Al Qaeda in Europe
Page 21
7. Piotr Smolar, "Quatre islamistes interpelles en Seine-Saint-Denis dans 1'enquete sur les `filieres tchetchenes,"' Le Monde, December 27, 2002.
8. Piotr Smolar, "Les Tribulations en Tchetchenie de Khaled Ouldali, qui Voulait `Voir de pres la Guerre et ses Ravages,"' Le Monde, December 19, 2002.
9. Chambon, "Comment Naissent et Vivent les Reseaux d'Al Qaida en Europe."
10. Indictment of Mourad Trabelsi and others (Ordinanza di Applicazione della Misura Cautelare), Tribunal of Milan, Italy, April 1, 2003.
11. Deposition of Shadi Abdallah, Federal High Court, Karlsruhe, Germany, November 18, 2002; indictment of Muhamad Majid and others (Ordinanza di Applicazione della Misura della Custodia Cautelare in Carcere), Tribunal of Milan, Italy, November 25, 2003.
12. Paul Quinn-Judge, "Inside al-Qaeda's Georgia Refuge," Time, October 19, 2002.
13. Indictment of Muhamad Majid and others; quotation from Maryann Bird, "A Poisonous Plot," Time International (Europe), January 20, 2003.
14. "CIA Warns Turkish Police on Poisonous Substance," Anatolia News Agency, July 10, 2002.
15. Jon Henley, "Al-Qaida Terror Plot Foiled, Say French Police," Guardian, January 12, 2004.
16. Piotr Smolar, "Les Policiers Portent un Premier Coup a la `Filiere Tch- etchene,"' Le Monde, December 19, 2002.
17. Official press release from the French Ministry of the Interior, "Apropos de l'interpellation de plusieurs individus par la DST," December 27, 2002, http:// www.interieur.gouv.fr/rubriques/c/c3_police_nationale/c3_actualites/2002_27 _12_dst.
18. "A propos de 1'interpellation de plusieurs individus par la DST."
19. This technology, which was taught in the Afghan camps, sadly was to become known in Europe; this was the method used on March 11, 2004, to detonate the bombs that killed more than 200 commuters on four trains near Madrid.
20. "A propos de 1'interpellation de plusieurs individus par la DST."
21. "France Says Arrested Men `Planned Attack,"' BBC, December 20, 2002; "A propos de l'interpellation de plusieurs individus par la DST."
22. "A propos de 1'interpellation de plusieurs individus par la DST."
23. Spanish parliament, Diario de sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, 7th Legislature, November 5, 2003, pp. 4-5.
24. "A propos de l'interpellation de plusieurs individus par la DST."
25. "Sventato attacco chimico. Arrestati in Francia quattro islamici," Corriere Bella Sera, December 21, 2002.
26. "A propos de 1'interpellation de plusieurs individus par la DST."
27. "France Foils Cell Linked to al-Qaida," AP, December 28, 2002.
28. "A propos de l'interpellation de plusieurs individus par la DST."
29. Jean-Charles Brisard, Zarkaoui.- Le nouveau visage d'al-Qaida (Paris: Fayard, 2005), p. 233.
30. "A propos de l'interpellation de plusieurs individus par la DST."
31. Sheila MacVicar and Henry Schuster, "European Terror Suspects Got Al Qaeda Training, Sources Say," CNN.com, February 6, 2003.
32. "Paris Police Quiz `Chemical Four' Plot," BBC, December 18, 2002.
33. "A propos de l'interpellation de plusieurs individus par la DST."
34. The Algerians, in the selection of their grievances against the Russians, were careful to appease both components of the anti-Russian forces fighting in Chechnya. In fact, Khattab was the leader of the foreign/Arab mujaheddin, while the Dubrovka commando was made up only of indigenous Chechen fighters.
35. "A propos de l'interpellation de plusieurs individus par la DST."
36. Official press release of Germany's Ministry of the Interior, "Zwei Jahre nach dem 11. September 2001: Schily sieht Erfolge bei der Bekampfung des internationalen Terrorismus" (Two years after September 11, 2001: Schilly shows developments in the fight against international terrorism), September 11, 2003, http://www.bmi.bund.de/cln_027/nn_122778/lnternet/Content/Nachrichten/ Pre s semitteilungen/2003/09/Zwei_Jahre_nach_dem_ 11 _S eptember_2001 _Id _92936_de. html.
37. Smolar, "Quatre islamistes interpelles en Seine-Saint-Denis dans 1'enquete sur les `filieres tchetchenes"'; "Paris `Plot' Chemicals Studied," CNN.com, December 18, 2002.
