Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  Why in the world, then, do not those who aim to attain a happy life do their best to make themselves happy instead of devoting their entire attention to things which do not at all prevent their leading a bad, yes wretched, existence?

  [5] οὐδὲ τοὺς μὴ φίλους θεοῖς μὴ δυστυχεῖς εἶναι. διὰ τί ποτ̓ οὖν οἱ μὲν ὀρεγόμενοι ὅπως εὐδαιμονήσουσιν οὐ προθυμοῦνται τοιούτους [p. 176] παρέχειν σφᾶς αὐτούς; ἃ δὲ πράττοντας οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς κωλύει κακῶς καὶ ἀθλίως ζῆν, πᾶσαν τούτων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιοῦνται; καίτοι ἄνευ μὲν αὐλητῶν καὶ κιθαριστῶν καὶ σκυτοτόμων καὶ παιδοτριβῶν καὶ ῥητόρων καὶ ἰατρῶν οὐκ ἀδύνατον ἀνθρώποις βιοῦν πάνυ καλῶς καὶ νομίμως, οἶμαι δ̓ ἐγὼ καὶ δίχα γεωργῶν καὶ οἰκοδόμων:

  [5] Yet without flute-players and lyre-players and shoemakers and athletic trainers and orators and physicians it is not impossible for men to live very good and ordered lives, and, I fancy, even without farmers and builders.

  [6] Σκύθαι γοῦν οὐδὲν κωλύονται οἱ νομάδες μήτε οἰκίας ἔχοντες μήτε γῆν σπείροντες ἢ φυτεύοντες δικαίως καὶ κατὰ νόμους πολιτεύεσθαι: ἄνευ δὲ νόμου καὶ δικαίου μὴ κακῶς ζῆν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πολὺ τῶν θηρίων ὠμότερον οὐ δυνατόν. ἔτι δ̓ ὅπου μὲν φαῦλοι σκυτοτόμοι εἰσὶ καὶ γεωργοὶ καὶ οἰκοδόμοι, οὐδὲν ἐκεῖ διὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνει χαλεπόν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑποδήματα καὶ πυροὶ ἐλάττους καὶ κριθαί: ὅπου δὲ ἄρχοντες χείρους καὶ δικασταὶ καὶ νόμοι, τὰ πράγματα κάκιον ἔχει τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκείνων καὶ ὁ βίος δυστυχέστερος καὶ στάσεις καὶ ἀδικίαι καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ ἀσέβεια πολλὴ φύεται παῤ

  [6] At any rate the Scythians who are nomads, though they neither have houses nor sow seed nor plant trees and vines, are by no means prevented from playing their part as citizens with justice and in accordance with law; yet without law and justice men cannot avoid living badly and in much more savage fashion than the wild beasts. Moreover, where shoemakers and farmers and builders are of inferior quality, no serious harm results on that account; it is merely that the shoes are inferior and the wheat and barley scarcer. On the other hand, where rulers and judges and laws are inferior, the affairs of those people are in worse condition and their life is more unfortunate, and factions, injustices, deeds of arrogance, and impiety flourish in abundance with them.

  [7] αὐτοῖς. ἔτι δὲ σκυτοτόμον μὲν αὐτὸν οὐκ ὄντα λυσιτελεῖ παῤ ἄλλου πρίασθαι ὑποδήματα, καὶ οἰκοδομεῖν οὐκ ἐπιστάμενον ἄλλον ἐπὶ τούτῳ μισθώσασθαι, καὶ γεωργὸν μὴ ὄντα σῖτον πρίασθαι καὶ ὄσπρια: ἄδικον δὲ αὐτὸν ὄντα οὐ λυσιτελεῖ τῶν δικαίων παῤ ἄλλου τυγχάνειν οὐδὲ ἄφρονα καὶ ἀγνοοῦντα ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ ὧν ἀπέχεσθαι, μετὰ νοῦν ἐφ̓ ἑκάστῳ πρὸς ἕτερον ἰέναι. πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁ μὲν ἀργυρίου δεόμενος ἢ ἱματίων ἢ οἰκίας ἢ ἄλλου του ἐπίσταταί τε καὶ ζητεῖ παρὰ τῶν ἐχόντων λαβεῖν: ὁ δὲ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχων οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐπίσταται ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει νοῦν: ἀλλ̓ αὐτός φησιν ἱκανὸς εἶναι καὶ ἰσχυρίζεται τῇ ἀφροσύνῃ, πάντα πράττων καὶ λέγων ἀφρόνως, καὶ οὔ φησιν ἄδικος εἶναι οὐδὲ ἀνόητος οὐδὲ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλ̓ ὡς οἷόν τε ἱκανῶς περὶ ταῦτα ἔχειν, ὧν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιήσατο οὐδὲ ἔμαθεν οὐδὲν τούτων

