Al Qaeda in Europe
Page 7
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingenen Veiligheidsdienst, or General Intelligence and Security Service), "Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands; from Incident to Trend," December 2002.
90. Cziesche et al., "As If You Were at War."
91. John Downing, "Taliban Refugee Still Sees the UK as His Enemy," Telegraph, February 16, 2003.
92. President Hosni Mubarak, dialogue with army officers on October 4, 2001, Egyptian State Information Service Web site, http://www.sis.gov.eg/ online/html5/m041021 y.htm.
93. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe, pp. 26-27.
94. Analysis of the June 26, 1995, searches of the Viale Jenner mosque, DIGOS, September 15, 1997.
95. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe, pp. 26-27.
96. Giles Foden, "The Hunt for `Public Enemy No 2,"' Guardian, September 24, 2001.
97. Camille Eid, "Arringa ai Musulmani: Terrorizzare e' un Dovere," Avvenire, November 30, 2001.
98. DIGOS, analysis of the June 26, 1995, searches of the Viale Jenner mosque, September 15, 1997.
99. Ibid.
100. That is Islamic Army of Aden, a Yemeni terrorist group closely linked to al Qaeda; Es Sayed had established close ties with it during his stay in Yemen (before he went to Italy).
101. DIGOS report, "Al Muhajiroun 3," November 21, 2001.
102. Report on the Islamic Center of Aachen by the Innenministerium, Nordrhein-Westfalen, http://www.im.nrw.de/sch/581.htm.
103. The Algerian network and the Finsbury Park mosque will be discussed in depth in part 2.
104. "Profile: the Caliph of Cologne," BBC, May 27, 2004.
105. Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, "Islamic Extremist Activities in the Federal Republic of Germany," December 1998.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. "Britain `Sheltering al Qaeda Leader,"' BBC, July 8, 2002.
109. Tribunal of Milan, Indictment of Muhamad Majid and others, November 25, 2003.
110. Krekar will be further discussed in chap. 10.
111. "Deported Militant Flown to Turkey," BBC, October 12, 2004. In June 2005, Kaplan was sentenced to life in prison by a Turkish court for planning the attack against the Ataturk Mausoleum in Ankara.
112. Paolo Biondani, "Festeggio it Martirio di mio Figlio," Corriere Bella Sera, December 3, 2003.
113. Sue Clough, "Suicide Bomber `Told Wife He Was Not Coming Back,"' Telegraph, April 30, 2004.
114. Vikram Dodd and Press Association, "Suicide Bomber's Family `Kept Plan Secret,"' Guardian, April 27, 2004.
115. "Inside France's Hotbeds of Discontent," Telegraph, August 6, 2004.
116. Piotr Smolar, "Quatre Islamistes Interpelles en Seine-Saint-Denis dans l'Enquete sur les `fileres tchetchenes,"' Le Monde, December 27, 2002.
117. "Ramifications of French Terror Network Examined," Le Figaro, January 17, 2004. Accessed via FBIS.
118. Craig S. Smith, "Web of Jihad Draws in an Immigrant Family in France," New York Times, July 31, 2004.
119. "Ramifications of French Terror Network Examined."
120. Smith, "Web of Jihad"; "Ramifications of French Terror Network Examined."
121. "French Report Profiles Venissieux Network Suspect," Le Figaro, January 12, 2004. Accessed via FBIS.
122. Smith, "Web of Jihad."
123. "French Report Profiles Venissieux Network Suspect."
124. "French Imam's Wife, Daughter Questioned in Ongoing Inquiry into Suspected Terrorist Network," Liberation, January 10, 2004. Accessed via FBIS.
125. "French Authorities Investigate Possible Plans for Chemical Attack in Europe," Le Monde, January 11, 2004. Accessed via FBIS.
126. "Ramifications of French Terror Network Examined."
127. Smith, "Web of Jihad."
128. "Son of French Muslim Cleric Held in Terror Probe Admits Knowing How to Make Bombs," AFP, January 13, 2004. Accessed via FBIS.
129. Smith, "Web of Jihad."
130. "French Authorities Investigate Possible Plans for Chemical Attack in Europe," Le Monde, January 11, 2004. Accessed via FBIS.
