A report published by the Italian secret service in the summer of 2003 made an alarming claim: "There is the fear, too, that the same routes used for illegal immigration are being used by militants to help form Islamic groups."67 European authorities worry that terrorist organizations have created a dangerous strategic alliance with groups of human traffickers, pooling their logistical and financial resources. Such an alliance might offer terrorist groups not just a share of the profits but also a means of smuggling operatives. European intelligence agencies believe, in fact, that dozens of terrorists have slipped into the Continent among the masses of illegal immigrants that regularly reach through land and sea. For example, a cell dismantled by Swiss authorities in 2004 attempted to facilitate the entrance in Switzerland of Abdallah ar-Rimi, an important member of al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. The cell, made up of Yemenis and East Africans had established a well-oiled mechanism to smuggle hundreds of Middle Eastern immigrants into Europe, supplying them with false documents. The cell, which was also engaged in illegal gold trading, sent the profits of its business to a Yemeni charitable organization linked to al Qaeda.68
In other instances al Qaeda has tried to smuggle operatives inside containers. In October 2001, Italian authorities, inspecting the Ipex Empedor, a cargo ship transiting through the port town of Gioia Tauro on its way to Canada from Egypt, heard noises coming from one of the ship's containers. The inspectors were not surprised to find a man, as hiding inside such containers is a standard ploy of illegal immigrants. But they were shocked to discover that he had with him a laptop computer, two satellite phones, and badges granting access to restricted areas of airports of three different countries. The Egyptian, who had attended a course for airplane mechanics in Canada, was detained on suspicion of links to terrorism.69
Containers are also used to smuggle counterfeit goods in and out of Europe's commercial harbors, as well as operatives and weapons. Islamic extremists are reported to be behind complex plans to smuggle counterfeit fashion products, CDs, video games, and leather purses from Asia and Africa to Europe. In 2002, for example, Danish authorities seized a boat full of counterfeit perfume and shampoo coming from Dubai and later established that they had been sent by an al Qaeda operative. According to Interpol officials, the counterfeiting trade is already an important source of revenue for terrorist organizations and has the potential to become "the preferred source of funding for terrorists."70 Trading in the opposite direction, terrorists are believed to be exporting stolen cars from Europe to the Middle East via ships.
There are even indications that al Qaeda owns its own fleet. US intel ligence officials estimate that directly or indirectly, al Qaeda controls at least fifteen ships, which can be used as sea taxis to transport operatives around the world." Substantial numbers of suspicious boats have been seen in Europe's southern sea, the Mediterranean, and the US Navy, working closely with European allies, has been monitoring its waters since the months after 9/11. In the summer of 2002, American maritime intelligence became particularly interested in the Sara, a ship registered in the tiny Pacific island of Tonga. Reliable sources indicated that the owners of the ship had murky connections and suggested that the vessel could have been used by terrorist groups to smuggle operatives into Europe. In July, while the ship was docked in the Moroccan port of Casablanca, its Romanian captain, Adrian Pop Sorin, received a phone call from its owner telling him that fourteen new Pakistani sailors had been hired who would be joining the other Pakistani man already on board. As soon as the ship began making its way toward the Mediterranean, Sorin realized that the men had absolutely no experience as sailors; indeed, many of them exhibited extreme seasickness. After Sorin complained about the incompetent sailors to his employer, he received specific orders to keep them on board and to stay in international waters. He nevertheless tried to get rid of the Pakistanis in Malta, but the authorities did not authorize the Sara's docking. Sorin finally docked in the Sicilian port of Gela in August, after pretending to have engine troubles.72 There the Pakistani sailors were found to be in possession of false passports and detained.
