Al Qaeda in Europe
Page 38
THE CAUSE AND THE REACTION
"It's a Dutch plot, homegrown terrorism," observed a spokesman for the AIVD after van Gogh's assassination.71 The statement is true on a number of levels. The operation was conceived, planned, and executed in the Netherlands. Bouyeri was a Dutch-born Muslim, as were most of the members of the Hofstad group. "What's disturbing," commented the Dutch justice minister, "is that the suspect, born and raised in the Netherlands, went through a radicalization process here that brought him to this unimaginable deed."72
More significantly, the motivations that drove Bouyeri and his associates to act were homegrown. Prosecutors have stated that the group's aims were to "terrorize Dutch society" and to "drive a wedge between dif ferent sections of Dutch society."73 Even though the group sympathized with bin Laden, the Iraqi insurgency, and the struggle of the Palestinians, its targets were Dutch, proving that its main enemy was secular Dutch society. In a bulletin he wrote in 2003, Bouyeri linked the situation in Iraq to the status of the Muslim community in Holland: "The Netherlands is now our enemy, because they participate in the occupation of Iraq. We shall not attack our neighbors but we will those who are apostates and those who are behaving like our enemy. Ayan Hirshi Ali is an apostate and our enemy."74 In online Islamic chat rooms, he called Holland a "democratic torture chamber" and described his dream of overthrowing the Dutch parliament and replacing it with an Islamic court.75
Though international events may have contributed to the men's radicalization, their rage was directed toward individuals they perceived as their immediate enemies: local figures who (they believed) were fighting Islam in the Netherlands. The letter that Bouyeri pinned on van Gogh's bodywritten in a traditional rhyming Dutch verse form, which itself demonstrated Bouyeri's apparent assimilation into Dutch society76-is full of references to events and characters of Dutch political life; no "global" Islamic issues are mentioned. The Hofstad group was completely immersed into Dutch society, and members therefore fully understood that targeting intellectuals and politicians would deal that society a painful blow.
The dangers of the radicalization of parts of the Dutch Muslim community had been thoroughly exposed and analyzed by the AIVD, Holland's internal security agency. In its 2003 annual report, the AIVD had warned that "small groups of young Muslims, mainly of North African origin, have appeared to be susceptible to radical views and expressed their preparedness to take part in the violent jihad in speech and action."77 The agency also clearly identified the reason of this radicalization: the spread of Salafism, the puritanical and violent strain of Islam embraced by growing numbers of fundamentalists worldwide. According to the AIVD, "presentday Salafism works like a magnet on some sections of the Muslim communities in Western countries, in particular on some groups of Muslim youngsters, the main reason being that it offers seemingly simple solutions to the problem of identity that many of them struggle with."78
A key role in the spread of Salafism in Holland, as elsewhere in Europe, has been played by mosques, charities, Islamic schools, and organizations linked to Saudi Arabia. By giving millions of dollars to individuals and organizations that have agreed to spread its rigorous interpretation of Islam, the oil-rich kingdom has contributed greatly to the radicalization of segments of the Dutch Muslim community. The AIVD reports that in some cases, the Saudi embassy has directly financed Dutch Salafi imams. In others, Saudi-based charities that are officially considered nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) but that in reality "maintain close ties with parts of the Saudi establishment" have been a crucial influence on "those segments of Muslim communities in the Netherlands that have shown to be susceptible to manipulative activities deployed from Saudi Arabia."79
The Dutch mosques that receive support from Saudi Arabia have often been linked to radical or terrorist activities. The al Tawheed mosque, which has been a headquarters of radical activities in the Netherlands, is closely linked to Al Haramain, a Saudi charitable organization whose branches in the Netherlands and in other six countries have been designated as terrorism financiers by the US Treasury Department.80 According to Dutch authorities, Al Haramain underwrote the construction of the al Tawheed mosque, located in a multiethnic district of central Amsterdam, and Al Haramain founder Aqeel al Aqeel and his assistant, Mansour al Qadi, held positions on its board.81 The joint US-Saudi document that designated al Aqeel as a terrorism financier notes that under al Aqeel's leadership Al Haramain became "one of the principal Islamic NGOs providing support for the al Qaida network and promoting militant Islamic doctrine worldwide."82
