Al Qaeda in Europe

by Lorenzo Vidino

  In addition, European authorities, like their American counterparts, are scrambling to find competent translators. The vast majority of the conversations and documents pertaining to Islamic terrorism are in Arabic, and tribunals and law enforcement agencies lack skilled and trusted linguists. Even when they rely on nonnative speakers, they find few available. And these translators are a poor substitute for native Arabic speakers, who are familiar with not only the language but also the terrorists' culture. Militants often use a jargon rich in references to religion and to popular Middle Eastern traditions, which is extremely difficult for out siders to comprehend. Moreover, terrorists operating in Europe generally use minor dialects of North Africa, not classical Arabic.

  But the difficulties in finding and retaining reliable translators who are native Arabic speakers are immense. On the one hand, on several occasions translators in different countries have been threatened by militants, who accuse them of being "traitors" because they are working for the "infidels" against "the brothers." Often these translators, after enduring years of fear, have been forced to quit their jobs and take their families to a new location. Low salaries do not help authorities as they try to persuade the translators to ignore the threats. On the other hand, they worry that the native Arabic speakers they recruit may be infiltrators. Several translators have been either fired or reassigned on suspicion of sympathizing with the individuals being investigated. At times, translators have intentionally failed to translate incriminating words or phrases, potentially jeopardizing a case. Recently a Dutch-born Muslim translator for the Netherlands' internal intelligence agency, AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingenen Veilighei- dsdienst, or the General Intelligence and Security Service), was discovered passing classified information to the targets of an ongoing investigation. One of the men who received the leaked documents was the roommate of Mohammed Bouyeri, the killer of Theo van Gogh.48

  As daunting as the problems faced by individual countries can be, the need for cooperation among countries creates even greater difficulties. Stefano Dambruoso, a leading Italian counterterrorism magistrate, has called the bureaucracy involved in a transnational investigation "depress- ing."49 According to Dambruoso, if an Italian magistrate wants to contact a counterpart outside of Italy, he or she has to fill out, in the language of the recipient country, a document that is at least four pages long. If the form is being sent outside the Schengen countries-Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden-it must first pass through the Ministry of Justice in Rome. Most European countries have similar procedures.

  Though several conventions have been signed and public promises of collaboration have been made, antiterrorism cooperation across Europe is still inadequate. Bureaucratic delays can make the effort pointless, for the information sought is often useless by the time it is received. It is common knowledge among magistrates and security officials that some European countries simply do not respond to official interrogatories or even informal requests for help. They frequently have to rely on personal contacts within other countries to speed up an otherwise endless process. Internal bureaucratic problems, language barriers, and centuries of diffidence and outright rivalry among European countries all tend to thwart effective joint counterterrorism efforts.

  In response to such problems, various institutions have been created. The largest and best-funded is Europol, which was founded in 1992 to facilitate legal cooperation among European countries on numerous issues, including terrorism. But as currently constituted, it cannot efficiently aid Europe's fight against terrorism. By law, every member country must provide Europol with up-to-date information on terrorist activities on its soil, which Europol will give to any member upon request. In theory, Europol should serve as a clearinghouse for intelligence. But, inexplicably, the law requires that the country from which the information originated be notified of the request and give its consent before the information can be passed to the inquiring country. Thus Europol does little more than add another layer of bureaucracy: it collects massive amounts of information that cannot be directly shared with European law enforcement agencies. Such restrictions led a frustrated senior German intelligence official to fume, "Muslim activities are more globalist-more pan-European-than Europeans are."50 A terrorist cell can easily be based in Germany, raise money in Holland, obtain weapons in Belgium, and simultaneously plan an attack in France. European investigators trying to prevent such an attack would find it almost impossible to coordinate their efforts. The terrorists have taken full advantage of the new Europe, paying no attention as they cross the Continent's now-invisible borders. "We drag ourselves and they run,"51 says Dambruoso, highlighting how terrorists stay several steps ahead of European authorities.

  Such obstacles and difficulties make Europe even more appealing to al Qaeda operatives and other terrorists as a base of operations. They fear not the Continent's authorities but the foreign intelligence agencies operating inside Europe. Dambruoso offers a particularly telling anecdote in his book on Islamic terrorism. One night a group of Italian counterterrorism agents raided the apartment of a group of North Africans. The agents were in plain clothes and had their faces covered with balaclavas. Since all the occupants of the apartment were North African, one of the agents barked a couple of words in Arabic, his Italian accent muffled by the mask he was wearing. The men panicked, thinking that the Italians were from the mukhabarat, the intelligence agencies of their home country (the name is used throughout the Arab-speaking world). When the officers identified themselves as Italian police, the militants were so relieved they almost burst into tears.52 They knew that agents in Italy, like those in all European countries, would follow the rule of law. The men might be arrested, charged, and detained, but all would be able to see a lawyer in a few hours and all would be charged with a specific crime. Most important, they knew they would not be tortured, a guarantee by no means enjoyed by those whom the mukhabarat of an Arab country detain.

