Park Chung Hee Era

by Byung-kook Kim

  With regard to Japan, the significance of Park’s rise to power was that, in him, South Korea finally had someone who was not just eager, but actually had the political strength to normalize relations with the country’s former foe and colonial overseer, despite vociferous domestic opposition.

  International Relations 432

  Park’s predecessor, Chang Myôn (1960–1961), had been just as eager to improve relations with Japan, but was unable to deliver because of his weak domestic political standing. But Park, who as we have seen had come to power in an undemocratic fashion, needed to find as many ways as he could to make up for his obvious lack of electoral legitimacy so that he could consolidate his power, govern the contentious society of South Korea, and lay the ground for industrialization. This is where the Japanese settlement came in. Uninhibited commercial ties with Japan were considered paramount not only because they would help to strengthen the financial basis of Park’s ruling political coalition, but also because they would help fuel Park’s development plans and, through them, enhance his political legitimacy on the basis of economic performance. Moreover, by accommodating the United States’ long-standing policy to strengthen the trilateral security ties between South Korea, Japan, and the United States for common regional security interests, the treaty initiative also aimed to strengthen military deterrence against North Korea, as well as prevent the United States from intervening in South Korean domestic politics on the side of the opposition. Like Park’s decision to dispatch combat troops to South Vietnam in 1965 (see Chapter 14), the treaty initiative was another instance where Park used foreign policy as an instrument of economic modernization, power consolidation, and military deterrence.

  From Park’s point of view, normalizing relations with Japan without its unambiguous apology did not make him any less a nationalist. Under the Park regime, to be panil (anti-Japan) was set aside to make way for a more pragmatic but still nationalistic k¤kil (beat Japan) approach. The normalization of relations with Japan was conceived as an instrument to secure the capital, technology, and markets required for South Korea to catch up with and eventually beat Japan in Japan’s own game of statist modernization. To be sure, many South Koreans accused Park of having pro-Japanese (ch’inil) tendencies, a view that some still hold today. These opponents ignored the fact that the reconciliation issue—via a proper Japanese apology and demonstrated repentance—was really beyond anyone’s power to resolve at the time. For the anti-Japanese nationalists, determined to force Japan to make amends for Korea’s humiliating colonial experience, Park was a convenient target to vent their deep sense of frustration over what had happened in the past and how little could be done about it. The volatility of South Korean–Japanese relations is, if anything, indicative of Park’s conscious, as opposed to indiscriminate, attempts to deal with the conflicting claims of geopolitics, geoeconomics, domestic politics, and historical legacies despite charges otherwise by the anti-Park, anti-Japanese elements in South Korea over the years.

  Normalization of Relations with Japan 433

  Converging Interests and Diverging Identities The normalization treaty brought out the sharp contrast between Park and Syngman Rhee in their approach to Japan. Personifying anti-Japanese Korean nationalism, Rhee demanded an unambiguous apology from Japan for all its colonial wrongdoing. When Japan failed to come forward, Rhee deliberately fostered anti-Japanese sentiments not only to satisfy his genuine hatred of Japan but also to mobilize the public behind his Liberal Party (LP) for the goal of political stability. Having fought all his life for independence from Japan, his instinct after liberation was to continue to oppose Japan. The more the Japanese resisted repentance, the more intensified his anti-Japanese political campaigns became.

  Consequently, for six years after South Korea’s liberation from Japan in 1945, the two countries lived in isolation from each other, almost completely lacking formal channels of contact. It was only with the intensification of the cold war in East Asia and the subsequent negotiations for the San Francisco Peace Treaty that the stage was set for dialogue on the issue of diplomatic normalization. Even then, the gap remained too wide for the intermittent bilateral talks to yield any concrete results. Rhee saw no urgent need to cooperate with Japan, especially in the context of the continued U.S. military commitment to South Korea. Japan, too, was in no hurry to normalize relations. Certainly, it wanted to resolve the conflict over territorial waters and fishery rights with South Korea but not at the political cost of making a public apology for its colonial rule. The result was lack-luster negotiations for diplomatic normalization throughout the 1950s.