Thanks to its large Saudi funding, al Tawheed became one of the most prominent mosques in Europe's Islamist underworld. The mosque often organized events and conferences attended by radicals from across the Continent. For example, investigators believe that Mohammed Atta, Ramzi Binalshibh, and Marwan al Shehhi traveled from Hamburg to Amsterdam in 1999 to attend a conference on Salafism organized at al Tawheed.833 The mosque's imam, Mahmoud El Shershaby, preaches that Islam is under attack and that Jews, Christians, and other unbelievers are "fuel for the fires of hell." And the mosque's bookstore recently came under scrutiny after newspapers revealed that it sold books that advocated throwing homosexuals headfirst off high buildings.84 Not surprisingly, given the mosque's radical teachings, investigators believe that Mohammed Bouyeri and Samir Azzouz there first met their mentor, Reduoane al Issar.85
But al Tawheed is hardly an isolated case. Saudi-funded Islamic schools and institutions throughout Holland have been under scrutiny since before the van Gogh assassination. In The Hague, the imam of the As Soennah mosque preaches the superiority of Muslims over all other people and teaches his congregation that women must not leave their houses unless they are going to the mosque or shopping for groceries.86 As we say in chapter 3, Eindhoven's al Furqan mosque is frequented by known terrorists and organizes radical seminars that the AIVD has judged "damaging to the Dutch democratic order."87 Both mosques have strong ties to the al Waqf al Islami Foundation, a Saudi "charitable" organization whose real purpose is to spread radical Islam.88 The values preached by these mosques are clearly incompatible with the basic principles of a Western democracy; yet thousands of the almost one million Muslims living in the Netherlands have embraced them, creating a direct threat to the Netherlands' stability.
"It's a group of radicals who see us as the enemy, and with whom we've actually been drawn into a war," said Jozias van Aartsen, a member of Hirsi Ali's People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, a few days after van Gogh's tragic murder. "There's a jihad in the Netherlands. Ayaan Hirsi Ali indicated this danger a year and a half ago, and now we've crossed a threshold."89 In the wake of the van Gogh assassination, mainstream Dutch politicians began saying what few "enlightened" public figures had dared saying before. Hirsi Ali, member of parliament Geert Wilders, and, in his provocative way, Theo van Gogh had warned about the dangers posed by the failed integration and subsequent radicalization of parts of the Dutch Muslim community, but most had ignored them, labeling their words racist or "Islamophobic."
But similar warnings had also come from the AIVD, which had repeatedly informed authorities about the dangerous repercussions for the country of the radicalization of Dutch Muslims. In 2002 the AIVD provided an accurate analysis of the challenges facing Holland.
The recruitments for the Islamic war which took place in the Netherlands over the past year, can therefore not be seen as mere isolated incidents. They are rather the first tangible illustrations of a tendency, closely related to a stealthy entrance of a violent radical Islamic movement in Dutch society, which is also taking place in the rest of the western world.
The outlined development is a significant threat for the Dutch society. People who can be included in this radical Islamic movement are positioning themselves explicitly outside and opposite the democratic legal order. They are not only willing to support or use violence if they deem it necessary to defend "true Islam," they are also decidedly trying to discourage the full participation of Mu
slims in Dutch society. By employing a strategy of provocation they are trying to drive a wedge between Muslims and non-Muslims.90
And if the goals of Islamists in the Netherlands, as the AIVD and prosecutors in the van Gogh case claim, is "to drive a wedge between Muslims and non-Muslims," the assassination of the filmmaker brought them nearer to that goal. The brutal killing of van Gogh brought turmoil to the Netherlands, traditionally one of Europe's most tolerant and open societies. In the tense days following the assassination, mosques and Islamic schools were firebombed by angry Dutch youngsters; a poll conducted after the attack revealed that 40 percent of the Dutch hoped that Muslims "no longer felt at home" in Holland.9' In retaliation, groups of Dutch Muslims attacked churches, intensifying the spiral of hatred.
