15. It is what economists term a dynamic equilibrium.
16. Hatton and Williamson ( 2008).
Chapter 3
1. Clemens ( 2011).
2. Cunliffe ( 2012).
NOTES TO PAGES 65–94 277
3. Besley and Reynal-Querol ( 2012).
4. Weiner ( 2011).
5. Pinker ( 2011).
6. Nunn and Wantchekon ( 2011).
7. Gaechter et al. ( 2010).
8. Fisman and Miguel ( 2007).
9. Hofstede and Hofstede ( 2010).
10. Shih et al. ( 1999).
11. Akerlof and Kranton ( 2011).
12. Koczan ( 2013).
13. See Hurley and Carter ( 2005), especially the chapter by Ap Dijksterhuis, “Why We Are Social Animals.”
14. Candelo-Londoño et al. ( 2011).
15. Putnam ( 2007).
16. Putnam ( 2007), p. 165.
17. Miguel and Gugerty ( 2005).
18. Hirschman ( 2005).
19. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol ( 2010).
20. Pinker ( 2011).
21. Murray ( 2012).
22. Sandel ( 2012).
23. Alesina et al. ( 2001).
24. Alesina et al. ( 1999). Natalie Candelo-Londoño, Rachel Croson, and Xin Li (2011) provide a useful recent review of the literature and some interesting new results.
25. Belich ( 2009).
26. Acemoglu et al. ( 2001).
27. In turn, the Scots who migrated to the north of Ireland were descendants of the Scoti, a tribe that invaded the north of Britain from Ireland around the eighth century. They did not, to my knowledge, invoke a “right of return” to Ireland.
28. Nunn ( 2010).
278 NOTES TO PAGES 95–160
29. Fleming ( 2011), Cunliffe ( 2012), and Halsall ( 2013) give rather different accounts.
30. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol ( 2010).
31. Kepel ( 2011).
32. Romer ( 2010).
33. Heath et al. ( 2011).
34. Herreros and Criado ( 2009), p. 335.
35. Koopmans ( 2010).
Chapter 4
1. Dustmann et al. ( 2012).
2. Docquier et al. ( 2010).
3. Grosjean ( 2011).
4. Corden ( 2003).
5. Nickell ( 2009).
6. Card ( 2005).
7. Hirsch ( 1977).
8. Sampson ( 2008).
9. Goldin et al. ( 2011).
10. Andersen ( 2012).
11. Docquier et al. ( 2010).
12. For an analysis that uses the 2012 British census, see Goodhart ( 2013).
13. Walmsley et al. ( 2005).
Chapter 6
1. Clemens et al. ( 2009).
2. McKenzie and Yang ( 2010); Clemens ( 2010).
3. Borjas ( 1989).
4. Van Tubergen ( 2004).
5. Cox and Jimenez ( 1992).
6. An old Yorkshire joke.
7. Yang ( 2011).
8. Agesa and Kim ( 2001).
9. Mousy and Arcand ( 2011).
NOTES TO PAGES 163–192 279
10. Aker et al. ( 2011).
11. Because our work is only provisional, it has not yet been through the process of academic refereeing. The results should therefore be treated with considerable caution. Our analysis includes migration from all low- and middle-income countries for which there is data, to all countries in the OECD, and covers the period 1960–2000. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 2013, “An Empirical Analysis of Global Migration,”
mimeo, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University.
12. Beine et al. ( 2011).
13. Cited in Clemens ( 2011).
Chapter 7
1. Docquier et al. ( 2010).
2. Deaton et al. ( 2009).
3. Stillman et al. ( 2012).
4. Stillman and his colleagues add a variety of other, nonstandard psychological questions such as “peace of mind,” and on these measures migration enhanced states of mind.
5. Dercon et al. ( 2013).
Chapter 8
1. Hirschman ( 1990).
2. Docquier et al. ( 2011); Beine and Sekkat ( 2011).
3. Batista and Vicente ( 2011).
4. Pérez-Armendariz and Crow ( 2010).
5. Dedieu et al. ( 2012).
6. Chauvet and Mercier ( 2012).
7. Mahmoud et al. ( 2012).
8. Beine et al. (forthcoming).
9. Docquier et al. ( 2007).
10. I turn to the evidence for this in the next chapter.
11. Spilimbergo ( 2009).
12. Besley et al. ( 2011).
13. Spilimbergo ( 2009).
280 NOTES TO PAGES 192–208
14. Akerlof and Kranton ( 2011), ch. 8.
15. Mercier ( 2012).
16. I Didn’t Do It for You, by Michaela Wrong ( 2006), provides a rare, lucid account of this little-known country.
Chapter 9
1. Thurow ( 2012).
2. Economists prefer a mathematically optimizing approach to probabilistic decisions, such as would be taken by a fully rational, well-informed person.
3. Docquier and Rapoport ( 2012); de la Croix and Docquier ( 2012); Batista and Vicente ( 2011).
4. One surprising effect that helps the poorest countries is that, controlling for other things, a country is more likely to be a net winner if it starts with few educated people. To see this, suppose that everyone is already educated: then neither the incentive effect nor the role model effect can have any traction. While this tends to help the poorest countries, the effect of size predominates.
5. Marchiori et al. ( 2013).
6. Docquier and Rapoport ( 2012).
7. Akerlof and Kranton ( 2011).
8. This is a variant of an idea of Besley and Ghatak ( 2003) about the matching of the attitudes of workers to those of the firms that employ them.
9. Akerlof and Kranton ( 2011), ch. 8.
10. Serra et al. ( 2010).
11. Wilson ( 1996).
12. Rempel and Lobdell ( 1978).
13. Yang ( 2011).
14. As with much concerned with migration, this outcome is not inevitable. If the migrants would have been particularly productive relative to those left behind, they may have contributed even more to others than through their remittances. But a modest increase in per capita expenditure is the most likely outcome.
NOTES TO PAGES 210–260 281
15. Clemens et al. ( 2012).
16. Yang ( 2008).
17. Hoddinott ( 1994).
18. Yang and Choi ( 2007).
19. Docquier et al. ( 2012).
20. Beegle et al. ( 2011).
21. Glaeser ( 2011).
22. Saunders ( 2010).
Chapter 10
1. Ferguson ( 2012).
Chapter 11
1. Sandel ( 2012).
2. Dijksterhuis ( 2005).
3. Haidt’s exception is the educated social elite of high-income countries who appear to suppress community and most of the other normal moral sentiments. Such “weird” people navigate their lives only by the two utilitarian moral sentiments of harm and fairness.
4. For a fascinating technical reformulation of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, see Benabou and Tirole ( 2011).
5. Zak ( 2012).
6. Pagel ( 2012).
7. Zak ( 2012).
8. Alesina and Spolaore ( 1997).
Chapter 12
1. See Corden ( 2003).
2. Beine et al. ( 2011).
3. Evidently, for student migration to be excluded from migration targets it is necessary to ensure that students return to their countries of origin upon completing their course of study. Once this is treated seriously, there are several options for effective control.
282 NOTES TO PAGES 262–266
4. See Schiff ( 2012).
5. Turkey would be the poorest member of the Union and have its largest population and its highest birthrate, encouraged by pronatal g
overnment policies. Its entry would place extraordinary strains on social cohesion in Europe without clear benefits for Turkey itself.
6. The same penalty might also apply to tourists and students who over-stayed. Clearly, these categories could not qualify for guest-worker status.
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