  With the inauguration of Chang Myôn’s Democratic Party (DP) government in 1960, there developed a greater interest in improving South Korean–Japanese relations. In contrast to Syngman Rhee, whose main concern was the strengthening of the U.S.–South Korean alliance to deter the North, Chang made economic growth his highest priority because he saw it as the only way to give his fragile DP government political legitimacy. The recognition of the importance of economic growth in generating legitimacy naturally encouraged Chang to develop closer ties with Japan, whose economy was becoming increasingly stronger. He looked to Japan as a source of much-needed economic assistance rather than as a perpetual enemy that had to be brought to its knees. To encourage bilateral cooperation, Chang invited Japanese politicians and business leaders to South Korea, liberalized sales of Japanese products, and refrained from making inflammatory remarks about Japan. But as he sought to advance normalization talks, he was overwhelmed by opposing forces, including

  International Relations 434

  the student-led dissident movements that took advantage of his lack of leadership within the faction-ridden DP. In the end, Chang could not act on his desire to bring about a political, economic, and historical settlement with Japan. Japanese prime minister Ikeda Hayato did not help, either, adopting a wait-and-see posture in dealing with Chang Myôn’s political overtures to extract maximum South Korean concessions. Time was obviously a crucial factor for the weak Chang Myôn government, under siege by mass demonstrations. Unfortunately, time ran out. Just as Chang boldly tried to break the deadlock, he was forced out of the office by Park’s 1961

  military coup.

  Park Chung Hee had a reputation as a Japan-hand with an earlier career in the Japanese Imperial Army. Enraging his critics, Park made clear his admiration for the Meiji modernizers of nineteenth-century Japan and eagerly pursued a normalization treaty with Japan once he assumed power.

  But contrary to the image of a colonial collaborator that his political opponents and chaeya activists drew of Park, he did not think that his emulation of the Meiji modernizers made him any less a nationalist. On the contrary, his talk of Meiji Japan was heavily marked by nationalist ideas and spirit. Park admired Japan’s modernizers because he too wanted to make South Korea economically prosperous and militarily strong like Meiji Japan. Park was more than a military strongman. He was a deeply committed leader, with a self-defined mission to deliver South Korea from deep poverty. For Park, Meiji Japan constituted a model to emulate for Korean nationalists; it showed the way to the “rich nation, strong army.”

  Even if Park were a Japan sympathizer, his personal predilection was only a secondary factor in his decision to turn to Japan for economic and technological assistance. The needs of his time compelled Park to lean on Japan, inextricably tying South Korea’s economic future with that of its neighbor. At the time of Park’s ascent to power, the per capita annual GNP

  stood at $80, only $9 more than its level at the end of the Korean War in 1953. The annual growth rate remained 1.1 percent, the trade deficit hit $310 million, the unemployment rate reached 11.7 percent, and inflation ran at 10.5 percent. Moreover, the United States was decreasing aid to South Korea as part of its global foreign policy to replace grants-in-aid with loans. Having hovered at over $200 million until 1963, U.S. aid would drop to $149.3 million in 1964 and to $131.4 million in 1965. As his chief of sta
ff Yi Tong-wôn suggested and Park agreed, given South Korea’s inability to contract foreign loans and technology licensing on a commercial basis, it needed to turn to diplomacy to achieve what South Korea could not achieve through market forces.

  Normalization of Relations with Japan 435

  In fact, had his country found alternative sources of foreign capital and technology, Park would have thought twice before risking the kind of political crisis that he brought on himself during the 1963–1965 period by rushing into the normalization of relations with Japan. In the short run, the rapprochement hurt rather than helped Park’s efforts to consolidate his domestic base of power as he was drawn into the emotionally charged politics of national identity. That he risked his political rule in ramming through the normalization of relations with Japan showed his lack of alternative market-based ways to secure capital and technology. To his vehement domestic opposition, Park defiantly said, “Spit on my grave,” believing that economic growth would in the end justify his decision to settle with Japan. Fortunately for Park, the first Five-Year Economic Development Plan (FYEDP) was successful beyond all expectations by 1964, making Park confident of South Korea’s growth potential and consequently even more focused on the normalization treaty.1

  Then there were security reasons to normalize relations with Japan, too.

  The United States argued and Park agreed that the containment of communist threats in East Asia could not be effective so long as the United States’ alliances with South Korea and Japan were left uncoordinated.

  Cold war tension had heightened worldwide in the early 1960s. With the U-2 spy plane incident and crisis situations brewing in Cuba, Congo, Laos, and South Vietnam, the predominant view in the United States was that the Soviets were winning the cold war. Having been himself one of the chief proponents of this view, John F. Kennedy won the 1960 presidential election on the strength of, among other things, his firm commitment to anticommunism. The young military officers who overthrew Prime Minister Chang Myôn in May 1961 also cited South Korea’s domestic weakness in the face of a growing communist threat from the North as the most important reason for the coup.

