εἰ τοίνυν ἐφ᾽ ὧν μάλιστα ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων βούλοιτό τις ἰδεῖν, τίνας ἀδικεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος καὶτίνας ἔμελλε λυπήσειν ἐκεῖνος ὁ νόμος, ἀφελὼν τοὺς μὴ μόνον ἔχοντας ἀτέλειαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς εἰκόνος τετυχηκότας, οὕτω σκοπείτω τοὺς λοιποὺς ἑκατέρων. οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ τρόπον τινὰ οὐδὲ ἔπασχον [p. 259] οὐδέν: ὃ γὰρ εἰλήφεσαν ἐν προσθήκης μέρει, τοῦτο ἀπώλλυον, τῆς μείζονος δωρεᾶς αὐτοῖς τηρουμένης: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἴσος ἂν γένοιτο ὁ λόγος. ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι μὲν δῆλον καὶ αὐτόθεν οἶμαι τὸ πρᾶγμα: ὅσῳ γὰρ τὸ τῆς εἰκόνος μεῖζον ἢ τὸ τῆς ἀτελείας, τοσούτῳ κρείττονες οἱ τούτου τυχόντες: ἔτι δ᾽ ἂν οὕτω γένοιτό γε ὁ λόγος φανερώτερος:

  [137] and this treatment is altogether more grievous to those affected.

  If, further, any one wishes, confining his consideration of the matter strictly to those cases in which the loss suffered is most nearly irreparable, to ask who are being wronged by this custom of yours and who were bound to be hurt by that Athenian law, let him disregard, not only those who were enjoying exemption from public burdens there, but also those who have received a statue here, and then let him consider those who are not in either class. Since those who had been honoured at Athens were in a sense not suffering any loss at all, for it was only what they would have received by way of a supplement that they were losing, whereas the greater gift continued to be theirs; but as regards the other gifts, the reckoning would come out the same for both classes. But, I think, the case is quite self-evident: For in proportion as the grant of a statue is a greater honour than the exemption, in just that degree those who receive the former are superior men. The argument can be made still clearer, though, if stated thus:

  [138] ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀτέλεια τοὺς λαβόντας εὐπορωτέρους ποιεῖ, καὶ οὗτοι μάλιστα ἐπιθυμοῦσιν αὐτῆς οἵτινες ἂν ὦσι περὶ χρήματα ἐσπουδακότες: ἡ δὲ εἰκὼν τὸ σεμνὸν μόνον ἔχει καὶ τὸ τῆς τιμῆς. ὅσῳ δὴ πάντες εἴποιμεν ἂν κρείττους τοὺς προῖκα καὶ δόξης μᾶλλον ἕνεκεν αἱρουμένους εὖ τινας ποιεῖν τῶν ἐπ᾽ ἀργυρίῳ καὶ διὰ κέρδος, τοσούτῳ φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ μόνον ἀμείνους ἀνθρώπους ἀδικεῖν τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ βελτιόνων ὑμᾶς κωλύειν εὖ πάσχειν ἤπερ ἐκείνους ὁ νόμος.

  [138] Whereas the exemption from public burdens makes the recipients of it wealthier, and those men are especially eager for it who are interested in money-making, the statue implies only dignity and honour; so just in proportion as those are superior men, as we would all agree, who choose to confer benefits upon others without remuneration and rather for reputation’s sake than those who set a price upon it and are moved by desire for gain, by just so much, as I at least would assert, are not only they better men whom this custom of yours wrongs, but also by just so much are those persons whom you are preventing from conferring benefits upon yourselves superior to those whom the Athenian laws prevented from benefitting the Athenians.

  [139] ἀλλ᾽ ἔγωγε ἀπορῶ τί δήποτε οὐχὶ καὶ νόμον τίθεσθε ἐπὶ τούτῳ καθ᾽ ὃν ἔσται τὸ λοιπόν, εἴπερ ὑμῖν ἀρέσκει. νὴ Δί᾽, αἰσχ
ύνην γὰρ οὐ μικρὰν ἔχει νόμος τοιοῦτος ἐν τῇ πόλει κείμενος. εἶτα ὃ γράφειν αἰσχρὸν ἡγεῖσθε, τοῦτο ποιεῖν οὐκ αἰσχρόν ἐστι; καὶ πόσῳ κρεῖττον μὴ χρῆσθαί τισι τῶν φαύλως γεγραμμένων ἢ ποιεῖν; ἢ ποτέρους ἂν εἴποιτε βελτίους, τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας πρὸς τὰ ἄτοπα, ὥστε ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ δεδομένων, ἢ τοὺς οὐ συγκεχωρημένα πράττοντας;

  [139] But for my part I am at a loss to understand why on earth you do not pass a law on this matter to regulate it for the future, if such is your pleasure.

