Al Qaeda in Europe

by Lorenzo Vidino

  At the same time, the cell also began their surveillance of the target. The evidence gathered in the Frankfurt apartments clearly indicated that a strike was about to be launched-but against what? And why did El Haddad tell Abu Doha that he had to rent two more apartments to carry out the operation? A twenty-minute videotape found in one of the two apartments partially answered these questions. The tape, which is dated December 23, 2000, starts by showing German billboards along the freeway, then the crossing into France, and finally downtown Strasbourg. The cameraman, strolling like a tourist, paused in front of the famous Strasbourg Cathedral, focusing on its gothic facade; he then moved around the stalls of the Christmas market in the pedestrian-only Place Kleber. Occasionally there is an Arabic voiceover: In the market square, "These are the enemies of God taking a stroll"; outside a large store, "These are the enemies of God. You will go to hell, God willing."21 The investigation revealed that the film had been shot by El Haddad and Sabour (who were careful to never appear in it) and that the voice was El Haddad's. Using false documents, the two men had rented two apartments in the German town of Baden Baden for the days between December 25 and January 2.22 Their target was clearly Strasbourg, and Baden Baden, near the French border but out of the French authorities' jurisdiction, would be their base of operations.

  El Haddad had told Abu Doha that the attack was to take place right before New Year's Eve, a time when the streets of the town's historic center would be busy with holiday shoppers. Authorities believed that the group intended to place the explosives in pressure cookers (one was found during the searches) and then explode them either in the cathedral's square or at the nearby Christmas market. In fact, Beandali admitted that just hours before his arrest, he had called another member of the Algerian network in London, Slimane Khalfaoui, to ask him to send a pressure cooker to Germany, where the kind of pressure cooker he intended to use for the attack was not available on the market. He also confessed to their plan to use pressure cookers in making bombs, a technique they had learned in al Qaeda's camps in Afghanistan.23

  But even after two long trials (one in Germany and one in France), doubts still remain about the Frankfurt group's precise target. During the trial in Frankfurt, El Haddad and Sabour denied any intent to kill, insisting that the group had planned to target an empty synagogue 24 Beandali initially confirmed that the group intended to attack a synagogue to "send a message to France and Israel" and told the court that the cathedral appeared in the video only because his accomplices had mistakenly thought it was a synagogue.25 He also insisted that the men had planned the attack to take place after prayers, so that nobody would be harmed.26 Beandali told the judge: "At no point did I think about killing one German or French citizen, as I cannot reconcile this with my beliefs." But confronted with the evidence of the tape, which wished death on innocent French bystanders, Beandali changed his story. By the end of the trial he admitted that the group intended to carry out the bombing outside the cathedral 21

  To be sure, all of Beandali's testimony is questionable, as he lied through the entire trial. Despite his previous admission of a link to FIS, Beandali claimed before the court that he had held no radical views before his arrival in Germany. Beandali also testified that no group recruited him, that he had paid all the expenses of his trip to Afghanistan with his own savings, and that the camp he attended in Afghanistan was "a privately financed school that had nothing to do with al Qaeda or Osama Bin Laden."28 Beandali had every reason to distance himself from bin Laden and any organized group that was involved in jihad. Though the plot had been thwarted before 9/11, the trial took place in 2002, months after bin Laden had become a household name, and Beandali realized that any link to the Saudi millionaire would not play well in court. Attempting to win the judges' sympathies, Beandali vehemently condemned the attacks of 9/11: "September 11 was a black day in history, especially for the entire Islamic world. I am horrified about such a terrible crime, particularly since it is allegedly justified through our religion.... I would never again participate in explosives attacks and the like, since after September 11 it is no longer possible to use such acts to call attention to political grievances in a meaningful way, since they are automatically associated with al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden."29 Perhaps his feeling of repentance was sincere-but probably Beandali was just practicing takiya, the art of double-speaking that is taught to Islamic fundamentalists in order to trick the infidels.