The captain of the ship, who had not received his salary in months and clearly had little love for his employer, revealed that the Sara had changed its name repeatedly-from Nador to Palona to Ryno-over the few months before its docking in Gela. This information proved to be very important, as Italian and American maritime intelligence agents had information indicating that a ship named Ryno had been used by Islamic fundamentalists from South Asia to enter Europe. After a short investigation, Italian authorities charged the fifteen Pakistanis with being members of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a Pakistani terrorist group with close ties to al Qaeda; the men were suspected of having been sent to Europe to carry out attacks. The information provided by Sorin and the Romanian crewmen was crucial in the investigation. The Romanians claimed that the Pakistani sailors, besides often feeling seasick, were completely unwilling and unable to do any work on the ship. Allegedly, one of them bragged about being a Taliban and the men proudly showed the Romanian sailors a cellular phone that displayed a picture of Osama bin Laden. The suspicions of the Italian authorities grew when they learned that the men had paid more than $1,200 to reach Casablanca from Pakistan, using a threemonth open airplane ticket. The indictment noted that these tickets cost more than the men would have earned in the three months they were supposed to work on the boat before returning to Pakistan.73
The story of the Sara reminded Italian authorities of an incident that had occurred a few months earlier in Trieste, a harbor in the north of the country. In February 2002, Trieste port authorities stopped another Tongan boat, the Twillinger, which was carrying eight Pakistani sailors with false documents. The men were from the same mountainous region of Pakistan as the fifteen sailors of the Sara, and they, too, were described by the Romanian crew as uncooperative and often seasick. One of them was a graduate of the Lahore Business School, an unusual credential for a sailor. Italian authorities found out that the men had open airplane tickets to Pakistan, $30,000 in cash, several magazines containing reports on 9/11, and a map of Rome with a circle around Vatican City. Even though the case raised suspicions, no specific terrorist connection could be proved and the men were deported to Pakistan.74 The connection between the Sara and the Twillinger was deeper than these numerous similarities. As Dimiciu Enaiche, the Romanian cook who worked on both, confirmed, the two ships had the same owners.71
Those owners, a Greek businessman living in Romania and a Pakistani with American citizenship, are behind several companies that control the Sara, the Twillinger, and other boats suspected of ferrying terrorists around the world. Their operations exemplify the intertwining of legal and illegal activities that makes the authorities' work very difficult. How can authorities prove that the shipowners knew their ships were transporting terrorists? And, by the same token, how can they prove that an individual who sent money to a terrorist knew that it would be used for a terrorist attack? Can the worshipers of a mosque that raises money later funneled to terrorists be accused of funding terrorism? All these unanswered questions prevent European (and American) authorities from effectively tackling terrorism financing.
Perhaps the millions of dollars that went into building al Qaeda's global network before 9/11 are no longer flowing so freely, but today's fight against the financing of terrorism is even more difficult. Cells have become more independent and they rely on simple mechanisms to sustain themselves, financing their activities through petty crime or legal activities. Moreover, the sums needed to carry out an attack are often risibly small. For example, authorities estimate that the Madrid train bombings cost no more than $10,000 and the May 2003 attacks in Casablanca only $4,000.11 Though Europe definitely needs to step up its efforts, authorities have to accept that complete success is almost impossible. As the 9/11 Commission observed, "Trying to starve the terrorists of money is like trying to catch one kind of fish by draining the ocean.""
NOTES
1. "Leading Sunni
Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradhawi and Other Sheikhs Herald the Coming Conquest of Rome," Middle East Media and Research Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch #447, December 6, 2002.
2. AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingenen Veiligheidsdienst, General Intelligence and Security Service), "Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands; from Incident to Trend," December 2002.
3. AIVD, "Background of Jihad Recruits in the Netherlands," March 10, 2004, p. 3.
4. Michael Taarnby, "Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe," Centre for Cultural Research, University of Aarhus, Denmark, January 2005.
5. AIVD, "Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands."
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Sebastian Rotella, "The Hunt for al Qaeda, Sunday Report; Extremists Find Fertile Soil in Europe," Los Angeles Times, March 2, 2003.
9. Ibid.
10. Taarnby, "Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe."
11. AIVD, "Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands."
12. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
13. Sageman, quoted in Marlena Telvick, "Al Qaeda Today: The New Face of the Global Jihad," PBS Frontline Special, January 2005, http://www.pbs.org/ wgbh/page s/frontline/shows/front/etc/today. html.
14. Es Sayed is believed to have died while fighting US forces in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, in December of 2001. In 2004 a Milan court sentenced him in absentia to eight years and four months. Ben Soltane was sentenced in 2003 by the Milan Court of Appeals to four years and six months.