38. Spanish parliament, Diario de sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, p. 5.
39. "Suspected Islamic Militant Says Radicals Targeted Eiffel Tower," AFP, February 16, 2005.
40. Brisard, Zarkaoui, p. 236.
41. After 9/11, special powers were bestowed on the British government, which could detain terrorists who did not hold British citizenship without charging them and with no limit of time, if they were considered particularly dangerous. A dozen individuals were detained under these laws (the abovementioned Abu Qatada is one of them). Most of these detainees were identified only by a letter.
42. Special Immigration Appeal Commission, Appeal of "K," July 12, 2004.
43. Ibid.
44. Jason Burke, "Revealed: How Secret Papers Led to Ricin Raid," Observer, April 17, 2005.
45. Nick Parker and Michael Lea, "Poison Factory Yards from Osama Pal's Home," Sun, January 9, 2003.
46. Jason Bennetto and Kim Sengupta, "Ricin Arrests: How MI5 Homed in on Kitchen-Sink Lab," Independent, January 9, 2003.
47. Daniel McGrory, "`Poison Factory' Suspects were Freed by French," Times, January 10, 2003.
48. Mark Huband, "Four Men Due before Magistrates on Ricin Charges," Financial Times, January 13, 2003.
49. Special Immigration Appeal Commission, appeal of "K."
50. Jason Lewis and Martin Smith, "Terror Chief on the Run Plans Lone Ricin Killing," Mail on Sunday, January 12, 2003.
51. Helen Gibson, "The Algerian Factor," Time, January 27, 2003.
52. Sebastian Rotella and Janet Stobart, "The World; N. African Arraigned in British Slaying," Los Angeles Times, January 18, 2003.
53. En Perry, "Suspects in Police Murder, Ricin Plot, to Face British Courts," AFP, January 17, 2003.
54. Nick Allen, "Probe Showed How Immigrants Made Mockery of Asylum System," Scotsman, April 13, 2005.
55. Warren Hoge, "Mosque Raid in London Results in 7 Arrests in Connection with Discovery of Poison," New York Times, January 21, 2003.
56. "North African Arrested in Ongoing Ricin Probe," AFP, January 23, 2003.
57. Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, "What Ricin?" Newsweek, April 13, 2005.
58. Crown Prosecution Statement on convictions of Kamel Bourgass, April 13, 2005.
59. David Bamber, "Ricin Terror Gang `Planned to Unleash Terror on Heathrow Express,"' Sunday Telegraph, April 17, 2005.
60. Crown Prosecution Statement on convictions of Kamel Bourgass.
61. David Leppard and Nick Felding, "Ricin Defendants to Claim Asylum. Trial Has Made Return `Unsafe,"' Sunday Times, April 17, 2005.
62. Daniel McGrory, "A Haven for Faithful Hijacked by Extremists," Times (London), January 21, 2003.
63. Ibid.
64. Chambon, "Comment Naissent et Vivent les Reseaux d'Al Qaida en Europe."
65. DIGOS report, "Muhajiroun 3," November 21, 2001.
66. Anthony Barnett, "Bin Laden Man's Mother Blames British Extremists," Observer, July 28, 2002.
67. Francoise Chirot and Piotr Smolar, "Entre Londres, Francfort et Jalalabad, les Itineraires de `Quatre Petits Soldats du Djihad,"' Le Monde, July 28, 2004.
68. Chirot and Smolar, "Entre Londres."
69. USA v. Mustafa Kamel Mustafa, USDC, Southern District of New York, April 19, 2004.
70. Stephen J. Hedges, "Britain Has Been Radicals' Refuge," Chicago Tribune, October 29, 2001.
71. Great Britain has long had an unofficial but very consistent policy of not extraditing terror suspects. While understandable and in line with the European norm in the case of countries where the suspect could face the death penalty (such as Yemen), the policy is also applied to other countries that do not apply the death penalty, including other members of the European Union. For example, as we saw in chapter 1, France has been unsuccessfully seeking the extradition of Rachid Ramda for y
ears.
72. "Hamza Is to Get a New Prosthetic Limb on the NHS, It Emerged Last Night," Daily Mail, October 20, 2004.
73. Daniel McGrory, Laura Peek, and Bill Bond, "Bin Laden's `European Ambassador' in London," Sunday Times, October 21, 2001.
74. "Radical Imam Bakri Facing Benefits Bother When Back in Britain," AFP, August 10, 2005; Karen McVeigh and Gerri Peev, "Public Pays for Luxury Life of Cleric Who Preaches Hatred," Scotsman, August 11, 2005.