  Conflicting information on the target also came from Ahmed Ressam, who has been helping US authorities since his arrest in Washington state in December 1999. Ressam, who had deep knowledge of the inner workings of the Algerian network, said that the Frankfurt cell meant to target "U.S., Israeli, and French interests outside Germany." In pronouncing the sentence, the Frankfurt court stated that the use of a pressure cooker full of explosives was better suited to an attack in the air rather than in a square; it concluded that the group's target could not be definitively deter- mined.30 That lack of certitude did not prevent the judges from imposing punishments that were quite harsh. El Haddad, whose voice was heard on the tape wishing death on the "unbelievers," received the longest sentence-twelve years in prison-while his companion on the reconnais sance mission, Sabour, was sentenced to eleven and a half years.' Beandali, despite his public professions of remorse, received ten years. Lamine Maroni, who refused to testify or make any statement during the trial, was sentenced to eleven years. Maroni broke his silence only to spit and curse at the public and the police officers in the court. In an outburst, he shouted at the court: "You are all Jews. I don't need the court. Allah is my defender. Our only judge is Allah. We'll get out of prison soon and go to heaven. 1112

  MAP 5.1. THE ALGERIAN NETWORK

  THE SUPPORT NETWORK

  Whatever the intended target, the Germans-thanks largely to international cooperation-had clearly prevented an attack. The arrests had consequences in other countries as well, as leads developed in the Frankfurt investigation helped uncover cells throughout Europe that were linked to the Algerian network. The repercussions were first felt in the United Kingdom, as British authorities decided to aggressively pursue the cells that were located on their territory. Scotland Yard, investigating jointly with the German BKA, found that the members of the Frankfurt cell had ties to Britain that went far beyond a single intercepted phone call between El Haddad and Abu Doha. At the time of their arrest, El Haddad and Laraine Maroni, who had long lived in the United Kingdom, were holding British Airways tickets from London to Frankfurt. They had flown together to Germany on December 5 and were supposed to fly back to London on January 5, after the job was done.33 Moreover, wiretaps revealed that the members of the Frankfurt cell had been in constant contact with Algerians in London, filling them in on the latest developments. It was clear that the men had been deployed to Frankfurt just for the attack: their support network was in Britain. An analysis of the chemical substances found in the Frankfurt apartments also uncovered an alarming link between the Meliani cell and England. One of the chemicals found in Frankfurt was triacetone triperoxide (TATP), a rare and highly unstable explosive.34 During a raid carried out by British authorities, TATP was also found in the Sheffield apartment formerly occupied by Maroni.35

  Having found explosives on British soil and realizing that London Islamists were bent on carrying out attacks in Europe, Scotland Yard decided to act. Breaking the unspoken nonaggression agreement the British government and Islamic radicals living in Britain had maintained for years, on February 13, 2001, police searched several apartments in London and arrested nine militants connected to the Algerian network. The searches produced a large assortment of blank and forged documents, counterfeit credit cards, tools to forge documents, and more than two hundred tapes of fighting by the mujahideen in the Russian breakaway republic of Chechnya. One of the men arrested, Kouidri Ilies, was found in possession of notes on chemical substances and electronic devices commonly used to fabricate bombs.36 Another was a thirty-year-old Algerian, Mu
stafa Labsi, who had also been involved in the failed millennium plot with Ahmed Ressam. Together with Abu Doha, Labsi had been in charge of daily communications with the Frankfurt cell from London. Labsi had traveled to Germany repeatedly and was arrested in Berlin in February 2000 while using a false credit card. At the moment of his arrest he was carrying a picture of El Haddad in his wallet, and a letter addressed to El Haddad was found in his apartment.37 As the investigation progressed, it became clear that the whole plot had been conceived, directed, and funded in England.