15. DIGOS report, "Al Muhajiroun 1," Milan, April 2, 2001.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. AIVD, "Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands."
19. `Brigitte `Plotted to Blow up Reactor,"' Age, November 12, 2003.
20. "Report: Islamic Militants Ran 7 Recruitment camps in France," AP, December 10, 2003.
21. Rotella, "The Hunt for al Qaeda, Sunday Report."
22. "Al Qaeda Training Manual," available in part on the US Department of Justice Web site, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm.
23. "The Al Battar Training Camp: The First Issue of Al- Qa'ida's Online Military Magazine," MEMRI, Special Dispatch #637, January 6, 2004.
24. Stefano Dambruoso, Milano Bagdad: Diario di nn magistrato in prima linen nella lotta al terrorismo islamico in Italia (Milan: Mondadori, 2004), pp. 94-97.
25. Judith Miller, "Some Charities Suspected of Terrorism," New York Times, February 19, 2000.
26. "Ex-Wife Massoud-Killer Arrested in Switzerland," AFP, March 31, 2005.
27. Bruce Crumley, "The Alliance Lives!" Time, June 15, 2003.
28. "Al Qaeda Training Manual."
29. DIGOS report, "Al Muhajiroun 1," Milan, April 2, 2001.
30. "Al Qaeda Training Manual."
31. Ginny Parker, "Prepaid Phones Get a Bad Rap from Crime Use," Wall Street Journal, February 17, 2005.
32. Don Van Natta Jr. and Desmond Butler, "How Tiny Swiss Cellphone Chips Helped Track Global Terror Web," New York Times, March 4, 2004.
33. Ibid.
34. Ontario Court of Justice, Her Majesty the Queen v. Mohammed Momin Khawaja, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, May 3, 2004.
35. Jason Bennetto and Kim Sengupta, "Terror Arrests: Bomb Plot Linked to Canada Suspect," Independent, April 1, 2004.
36. Fabrizio Gatti and Guido Olimpio, "Presi Quattro di Al Qaeda: `1'Italia e' un Nemico," Corriere Bella Sera, October 11, 2002.
37. "France Terror Code Breakthrough,"' BBC, October 5, 2001.
38. Guido Olimpio, La Rete del Terrore (Milan: Sperling & Kupfer, 2002), pp. 73-75.
39. Dambruoso, Milano Bagdad, pp. 53-55.
40. "Al Qaeda Training Manual."
41. Ibid.
42. Dambruoso, Milano Bagdad, pp. 53-55.
43. Ibid., pp. 58-59.
44. "Al Qaeda Training Manual."
45. Ibid.
46. Gilles Kepel, "Jihad; The Trail of Political Islam," trans. Anthony F. Roberts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 254 ff.
47. US Treasury Department press release, "The United States and Italy Designate Twenty-Five New Financiers of Terror," August 29, 2002, http://www .ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3380.htm.
48. Tom Hundley, "European Loopholes Too Inviting," Chicago Tribune, November 11, 2001.
49. Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Democratica (SISDE, the Intelligence and Democratic Security Service), official dossier on Ahmed Nasreddin, April 6, 1996.
50. Marco Cobianchi, "L'FBI Sbaglia Indirizzo," Panorama, December 5, 2003.
51. William F. Wechsler, Lee S. Wolosky, and Maurice R. Greenberg, Terrorist Financing; Report of an Independent Task Force (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002).
52. Indictment of Essid Sami Ben Khemais and others, Tribunal of Busto Arsizio, April 6, 2001.
53. John Crewdson and Laurie Cohen, "Charity Founders Tied to Hamburg Terror Suspect," Chicago Tribune, November 3, 2002.
54. Magdi Allam, "I Soldi delle Moschee per i Fanatici di Allah," Corriere della Sera, September 24, 2003.
55. "Russian TV Looks at European Supply Routes for Mercenaries in Chechnya," RTR Russia TV, December 21, 2003. Excerpts provided by BBC Monitoring International Reports.