"We were tolerant to the intolerants and we only got intolerance back," commented Geert Wilders on the country's lenient attitude toward fundamentalism.92 In the days after the van Gogh assassination Dutch politicians of all colors rushed to declare that Holland was at war against radical Islam and that extraordinary measures would be taken to defeat it. Nevertheless, six months after the attacks, not much had changed. In March 2005, a Dutch court rejected a request from public prosecutors to ban the activities of Al Haramain, stating that it had seen no evidence that the charity supported terrorism, despite being designated a terrorist financier by the United States and the United Nations. As already recounted, in April a Rotterdam court acquitted Samir Azzouz, the child prodigy of the Hofstad group. The sentence caused strong emotions in the country; according to the public broadcasting channel NCRV, 82 percent of the respondents to its opinion program were opposed to Azzouz's acquittal and many declared they wanted to take the law into their hands." And while Wilders and Hirsi Ali are forced to live under round-the-clock surveillance and must sleep, for security reasons, in a high-security jail and on a naval base, respectively, more than one hundred known Islamic fundamentalists live undisturbed in the country, with Dutch authorities powerless to do anything beyond watching them.
At the same time, the radicalization of the Dutch Muslim community is still taking place. Reportedly, Bouyeri has become a hero for young Moroccan children living in the Netherlands, and many of them even display his picture on their backpacks or notebooks.94 His appeal among young radicals has only grown after his conviction to life in prison decreed by an Amsterdam court in July 2005. Wearing a traditional robe and brandishing a Quran, a defiant Bouyeri refused to speak during the trial, claiming he recognized only the justice of Allah. He opened his mouth only once to address the mother of Theo van Gogh, Anneke, who had given a moving speech about her son. "I don't feel your pain," he said coldly, "I don't have any sympathy for you. I can't feel for you because you're a non-believer." He added remorselessly: "If I ever get free I would do it again."95
If the situation in Holland is representative of things to come for the rest of Europe, and many think it is, then al Qaeda needs no effort to send terrorists to Europe-the Continent is growing its own. The July 2005 attacks in London are just further confirmation of this new reality. He was ,.an average, second-generation immigrant," said the chairman of the parliamentary commission that reviewed the immigration history of Mohammed Bouyeri.96 He was the new face of al Qaeda in Europe.
NOTES
1. Sebastian Rotella, "Terrorists at the Table; Islamic Militants in Europe Blend Political Sophistication and Crude Violence to Influence Events, as the Bombings in Madrid Show," Los Angeles Times, March 6, 2005.
2. US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, http:// www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/.
3. Rotella, "Terrorists at the Table."
4. Daniel Wools, "Spain: Militants Threaten Morocco Gov't," AP, March 8, 2005.
5. Elaine Sciolino, "Morocco Connection Is Emerging as Sleeper Threat in Terror War," New York Times, May 16, 2004.
6. "Spanish Judge Starts Questioning Moroccan Suspect in Train Bombings," AP, April 8, 2005.
7. Daniel Wools, "Spain Arrests Four Moroccan Suspects in Madrid Train Bombings, Belgium Detains Moroccan Man Sought by Spain," AP, February 1, 2005; "Al-Qaidah Spokesman in Europe Travelled to Madrid at End of 2003 to Order 3/11 Massacre," ABC, February 28, 2005 (accessed via Foreign Broadcast Information Service, or FBIS).
8. "La fecha del ataque del 11-M fue fijada al dia siguiente de que Bin Laden amenazara a Espana," El Pais, August 5, 2005.
9. Al Goodman, "Family Charged in Madrid Bombings," CNN, February 5, 2005.
10. Spanish investigators have carried out an in-depth investigation on who helped Afalah leave Spain. On July 15, 2005, Spanish daily El Mundo reported that authorities arrested a Moroccan man, Abdeneri Essebar, for his role in facilitating Afalah's escape. What is shocking is that Essebar had lost his stepdaughter, thirteen-year-old Sanae ben Salah, in the Madrid train bombings.
11. "Interior Sospecha que Afalah se Inmolo' en Irak," El Mundo, June 15, 2005.
12. Mark Eeckhaut, "The El Haski Connection-Three Brothers Are Muslim Terrorist Leaders," De Standaard, December 21, 2004 (accessed via FBIS).
13. Piotr Smolar, "Implique dans les Attentats de 11 Mars, Hassan El Haski a Ete Incarcere," Le Monde, December 24, 2004.
14. "Reports List Names of Madrid-Linked Terror Suspects Arrested in Belgium," Le Soir, March 11, 2005 (accessed via FBIS).
15. Spanish Ministry of the Interior, Summary of Anti-Terrorist Activities, 2004.
16. Jean-Pierre Tuquoi, "Un Franco-Marocain suspecte dans les Attentats de Casablanca et Madrid," Le Monde, March 24, 2004; Evan Stretch, "Terror in UK Atrocity Fear," Sunday Mirror, April 4, 2004.