  British authorities applauded the operation, which also netted Abu Qatada, the former editor of the Ansar newsletter and the spiritual leader of the network.38 However, one of its main targets, Abu Doha, managed to avoid arrest. Whether directly or indirectly, virtually all the operatives involved in the Strasbourg plot had been in contact with him,39 but authorities could not locate him on the day of the raids. But his escape from the law was brief; he was arrested just two weeks later at Heathrow Airport while trying to flee to Saudi Arabia using false documents.40

  Abu Doha's arrest represented a massive blow to the Algerian network. The head of the DST (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, France's internal intelligence agency), Pierre de Bosquet de Florian, who had described Abu Doha as "the principal catalyst" behind the London network, commented that it came "a little too late."4' The DST had been warning Scotland Yard for years about Abu Doha and his network, and the satisfaction felt on the other side of the English Channel at his arrest was understandably bittersweet. Abu Doha's arrest also immediately created legal complications, as authorities from four countries inquired into the possibility of extraditing him from Britain. While France and Germany wanted him in connection with the Strasbourg plot, Italy was interested in him because of his alleged role in a plot to attack the US Embassy in Rome. The strongest pressure for his extradition came from the United States, which had indicted Abu Doha in July 2001 for his role in the thwarted millennium plot. Abu Doha is currently sitting in London's Belmarsh prison, fighting the motions filed by the US government.

  Two men traveling with Abu Doha, Rabah Kadre and Abdul Samir Nuri, were also arrested at Heathrow airport. Detained only for violating British immigration laws, they were soon let go.42 But as the investigation progressed, authorities realized that Rabah Kadre's release had been a mistake. Kadre had been Abu Doha's right-hand man for years, and it was to him that the members of the Algerian network looked for directions after Abu Doha's arrest.43 In the months following his brief detention, Kadre, using different identities and passports, traveled extensively to Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands to reorganize the network after the wave of arrests. He also spent time in his wife's native country, Slovenia. Later on, authorities also discovered that Kadre had been directly involved with the Strasbourg plot; German police found his fingerprint in one of the Frankfurt apartments. At the end of November 2002, French authorities issued an international warrant for his arrest.44 By that time, Kadre was sitting in a British jail, suspected of masterminding a cyanide attack against the London underground. Even though British authorities did not extradite him to France, Kadre was tried in absentia in Paris for his involvement in the Strasbourg plot and sentenced to six years.45

  The thwarted Strasbourg attack was not the only operation planned by Abu Doha after his return to Europe. In early January 2001, Italian authorities received information that a group of Afghan-trained militants had been dispatched by both Abu Doha and Seifallah Ben Hassine to attack the US Embassy in Rome. The threat was deemed very serious and the embassy was temporarily closed. The plot was never carried out, but investigators learned that the operatives had been instructed to contact the group of "Umar al Muhajer" on their arrival in Italy.46

  At the time, Italy had been monitoring the activities of a group of Tunisians that was directly linked to the Algerians and Tunisians in London. It operated in the Milan area and had ties to the city's infamous Islamic Cultural Institute. The head of the cell was Essid Sami Ben Khemais, a Tunisian veteran of Afghanistan with extensive contacts throughout Europe. Other militants often called him Abu al Muhajer. It was clear that the Ben Khemais cell was involved in something big, and DIGOS, the Italian internal intelligence agency, began monitoring it around the clock. Thousands of hours of intercepted conversations shed a great deal of light on a group that was deeply plugged into the TunisianAlgerian network. While the Italian cell never directly took part in attacks, it played a crucial role by helping militants who needed to hide from authorities, providing them with safe houses and false documents.47

  The militants' reaction to the arrests of their associates in Frankfurt and London underscores the extent of the Italian cell's involvement with the Tunisians and Algerians. In a phone call of January 13, 2001, Ben Khemais's nervousness after the Frankfurt arrests is obvious:

  Ben Khemais: I warn you, half of the group in Germany has been caught.

  Man: No!

  Ben Khemais: Yes, do you understand me? They arrested the brothers from Germany and they found the weapons storage in Germany, in Frankfurt.