  [7] Furthermore, though when one is not himself a shoemaker it is profitable to purchase shoes from another person, and when one does not understand building, to hire another person for that work, and when one is not a farmer, to purchase grain and pulse; on the other hand, when one is himself unjust, it is not profitable to get his justice from another, nor, when one lacks wisdom and does not know what he ought to do and what he ought to refrain from doing, to be constantly regretting every single act and resorting for knowledge to another person. For, in addition to all the other considerations, he who needs money or clothing or house or anything else not only knows that fact but also seeks to get these things from those who have them; whereas he who has no sense does not even know just this very fact, that he has no sense; instead, he himself claims to be competent and obstinately persists in his folly, everything he does or says being witless, and he denies that he is unjust or foolish or lawless but insists that is ever so competent in these matters, though he has never paid any attention to them or learned anything as far as those things are concerned.

  [8] ἕνεκεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι νομίζουσι, καθ̓ ἣν εἴσονται τί πρακτέον αὐτοῖς ἢ τί μὴ πρακτέον καὶ πῶς βιώσονται ὀρθῶς: ἀλλὰ τοὺς νόμους αὐτοῖς ἱκανοὺς εἶναι πρὸς τοῦτο τοὺς γεγραμμένους: [p. 177] ὅπως δὲ πείσονται τοῖς νόμοις καὶ ἑκόντες ποιήσουσι τὰ ἐκείνοις δοκοῦντα οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν. καίτοι τί ἧττον ὁ φόβῳ τοῦ κλέπτειν ἀπεχόμενος δοκῶν, ἀλλὰ μὴ μισῶν τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ καταγιγνώσκων, κλέπτης τῶν ὑφαιρουμένων ἐστίν; εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸν ἡμέρας οὐ κλέπτοντα, ἀλλὰ νυκτὸς γενομένης, κλέπτην οὐ φήσομεν ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ἀλλὰ δίκαιον εἶναι. ἔπειτα δέονται πολλῶν τῶν ἀπειλούντων καὶ κολαζόντων, ὡς οὐ δυνάμενοι αὐτοὶ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀδικημάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἴκοι ὄντες: τοιοῦτοι δὲ ὄντες αἱροῦνται τοὺς νομοθέτας καὶ κολάζουσι τοὺς νόμους ὥσπερ εἰ ἄμουσοι ὄντες ᾑροῦντο τοὺς μουσικοὺς καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπαΐοντες περὶ γεωμετρίας τοὺς

  [8] In fact, these men do not even believe in the existence of a knowledge in accordance with which they will know what they ought to do or what they ought not to do and how they will live correctly; nay, they believe that the laws are sufficient for them for that purpose, the laws on the statute books; but how they are to obey the laws and voluntarily do what those laws prescribe is a matter to which they give no serious thought. And yet how is he any less a thief who refrains from thieving out of fear, if he approves but does not loath and condemn the business, than those who actually commit theft — unless also he who does not do his thieving by day, not only after nightfall, is to be called no thief in daytime, but rather a man of probity? Besides, such persons require the presence of many to threaten and restrain them, since they are not able of themselves to refrain from their misdeeds, but even when at home are men of thievish disposition. However, though they are of such character, they choose the law-givers and punish the lawless, just as if persons who are unmusical were to choose the musicians, or as if those who know nothing of surveying were to choose the surveyors!

  [9] γεωμέτρας. σημεῖον δὲ τῆς πονηρίας τ�
��ς τῶν ἀνθρώπων: εἰ γὰρ ἀνέλοιεν τοὺς νόμους καὶ ἄδεια γένοιτο τοῦ τύπτειν ἀλλήλους καὶ ἀποκτείνειν καὶ ἁρπάζειν τὰ τῶν πέλας καὶ μοιχεύειν καὶ λωποδυτεῖν, τίνας ἔσεσθαι οἰητέον τοὺς ἀφεξομένους τοῦ των καὶ μὴ πάνυ ῥᾳδίως τε καὶ ἑτοίμως ἅπαντα ἐξαμαρτεῖν; καὶ τὸ νῦν γε οὐδὲν ἧττον λανθάνομεν μετὰ κλεπτῶν καὶ ἀνδραποδιστῶν καὶ μοιχῶν ζῶντες καὶ συμπολιτευόμενοι καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν βελτίους τῶν θηρίων ἐσμέν: καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἂν φοβηθῇ ἀνθρώπους φυλάττοντας ἢ κύνας, ἀπέχεται τοῦ ἁρπάζειν.

