Bitter Harvest

by Ian Smith

  I asked our negotiators to think aloud in front of their South African counterparts, with all dignity and tact, that if it had not been for the South African escapades involving the Falls Bridge conference, the withdrawal of the South African police from the Zambezi, the release from detention of our terrorist leaders, etc, there was a strong likelihood that the problem would have been solved by now. They were not hopeful, however, because of Vorster’s obsession with his détente brainchild. The main obstacle to the South African efforts was that Kaunda and Nyerere and the other black leaders to our north questioned the South African credentials for playing a part in trying to solve our problem, when the South Africans themselves were indulging in even greater entrenchment of apartheid and the elimination of their political opponents. When people practised such double standards, then obviously the sincerity of their motives was suspect. Put bluntly, they were not trusted.

  I harked back to that occasion in Pretoria in 1974 when Vorster was telling me that Kaunda and the others had sent him a message requesting his support in settling the Rhodesian issue in return for their acceptance of South Africa and its philosophy of apartheid. When I had questioned whether that was credible, he had nonchalantly replied: ‘My dear friend, you’ve been so out of touch with the world around you for so long, that you don’t know what’s going on nowadays!’

  We simply kept on with our task, and renewed our contacts with the terrorists in the bush, picking up where things had broken down because of the Falls Bridge conference. The good news was that the war against the terrorists was going better than ever. Now that the Mozambican government had openly declared war against Rhodesia on 3 March 1976, and were actively assisting our terrorists in a stepped-up terror campaign across our eastern border, we were indulging in more frequent cross-border raids. There is a generally accepted convention worldwide that, if a country is attacked by its enemies operating from outside its borders, then that country is completely within its rights to go in and attack the bases from which the operations were launched. We had mounted a number of successful attacks, the kill-rate was high and the security forces were revelling in taking the offensive. During one particular period we had eliminated one hundred terrorists in return for two of our people killed. The assessment I received was that it was only a matter of time before there would be a general crack-up among the terrorists.

  Then, however, reports started coming through, via security force channels, that these raids were beginning to worry the South Africans, as they were detracting from the ‘détente’ effort. Clearly, this was a political question, so I sent a message to Vorster asking for clarification. A reply came in no great hurry, saying that it was a matter for the security forces, and pointing out the need for liaison. Nevertheless, I was receiving stories of frustration from our troops in the border areas, because they were suddenly being restrained from crossing the border owing to some ‘political directive’. So I immediately arranged a tour of the JOCs (Joint Operations Commands) along our eastern border, and in order to ensure that there was no misunderstanding I took the army commander, Lieutenant General Peter Walls, and a few of his top aides along. Meeting with and talking to the troops on the ground was always a stimulating experience for me, and on this tour I made it clear in deliberate language that as far as our government was concerned we welcomed the successful cross-border attacks, and hoped for even greater success in the future — accordingly, any suggestion of political restraint could be discounted. One could detect a number of raised eyebrows.

  I was never able to ascertain exactly who was responsible for conveying the message to our people, other than that a garbled message had come through our security network indicating that our raids into Mozambique were causing the South Africans to question whether these were not prejudicing détente and that it might be an idea if they were first cleared with the South Africans beforehand. This was a ridiculous suggestion, because if information came through that there were a bunch of terrorists at some point across the border and if our forces were denied freedom to plan a reaction, the opportunity would be lost. One can imagine the frustration of troops waiting for clearance to act, which could take days, or even never materialise. This was another example of how the South African politicians were resorting to devious methods of pressurising us in order to assist them in their plan of appeasing the terrorists — I was sad and despondent. Regrettably, that was not all: there were continuing reports of supplies being held up, ammunition, fuel, spare parts for aircraft, necessitating constant approaches to the South Africans. We were informed that the South African security people with whom we liaised were openly unhappy over this new development, which necessitated clearance at political level and obstructed action. Our analysis led us to the conclusion that this was a continuation of the strategy to impress on us our dependence on the South Africans, and thus ensure our compliance with their wishes: subtle blackmail.

  I wondered what more they wanted us to do. Whenever their ideas differed from ours, we made our representations in a logical, reasoned manner, and at no time had there been a confrontation. There were times when we deferred to their judgement and, as the record shows, invariably we were proved right and they were wrong for the obvious reason that we understood our problems better than they did. The Falls Bridge conference was the most recent example, and it resulted in a setback from the advantageous position into which we had worked ourselves. Instead of recognising these facts and accepting the need for greater consultation with us, they moved in the opposite direction, working with their partners in their détente exercise, Kaunda and Nyerere, the British, and now the Americans, and then passing on to us their conclusions — in all honesty, their directions.

  Supporters of ours on the local scene, including some of my caucus members, questioned what they termed our lack of resolve in standing up to South African pressure to move us in the wrong direction. They were not aware, however, of the intrigue of the South African government, or at least of Vorster and those closely associated with him, and the resultant facts with which we were confronted. The last thing I was prepared to do was to initiate anything which might indicate to the public that we were unhappy about the strained relations which were developing, because there was no doubt in my mind that this would be to the detriment of my country.

