Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  [3] Whenever, for instance, a man is confronted by a perplexing situation and is seeking to discover what is expedient for him, he need not, I believe, call in friends or kinsmen, but rather go to the laws and pose his question. For the law would not, having an eye to its own advantage, give him inferior advice, nor yet through ignorance of the better course, nor would it because of some engagement or lack of interest beg its consultants to let it be excused. For, on the contrary, it has regard for all alike, and it has leisure for the problems of all others, and for it there is no private or special interest.

  [4] οὐδὲν ἴδιον οὐδὲ ἐξαίρετόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ. καὶ μὴν τοσούτῳ γε τῆς [p. 203] παρὰ τῶν θεῶν μαντείας ὠφελιμώτερός ἐστι νόμος, ὅσῳ τοὺς μὲν χρησμοὺς ἤδη τινὲς ἠγνόησαν καὶ δοκοῦντες πράττειν κατ̓ αὐτοὺς τἀναντία ἐποίησαν, ὅθεν οἶμαι συμφοραῖς ἐχρήσαντο. παρὰ τοῦ νόμου δὲ οὐδέν ἐστι σκολιὸν οὐδὲ ἀμφίβολον, ἀλλ̓ ἁπλῶς ἅπαντα ἃ προσήκει τοῖς δεομένοις φράζει. ἄρχων δὲ ἁπάντων καὶ κύριος ὢν χωρὶς ὅπλων καὶ βίας κρατεῖ: τοὐναντίον γὰρ αὐτὸς καταλύει τὴν βίαν: ἀλλὰ μετὰ πειθοῦς καὶ βουλομένων προέστηκεν. πείσας γὰρ πρότερον καὶ δοκιμασθεὶς οὕτως γίγνεται καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν

  [4] Again, law is more serviceable than the oracular responses of the gods in that, while there have been some who did not understand the oracles, and, supposing that they were acting in harmony with them, have done the very opposite — which accounts, I imagine, for their having met with disaster — from the law there proceeds nothing which is tortuous or ambiguous, but, instead, it puts in simple phrases everything which is appropriate for those who are in need. Besides, though ruler and master of all things, it exercises its authority without the use of arms and force — on the contrary, law itself does away with force; nay, it rules by persuasion and governs willing subjects. For it is because it first persuades men and secures their approval that law comes into being and acquires its own power.

  [5] τὴν αὑτοῦ λαμβάνει. τηλικαύτην δὲ ἔχει δύναμιν ὥστε καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ βοηθῶν. τοὺς γὰρ ἱεροσύλους καὶ τοὺς παραβαίνοντας τὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς εὐσέβειαν κολάζει. καὶ μὴν αὐτόν γε οὐδὲ εἷς οἷός τέ ἐστιν ἀδικῆσαι. τῶν γὰρ παραβαινόντων τὸν νόμον

  [5] But so great is the power it possesses, that it is the law which assists even the gods. For example, the sacrilegious and those who violate the reverence due to the gods it punishes. Moreover, the law itself no one has the power to injure. For every one who transgresses the law harms, not the law, but himself.

  [6] ἕκαστος οὐκ ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ̓ ἑαυτὸν βλάπτει. τοσαύτης δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ φιλανθρωπίας μεστός ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ τοῖς ἀτυχοῦσι χρησιμώτερος καθέστηκε τῶν γένει προσηκόντων καὶ τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις ἰσχυρότερος τῆς αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ῥώμης καὶ πατράσιν υἱέων εὐνούστερος καὶ παισὶ γονέων καὶ ἀδελφοῖς ἀδελφῶν. πολλοὶ γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φιλτάτων ἀδικούμενοι πρὸς τοῦτον καταφεύγουσιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ μηδὲν ὑπὸ μηδενὸς εὖ πεπονθὼς ὁ νόμος πᾶσιν ὧν ἂν εὐεργετήσωσιν ἑτέρους ἐκτίνει τὰς χάριτας, καὶ γονεῦσι παρὰ παίδων τὰς ὁμοίας κομιζόμενος καὶ τοῖς ἰδίᾳ τινῶν εὐεργέταις παρὰ τῶν εὖ παθόντων καὶ τοῖς κοινῇ φιλοτιμουμένοις παρὰ τῆς πόλεως.

  [6] But such is the righteousness and benevolence which pervades the law, that for the unfortunate it has proved even more helpful than their blood relatives; and for the victims of injustice it has proved more potent than their own might; and for fathers, more kindly than their sons; for sons, more kindly than parents; for brothers, than brothers. At any rate many, when wronged by their closest kin, seek refuge with the law. Then too, though it has experienced no kindness at the hands of any one, the law renders thanks in full to all for the kindnesses which they show to others, exacting thanks alike for fathers from their sons, for those who have in private done some deed of kindness from those whom they have benefited, and for those who display public spirit in municipal affairs from their city.