  “Good heavens!” you exclaim, “Why, the existence of a law like that in a city brings no little shame.”

  And so it is not disgraceful to do what you think it is disgraceful to enact in writing? And yet how much better it is to refrain from following any written laws which are badly conceived than to do bad things! Or what class of men would you call the better, those who are so disposed toward improper things that they refrain from doing them even when they are authorized, or those who do them even though they are not allowed?

  [140] ἀλλ᾽ ἔγωγε φαίην ἄν, ὁμολογουμένου τοῦ μηδαμῶς δεῖν μηδὲν ἄδικον πράττειν μηδὲ ἀπρεπές, παρ᾽ οἷς ἂν νόμῳ γίγνηται τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἥττονα ἂν ἔχειν κατηγορίαν ἢ παρ᾽ οἷς ἂν κατὰ ἔθος. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὁ νόμος ῥητός ἐστι, καὶ οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο χείρων: οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν οὔτε ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις: τὸ δέ γε ἔθος, ἂν ᾖ φαῦλον, ἀνάγκη καὶ φαυλότερον ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι τῷ μὴ κατειλῆφθαι μηδὲ ὡρίσθαι.

  [140] But as for me, I would say that, while it is agreed that one should by no means do any unjust or unseemly act, yet among peoples where such acts are under the control of law there would be less cause for reproach than among people where they are regulated by custom. For, in the first place, the law is explicit and can never become worse, since it is not possible either to take away from or add to its written terms; whereas the custom, if it is a bad one, must necessarily become steadily worse because it is not clearly apprehended or defined.

  [141] λέγω δ᾽ οἷον εὐθὺς τοῦτό φασι τὴν ἀρχὴν λαβεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν συντετριμμένων καὶ οὐδὲ ἐφεστώτων ἔτι ταῖς βάσεσι: τούτοις γὰρ ἀποχρῆσθαι τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἐπισκευάζοντας καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιοῦντας [p. 260] ἑτέρους, εἶθ᾽, ὅπερ λοιπόν, τοὺς ὑγιεῖς μέν, οὐκ ἔχοντας δὲ ἐπιγραφάς, ἐπιγράφεσθαι: καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη καὶ τῶν ἐπιγεγραμμένων τινὰς τῶν σφόδρα παλαιῶν: ἔστω γὰρ ὃ λέγουσιν ἀληθές: εἰς ὕστερον ἀνάγκη μηδεμίαν εἶναι διάκρισιν: καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἔχει, δαπάνης, ἀκοσμίας, τρυφῆς:

  [141] I mean, for instance, the case we now have before us: they tell us that this practice began with the statues that were broken and not even standing on their pedestals; it was these that the chief magistrates used after repairing them and in a way making them altogether different; then the next step was that those which were well preserved but bore no inscriptions were inscribed; and at last came the taking of some statues which did have inscriptions on them, provided they were very old. Well, let us assume that their statement of the case is true. In the future there will necessarily be no distinction made at all — for this is the way it is with all other evils, such as extravagance, disorderly conduct, luxury —

  [142] οὐδέποτε τῶν χειρόνωνἐθῶν οὐθὲν εὑρήσετε ἱστάμενον οὐδὲ διαμένον, ἕως ἂν παντάπασι κωλυθῇ. διὰ γὰρ τὸ δέχεσθαι πρόσθεσιν ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν ἀνεξέλεγκτον εἶναι καὶ μηδενὶ φαίνεσθαι ῥᾳδίως, ὅσῳ τοῦτο ἐκείνου κάκιον, ἐπὶ πᾶν πρόεισιν, ὥσπερ οἶμαι καὶ τῶν ἑλκῶν τινα καὶ τῶν νοσημάτων ὅσα ἐξ ἅπαντος αὔξεσθαι φύσιν ἔχει. πρὸστούτῳ δὲ κἀκεῖνό ἐστιν: οἱ μὲν νόμῳ τι πράττοντες πονηρὸν οὐχ ὡς τοιοῦτον αὐτὸ πράττουσιν, ἀλλὰ ἐξηπατημένοι: τοὺς δὲ ἔθει φαῦλα ποιοῦντας ἅπαντες ἂν φαῖεν εἰδότας ἁμαρτάνειν, ἅ γε μηδ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐπιτήδεια εἶναι γεγράφθαι δοκεῖ.