75. David Cohen, "Terror on the Dole," Evening Standard, April 20, 2004.
76. Euan Stretch, "Terror in UK Atrocity Fear; Wanted Linked by Morocco for Bomb Massacre to Slaughter of 200 in Madrid ... Living 4 Miles from 10 Downing Street; the Cleric We Can't Kick Out," Sunday Mirror, April 4, 2004.
77. "Algerian Held in Britain on Terrorism Charges," AFP, January 16, 2003.
78. Padraic Flanagan and Alison Little, "Victim of Terror Outrage at Our Shambolic Asylum Laws as Man DC Oake Went to Arrest Is Revealed to Have Been a Fugitive Since His Plea to Live Here Was Scorned; Suspect Was on Run for 4 Years," Express, January 16, 2003.
79. Hedges, "Britain Has Been Radicals' Refuge."
80. Italian Security Official, interview, Rome, February 2004.
81. According to published reports, the Finsbury Park mosque was frequently visited by alleged July 7 planner and British national Haroon Rashid Aswat (Times, August 8, 2005), July 7 suicide bomber and ringleader Mohammed Siddique Khan, at least another July 7 suicide bomber from Leeds, and July 21 "failed bombers" Mukhtar Said Ibrahim and Yasin Hassan Omar (Times, July 27, 2005).
82. Daniel McGrory and Sean O'Neill, "Four Bomb Suspects `Had £500,000 in Benefits,"' Times, August 6, 2005.
83. "M15 Said Bomber Was Not a Threat," BBC, July 17, 2005.
84. Louise Male, "Suspected by M15 and Subsidised by Europe," Yorkshire Evening Post, July 18, 2005.
85. Bird, Fresco, Ford, and Luck, "The Benefit Bombers Who Repaid Help with Hatred," Times, July 27, 2005; Duncan Gardham and Philip Johnston, "Terror Suspect Is a Convicted Mugger," Telegraph, July 27, 2005.
86. Bank of England News Release, August 5, 2005.
87. McGrory and O'Neill, "Four Bomb Suspects."
88. Prime Minister Tony Blair's Press Conference, August 5, 2005. http://www.number-IO.gov.uk/output/page8O41.asp.
89. Ibid.
CHAPTER 7
CHECHNYA,
LAND OF THE
FORGOTTEN JIHAD
The liberation of the Caucasus would constitute a hotbed of jihad (or fundamentalism as the United States describes it) and that region would become the shelter of thousands of Muslim mujahidin from various parts of the Islamic world, particularly Arab parts.... The fragmentation of the Russian Federation on the rock of the fundamentalist movement and at the hands of the Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia will topple a basic ally of the United States in its battle against the Islamic jihadist reawakening.
-Ayman al Zawahiri, Knights under the Prophet's Banner (2001)
No other major cells involved in the ricin plot were uncovered in Europe after the British arrests of January 2003. Even though the substance produced in the kitchen of the London apartment was never recovered, British authorities had detained the man they believed had produced it, Kamel Bourgass, the killer of Detective Constable Stephen Oake. Spain also carried out a series of arrests attempting to dismantle the network that had provided support to the militants returning to Europe from the Caucasus. In the meantime, French magistrates quietly continued their investigation on the filiere tchetchene, as the case is known in France.
After arresting some smaller players, the counterterrorism magistrates Jean-Louis Bruguiere and Jean-Francois Ricard got a big break in June 2004, when they managed to obtain the extradition from Syria of a key figure in the network, Said Arif. Arif was one of the two members of the Frankfurt cell who had escaped the Christmas Day's raids with the help of the entire Algerian network. He traveled to Georgia, where he found refuge in the camps in the Pankisi Gorge. Arif and some other cell members traveled back to Europe in March 2002, landing in Barcelona and then making their way to Paris.' Though his travel companions were arrested during the December 2002 raids in the Paris suburbs, Arif managed, once again, to avoid capture. In May 2004, Arif was arrested in Syria carrying a false Moroccan passport.' The French judges, who had issued an international warrant for Arif, obtained his extradition in June, adding an important piece to an investigation that had netted more than twenty individuals.
The French investigation can legitimately be considered very successful, but the ricin scare highlighted a problem long ignored by European counterterrorism officials: the existence of a lawless region, where hundreds of mujahideen can gain battlefield experience and train in poisonous materials, just a few hours from Europe by airplane. The Caucasus has attracted Islamic militants from throughout the world since the beginning of the 1990s, when several conflicts erupted in the area after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Foreign Islamist fighters, mostly veterans of the Afghan war who could not return to their home countries for fear of persecution from the local government, chose instead to participate in regional conflicts such as those in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, eventually settling in the area after the end of the hostilities.