  [7] κάλλιστα δὲ τὰ ἆθλα τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν πεποίηκε, στεφάνους καὶ κηρύγματα καὶ προεδρίας ἐξευρών: ἃ τοῖς μὲν παρέχουσιν οὐδεμίαν φέρει δαπάνην, τοῖς δὲ τυγχάνουσι τοῦ παντὸς ἄξια καθέστηκεν. ὅ,τι δ̓ ἂν ἐθέλῃ τῶν εὐτελεστάτων, εὐθὺς τοῦτο μέγα καὶ τίμιον ἐποίησεν. οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τὸν κότινον οὕτως μέγα καὶ τηλικαύτης ἄξιον σπουδῆς ἀποδείξας καὶ τὰ σέλινα καὶ τὴν πίτυν καὶ τὸν τοῦ θαλλοῦ στέφανον: οὗτος ὁ τὰ τρία ῥήματα, οἷς ἕκαστος [p. 204] κηρύττεται τῶν ἀγαθῶν, πολλοῖς ἀποφήνας τοῦ ζῆν τιμιώτερα.

  [7] Furthermore, most beautiful are the rewards which it has established for their benefactions, having devised crowns and public proclamations and seats of honour, things which for those who supply them entail no expense, but which for those who win them have come to be worth everything. Indeed, whatever it so desires, however inexpensive it may be, the law immediately renders important and precious. It is the law which has made the wild olive so important, worth so much devoted effort,

  [8] οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς πανηγύρεις συνάγων, ὁ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμῶν, ὁ τὴν ἀρετὴν αὔξων: οὗτος ὁ τὴν θάλατταν καθαίρων, ὁ τὴν γῆν ἥμερον ποιῶν, ὁ τοῦ Διὸς θετὸς υἱός, ὁ τὴν ἀήττητον καὶ ἀνυπέρβλητον ἰσχὺν ἔχων: τοσοῦτον ἁπάντων σωφροσύνῃ καὶ πίστει διαφέρων, ὥστε καὶ γυναικῶν κοινωνίαν καὶ παρθένων ὥραν καὶ παίδων ἀκμὴν τούτῳ πάντες πεπιστεύκαμεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ παρθένου τῆς

  [8] just as also with the parsley, the pine, and the olive crown; it is the law which has made the three words with which each good man is publicly acclaimed more precious to many than life itself. It is the law which convenes the national festive gatherings, which honours the gods, which exalts virtue; it is the law which purges the sea, makes civilized the land, is the veritable son of Zeus, the possessor of invincible, insuperable might for it is so far superior to all else in temperance and trustworthiness that not only partnership with women but also the bloom of maidens and the prime of lads we all have entrusted to the law. Besides, though Justice is a virgin, such is his continence that Law dwells with her without a chaperon.

  [9] Δίκης οὔσης μόνος αὐτῇ διὰ σωφροσύνην σύνεστιν. οὗτος ἐπίκουρος γήρως, διδάσκαλος νεότητος, πενίας συνεργός, φύλαξ πλούτου, τῇ μὲν εἰρήνῃ σύμμαχος, τῷ δὲ πολέμῳ ἐναντίος. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ πλεῖστον ἰσχύει. τὸν γοῦν παρὰ τῶν ἐχθίστων κήρυκα πεμπόμε
νον οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ σῴζων καὶ διαφυλάττων, παντὸς θώρακος καὶ πάσης ἀσπίδος ἰσχυρότερον αὐτῷ δοὺς ὅπλον τὸ κηρύκειον: ἔστι δὲ τοῦ νόμου σύμβολον. διὰ τοῦτον τοὺς ἀποθανόντας οὐδεὶς ἔτι κρίνει πολεμίους οὐδὲ τὴν ἔχθραν καὶ τὴν ὕβριν εἰς τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ἐπιδείκνυνται.

  [9] Law is a protector of old age, a schoolmaster of youth, of poverty a fellow labourer, a guard of wealth, to peace an ally, to war a foe. Nay, even in war itself law has the greater might. For instance, the herald who is dispatched from one’s bitterest foes the law protects and guards, giving him as a weapon more mighty than any corselet or any shield the herald’s staff — in fact, this is a symbol of the law. Because of the law the slain are deemed no longer to be foes, nor are hatred and insult wreaked upon their bodies.

