LIFE
Once the militants have been recruited, they need to have proper training. The recruiter uses his extensive international network to send his new "pupil" to the right place." The recruit is often provided with money, false documents, and an airline ticket. Even more important, the recruiter tells him how to contact a trusted accomplice at his destination. A letter of recommendation signed by the recruiter is sometimes needed to open the doors of organized terror to the budding new jihadi. A man at the other side of the world, seeing the letter from a trusted jihad veteran he knows, will welcome the new brother coming from Europe.
Before 9/11, training took place mainly in Afghanistan, where al Qaeda operated several facilities that graduated thousands of future terrorists. After the fall of the Taliban and the destruction of the camps, the jihadis have had more difficulty finding locations for their bases. There are reports of training facilities being operated in remote, lawless areas of Pakistan, Algeria, and Somalia that are controlled by terrorist groups. Militants also gain direct experience in jihad in places such as Chechnya and Iraq, where Islamic fundamentalists can train in camps and participate in combat at the same time.
But European jihadis do not necessarily have to leave the Continent to undergo terrorist training. Much as the terrorists who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 practiced with guns in the woods of Connecticut, so for years European militants have been operating training camps in mountainous regions of France, Italy, and Spain. Willie Brigitte, a French terrorist accused of heading a Sydney-based terrorist cell planning to blow up Australia's only nuclear reactor,19 told French authorities that Islamic radicals had been training potential recruits in at least seven locations throughout France. The sessions, which were held in rugged areas near the Alps and in a forest near Paris, included physical training and religious indoctrination. They were intended to determine which recruits were ready to fight in Afghanistan or on other battlefields of jihad.20 Reportedly, weekend weapon practices are still held throughout Europe in backwoods locations, where experienced jihadis share their knowledge with eager recruits .21
To supplement the actual training, jihadis have also created a virtual library of their murderous knowledge-thousands of pages on which their terrorist skills are condensed into a form easily learned by new recruits. In 2000, while searching the residence of a suspected al Qaeda operative, British police discovered a computer file containing an Arabic book titled "Declaration of Jihad against the Country's Tyrants-Military Series."22 The one-hundred-eighty-page volume, dubbed "Al Qaeda Training Manual" by US authorities, is a compendium of the organiza tion's knowledge. Its twelve chapters teach operatives all the tricks of the trade, from how to communicate undetected to how to gather intelligence.
Other manuals, circulating both in paper editions and on CD-ROM, provide instructions on how to build bombs out of everyday components and how to carry out urban warfare. More recently, al Qaeda has invaded the Internet, setting up hundreds of Web sites that provide propaganda and training to the mujahideen. In 2003 the Saudi branch of al Qaeda created Al Battar, an online magazine that covers subjects ranging from target selection to how to handle an Uzi submachine gun. "Oh Mujahid brother," the first issue declares enthusiastically, "in order to join the great training camps you don't have to travel to other lands. Alone, in your home or with a group of your brothers, you too can begin to execute the training program. You can all join the Al-Battar Training Camp. "23
Once he is properly educated, the terrorist is assigned to a cell, created perhaps to provide logistical support to the network or for the sole purpose of carrying out a specific attack. The cells' operational independence varies significantly. Some of them follow strict orders from al Qaeda's leadership, striking at preassigned targets as instructed by the masterminds in Afghanistan. Thus, in the 9/11 attacks the targets and the weapons were chosen by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. In the post-9/11 era, as al Qaeda's leadership finds it increasingly difficult to communicate with its operatives, this micromanagement is less common; analysts believe that al Qaeda cells now simply receive the green light for an attack whose specifics-the targets and specific operational details-remain under their control. The March 11 Madrid train bombings are thought to have followed this model. In other cases, cells operate independently of any organization, though their members may have received their training in al Qaeda camps. Cells of "nonaligned mujahideen" are spread throughout Europe and represent a nightmare for intelligence officials. While these cells share al Qaeda's ideology and global goals, they see bin Laden only as an inspirational figure, not as their commander. Their independence makes them more difficult to detect, as their contacts with monitored terrorists are sporadic at best.
The greatest number of militants operating in Europe are assigned to logistical cells, which provide the network with all the tools it needs to operate. Sometimes they operate directly and knowingly in support of a cell that is carrying out an operation. For example, attacks often are carried out by terrorists who come to the targeted city just a few days or weeks before they intend to act. The logistical cells must provide the newly arrived operatives with safe houses, money, cars, explosives, and the false documents they might need to leave the city after their work is done. In some cases logistical cells also undertake target surveillance, necessary preparatory work done with extreme dedication and patience. Potential targets such as bridges, government buildings, landmarks, and transportation systems are surveilled for months and their vulnerabilities are analyzed. To gain additional intelligence, operatives try to get inside facilities to which access is restricted-for example, seeking work as airport workers or cleaners. Operatives reportedly have even deliberately committed a crime in order to have the opportunity to assess the vulnerabilities of the inside of a police station.24
In many cases, cells operate without even knowing whom they are helping. A cell in Spain might simply be ordered to provide one hundred blank passports to an operative in Belgium, with no further details supplied. An operative in a port city could be asked to host a couple of individuals who are wanted by law enforcement agents without being told why. Cells often raise funds that go to the network's collectors, but only few know what exactly the collectors will do with the money. Bound together by their common faith in jihad, cells operate without asking too many questions about the rest of the network's activities.