But the real magnet for jihadis in the region has always been the breakaway republic of Chechnya, a tiny mountainous territory located in the heart of the Caucasus. Chechnya, which today has slightly more than 1 million inhabitants, has fought for centuries to obtain its independence, struggling against Czarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and most recently the Russian Federation. The Chechen population underwent mass deportations at the orders of Stalin in the 1940s and suffered pervasive discrimination in the following decades. Nevertheless, the Chechens, a proud people whose unity is bolstered by their Islamic identity, have never surrendered or accepted Moscow's authority over their land. In 1994, after the fall of the Soviet regime, Chechens took advantage of Moscow's weakness and proclaimed their independence. The unilateral secession of the oil-rich territory was not accepted by Russia, which sent troops to the region. Moscow's move signaled the beginning of the first of two brutal wars, the second of which is still ongoing.'
The first Chechen war, which ended with the Russian retreat of November 1996 and the creation of an independent Chechen government led by commander Arslan Maskhadov,4 involved few foreign fighters. Reportedly, the first organized group came to Chechnya in the spring of 1995, led by the Saudi native Ibn ul-Khattab. Khattab, who had fought against the Soviets alongside bin Laden and other legendary Arab mujahideen in Afghanistan, saw media reports of the war in Chechnya and, with a few of his closest aides, decided to join the jihad in the Cau- casus.5 This vanguard teamed up with local Chechen fighters and had considerable success. Russian forces were surprised and repeatedly defeated by the mujahideen's guerrilla tactics. By the summer of 1996, Khattab and his fighters were taking part in the most intense fighting; along with the militias of the Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev, they had a primary role in the capture of the Chechen capital, Grozny.b
After Chechnya's independence was reluctantly recognized by the Russians in 1996, Khattab and his foreign mujahideen settled more permanently in the region. Khattab established several training camps where Chechen and foreign fighters were given military and religious instruction. The form of Islam that was taught in these camps was not the moderate Sufism that is traditional among Chechens but Saudi-imported Wahhabism. And as growing numbers of Chechens embraced Wahhabism, hundreds of foreigners from all over the Muslim world and the West flocked to Chechnya to train in Khattab's camp.
The mujahideen used the freedom they enjoyed in the newly independent Chechen republic to prepare for the next attack on Russian forces. In the summer of 1999, foreign and Chechen armed fighters led by Khattab and Basayev invaded Dagestan, a neighboring republic belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian troops quickly responded by entering Chechnya, and the second Chechen war began.' Sinc
e then the area has been plagued by ever-escalating violence. Indiscriminate attacks by the Russians are countered by guerrilla warfare and terrorist strikes. Thus far, the second Chechen war has been characterized by greater reliance on terrorist tactics previously unseen in the conflict and clearly imported by the foreign mujahideen. For example, while no suicide attack took place in Chechnya before 2000,8 over the past four years several attacks by Chechen suicide bombers have been reported in Russian territory as well as inside Chechnya. Female suicide bombers, known as "black widows," were responsible for attacks at a Moscow rock concert in July 2003 and a subway station in Moscow in August 2004, as well as the simultaneous explosion of two Russian civilian airliners in September 2004.9 Such tactics can be blamed not just on the growing desperation of Chechen fighters but also on their religious radicalization under the guidance of the Arabs. The training camps run by the mujahideen provide the Chechen fighters both with military skills and with a rigorous indoctrination in Wahhabi ideology. Not coincidentally, Khattab always maintained close relationships with al Qaeda-linked Saudi clerics, who often issued fatwas in his support.10
Khattab was killed in March 2002, probably by a poisoned letter sent by Russian intelligence." After his death, Abu Walid al Ghamdi, another Saudi, became the leader of the foreign mujahideen in Chechnya.12 Abu Walid, who had been in Chechnya since the late 1990s,13 paid more attention to terrorist acts in Russia than to guerrilla warfare within Chechnya. The FSB (Federalnaya Slozhba Biezopasnosty, Russia's domestic security agency) claims that practically all suicide bombings in Russia during the past few years were financed from abroad and organized by Abu Walid.14 For example, the FSB believes that Abu Walid was one of the planners of the February 2004 bombing in the Moscow subway that killed more than forty people.11 Abu Walid was reportedly killed in April 2004; the specifics of his death are not known. 16 While it is unclear who has replaced him at the head of the mujahideen, foreign fighters are still active in the region. In April 2003, Colonel Ilya Shabalkin, a spokesman for Russian forces in Chechnya, said that Arabs made up about one-fifth of Chechnya's roughly one thousand active fighters. "The Arabs are the specialists, they are the experts in mines and communications," said Shabalkin."