131. Ibid.
132. "French Imam's Wife, Daughter Questioned in Ongoing Inquiry into Suspected Terrorist Network," Liberation, January 10, 2004. Accessed via FBIS.
133. Jean-Baptiste Labeur, "Father of Guantanamo Bay Detainee Held," AP, January 6, 2004.
134. Sebastian Usher, "Jihad Magazine for Women on Web," BBC, August 24, 2004.
135. "Rabat Bomb Plot Twins Are 14-Year-Old Girls," AFP, September 5, 2003.
136. "FBI Warns of Al Qaeda Women," CBS News, April 1, 2003.
137. Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, "Tangled Ties," Newsweek, April 7, 2004.
138. Tribunal of Milan, indictment of Rabei Osman Ahmed El Sayed and others, June 5, 2004.
CHAPTER 2
LIFE AMONG THE INFIDELS
If a Muslim is in a combat or godless area, he is not obligated to have a different appearance from (those around him). The (Muslim) man may prefer or even be obligated to look like them, provided his action brings a religious benefit of preaching to them, learning their secrets and informing Muslims, preventing their harm, or some other beneficial goal.
-Sheik Ibn Taymiyah, Islamic scholar (1263-1328), quoted in an al Qaeda training manual
RECRUITMENT
Today, hundreds of thousands of Muslims residing in Europe embrace, to varying degrees, a militant interpretation of Islam, favoring the introduction of sharia law and despising Western values and principles. "Islam will return to Europe as a conqueror and victor, after being expelled from it twice," is the dream expressed by one of the world's most respected Islamic scholars, Sheikh Yusuf al Qaradawi, and shared by thousands of European Muslims. But al Qaradawi points out that though in the past Islam repeatedly tried to conquer Europe with force, "the conquest this time will not be by the sword but by preaching and ideology."'
That so many Muslims reject the values that rule the countries in which they live clearly threatens the harmony of Europe's future, but it does not necessarily mean that they directly threaten its security. Radicalization is just the first step on the road toward terrorism. In fact, only a minority of those who support radical Islam become terrorists and decide to resort to violence to pursue their political goals. Generally, before an Islamist turns into a terrorist, he (or she) needs to be recruited by a terrorist organization. And the recruiter-the individual who is somehow connected to a terrorist organization and is looking for new militants-often finds it unnecessary to present jihad propaganda, as candidates have already been indoctrinated. As the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingenen Veiligheidsdienst, or AIVD) noted in a 2002 dossier on recruitment for jihad in the Netherlands, "before a recruiter approaches a potential recruit ... this young person is probably already acquainted with or even sympathises with Islamic fundamentalism."' The AIVD reiterated the point in 2004: "The complex of interrelated sentiments like (a lack of) self-respect, commitment to the Islamic ideal, solidarity with the oppressed Muslims and identity problems is a major point of departure for recruiters. In some cases, these sentiments are fuelled by recruiters, but in other cases they develop independently."3
Radicalization can take place anywhere. As chapter 1 showed, young Muslims are introduced to militant Islam in prison, in private groups with friends, or on the Internet. Nevertheless, most young European Muslims convert to radical Islam in the mosque. Such radicalization can occur one of two ways, depending on the role played by the mosque's leadership. In some cases, the radicalism is institutionalized: that is, the imams and other leaders directly promote fundamentalist views. In many other cases, however, radicals and recruiters attend the mosque but oppose the more moderate views of its imam, thereby often creating conflicts among the congregation.
Though mosques where radicalism is institutionalized are in the minority, there are many of them in Europe. In mosques such as Finsbury Park
in London, the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan, or al Quds in Hamburg, places of worship have been turned into hotbeds of fundamen talism, with the chief imams directly urging the believers to fight jihad and recruiters operating with the full knowledge and support of the mosque's leadership. Donations for the mujahideen fighting throughout the world are openly collected and videotapes recording their gruesome endeavors are publicly shown. Recruiters operate freely inside the mosque and frequently even hold an official position.