  Middle Eastern intelligence agencies have been operating in Europe for decades, monitoring the activities of known radicals who have left their native countries and joined the Arab diaspora in Europe. Their agents have infiltrated mosques and Islamic organizations, often operating without the knowledge of European authorities. Typically, Middle Eastern regimes dispatch a few intelligence agents to keep tabs on radicals who have been convicted for their terrorist activities in their home countries but have managed to flee to Europe, where they take advantage of liberal asylum policies. Since most European countries refuse to extradite individuals to countries where they could be punished with the death penalty, Arab regimes have occasionally decided to take the law into their own hands after long and unsuccessful political and legal battles. In some cases, the mukhabarat have gone beyond mere monitoring and have "disappeared" some important radicals. Such disappearances occur domestically in several Middle Eastern countries: Individuals are seized off the street and taken to a secret jail, where they are often tortured, and sometimes they never return. Evidence of this practice in Europe is strong. For example, it is widely believed that Cairo's mukhabarat "disappeared" a known militant, Abu Talal al Qassimi in 1995, while he was in Croatia (Egyptian authorities deny any involvement). Al Qassimi, who was the European spokesman for the Gamaa Islamiya, was reportedly arrested by Croatian police and handed over to the Egyptians, who have detained him ever since.53

  After 9/11, European countries began to change their attitudes, and the total ban on extradition was occasionally relaxed. In December 2001, Sweden, traditionally one of the staunchest defenders of human rights and a country that has welcomed thousands of political refugees, extradited two Egyptian militants, Mohammed al Zery and Ahmed Agiza, less than a day after seizing them. A high-ranking Swedish official justified his country's new position: "We had very clear indications that these individuals had leadership positions in organizations involved with terrorist acts. ... And the seriousness of
these cases was underlined by the events of the 11th of September."54

  Stockholm's action came at a delicate moment and after strong pressure from outside. The events of 9/11 shocked countries around the world into realizing what might happen on their own soil, but the change in US attitudes was understandably most dramatic. While Islamists and other unconfirmed sources allege that the United States played a role in several "disappearances" or other forms of extradition of questionable legality even before 9/11, the United States has since embraced a much more aggressive stance toward Islamic terrorists, spearheading efforts to see militants living in Europe put behind bars at any cost. A month after 9/11, President Bush wrote a letter to Romano Prodi, at the time president of the European Commission; among his requests was that the European Union explore "alternatives to extradition including expulsion and deportation, where legally available and more efficient."55 America was clearly pushing Europe to relax its standards, inviting it to get rid of the known terrorists living on its soil by any means possible.

  Since 9/11, America has been directly involved in several cases of disappearances or "lightening-extradition": suspected Islamic terrorists have been kidnapped from the streets of Europe, hurled onto a plane, and sent to undisclosed locations, often to some secret jail in the Middle East. The CIA refers to these operations as "renditions"; while they are necessary and useful in the war on terror, they have caused embarrassing diplomatic rows between Washington and some European countries. Indeed, months after the two Egyptian militants were extradited from Sweden to Egypt, evidence emerged that the CIA had been behind the entire operation. After Swedish police arrested them, "America security agents just took over," according to a former Swedish diplomat who led the efforts for a Swedish parliamentary investigation into the incident. Alleged CIA operatives shackled and sedated the two men before putting them on an American plane. The men were then flown to Egypt, where they have been reportedly tortured while in detention.56 As allegations of their torture in Egypt surfaced in Swedish newspapers, human rights advocates began lambasting their government's actions. Public opinion and the political elite class expressed their disappointment in the whole incident, declaring their reluctance to participate again in any similar operation.

  While the CIA never comments on such matters, journalists who have tracked the movements of the American plane that flew al Zery and Agiza from Stockholm to Cairo have uncovered sufficient information to affirm that the same aircraft is often used by the CIA for renditions. Registered to a front company in Massachusetts, since 9/11 the aircraft has touched down in all the hot spots of the war on terror, reportedly flying on several occasions to Jordan, Afghanistan, Morocco, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, and Guantanamo Bay.57 The plane, in all likelihood, acts as a shuttle between countries where the Americans first detain suspected terrorists and places where the individuals are subsequently held. Of course, when the individual is held in a country such as Egypt, it is very probable that he will be subjected to torture.

  A more serious diplomatic incident caused by the CIA's renditions took place in Italy, where nineteen CIA operatives have been indicted in the summer of 2005 for their role in the kidnapping of Nasr Osama Mustafa Hassan, better known as Abu Omar, the imam of a radical Milan mosque and a known Gamaa Islamiya operative with experience in the Balkans and Afghanistan. According to a witness, Abu Omar was pushed into a car by two Italian-speaking men on the morning of February 17, 2003, while he was walking on a street in Milan. For more than a year nobody heard from the cleric. Then, in April 2004, Abu Omar called his wife from Egypt, telling her he had been kidnapped by the Italian and American secret services and detained in Egypt ever since. Abu Omar, who had been temporarily released without explanation by Egyptian authorities, also claimed to have been beaten and tortured with electric shocks, leaving him with permanent injuries.58

  The investigation opened by the Tribunal of Milan uncovered evidence that a CIA team had carried out the kidnapping of Abu Omar. Italian magistrates identified more than 20 CIA operatives who, divided in different teams, had seized him in Milan, driven him to the US military base in Aviano (in northern Italy), and flown him to two other US military bases (one in Germany and one on the Red Sea) and then to Cairo, where he was reportedly brought to the infamous al Tora prison, the highsecurity facility where most Egyptian political prisoners are detained. Reportedly, the CIA operatives left several obvious clues behind them, renting cars under their real names and using regular Italian cellular phones.59 Italian investigators, who treated the kidnapping as a common criminal case, put together compelling evidence against the men involved in the operation and, between June and July of 2005, nineteen alleged CIA operatives were charged in relation to Abu Omar's kidnapping.

