Fear of detection keeps operatives perpetually on edge and drives them to maniacally organize every aspect of their everyday routine. They worry that not just their telephones but also their apartments and cars are bugged, and they therefore periodically check them for listening devices. In some cases, distrusting the privacy of their own apartments, they go to public parks and sit on a bench to conduct an important conversation.39 Militants agree to knock on apartment doors in special ways so that potentially undesired outsiders can be immediately recognized. Al Qaeda even advises its operatives to devise special signals to indicate that an apartment is not currently under surveillance, such as "hanging out a towel, opening a curtain, placing a cushion in a special way, etc. 1140
Operatives also are instructed in how to detect surveillance by intelligence agents. Militants should walk down dead-end streets or stop suddenly to observe if someone is following them. They should drop something out of their pockets and see who picks it up.41 Militants occasionally walk in pairs, with one trailing some fifty yards behind the other to see if he is being followed. Sometimes they enter a metro station and let a train go by, knowing that anyone else who does the same is probably an agent. If they take a bus, they get off with a quick jump to force into sight any individual who might be following.
European cities often become the settings of extensive games of cat and mouse between terrorists and intelligence agents. Generally, at least three to four highly trained agents are needed to follow a single terrorist in an urban environment.42 If he travels by car, at least two cars are required to track his movements, since operatives often stop to check for tails. Sometimes the militants deliberately slow down when coming to a traffic light, only to speed through as soon as it turns red. They know that any car that follows them through the red light is likely tailing them.
Nobody can predict how long the day of a surveillance agent tracking a militant will be. The target of the operation can spend weeks secluded in his apartment and then, without warning, leave for another European city. After quickly communicating to his or her supervisor that the target has taken a train, the agent must follow, often without knowing where the mission will go. If the militant travels to another country, as it frequently happens in Europe now that borders are effectively open to other EU members, the authorities of that country have to be contacted and asked to monitor the suspect. Of course, cooperation among countries, with their independent bureaucracies and different languages, is not always easy.
Knowing that their telephones are tapped, militants sometimes feed agents false information.43 A militant living in Cologne, for example, can discuss his plans to leave the following day for Paris at noon from the city's main train station. German authorities then contact their French counterparts, informing them of the suspects' plans and asking them to wait for the terrorists at the station. But the next day, the militants take some different action-for example, they travel by car, leaving at five in the morning. And perhaps their true destination is Vienna. In that case, Austrian authorities have only a few hours to be ready with a team to follow them.
And these problems that intelligence agencies experience while tracking known militants look small beside their difficulties in profiling potential terrorists. As chapter 1 made clear, Islamist terrorists operating in Europe are drawn from almost every social type, from educated Westerners to illiterate North African women. Some have rewarding jobs or are pursuing graduate studies. Others have menial jobs as a cover for their real activities and a means to raise petty cash for jihad. Many are unemployed or involved in crime, committing burglaries and drug-related offenses. Some dress in traditional Arab garb and wear long beards, while others wear trendy Western clothes and sport expensive sunglasses. Many go to mosques, still a key meeting point for militants despite their increased scrutiny by European intelligence agencies after 9/11. Some terrorists even hold official positions at a mosque and sleep inside it. Others never visit a place of worship, carefully avoiding any location where "the snakes" would be likely to look for Islamic fundamentalists.