Europe, a place where terrorists can operate with relative freedom, is the logistical cells' ideal environment. False documents are easily available on the black market, the transportation system is first-rate, money is abundant, and European intelligence agencies are not as repressive as their Middle Eastern counterparts. It is therefore not surprising that almost every attack carried out by al Qaeda throughout the world has had some link to Europe. A Dublin-based charity provided material support to some of the terrorists who attacked the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.25 False documents provided by a cell operating between Belgium and France enabled two al Qaeda operatives to portray themselves as journalists and assassinate Ahmed Shah Massoud, the commander of the Afghan Northern Alliance, just two days before 9/11.26 And the attacks of 9/11 themselves were partially planned in Hamburg, where three of the four pilots of the hijacked planes received extensive financial and logistical support.
After 9/11, as the al Qaeda network became less dependent on its leadership in Afghanistan and more decentralized, the cells operating in Europe took on even greater importance. Most of the planning for the April 2002 bombing of a synagogue in the Tunisian resort town of Djerba was done in Germany and France.27 According to Moroccan authorities, the funds for the May 2003 Casablanca bombings came from Moroccan cells in Spain, France, Italy, and Belgium. Cells operating in Europe have also directly targeted the Continent and attacks have been either planned or executed in Madrid, Paris, London (in at least four different instances), Milan, Berlin, Amsterdam, Rome, and Porto. In all these cases, investigations reveal
ed the involvement of various European cells.
The importance of a logistical cell cannot be overestimated, as no operation can be carried out if the terrorists do not have the documents required to enter the country, the money with which to buy explosives, and the safe houses in which to hide. Islamist cells operating in Europe are impressively skilled in supplying most of these necessities, but they particularly excel in acquiring forged documents. Al Qaeda has always placed great emphasis on obtaining high-quality false papers for its operatives. Documents from Western countries are considered the most valuable, as they allow the bearer unrestricted travel to most countries and they draw less attention from immigration officials throughout the world.
For this reason, al Qaeda cells operating in Europe have specialized in creating state-of-the-art false European documents, which have been supplied to operatives throughout the Continent and overseas. Usually militants doctor stolen documents they have bought on the black market, simply replacing the picture. In some cases, cells print their own documents, teaming up with gangs of document forgers and human smugglers. In other cases, they manage to obtain batches of blank documents stolen from diplomatic facilities or other government offices. Ideally, cells try to create a complete set of documents, providing the operative with a passport, identity card, and driver's license reflecting the same false identity. As the al Qaeda manual recommends, the photos on the document generally show the operative clean-shaven, in order to attract less attention.28 If his Arab or Middle Eastern features are not too strong, he is given a European-sounding name, as a Thomas or a Christopher is less likely to be stopped than a Mohammed.
The various cells scattered throughout Europe are independent, insofar as they tend to finance their own activities and carry out their operations autonomously. But they are also part of a network, and they work constantly with other cells on the Continent and in other parts of the world. Generally, only the leader of the cell keeps contacts with other cells. Occasionally a high-ranking member of the network travels around Europe, visiting the various cells and coordinating their efforts. Worries about security limit communication between cells to what is strictly necessary, but operational needs force operatives into frequent contact.
The telephone is a terrorist's most treacherous friend. Though human couriers are their ideal means of communication, it is often impractical, if not impossible, to use messengers to quickly send information to a cell operating hundreds of miles away. Therefore, the telephone is a necessary companion of the terrorist. But as the terrorists well know, the telephone is easily monitored by intelligence agencies. An outburst by a Munichbased al Qaeda operative visiting an Italian cell that had been monitored for months by Italian authorities gave them an interesting insider's perspective on terrorist cells' use of telephones. The man, who clearly is holding up a cell phone for emphasis, lectures his associates:
Do you see this? This was created by an enemy of God. You can't imagine how many operations this has made fail and how many arrests it has caused. How do you think the brothers in Germany got arrested? Thanks to this they found out many important things! Because when they spoke, the others [i.e., the police] were already listening. Several operations were prevented. It is nice, you can use it to communicate. It's fast. But it causes you huge problems. They created it and they know how to intercept it.29
Terrorists do not trust telephones, the invention of the "enemies of God," but they are forced to use them. Few operatives install a landline in their apartment, as they know that landlines are easy to trace and bug. When they do, they periodically check it for listening devices. Cell members often use public phones, but since they fear that those close to their apartment or mosque may be monitored as well, they may travel for miles just to use what they think is a "clean" telephone. Phone booths in the many phone shops that have sprung up in the immigrant neighborhoods of most European cities are also used. Operatives are instructed to memorize telephone numbers, not to write them down.30 If they do have to commit them to paper they use codes, substituting a number with another or omitting parts of the number.