56. Emmanuel Jarry, "French Nab Suspect in Robbery for Islamic Militants," Reuters, November 21, 2004.
57. Piotr Smolar, "Faux Braquage de six Banques pour Financer le Terrorisme," Le Monde, November 21, 2004.
58. Ibid.
59. Jarry, "French Nab Suspect in Robbery for Islamic Militants."
60. Smolar, "Faux Braquage de six Banques pour Financer le Terrorisme."
61. "Al-Qaida-Verdaechtiger bekam Auftrag direkt von Bin Laden," Der Spiegel, January 25, 2005.
62. David Crawford, "German Terror Cell Shifts Focus to Iraq," Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2005.
63. "Le Spectre de Reseaux Islamistes Algeriens," La Depeche Internationale des Drogues, no. 26, December 1993.
64. Sebastian Rotella, "Jihad's Unlikely Alliance," Los Angeles Times, May 23, 2005.
65. Tribunal of Milan, Indictment of Muhamad Majid and others, November 25, 2003.
66. Luke Baker, "Italy Study Sees Al Qaeda Link to Human Smuggling," Reuters, September 7, 2003.
67. Ibid.
68. Swiss Federal Police Office, "2004 Report on Switzerland's Internal Security," Bern, May 2005, p. 29.
69. "Uomo Arrestato in Calabria; Forse Legami con Terrorismo," Repub- blica, October 24, 2001.
70. Jon Ungoed-Thomas, "Designer Fakes `Are Funding Al-Qaeda,"' Sunday Times, March 20, 2005.
71. John Mintz, "15 Freighters Believed to be Linked to al Qaeda," Washington Post, December 31, 2002.
72. "Arrestati a Gela 15 Pakistani Legati ad al Qaeda," Avvenire, September 13, 2002.
73. Tribunal of Caltanissetta, Indictment of Zahid Mehmood and others, September 25, 2002.
74. Carlo Barbacini, "Uomini di Al Qaeda sulla Tvillinger," Il Piccolo, October 22, 2002.
75. Ibid.
76. Mark Chediak, "Following the Money: Tracking Down al Qaeda's Fund Raisers in Europe," PBS Frontline Special, January 25, 2005, http://www.pbs .org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/finance.html; Los Angeles Times, September 26, 2004.
77. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: Norton, 2004), p. 382.
CHAPTER 3
EUROPE'S TIED HANDS
There has to be a balance between individual liberty on one hand and the efficiency of the system to protect the public on the other. In an ideal world, I would choose the first, but this is not an ideal world, and when dealing with Islamic extremists we have to be brutal sometimes.
-Alain Marsaud, member of the French parliament (2005)
"These guys are smart. They are using our laws and the rights we have given them when we welcomed them into Europe against us. They are taking
advantage of the very same liberties they want to destroy."' A German intelligence official speaks for many Europeans in expressing his frustration over the inability of his country and others to fashion effective legal tools against Islamic terrorism. Throughout Europe, judges and security officials often find themselves unable to detain known terrorists under current laws.
That terrorism is a crime not easily defined in law makes it extremely difficult to prevent. If an attack is carried out, the authorities have many effective tools available to prosecute the perpetrators. But more difficult questions arise when they must deal with the accessories to the crime. Is the person who provides a false passport to a suicide bomber a member of a terrorist organization? Can he be charged with a role in the attack? If so, then in order to prove his guilt, prosecutors have the difficult task of proving mens rea, his criminal intent-that is, that the individual provided the document knowing that it would be used by a terrorist in an attack. Otherwise his act constitutes not terrorism but a common crime, generally punished with a few days in jail. And what if the document is provided and the attack does not take place? Or if it does take place, but in a country other than the one where the provider of the false passport operated? And what about people who adhere to the jihadi ideology, praise Osama bin Laden, and declare their willingness to die and kill for jihad? Experience shows that these characteristics are displayed by the people who have committed the most heinous terrorist acts. Can those who voice such views be prosecuted even if there is no information that they are actually planning any specific terrorist act? If not, must we just sit and wait until they strap explosives to themselves and kill dozens of innocents?
Al Qaeda in Europe Page 10