Life among the "infidels" can be hard for Islamic militants. Some of them strictly avoid any contact with native Europeans, shopping and eating only at places run by fellow Muslims. The large immigrant neighborhoods of many European cities constitute de facto parallel societiessmall islands of Arab culture where a Muslim man can get by without speaking the local language or interacting with non-Muslims. Still others mingle easily with the enemy, hiding their deep hatred for the West behind the facade of the simple immigrant who wants nothing more than to integrate into his or her adoptive country. Many of them make a point of looking like a Westernized Muslim rather than an Islamic fundamentalist to avoid raising suspicion. Several Islamic scholars have provided support for such actions, issuing religious decrees that justify a jihadi's behaving like an infidel while living in the enemy's land. Sheik Ibn Taymiyah, one of the most eminent religious authorities among Islamic fundamentalists, declared seven centuries ago: "If a Muslim is in a combat or godless area, he is not obligated to have a different appearance from (those around him)."44
The idea that "necessity permits the forbidden"45 has been wholeheartedly embraced by a number of Islamic fundamentalists operating in Europe. The Western appearance of its operatives is the particular trademark of and, at the same time, the particular danger posed by one ultrafundamentalist sect, Takfir wa'l Hijra (Exile and Excommunication). The movement was born in Egypt in the 1970s, composed of extremely violent radicals who believed that anybody that did not follow their interpretation of Islam was not true a Muslim and should therefore be excommu- nicated.46 According to Takfir wa'l Hijra's ideology, the punishment for excommunication was death. The movement has found new strength in Europe, with thousands of loosely connected but committed adherents throughout the Continent. Takfiris not only look like Westerners but even indulge in European decadence, drinking alcohol in large quantities, dating women, and smoking marijuana. And Takfiris do not hesitate to commit crimes to finance their activities, convinced that any method used to carry out their jihad is lawful.
THE MONEY
Youssef Nada, seventy-four years old, rarely leaves his lakefront mansion in Campione d'Italia, a posh Italian enclave in Swiss territory. When he does, he enjoys a quick breakfast in one of the elegant bars of Lugano and a chat with local bankers. The seventy-six-year-old Ahmed Idris Nasreddin spends his days in the quiet of his Tangiers villa; near the mansion of the king of Morocco, it sits on the edge of a hill overlooking the Mediterranean. He dedicates most of his time to reading Islamic scholars and taking care of his businesses, located from Nigeria to Switzerland. Nada and Nasreddin are the very picture of successful Muslim businessmen who have retired and now tend to their small empires from home.
But according to the intelligence agencies of a dozen countries, Nada and Nasreddin have also been the masterminds of a sophisticated terrorism-financing network that spanned four continents and funneled millions of dollars to various Islamist groups. The US Treasury Department, which designated both men as terrorist financiers in the months following 9/11, claims that Nada and Nasreddin ran an array of banks and "shell companies lacking a physical presence" whose sole purpose was to finance terrorism. It points in particular to Al Taqwa, a bank headed by both men and incorporated in the Bahamas, which since its foundation in 1988 has financed terrorist groups such as Hamas, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, and al Nahda in Tunisia. Moreover, the Treasury Department claims that Al Taqwa "provid[ed] a clandestine line of credit to a close associate of Usama Bin Laden" and that al Qaeda itself received funding from the bank until September 2001.41
Although Al Taqwa was based in the Bahamas to take advantage of the country's strict privacy laws, the bank formed part of a sophisticated network of more than twenty companies headquartered in Italy, Switzerland, and the tiny principality of Liechtenstein. Both Nasreddin and Nada had spent most of their lives in Europe, creating their fortunes in Italy, Switzerland, and German
y. The Ethiopian-born Nasreddin is an Italian citizen who briefly held the title of honorary consul of Kuwait in Milan and paid the rent of the city's infamous Islamic Cultural Institute, which the Treasury Department has called "al Qaeda's main stationhouse in Europe."48 Nada, an Egyptian-born naturalized Italian businessman and son of an adviser to the late Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat, masterminded the financial activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe for more than thirty years.49 It is safe to say that, in all likelihood, Nada and Nasreddin have been the two largest financiers of terrorism to have operated in Europe over the past twenty years.
But Nada and Nasreddin also exemplify the difficulties faced by European (and American) authorities seeking to adequately punish terrorist financiers. Despite the serious accusations leveled against them by US and European counterterrorism agencies, Nada and Nasreddin have never served a single day in jail and are still managing their fortunes from the comfort of their mansions. Though they have been subjected to official designations and sanctions by the United Nations, United States, and European Union, the two businessmen have not been charged with any crime and have suffered little from the freezing of some of their assets.