But many young Muslims are introduced to radical Islam in small groups within mosques that do not directly support terrorist activities, though they espouse a conservative brand of Islam. Often these groups are composed of young men who have grown up in the same neighborhood and been friends since childhood. Spontaneously, they form small clusters that share a radical interpretation of Islam, creating a subgroup inside the mosque.' The AIVD describes the process: "Several youths visiting the orthodox mosque which is also frequented by their families, often share the same fascination for the Islamistic war. They watch jihad videos together and attend lectures, conventions and summer camps organized for them."'
These clusters of young extremists provide ideal pools for the recruiters. The 2002 Dutch intelligence dossier reveals how easily recruiters can find potential recruits: "All they have to do is join in the prayers, conversations and activities to get in touch with these youths."6 While the radicalization is the first phase of the recruiting process, the second, which the AIVD calls "spotting," takes place quite publicly.' A French intelligence official observes gloomily, "The influence of the extremist networks grows stronger every day.... What the recruiters do is not illegal at first. Neither the republic nor the families of the recruits have found a way to stop them."' Recruiters lurk in mosques, Islamic bookstores, and the cafes of Arab neighborhoods, waiting for the right moment to strike up a conversation. They often operate at the margins of the mosque, and often mosque officials try to force them out. "He imposed himself in the mosques," commented an Algerian journalist on the activities of one recruiter, Karim Bourti (the journalist had gone undercover to investigate the recruiting networks operating in the Arab neighborhoods of Paris). "The imam spoke upstairs. But downstairs, Karim and the fundamentalists were in control. That's a metaphor for what is going on."'
Recruiters' strong character, jihad experience, and religious knowledge draw many young men to them. Most of them have a mujahid background, having fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets or in Bosnia or Chechnya. They recount glorious stories of jihad, praising the endeavors of fallen mujahideen and urging the young potential recruits to imitate their heroic example. The clusters of young radicalized men view these veterans of jihad as heroes themselves, for having fulfilled the highest duty of a good Muslim. The recruiters also generally exert influence through their superior knowledge of Islam. Though most have only a limited grasp of Islamic doctrine, their expertise is superior to that of most second- or third-generation Muslims living in Europe. The recruiter, who is usually older than his recruits, uses his experience and knowledge of Islamic theology to put himself in a leadership position over the small clusters of fundamentalists. In short order, he will have created a small following of young jihadi wannabes who look to him for guidance and direction.
Once the clusters are co-opted by the recruiter, they normally break away from their original environment, thus arriving at the third phase of the recruiting process: isolation from society.10 The radicalized clusters often clash with mosque officials, accusing them of being too moderate and failing to defend Muslims. In some cases, mosques officials ask recruiters to depart from the mosque because of their militant views, and their clusters leave with them. Those who leave the mosque also leave mainstream society, entering completely the self-segregated world of militant Islam. At this point, the clusters withdraw into a separate existence, meeting in private apartments or garages. Every aspect of their life becomes secretive, as they begin to make contacts with more individuals who have been involved with terrorist acts and are under surveillance. In some cases the recruit is assigned to a "buddy," an experienced militant who shadows the potential new holy warrior every step of the way." Recruits spend their days listening to cassettes of radical Islamic scholars and watching tapes of the mujahideen fighting in Bosnia, Chechnya, or Afghanistan. The tapes are interrupted only for speeches given by experi enced jihadis, authoritative figures who teach the recruits the importance of jihad and beauty of martyrdom. When they are alone, they spend hours on the Internet, browsing the thousands of radical Islamist Web sites.
It is at this stage that the role of the recruiter becomes crucial. Though his involvement in the candidate's initial radicalization was probably marginal, he has complete power over the destiny of the "complete" radical-the recruit who has undergone a total transformation and is now willing to fully commit himself to jihad. Now the recruiter exercises his discretionary powers and decides what the new jihadi will do. This is in fact his core task. The studies on recruitment for jihad undertaken by Marc Sageman, a former CIA official and an adjunct professor of psychology at the University of Pennsylvania, have revealed that al Qaeda carries out no top-down recruitment; instead, spontaneously formed clusters of young radicals naturally team up with recruiters, who select those who have skills and dedication that can be useful to the cause.12 "It's actually very much like applying to Harvard," says Sageman, pointing out that al Qaeda's problem is selection, not recruitment.13
Recruiters are better described as experienced jihadis who travel around Europe and operate as gatekeepers of terror, selecting the best candidates for terrorism. The recruiters have contacts with terror masterminds around the world who can open the doors of organized terrorism to young motivated individuals. Before the training camps were destroyed in 2001, the young militants were sent to Afghanistan. Today, they either go to other fields of jihad, such as Iraq or Chechnya, or simply are used to create cells inside Europe. The recruiter evaluates the recruit, analyzes his weaknesses and strengths, and decides where he can best serve the organization.