  I longed for those carefree days when I was flying around the skies in my Spitfire, saying to myself: ‘Let anyone cross my path and he will have to take what comes his way.’ Conversely, of course, I might have been on the receiving end, but that was part of life and of little consequence. But now there was a big difference: there were millions of people whose interests were paramount, and most important of all the children who still had their whole lives before them. There were so many visitors from overseas countries, mainly Britain, USA and the Commonwealth, who expressed deep feelings for what we were standing for, and how our efforts were being sabotaged by our so-called friends. Why, they asked, did we not adopt a more offensive tactic, capturing towns along the railway line into Mozambique and eventually even take Beira, thus securing the terrorist supply routes? With our tremendous security forces such an operation was feasible, and the local people in Mozambique would be on our side — they were fed up with terrorists eating their food and seducing their women. Rhodesia, like Israel, had some of the finest soldiers in the world, and we should take advantage of this. It was surprising how many people talked thus.

  Of course there was a big difference between the situations of Israel and Rhodesia. Israel was not subjected to UN sanctions, and their friends stood by them and supported them, in particular the USA, which provided them with the most sophisticated armaments in the world. Rhodesia was operating under mandatory UN sanctions, more comprehensive than any previously imposed, and our friends, far from supplying our requirements, had stabbed us in the back. We had survived because of assistance from South Africa and Portugal. With the collapse of Mozambique, only South Africa remained. We had been getting along fine in that si
tuation, but the changing circumstances were worrying. It had been made clear to me by Vorster on more than one occasion that, while trans-border raids to deal with the terrorist bases were perfectly in order, any deep penetration involving more than transitory occupation was tantamount to invasion, and therefore unacceptable. So that was the clear answer to those who thought we should take Beira. Moreover, as I have indicated, the most recent evidence was that the South Africans were getting edgy over bona fide attacks against terrorist bases. So things were not as easy as they appeared on the surface, and I sometimes had problems convincing some of my oldest and most trusted friends. There were many people who could not credit that the South African government would treat us in such a way, and believed that I should disclose the facts, as they were of the opinion that the South African public would not stand for such antics.

  They were wrong, however. Politics is involved and deep. There would have been spontaneous strong support in South Africa for Rhodesia because of the ties that had always existed between our two countries, and the respect for the fight which we had put up against terrorism and communism, which were now both knocking at the South African door. Yet such support would be momentary, because tomorrow the headlines would be focusing on the problems and the dangers facing South Africa: inflation and the escalating cost of living, education and health facilities, sanctions and the direction in which their country was heading.

  South Africans are no different from other people, subject to a rule that applies everywhere in the world: your friends will think of you and try to help you, provided only that it does not detract from their lives. Those who are prepared to make a stand on a matter of principle, especially when it demands a sacrifice, you can count on the fingers of your hands. That is why it is so unfair of governments and peoples to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. It happens more and more with the passage of time, in spite of the fact that it is in conflict with one of the founding principles of the UN, and perhaps one should not be surprised that the UN itself is the greatest culprit in breaking this principle.

  We now went through a period of waiting for the next move from Vorster. The USA, conscious of their about-face over Angola, were seeking means of compensating South Africa, and reinstating themselves with the OAU. If by working together the USA and South Africa could solve the Rhodesian problem, this, they thought, would stand them both in very good stead. We were on course, with the war very much in our favour, and the psychological campaign, convincing the terrorists that there was no future in fighting, was once again progressing well. Our fervent hope and prayer was that we would be left in peace in order to get on with our task.

  It is important that I should underline clearly that Rhodesia at no time opposed the philosophy of détente, which in practice means solving problems and differences by discussion and negotiation, as opposed to by confrontation and war. Our record had always been consistent. The first glorious example was when C.J. Rhodes went on horseback into the Matopos Hills, unarmed, in order to meet and speak to the rebelling Matabele Chiefs in 1896. They agreed to stop their fighting and work together. Over the years the Rhodesian government had never deviated. When the British government reneged on the agreement made at the Victoria Falls conference in 1963, we talked and talked and talked. In the end we were forced to insist on the implementation of the contract which had been made, but at no time was our door closed to negotiations. There were the meetings on the warships in the Mediterranean, and after the second meeting, on HMS Fearless, it had been Harold Wilson who had slammed the door to more negotiations, and taken the issue to the UN. We never changed our stance and, before long, Wilson came back and talked. We talked to the black terrorist leaders time after time, I even sat around a table and negotiated with terrorists who had been convicted in our High Court for planning to kill me.

  When détente, however, is twisted into appeasement for the gaining of questionable short-term benefits by compromising on the long-term future, then surely one is entitled to question the motives, and consider the credentials of those participating? This was the agonising position in which Rhodesians now found themselves. There were many good, sensible people asking me, ‘Is it not time we called a halt to this détente business, because we only come out on the losing side?’