  [10] τοσούτῳ δὲ ταῖς πόλεσι χρησιμώτερός ἐστιν ἤπερ τὰ πηδάλια ταῖς ναυσίν, ὥστε ἡ μὲν ἀποβαλοῦσα τοὺς οἴακας ναῦς οὐκ ἂν ἀπόλοιτο μὴ χειμῶνος καταλαβόντος, πόλιν δ̓ οὐκ ἔνι σωθῆναι τοῦ νόμου λυθέντος, οὐδ̓ ἂν μηδὲν ἔξωθεν συμβαίνῃ δεινόν. ὥσπερ δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ διανοίας διοικεῖται καὶ σῴζεται τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστος, ἡ δὲ ταύτης διαφθορὰ μανίαν καὶ παρακοπὴν φέρει, παραπλησίως, ἄν τις ἀνέλῃ τὸν νόμον ἐκ τοῦ βίου, καθάπερ οἶμαι τὸν νοῦν ἀπολωλεκὼς εἰς παντελῆ μανίαν καὶ ταραχὴν περιστήσεται. [p. 205]

  [10] Again, so much more useful is the law to our cities than rudders are to our ships that, whereas a ship which has lost its rudders would not perish unless a storm should overtake it, a city cannot be saved if the law has been destroyed, not even when no dire disaster befalls it from without. But just as each of us is governed and safeguarded by the intelligence which is in him, while its destruction entails madness and insanity, similarly, if one expels the law from his life, just as if he had lost his mind, I believe he will be brought into a state of utter madness and confusion.

  THE SEVENTY-SIXTH DISCOURSE: ON CUSTOM

  ΠΕΡΙ ΕΘΟΥΣ.

  THE SEVENTY-SIXTH DISCOURSE: ON CUSTOM

  This is another sophistic exercise. Comparison with the preceding Discourse will show with what ease the sophist could shift his ground. In Or. 75 law is eulogized as a beneficent influence in human affairs; here custom has taken its place. Contradictions between the two documents abound, but perhaps none more striking than the two statements that follow: “from the law there proceeds nothing which is tortuous or ambiguous, but, instead, it puts in simple phrases everything which is appropriate for those who are in need” (Or. 75.4) and “some laws have not been clearly written, and they are often warped and twisted by the eloquence of the orators; but our customs are never ambiguous or crooked, and oratory could not get the upper hand with them” (Or. 76.4).

  [1] Ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἔθος γνώμη μὲν τῶν χρωμένων κοινή, νόμος δὲ ἄγραφος ἔθνους ἢ πόλεως, δίκαιον δὲ ἑκούσιον, κατὰ ταὐτὰ πᾶσιν ἀρέσκον, εὕρημα δὲ ἀνθρώπων οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ βίου καὶ χρόνου. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων νόμων ἕκαστος ἅπαξ δοκιμασθεὶς ἔλαβε τὴν ἰσχύν: τὸ δὲ ἔθος ἀεὶ δοκιμάζεται. καὶ νόμος μὲν οὐδεὶς ῥᾳδίως ὑπὸ πάντων ἐγκριθήσεται: ταῖς γὰρ τῶν πλειόνων δόξαις κυροῦται: ἔθος δὲ οὐκ ἐνῆν γενέσθαι μὴ προσδεχθὲν ὑπὸ πάντων. κἀκεῖνος ἀπειλῶν καὶ βιαζόμενος μένει κύριος, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐθῶν πειθόμενοι

  The Seventy-sixth Discourse: On Custom

  Custom is a judgement common to those who use it, an unwritten law of tribe or city, a voluntary principle of justice, acceptable to all alike with reference of that same matters, an invention made, not by any human being, but rather by life and time. Therefore, while of the laws in general each obtains its power through having been approved one and for all, custom is constantly being subjected to scrutiny. Moreover, while no law will readily be chosen by everybody — for it is by the opinions of the majority that it is ratified — yet a custom could not come into being if not accepted by all. Again, while law by threats and violence maintains its mastery, it is only when we are persuaded by our customs that we deem them excellent and advantageous.