Terrorists favor cell phones, which are more difficult to monitor. In a constant race against European intelligence fueled by their paranoia, operatives repeatedly change cell phones, often using more than one at a time, switching the prepaid cards after every phone call or even stealing a cell phone for just one call. Operatives frequently communicate using cryptic phone text messages, which are more difficult to detect and understand. In some cases, they use cell phones bought in another country, knowing that, for example, French authorities will have more difficulties monitoring a Danish or a Portuguese cell phone. Terrorists around the world have relied on European cell phones. Satellite phones purchased in Europe have been used by al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan and, more recently, by Abu Musab al Zarqawi's operatives in Iraq.
Swiss mobile phones have been particularly attractive for terrorists, as Swiss regulations formerly did not require buyers to disclose their names. Authorities believe that terrorists bought hundreds of Swisscom's SIM cards: prepaid telephone cards that allow phones to connect to cellular networks in more than a hundred countries. In 2004, fearing that terrorists were taking advantage of Swiss laxity, Bern finally passed a law requiring users of prepaid phones to register their names and addresses.31 Nonethe less, the terrorists' passion for Swiss prepaid phone cards ended up being a blessing for Western intelligence agencies. The terrorists' confidence in the anonymity provided by the SIM cards was false: A joint operation conducted by intelligence agencies of the United States, Switzerland, and more than dozen other countries that focused on the monitoring of Swiss cell phones led to the arrest of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and several other important al Qaeda operatives.32 After discovering that Mohammed used a Swisscom SIM card, authorities began tracing his movements inside Pakistan until he was finally arrested in Rawalpindi in March 2003. Other operatives were later tracked down through their Swisscom prepaid card. "They'd switch phones but use the same cards," one intelligence official remarked. "The people were stupid enough to use the same cards all of the time."33
After 9/11, realizing that their telephone conversations were under closer surveillance, al Qaeda operatives increasingly began to find other ways to communicate. As noted, couriers are ideal but impractical for all but the most important and secret information. In some cases militants have fallen back on other traditional methods-letters, for example, whose real meanings are carefully hidden in innocent-sounding words. The militants' imagination has sometimes led them to decidedly low-tech solutions, such as placing messages inside jars of food or bottles of soda. But technology has been enormously helpful to them, offering an abundance of tools for communicating with minimum risk of detection. E-mail messages are widely used by terrorists in Europe and elsewhere, even though they can be intercepted by intelligence agencies without much difficulty. Al Qaeda is known to encrypt messages on Web sites, using technology that is quite complicated and not very widespread. In some cases, militants hide their messages on Web sites that require a password to be accessed. The password is either known to the operatives or can be easily determined only by them (for example, the instructions might be "enter the name of Abdullah's cousin, the one living near the butcher").
In order to prevent agencies like the National Security Agency (NSA) from intercepting messages sent online, operatives have adopted a cunning e-mail method dubbed the "dead drop box."34 It was used by Mohammed Momin Khawaja, a Canadian man arrested in March 2004, and by a cell of Pakistani militants in London accused of planning to bomb unspecified targets in Britain.35 A message is written and simply saved in the "draft" box of an e-mail account. Various people in different parts of the world who have the password of the account can read the message without it ever being sent, thereby avoiding the risk of interception.
Since most online chat services allow registration under aliases, terrorists often use these to communicate. In s
ome cases, militants use chat rooms of known radical Islamic Web sites; in others, they simply insert their murderous conversations into chat rooms focused on gardening, pet care, or anything else. Using a pseudonym such as Ahmed23 or JohnnyK, an operative sitting in an Internet cafe in Rotterdam or Barcelona can anonymously communicate in real time with an associate at the other end of the world with no fear of being traced.
However they communicate, militants tend to use coded language. To be sure, operatives sometimes forget their instructions and openly talk on the phone about false documents or planned attacks (often leading to an angry rebuke from the listener), but in general, they are extremely careful about what they say. All the important terms are changed; therefore, Rachid might become Mohammed and false documents could be referred to as "the books." After years of experience listening to terrorists speaking in codes, Italian authorities have learned how to decode the conversations of terrorists; thus in 2002 they moved quickly to arrest the militant who was heard saying, "Now the field where we have to play football is ready. The people went to play football ... think carefully.... Everything is ready, the game is ready, we have to play."36 They knew that an attack was imminent.
Information gained from arrests carried out across Europe after 9/11 significantly improved authorities' understanding of the codes used by terrorists. In September 2001, British authorities arrested a North African militant named Kamel Daoudi, who was reportedly found in possession of a codebook. With its help, investigators could interpret the criminal messages that North African terrorists operating in Europe were disguising in seemingly innocent conversations.37 According to the manual, the secret services are called "the snakes," an armed group is "the family," and a man under surveillance is "a sick man." Weapons are identified by their country of production; thus a Kalashnikov is referred to as "the Russian," and an Israeli-made Uzi submachine gun is called "the Jew." A lawyer is "a doctor," and an operative who was killed in action "got married."38
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