In fact, since the various resolutions that target terrorism financing allow authorities only to freeze the bank accounts of the suspected financiers, the businesses and residential and commercial properties belonging to Nada and Nasreddin have remained untouched. Both men, financial experts with decades of experience, have also devised a system of front companies and secret off-shore bank accounts that enables them to circumvent resolutions and shelter their wealth and enterprises from any actions by the authorities. Nada still maintains business interests in Switzerland and Liechtenstein; Nasreddin still owns a luxurious hotel in downtown Milan.5°
The cases of Nada and Nasreddin illustrate how ill-designed European legislation is to tackle terrorism financing; entities and individuals that have raised funds for terrorism have generally been punished merely with a "designation," an administrative decision of little practical value if detailed investigations and repressive measures do not follow. But European authorities have not paid enough attention to this issue. Whereas in 2002 the US Treasury had more than a hundred trained analysts in its terrorismfinancing unit, the Bank of England had only seven, the German Bundesbank one, and the French Ministry of Finance two-working part-time.51
Lax laws on financial transactions, poor enforcement, and the vast amounts of money in circulation make Europe the terrorists' ideal place for raising money. If Nada and Nasreddin, who moved millions of dollars for decades, can go substantially unpunished, terrorists who raise small amounts know that they can operate in Europe with almost complete freedom. Therefore, terrorist organizations have set up hundreds of front charities, humanitarian organizations, companies, and businesses across the Continent with the primary purpose of raising or laundering money.
Legal businesses have traditionally been an important source of funding for terrorist groups. Wealthy charities closely linked to royal families in the Arab Gulf countries have operated in Europe and funneled money to known militants for years. Terrorist financiers have managed real estate firms in Spain, import/export businesses in Germany, and restaurants in England. In 2001 Italian authorities shut down an association of cooperatives run by North African men that in fact did nothing more than launder money and sponsor militants for visas to enter the country.52 Syrian businessmen closely linked to the Muslim Brotherhood ran a complicated network of companies in Spain and Germany that allegedly financed al Qaeda activities in Europe and even employed some of the 9/11 hijackers.53
At the same time, militants have often resorted to crime for a significant portion of their funds. Many Islamic fundamentalists are former street thugs who have found a new direction in Islam. Some of these experienced criminals simply keep on doing what they were doing before their conversion to radical Islam-though now, they are told, they are acting "for the cause of Allah" and are, therefore, doing a good and necessary deed. Justifying the commission of crimes with the religious formula mentioned in the previous section, "necessity permits the forbidden," terrorists have raised money by carrying out credit card fraud, forging documents, using counterfeit banknotes, and stealing. Reportedly, Islamic fundamentalists have sometimes relied on Mafia-style techniques, threatening fellow Muslim shopkeepers to extort money for jihad in exchange for protection.54
Militants have often financed their activities with robberies, since stealing the money of the infidels for jihad is considered permissible. An investigation conducted by a Russian television station revealed that Parisian street gangs composed of young Muslim men from the city's slums were robbing jewelry stores and sending part of the profits to Islamic fighters in Chechnya. Ahmed, a young French Muslim interviewed in the program, described how the robbers ride up to jewelry shops in motorcycles, smash the windows with a sledgehammer, and take all they can in less than a minute. The jewels are sold few hours later on the city's black market or quickly carried to stores in Antwerp, Europe's main market for precious metals and diamonds. According to Ahmed, couriers, often accompanied by women in order to appear less suspicious, then transport the profits of the robberies to Chechnya, traveling with bags packed with cash along a carefully planned route that goes through Italy, Slovenia, the Balkans, Turkey, and Georgia. At every stop along the way, members of the network facilitate the couriers' passage.55
Paris-based members of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, the terrorist organization behind the Casablanca bombings, devised a particularly cunning robbery. As a spokesman for the French Interior Ministry described it, "Hassan Baouchi organized his own kidnapping and the theft of the money for the cash machines. The stolen money was destined to finance terrorist activities in France and abroad."56 In March 2004, Baouchi, a twenty-three-year-old technician with a security company whose job was to fill ATMs with cash, claimed to have been forced by three masked robbers to open the machines in six different locations in the northern suburbs of Paris. It appeared that the thieves had managed to steal more than a million euros.57