In December 2000, Italian authorities taped a conversation between Mahmoud Abdelkader Es Sayed, a high-ranking al Qaeda operative then living in Milan, and Adel Ben Soltane, a young Tunisian radical who met Es Sayed at the city's Islamic Cultural Institute.'4 It is an excellent illustration of the interplay between an al Qaeda recruiter and his young recruit.
Es Sayed: It is not that I don't trust you, it's not up to me ... I have only analyzed you ... you are ready to eat the stones of the desert .. . but you have to understand the meaning of it ... in your mind do you think that I would stop a young man like you who wants to go to jihad? Of course not ... to the contrary, I encourage him ... I take him with me and I consider him like he was part of my family ... I even give him my pants ... you have to know that it is not up to me and every thing has its time ... you see that you did not understand my words when I told you that you are a street fighter? Jihad is not the weapon ... even this is jihad.
Ben Soltane: Sheikh, you confuse me, there are many plans, but then .. .
Es Sayed: Believe me, brother, I love you in the name of God and what I wish for me I wish it for you too.
Ben Soltane: God bless you, but I made a promise to God and I have a goal and in this sense no human can stop me ... I don't like playing around ... but, honestly, sheikh, you have many things and problems, but you did not base it on one thing.
Es Sayed: You are giving me too many faults ... it is not like that ... I am just checking you ... I observe you ... I need proofs.
Ben Soltane: Why? My proofs are not enough?
Es Sayed: This is not the reason, at the moment I have nothing and after that what God brings is welcome ... I can tell you one thing ... you have a lot of confidence in yourself and a lot of faith. A lot of people who lived in Europe have this enthusiasm, but then they go back ... I am telling you, it is very difficult, extremely difficult, it's hard. I5
Anxious to
leave Italy and fight jihad, Ben Soltane is complaining that Es Sayed, whom he respectfully addresses as "sheikh," is delaying him. But Es Sayed is acting as the perfect selector. He spends entire days with Ben Soltane, analyzing his characteristics to see if he could be a good jihadi: "I observe you ... I need proofs." Before sending him to Afghanistan, Es Sayed has to be sure that Ben Soltane could make it in the harsh Afghan camps, where trainees endure arduous conditions. "A lot of people who lived in Europe have this enthusiasm, but then they go back ... I am telling you, it is very difficult, extremely difficult, it's hard." Thanks to his charisma and authority, Es Sayed convinces Ben Soltane that even a logistic role in Europe is important to the cause:
Es Sayed: So now everything is clear ... and it's not everything.... If you want to work with me this is the job ... if the brothers want to hide, we hide them, if the brothers want documents, we take care of their documents, if the brothers want to move, we move them ... if they need a weapon, you give them a weapon.... One thing... . Adel, you should not tell anybody what I am telling you. If you feel under surveillance or observed or you have a doubt, delete everything and stay away from me ... but I need one like you ... I am sorry that you think I don't trust you ... this is not trust.
Ben Soltane: God bless you! 16
Finally, at the end of the conversation, Es Sayed asks Ben Soltane about his motivations. The response provides further proof that radicalism does not result only from social or economic segregation:
Es Sayed: So, this is at Qaeda ... but I am curious about one thing ... don't you like this good life? You want to die?
Ben Soltane: Listen, sheikh, if I liked this life ... I would have gone to my cousin who is waiting for me in Germany and wants to marry me, in five years I would have the German passport and I would live in peace.
Es Sayed: God willing, I am the first person to wish you to die as a martyr ... do you see this way? You need to know how to enter and exit, right? ... These are the basics of al Qaeda.17