  [9] And here is an indication of the depravity of mankind. If men were to do away with the laws and licence were to be granted to strike one another, to commit murder, to steal the property of one’s neighbours, to commit adultery, to be a footpad, then who must we suppose would be the persons who will refrain from these deeds and not, without the slightest scruple or hesitation, be willing to commit all manner of crimes? For even under present conditions we none the less are living unwittingly with thieves and kidnappers and adulterers and joining with them in the activities of citizenship, and in this respect we are no better than the wild beasts; for they too, if they take fright at men or dogs set to guard against them, refrain from thieving.

  THE SEVENTIETH DISCOURSE: ON PHILOSOPHY

  ΠΕΡΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ.

  THE SEVENTIETH DISCOURSE: ON PHILOSOPHY

  This brief dialogue, like others in our collection, both begins and ends abruptly. It has the appearance of being an excerpt from a lengthier discussion, probably selected for publication because it contained a noteworthy tribute to the essential nature of philosophy. The rôle of the student in this document — if it was a student — is decidedly minor, consisting chiefly in assenting to the statements made by the principal speaker. Dio is emphasizing the crucial difference between pseudo-philosophers and those who are philosophers in deed as well as in word. In Truly Socratic fashion he leads up to his main thesis by citing examples of pretence in fields such as farming, trading, hunting, and the like, showing in each instance that no one is misled by profession of interest unaccompanied by fitting conduct.

  [1] Δ. Φέρε, εἴ τινος ἀκούοις λέγοντος ὅτι βούλεται γεωργεῖν, μηδὲν δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο πράττοντα ὁρῴης αὐτόν, μήτε βοῦς ὠνούμενον ἤ τρέφοντα μήτε ἄροτρα κατασκευαζόμενον μήτε τὰ ἄλλα τὰ πρὸς τὴν γεωργίαν σκεύη, μηδὲ ἐνοικοῦντα ἐν ἀγρῷ αὐτὸν ἢ [p. 178] αὐτὸν μὴ κεκτημένον ἢ παῤ ἄλλου μισθωσάμενον, ἀλλ̓ ἐν ἄστει τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβοντα περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν καὶ τὸ γυμνάσιον καὶ περὶ πότους ὄντα καὶ ἑταίρας καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην ῥᾳθυμίαν, πότερον προσέξεις οἷς λέγει μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς πραττομένοις ὑπ̓ αὐτοῦ; καὶ πότερα

  The Seventieth Discourse: On Philosophy

  Dio. Come now, suppose you should hear some one say that he wants to be a farmer, but should observe that he is doing nothing toward that end, neither buying or raising cattle nor preparing ploughs or the other equipment needed in farming, nor even living on a farm himself, either as owner or as tenant of another, but rather in town, spending his time principally about the market-place and the gymnasium and occupied with drinking parties and courtesans and that sort of frivolity — in such a case will you treat seriously what he says rather than what he does? And will you say the fellow is a farmer and a producer, or one of the lazy and frivolous set?

  Interlocutor. One of the lazy set, of course.

  [2] φήσεις γεωργὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἐργάτην ἢ τῶν ἀργῶν καὶ ῥᾳθύμων; — Δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀργῶν. — Δ. Εἶεν: εἰ δὲ κυνηγέτης εἶναι λέγοι τις καὶ τὸν Ἱππόλυτον αὐτὸν ἢ Μελέαγρον ὑπερβάλλειν τῇ τε ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ τῇ φιλοπονίᾳ, μηδὲν δὲ φαίνοιτο πράττων ὅμοιον, μήτε κύνας κεκτημένος μήτε λίνα μήτε ἵππον μήτε ὅλως ἐπὶ θήραν ἐξιών, ἀλλὰ μήτε ὑπὸ ἡλίου τὸ σῶμα ἐπικεκαυμένος μήτε ψύχους ἀνέχεσθαι δυνάμενος, ἐσκιατραφημένος δὲ καὶ ἁπαλὸς καὶ μάλιστα ἐοικὼς ταῖς γυναιξίν, ἔσθ̓ ὅπως ὑπολάβοις ἂν τἀληθῆ λέγειν τοῦτον καὶ προσήκειν τι αὐτῷ κυνηγεσίων; — Οὐκ

  [2] Dio. Very good. But suppose a man were to say that he is a huntsman, and that he surpasses Hippolytus himself or Meleager in both his valour and his diligence, but it should be obvious that he is engaged in no activity of that nature, since he has acquired neither dogs nor hunting-nets nor a horse and never goes out after game at all but, on the contrary, neither has been tanned by the sun nor is able to endure cold, but has been reared in the shade and is soft and very like the women, could you possibly believe that this man is telling the truth and that he has anything to do with hunting?