  The day after the indictments were made public, the names of the operatives were splashed on front pages of most Italian and American newspapers. The men and women involved in the operation risk more than 10 years in jail if they are caught in Italy. While it is unlikely the operatives will ever set foot in Italy again, the cover of those who have been identified by their real names has been blown.

  More importantly, what has been seriously put in jeopardy is the relationship between the United States and Italy, one of its key allies in Europe. Milan magistrates accuse the United States of "having severely violated Italy's sovereignty."60 Technically, they are right. Moreover, they allege that, by kidnapping Abu Omar, the CIA prevented Italian authorities from fully investigating the imam's contacts in Milan, as the man was already under surveillance at the time of his "disappearance." Immediately after the indictments came out, members of Italy's center-left opposition began to publicly attack the US operation and accused the center-right Berlusconi government of not being able to defend Italy's sovereignty. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, whose close relationship with President Bush and support for the Iraq war have already been under fire, was accused of knowingly allowing agents of a foreign country to operate on Italian soil and violate Italian law. Former intelligence agents on both sides of the ocean agreed that the Italian government must have been aware that the CIA was behind Abu Omar's kidnapping, a man that was closely monitored by security services, at least after the action took place, if not earlier. Obviously, the Italian government denied any knowledge of the fact and, on July 1, it summoned the US ambassador to Italy, Mel Sem- bler, a necessary act under the circumstances. Italy still remains one of America's strongest allies, but, thanks to the CIA's clumsiness, it is very unlikely that will allow this kind of operation on its soil again.

  The Italian and the Swedish cases are just two examples that rebuke the US government's official claim that it is not involved in renditions. In fact, there is substantial evidence to the contrary. In March 2005, the New York Times reported that in the days immediately following 9/11, the White House issued a classified directive authorizing the CIA to "transfer suspected terrorists to foreign countries for interrogation."61 Unconfirmed but reliable reports indicate that at least 100 renditions have taken place since 9/11.62 The Egyptian prime minister Ahmed Nazif revealed that at least sixty individuals have been flown to his country by the United States since 9/11 under the rendition program.63 Critics of the practice allege that the individuals who are shipped by the United States to prisons in Jordan or Egypt are often tortured. The common accusation is that the United States, while not itself torturing alleged terrorists, is "outsourcing torture."64 The official position of the US government, expressed by President Bush in a January 2005 interview, is that "Torture is never acceptable, nor do we hand over people to countries that do torture."65

  In reality, America is indeed handing over suspects to countries that use torture. But in some cases it is difficult to blame the United States. "The option of not doing something is extraordinarily dangerous to the American people," notes Michael Scheuer, a former senior CIA official and the author of the book Imperial Hubris.66 America, unlike most European countries, perceives itself to be at war. The common sentiment
among US officials is that in times of war, every weapon available should be used. The argument takes on added force in this conflict, as the enemy has decided to engage the West in an asymmetric war.

  Renditions are probably not the best solution to the terrorist threat, as they undoubtedly raise strong legal and moral issues. They are troubling not just because of the likelihood that intelligence agencies occasionally make mistakes and "disappear" the wrong person but also because respect for the law and human rights is part of what the West is fighting to preserve. Nevertheless, the West now finds itself involuntarily engaged in the first years of a long war that it is not yet prepared to fight. The price of defeat in this war would be the loss of all freedoms. While the civil rights of any individual are sacrosanct, every political leader should keep in mind that the survival of the country should be his or her paramount aim. In the balance between the respect of the civil liberties of a few and the survival of the many, the guiding principle should be ubi maior minor cessat (in the presence of the greater, the lesser loses importance).

  NOTES

  1. German intelligence official, interview with author, Frankfurt, February 2004.

  2. Craig Whitlock, "French Push Limits in Fight on Terrorism," Washington Post, November 2, 2004.

  3. Federal Court of Karlsruhe, Indictment of Mounir El Motassadeq, August 30, 2002.

  4. Federal Court of Karlsruhe, Indictment of Abdelghani Mzoudi, October 9, 2002.

  5. Ibid.

  6. Ibid.

  7. Federal Court of Karlsruhe, Indictment of Mounir El Motassadeq.

  8. "Sept. 11 Terror Suspect Acquitted," Deutsche Welle, February 6, 2004.

  9. Desmond Butler, "German Judges Order a Retrial for 9/11 Figure," New York Times, March 5, 2004.

  10. Tribunal of Rotterdam, Indictment of Mohammed Ramzi and others, May 20, 2003.