17. Jean-Pierre Stroobants, "Le Reseau Islamiste `Hofstad' Etait Solidement Ancre en Europe," Le Monde, December 10, 2004.
18. Mark Eeckhaut, "Van Gogh Investigation Leads to Brussels," De Stan- daard, December 15, 2004 (accessed via FBIS).
19. Craig Smith, "Dutch Look for Qaeda Link After Killing of Filmmaker," New York Times, November 8, 2004.
20. AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingenen Veiligheidsdienst, or General Intelligence and Security Service), Annual Report 2003, p. 17.
21. Sebastian Rotella, "2 Held after Dutch Standoff," Los Angeles Times, November 11, 2004.
22. David Crawford and Keith Johnson, "New Terror Threat in EU: Extremists with Passports," Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2004.
23. Crawford and Johnson, "New Terror Threat in EU."
24. "Teen Terror Suspect Stays Silent," Expatica, February 24, 2005.
25. "Terror Suspect Faces Seven Years," Expatica, March 23, 2005.
26. "Teen Terror Suspect Stays Silent."
27. "Terror Suspect Faces Seven Years."
28. "Dutch Court Acquits Teenager of Terrorism," Guardian, April 6, 2005.
29. "Ex-Terror Suspect Accused of Assault," Expatica, April 8, 2005.
30. Joao Pedro Fonseca, "Police Give Details of Attack Planned on Portugal by Dutch-Based Islamist Cell," Diario de Notocias, November 15, 2004 (accessed via FBIS).
31. Ambrose Evans, "Islamic Terrorists `Plotted Attack at Finals of Euro 2004,"' Telegraph, November 16, 2004.
32. "AIVD Secrets `Leaked to Van Gogh Accomplice," Expatica, January 10, 2005.
33. Stephen Castle, "Secret Service Link to Film-Maker's Killing," Independent, January 11, 2005.
34. "Mol' Lekt naar Hofstadgroep," Volkskrant, January 11, 2005.
35. Keith B. Richburg, "From Quiet Teen to Terrorist Suspect," Washington Post, December 5, 2004.
36. "Terrorism Suspect Bragged on Internet about Killing Dutch Prime Minister," Agence France-Presse, January 28, 2005.
37. Sebastian Rotella, "Europe's Boys of Jihad," Los Angeles Times, April 2, 2005; "Terrorism Suspect Bragged on Internet."
38. "Van Gogh Murder Designed to `Terrorise Dutch Society,"' Expatica, January 26, 2005.
39. "Al-Qa'idah Member with Spanish Passport Held in Netherlands," El Pais, November 12, 2004 (accessed via FBIS); Smith, "Dutch Look for Qaeda Link."
40. Fonseca, "Police G
ive Details of Attack."
41. Glenn Frankel, "From Civic Activist to Alleged Terrorist; Muslim Suspect in Dutch Director's Killing Was Caught between Cultures," Washington Post, November 28, 2004.
42. Frank Hendrickx and Ferdi Schrooten, "Mohammed B. Bijna Bewaker Schiphol," Rotterdams Dagblad, August 5, 2005.
43. "L'Assassin presume de Theo van Gogh deja Condamne pour Agres- sion," Le Monde, January 25, 2005.
44. Frankel, "From Civic Activist to Alleged Terrorist."
45. Craig S. Smith, "Dutch Try to Thwart Terror without Being Overzealous," New York Times, November 25, 2004.
46. Marco Imarisio, "Vi Uccidero' come Al Zarkawi'; 11 Diario del Killer di Van Gogh," Corriere Bella Sera, April 15, 2005.
47. Frankel, "From Civic Activist to Alleged Terrorist."
48. "Al-Qa'idah Member with Spanish Passport."
49. Stroobants, "Le Reseau Islamiste `Hofstad' Etait Solidement Ancre en Europe."
50. Smith, "Dutch Try to Thwart Terror without Being Overzealous."
51. Smith, "Dutch Look for Qaeda Link."
52. Frankel, "From Civic Activist to Alleged Terrorist."
53. "Dutch Investigation Reveals Suspected Terror Cell with International Links," Agence France-Presse, November 12, 2004.
54. Smith, "Dutch Try to Thwart Terror without Being Overzealous."