  Int. Not I.

  [3] ἔγωγε. — Δ. Ἄτοπον γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων μᾶλλον, οὓς λέγει τις, ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων εἰδέναι καὶ τεκμαίρεσθαι τὸν ἑκάστου βίον. εἰ δέ τις ἐπαγγέλλοιτο μὲν ὡς μουσικὴν ἄριστα ἐπιστάμενος καὶ περὶ τοῦτο διατρίβων, μήτε δὲ αὐτοῦ κιθαρίζοντος μηδεὶς πώποτε ἀκούσαι, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ κιθάραν ἢ λύραν ἔχοντα ὁρῴη τις, μήτε λόγον τινὰ διεξιόντα τῶν κατὰ μουσικὴν δίχα γε τῆς ἐπαγγελίας καὶ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι φάσκειν τοῦ Ὀρφέως ἄμεινον καὶ τοῦ Θαμύρα, βλέποι δ̓ αὐτὸν ἀλεκτρυόνας ἢ ὄρτυγας θεραπεύοντα καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ μετὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ὡς τὸ πολὺ διατρίβοντα, πότερον τῶν μουσικῶν τοῦτον δεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν ἢ τούτων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, μεθ̓ ὧν ἐστι καὶ οἷς ταὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύει; — Δῆλον ὅτι

  [3] Dio. Correct; for it is absurd that we should know and pass upon every man’s life on the strength of what he says rather than of what he does. Again, if some one should offer his services as an expert in music and as one who devotes his time to this, and yet no one should ever hear him either playing the cithara, nay, even see him holding a cithara or a lyre, or descanting on any subject related to music — that is, apart from his offering his services and saying that he has a better knowledge of music than Orpheus and Thamyras — but if one should see him training and rearing game-cocks or quails and spending his time for the most part in company with those of like interests, ought one to conclude that he is a musician, or, on the contrary, one of the set with which he associates and whose pursuits are the same as his?

  Int. Evidently one of that set.

  [4] τούτων. — Δ. Ἐὰν δὲ ἀστρονόμος εἶναί τις ὑπισχνῆται καὶ σαφέστατα ἐπίστασθαι τὰς περιόδους καὶ πορείας καὶ τὰ ἀποστήματα πῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἄστρων καὶ τὰ οὐράνια πάθη, μηδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον ᾖ προῃρημένος [p. 179] μη
δὲ περὶ ταῦτα φροντίζων, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον συνὼν τοῖς κυβεύουσι καὶ μετ̓ ἐκείνων ἑκάστοτε ζῶν καὶ βλεπόμενος, ἀστρονόμον τοῦτον φήσεις ἢ κυβευτήν; — Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δἴ ἀστρονομίας ἡγησαίμην ἂν

  [4] Dio. Again, if one were to profess that he is an astronomer and that he knows most accurately how the orbits and courses and the intervening distances stand with relation to one another in the case of sun and moon and similar heavenly bodies, and also celestial phenomena, and yet the man has shown no predilection of this sort and has no serious interest in these matters, but rather prefers to associate with gamblers, lives his life in their company, and is seen with them day after day, will you call this man an astronomer or a gambler?

  Int. Nay, by heaven, I would not consider that he had anything at all to do with astronomy, but much rather with gambling.

  [5] ἔγωγε προσήκειν αὐτῷ τι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον κυβείας. — Δύο δέ τινων τοῦ μὲν λέγοντος ὅτι πλευσεῖται τὴν ταχίστην καὶ πολλὰ κερδανεῖ χρήματα ἀπὸ ἐμπορίας, μήτε δὲ ναῦς μήτε ναύτας παρεσκευασμένου μήτε φόρτον ἔχοντος μηδένα, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ προσιόντος ὅλως τῷ λιμένι μηδὲ τῇ θαλάττῃ, τοῦ δὲ πραγματευομένου περὶ ταῦτα καὶ πλοῖον περισκοποῦντος καὶ κυβερνήτην καὶ χρήματα ἐμβαλλομένου: πότερον αὐτῶν φήσεις ἐμπορίᾳ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν; τὸν λέγοντα ἢ τὸν πράττοντα καὶ παρασκευαζόμενον τὰ τοῦ πλοῦ