  Man: Today?

  Ben Khemais: No, no, it's almost ... [asking people in the room] Mohammed, it has been three weeks, right? Yes, more or less three weeks ago.

  Man: Well ... the important is ... what did I want to say?

  Ben Khemais: At this point you need cover.48

  The man that Ben Khemais urged to go into hiding was Tarek Maaroufi, another Tunisian and the ringleader of a cell in Brussels.49 Maaroufi was the quintessential example of a militant who built alliances with Islamic radicals across countries of origin in Europe. Maaroufi confessed to Belgian authorities that as early as 1991, he had been in contact with Rachid Ramda and other Algerian leaders in London. Maaroufi also wrote articles for the Ansar newsletter and helped bring together Tunisian and Algerian militants.50 He is currently serving a six-year sentence in Belgium, where he was convicted for recruiting European Muslims for training in al Qaeda's camps in Afghanistan.5'

  A conversation between Ben Khemais and other men at his apartment, recorded by Italian intelligence in March 2001, reveals that the London arrests caused even more panic within the Milan cell. Similar alarm is displayed in a phone call between Ben Khemais and one of his confederates, Bouchoucha Moktar, on March 6:

  Moktar: Listen ... Rashid ... without me saying anything more ... the one in Britain.

  Ben Khemais: Rashid ... yes ... London?

  Moktar: The one I don't want to mention.

  Ben Khemais: Hey!

  Moktar: They got them, him and another brother, at the airport.

  Ben Khemais: At the airport?

  Moktar: Yes.

  Ben Khemais: What were they doing at the airport? Where were they going?

  Moktar: They were fleeing. They were wanted.

  Ben Khemais [agitated]: No! What a problem! They are getting all of them!

  Moktar: Yes. Abdelhakim, do you know him? Yeah, you know him.

  Ben Khemais: Abdelhakim ... I understand. Abdelhakim the Slim.

  Moktar: Yes. They arrested him as well.

  Ben Khemais: Abdallah, the same?

  Moktar: I haven't heard from him.

  Ben Khemais: No.

  Moktar: I swear. I haven't heard from him.

  Ben Khemais: Try to call him.

  Moktar: Yes. And should I try calling the other one as well? I'll call the other one and I'll tell him we'll go in the afternoon.

  Ben Khemais: Call him. But be careful, call him from a pay phone.

  Hundreds of monitored phone calls exposed the shape of a triangle linking Milan, London, and Frankfurt. Though the operatives in Italy often took precautionary measures, frequently changing the prepaid cards in their mobile phones and using public phones, Italian investigators managed to collect an impressive amount of evidence on them; in April, Italian magistrates charged the members of the cell with being members of a terrorist organization. According to the indictment, the group operated from th
e northern Italian region of Lombardy, "using it as a staging post for terror attacks in other countries." In February 2002, Ben Khemais, the leader of the group, was sentenced to six years in prison; three other members of the cell each received four and a half years.52

  In intercepted conversations, the cell demonstrated the great deal of attention it paid to new types of explosives and chemical weapons. Here, too, as a conversation of March 2001 reveals, the Algerians in London played an important role:

  Ben Khemais: The thing that the Algerian there [in London] does is "plastic" [explosive] and nowadays is old stuff. I tried to do it too, you can make it with electric wires and one day we tested it with a light switch and we had a positive result.

  Man: It's true, they are specialists.

  Ben Khemais: No, it's old stuff. I would like to learn how to use the medicine and see what effect it has when it is inhaled ... but the Libyan has the formula ... a professor of chemistry ... because they have found a way to mix the fumes [of the medicine] with the explosive.... It's easy, but I don't know how to do it. There are many ways to use explosives with this product, it's not the same kind that was made in Germany. This is the method: you have to add hot water, then you have to divide the whole thing in four parts and after you have prepared this you add the product and you put a wire every two pieces.