French authorities immediately doubted Baouchi's story. Their check into his background raised additional suspicions, as Baouchi's brother had been arrested in April 2004 for his role in the Madrid train bombings. Mustapha Baouchi, a skilled mujahid who had visited Afghanistan at least twice, was the leader of the Paris cell of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, a group of French-born Islamists who had raised funds for the Madrid train bombers and for other operations carried out by the Moroccan group.58 A thorough investigation of the "robbery" revealed that Hassan Baouchi had staged the whole incident and that the group had used the money, which was never found, for terrorist purposes. An alleged accomplice of the Baouchis, a man with close ties to the Chechen mujahideen, was detained in Algeria in October 2004 with forty thousand euros in cash.59 Hassan Baouchi was arrested by French authorities one month later.6o
The Paris ATM case is just one example of the frauds planned by Islamic fundamentalists to raise money. In January 2005, German authorities in the western city of Mainz arrested Mohammed Khalil, a twentynine-year-old Iraqi, and Yasser Abu Shaweesh, a thirty-one-year-old Palestinian, on the charge that they had planned suicide attacks in Iraq.6' Khalil, a high-ranking al Qaeda operative who had direct contacts with Osama bin Laden and had spent years in Afghanistan, had done more than recruit Shaweesh for a suicide operation: he had devised an elaborate scheme to benefit financially from Shaweesh's death. His plan was to purchase life insurance for Shaweesh and to subsequently stage his death in a car accident in Egypt, complete with a purchased dead body to add to its realism. The money from the life insurance was to be collected by Shaweesh's wife, who would have kept part of it for herself and given the rest to Khalil to finance additional operations. After his staged death, Shaweesh intended to travel to Iraq and die in a suicide attack against US forces. Since insurance companies do not share data, Shaweesh reportedly had planned to buy life insur
ance from at least ten companies in order to maximize the organization's financial gains from his death.62
Though robberies, frauds, and thefts are crimes that target infidels and are, therefore, easily justifiable by more militant interpreters of Islamic law, many radicals consider the sale of drugs to be haram (prohibited). Mainstream Islam strictly prohibits involvement with any substance that impairs the mind and a person's judgment, making any drugrelated activity a sin. Nevertheless, other radicals believe that any method of raising money is permissible if the profits are used for jihad. The most extreme sects of fundamentalist Islam, like Takfir wa'l Hijra, condone trafficking in drugs, and some adherents have sold heroin, cocaine, and hashish in small amounts on street corners and have even organized largescale smuggling.
Already in 1993, French intelligence was warning that the sale of drugs in the slums outside the country's large cities was in the control of North African gangs led by veterans of the Afghan war against the Soviets and linked to terrorist groups operating in Algeria. There were reports that some drug dealers operating in the southern outskirts of Paris were enforcing a brutal version of Islamic law, chopping off the hands of drug addicts who did not pay their debts.63 As part 4 will show, some of the key terrorists behind the Madrid train bombings, most of whom adhered to Takfir wa'l Hijra's ideology, financed their operations with drug trafficking between Spain and Morocco. According to Spanish authorities, the two hundred twenty pounds of dynamite that the terrorists used in the attacks were acquired in exchange for sixty-six pounds of hashish.64
Over the past few years, Islamic terrorists have also engaged in one of Europe's most profitable illegal activities: human smuggling. The GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat, or Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat), a radical Algerian Islamist group operating in the desert areas of North Africa, is actively involved in smuggling large groups of sub-Saharan migrants across the desert and then to Europe. There the GSPC can count on an extensive network of cells that provides the illegal immigrants with false documents and safe houses. In 2003 German authorities dismantled a network of Kurdish militants linked to Ansar al Islam, the terrorist group led by Abu Musab al Zarqawi that is battling US forces in Iraq. The Kurdish cells had organized a sophisticated and profitable scheme to smuggle hundreds of illegal Kurdish immigrants into Europe and thereby raise hundreds of thousands of dollars.65 Given that each migrant pays, on average, about $4,000 to his smugglers and that around half a million illegal immigrants reach Europe every year,66 terrorist groups have every reason to get into the business.
Al Qaeda in Europe Page 9