  [2] καὶ καλὰ καὶ συμφέροντα κρίνομεν αὐτά. διό μοι δοκεῖ τις ἂν προσεικάσαι τὸν μὲν ἔγγραφον νόμον τῇ δυνάμει τῆς τυραννίδος: φόβῳ γὰρ ἕκαστον καὶ μετὰ προστάγματος διαπράττεται: τὸ δὲ ἔθος μᾶλλον τῇ φιλανθρωπίᾳ τῆς βασιλείας. βουλόμενοι γὰρ αὐτῷ πάντες καὶ δίχα ἀνάγκης ἕπονται. καὶ νόμους μὲν ἴσμεν πολλοὺς ἀνῃρημένους ὑπὸ τῶν θέντων αὐτούς, ὡς πονηρούς: ἔθος δὲ οὐκ ἂν οὐδεὶς ῥᾳδίως δείξειε λελυμένον. καὶ μὴν τῷ παντὶ ῥᾷόν ἐστιν ἀνελεῖν ὅ,τι βούλει τῶν ἐγγράφων ἢ τῶν ἐθῶν. τὰ

  [2] Therefore it seems to me that we might liken the written law to the power of tyranny, for it is by means of fear and through injunction that each measure is made effective; but custom might rather be likened to the benevolence of kingship, for of their own volition all men follow custom, and without constraint. Again, we know of many laws which have been repealed by those who made them, because they judged them to be bad; but no one could readily point to a custom which had been dissolved. Nay, it is altogether easier to do away with any written ordinance you please than to do away with any custom.

  [3] μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἀπαλείψῃς ἅπαξ, ἡμέρᾳ μιᾷ λέλυται: συνήθειαν δὲ πόλεως οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν πάνυ πολλῷ καταλῦσαι χρόνῳ. κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ἐν σανίσιν ἢ στήλαις φυλάττονται: τῶν δὲ ἕκαστον ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις ψυχαῖς. ἀσφαλεστέρα δὲ καὶ κρείττων ἡ τοιαύτη φυλακή. καὶ μὴν ὁ μὲν ἔγγραφος νόμος αὐστηρός ἐστι καὶ ἀπηνής, ἔθους δὲ οὐδὲν ἥδιον. ἔπειτα τοὺς νόμους παῤ ἄλλων πυνθανόμεθα,

  [3] For written ordinances, once the writing is erased, are done for in a single day; but a city’s usage it is impossible to destroy in a very long period of time. Besides, while laws are preserved on tablets of wood or of stone, each custom is preserved within our own hearts. And this sort of preservation is surer and better. Furthermore, the written law is harsh and stern, whereas nothing is more pleasant than custom. Then too, our laws we learn from others, but our customs we all know perfectly.

  [4] τὰ δὲ ἔθη πάντες ἐπιστάμεθα. κἀκείνων μέν εἰσιν οὐ σαφῶς ἔνιοι γεγραμμένοι καὶ διαστρέφονται πολλάκις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων δυνάμεως: [p. 206] τῶν δὲ ἐθῶν οὐδὲν ἀμφίβολον οὐδὲ σκολιόν, οὐδ̓ ἂν περιγένοιτ̓ αὐτῶν λόγος. κἀκείνων μὲν ἀεὶ δεῖ μνημονεύειν, εἰ μέλλοιμεν αὐτοῖς ἐμμένειν: τοῦ δὲ ἔθους οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ βουλομένους ἐπιλαθέσθαι: τοιαύτην γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν ὥστε
ἀεὶ ὑπομιμνήσκειν αὑτοῦ. καθόλου δὲ τοὺς μὲν νόμους φαίη τις ἂν ποιεῖν δούλων πολιτείαν, τὰ δὲ ἔθη τοὐναντίον ἐλευθέρων. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ ποιοῦσιν εἰς τὰ σώματα κολάσεις: παραβαινομένου δὲ ἔθους τὴν ζημίαν εἶναι συμβέβηκεν αἰσχύνην. ὥστε ἐκεῖνος μὲν φαύλων, οὗτος δὲ ἀγαθῶν ἐστι νόμος. εἰ γὰρ ἅπαντες ἦσαν ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἐγγράφων ἡμῖν οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει νόμων. ἔτι δὲ τῶν μὲν νόμων εἰσὶν οἱ βασιλεῖς ἐπάνω καὶ πολλὰ πράττουσι παῤ αὐτούς,

  [4] Again, some laws have not been clearly written, and they are often warped and twisted by the eloquence of the orators; but our customs are never ambiguous or crooked, and oratory could not get the upper hand with them. Also the laws must be kept constantly in mind if we are to abide by them; whereas a custom men cannot forget, even if they would; for such is its nature that it is constantly reminding them.

  And, speaking generally, while one might say that the laws create a polity of slaves, our customs, on the contrary, create a polity of free men. For the laws inflict punishment upon men’s bodies; but when a custom is violated, the consequent penalty has always been disgrace. Therefore the one is a law for bad persons, the other for good persons. Indeed, if all men were good, evidently we should have no need of the written laws. Furthermore, although our kings are above the laws and do many things in violation of them, even they follow the customs.