  And if one looks back and analyses the history of the past half century, the pages are littered with cases of how détente, or ‘diplomacy’, has been corrupted into appeasement, to the advantage of dictators or political gangsters, be they Nazis, fascists or communists. Always it is to the disadvantage of the free world. One of the early classic examples was Chamberlain’s meeting with Hitler in 1938, after which he returned to London and, holding in his hand the paper which Hitler and he had signed, claimed to have brought back ‘peace in our time’. In fact all he had done was to condone Germany’s invasion of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and thus give the Nazi tyrants the green light for the rape of Poland, which led to the Second World War. If the major countries of the free world had made a concerted stand at that time, confronting German aggression, it is likely that the war, with all its dreadful carnage and suffering, could have been averted. Fortunately for Britain, and indeed the whole free world, we had Winston Churchill, who had warned time and time again against appeasing the German war machine with its maniacal demagogues. The cost in human lives and suffering for that period of détente was a dreadful price to pay.

  Yalta was another terrible example of appeasement, where Roosevelt sided with Stalin, against Churchill’s advice, resulting in the post-war division of Europe between the communists (the USSR) on the one side, and the free world (Britain and the USA) on the other. In all fairness it must be conceded that Roosevelt was a sick man and unable to cope with the task. If he had handed over to Truman, who proved to be one of America’s great presidents, the position would have been different. It was totally unforgivable to abandon so much of Europe and hand it over to the communists. The glaring and obvious case was Poland. We declared war because of Hitler’s invasion of Poland, and after finally defeating and driving out the Germans, we handed Poland over to Stalin, a monster no less evil than Hitler.

  If the three victorious powers — Britain, the USA and Russia — had formed a joint force to occupy the liberated countries, there would have been no Iron Curtain in Europe. All those countries that were occupied and persecuted by USSR for the following forty years would have had immediate freedom in the same way as those countries which came under the wing of Britain and the USA. Sadly, the thread of appeasement was still discernible in many parts of the world, with the communists steadily moving forward, and the free world retreating. We saw this at its worst during the presidency of Jimmy Carter — every time Russia took a step forward, he moved two steps backwards. Fortunately for the whole free world, Ronald Reagan put an end to that. The change which took place was amazing to outsiders. During Carter’s time I personally questioned a number of Americans on their government’s negative attitude and received no answer. Once Reagan took over there was a complete transformation, with Americans once again standing tall and able to look you in the eye.

  Our greatest concern, of course, was with Africa, where we had witnessed the steady encroachment of the communists down the continent, while the free world retreated. That was what détente had come to mean to us. But we believed that Rhodesia was going to be different; the Zambezi was going to be the dividing line. To the north it seemed to be a lost cause, and it was becoming more and more clear, even to our black citizens, that conditions in those countries were deteriorating at an alarming rate. The freedom and better life which they had been promised was non-existent, corruption and nepotism and the one-party state philosophy rampant. Therefore our hopes of preserving our freedom, with its free enterprise system, were based on sound foundations, particularly as the South Africans had assured us on numerous occasions of their support, and of their belief that the Zambezi was a far stronger fortification against communist encroachment than
the Limpopo. Everything, however, turned on the actions of the South African government. As soon as they retired into the background, our black nationalist leaders came forward and negotiated, but once the South African government emerged on to the scene, invariably with the connivance of the British government, they stepped back. I received this message on a number of occasions from the black leaders, telling me they had had a communication from the British, usually through Lusaka, saying, ‘Hold on, because we are starting a new initiative with the assistance of the South African government.’

  After the Victoria Falls fiasco, I was not surprised to receive a message that Nkomo wished to talk. This was duly arranged, with meetings taking place in October 1975, and my hopes rose with the news that this initiative had Kaunda’s blessing. There were only a few problems, and we finally came to an agreement to implement what was scheduled to have been accepted at the Falls Bridge conference. Plans were made to hold a signing ceremony in Salisbury and Kaunda had assured Nkomo that he intended to be present for this important occasion. The date was arranged for the first week in December 1975.

  Janet and I decided to take a break down at the coast, and we duly left after our 11 November Independence Day celebration. We received a message from Harold Hawkins informing us that South African Railways had kindly offered us a trip on the Blue Train, so we flew to Pretoria, and much to our surprise and pleasure were accommodated in the presidential suite. A trip on this train, generally regarded as one of the finest in the world, is indeed a glorious experience. We arrived in Cape Town the following day, and after a brief stay to attend to a few matters, motored to Knysna, the heart of the great stinkwood and yellow wood forests of South Africa. This must be one of the most beautiful spots on earth; it has retained its rustic, small-town atmosphere, with smokeless factories turning out their beautiful and exclusive furniture. We had previously spent a number of happy holidays among these friendly people, and this proved to be no exception, with many expressing strong feelings of support for Rhodesia. One day we visited the nearby town of George, where we met a spontaneous demonstration of feeling. In one big shopping complex a lady shook my hand and said in a voice which was audible to many surrounding people: ‘We would like you to know that the people in these parts support you in what you are trying to do for your country, no matter what others, including our government, may say.’ It was an embarrassing moment, and I thanked the person concerned and moved quietly on. I knew only too well that no matter how much sympathetic support we had from the South African public, any moves from their government would be played in such a way as to make it clear that their actions had received our support and were planned specifically in the interests of Rhodesia. They knew they were safe from any contrary view from our side — otherwise we would have paid the price.