  [142] you will never find any really bad custom halting or remaining stationary until it is utterly suppressed. For because it continually receives some accretion and because a gradual process is almost impossible to detect and does not readily become perceptible to anyone, inasmuch as the present state is worse than the former it goes on to extremes as, I believe, is the case with some ulcers and all those diseases whose nature it is inevitably to get worse.

  Then there is this further consideration — that those who do anything which the law makes wrong, do it, not as being such, but under a misconception, whereas with those who do things which custom regards as base, would one and all admit that they sin deliberately, those acts being of such a kind that even the perpetrators themselves think they are not fit to be forbidden by an enactment.

  [143] μὴ τοίνυν εἰ πρότερον ἤρξατο καὶ χρόνος πλέων γέγονε, διὰ τοῦτο ἔλαττον ὑμῖν νομίζετε προσήκειναὐτὸ ἀνελεῖν: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἥττονα αἰσχύνην ὄφλουσιν οἱ φυλάττοντες τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν παραδεξαμένων, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον μᾶλλον ὑπόκεινται τοῖς βουλομένοις αἰτιᾶσθαι. τὸ μέν γε πρῶτον γιγνόμενον οὐδὲ λαθεῖν ἀδύνατον τοὺς τότε, καὶ ταῦτα φυλαττομένων ἔτι τῶν ποιούντων: τὸ δὲ ἐκ πολλοῦ συμβαῖνον ἀνάγκη μηδένα ἀγνοεῖν, ἄλλως τε παντελῶς ἀνῃρημένης ὑμῖν τῆς προφάσεως ταύτης, οἵ γε περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου κάθησθε κρίνοντες. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ἄρξασθαί τινος ἔδει τῶν καλῶν ὑμᾶς, οὐκ ἂν ὠκνεῖτε διὰ τοῦτο, ὁμοίως εὐλόγως ἔχει, κἂν λῦσαί τι τῶν φαύλων δέῃ.

  [143] Moreover, just because the practice began some while ago and considerable time has elapsed, do not for this reason consider that it is any the less your duty to get rid of it; for those people who perpetuate such practices as this incur no less disgrace than those who first allowed them; nay, on the contrary, they are more exposed to the attack of any who wish to censure. When the thing was done first, it may well have even escaped the notice of the people of that time, particularly as those who practised it were still cautious about it; but when a thing has been going on for a long time, nobody can be unaware of it; and, besides, that excuse has been completely taken away from you, because you are sitting here passing judgment on this very matter. Therefore, just as if you felt it to be necessary to initiate some honourable usage, you would not hesitate on that account, so you have every reason now to act with equal readiness if it is desirable to abolish some unworthy practice.

  [144] μὴ τοίνυν ὁ χρόνος ὠφελείτω τὸ ἔθος, εἴπερ ἐστὶ μοχθηρόν, ὡς πάλαι νομίζω πεποιηκέναιφανερόν. οὐ γὰρ εἰ �
�ολὺν χρόνον ἔβλαψεν ὑμᾶς, διὰ τοῦτο οἶμαι προσήκειν αὐτὸ μηδέποτε παύσασθαι βλάπτον. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνδρα μοχθηρὸν ἐκ πολλοῦ λαβόντες ἀφήσετε τοῦ χρόνου χάριν [p. 261] οὗ διῆλθε πονηρὸς ὤν. οὐδέ γε εἴ τις νόσον ἰάσασθαι δύναιτο ἐνοχλοῦσαν πάλαι, φείδοιτ᾽ ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑγιαίνειν.

  [144] Therefore, do not let its antiquity support the custom if it is really a vicious one, as I think I have long since made clear. For I do not think that just because a thing has injured you for a long time it ought never to cease injuring you. For instance, if you take into custody a man who has been wicked for a long time, you will not release him on account of the length of time which he has spent in being a bad man. Nor yet if a person should be able to cure a disease that had long been harassing him, would he count the cost of enjoying good health all over again.

  [145] οἶμαι δ᾽ ὑμᾶς, εἴ τις θεῶν φανερὸν ὑμῖν ποιήσειε τὸ μέλλον αὖθίς ποτε λυπήσειν τὴν πόλιν, πάντως φυλάξεσθαι τοῦτο, ἐν ὑμῖν γε ὄν: εἶτα τοῦ μὲν ἑτέρους βλάψοντος οὐκ ἀμελήσετε, ἐπειδὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἔσται: τὸ δὲ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦν ἐάσετε, ὅτι πρότερον ἤρξατο; τουτὶ μὲν οὖν παντελῶς εὔηθες, εἴ τις οἴεται μηδέποτε δεῖν κωλῦσαι τὸ συνήθως μέν, ἀτόπως δὲ γιγνόμενον.