  The year 1961, then, looked promising for a breakthrough in South Korean–Japanese relations. The military coup freed South Korea from Syngman Rhee’s stubbornly anti-Japanese posture as well as from Chang Myôn’s political drift and administrative ineffectiveness. Park appeared to have the strength to take on the challenges of anti-Japanese public sentiment as well as the bureaucratic imbroglio. The military junta looked like it possessed the political strength as well as the will not only to bring the normalization treaty to a successful conclusion but also to steer the nation on the path of export-led growth on the basis of that treaty. The question was how to get diplomacy to do the work the market would not do for South Korea.

  International Relations 436

  Yi Tong-wôn advocated the strategy of securing Japanese capital and technology on the basis of a political understanding on a range of issues that were of interest to Japan:

  What is lacking in natural resources and financial instruments can be made up through strategically timed diplomatic manoeuvres. Foreign policy can either make or break a nation. If [the military junta] can concentrate on the strengthening of economic ties with the United States as much as the security ties, and on the normalization of relations with Japan, South Korea can secure large amounts of economic assistance in a timely manner. With the resources secured through diplomacy, I believe [the military junta] will have a chance at creating an economic miracle.2

  Even before Yi Tong-wôn advanced the idea of diplomacy-led economic modernization, Park had politically committed himself to the policy of reaching a quick settlement with Japan on the bilateral issues of the day in order to clear the way for economic cooperation. As early as May 22, 1961, only six days after the military coup, Park had foreign minister Kim Hong-il, a lieutenant general in the reserves, hold a press conference to announce that the junta was interested in resuming talks with Japan on the issue of normalization of relations at the earliest possible date.3 On July 15, Yi Tong-hwan, a graduate of Tokyo University and then the vice chairman of the Korean Trade Association, was appointed the minister plenipotentiary to the South Korean representative office in Japan, with the goal of making full use of the private sector’s ties to Japanese political and business leaders to make the Japanese audience receptive to the idea of early diplomatic normalization.4 The driving force behind the South Korean initiative was Kim Chong-p’il, Park’s right-hand man and the director of the newly established Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).

  For the United States, once the early jitters over the military coup in May 1961 were overcome, Park’s rise to power was seen as an opportunity to consolidate the Seoul-Tokyo link in the U.S. system of bilateral security alliances. The Kennedy administration was particularly hostile to communism,5 and saw the staunchly anticommunist Park as a welcome addition to its list of junior security partners in the third world.6 Although the United States highly regarded Chang Myôn’s democratic credentials, it was also true that an increasing number of U.S. officials had become skeptical of Chang’s ability to check the growing leftist forces in South Korea.

  Now, with a pragmatic and powerful military leader at the helm, the United States hoped to contain leftist forces in South Korea, as well as forge a triangular East Asian security alignment between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, as the emerging superpower had advocated since

  Normalization of Relations with Japan 437

  the days of secretary of state John Foster Dulles. Shortly after the coup, the U.S. House Committee on International Relations recommended that the National Security Council take measures to improve South Korea–Japan relations: “Discuss with the Japanese Prime Minister during his forthcoming visit, the U.S. planning for [South] Korea and the ways in which economic and political differences between [South] Korea and Japan can be bridged . . . It should be understood that while the United States will not participate actively in negotiations, it should be prepared to act as a catalyst in seeking a settlement. The Prime Minister should be encouraged to continue efforts recently begun to develop Japanese trade with [South] Korea, and to provide economic assistance for [South] Korean development coordinated with American programmes.”7 Presumably, it was for this prospect of building a trilateral security network that Kennedy received Park in Washington on November 14, 1961, to extend the United States’

  continued support for South Korea, a move that was received as an endorsement of Park’s political leadership.8

  Just as the news of the military coup in South Korea caught the United States by surprise, Japan was caught off guard when Park seized power in 1961. Understanding the full meaning of Park’s rise to power took time.

  Only a week before the military coup of May 1961, a Japanese parliamentary delegation on a visit to Seoul had given a rosy picture of the political situation. Iseki YujirÃ, as a Foreign Ministry member of the delegation, assured Ikeda that the Chang Myôn government was “extremely stable.”9

  Noda Uichi, the head of the delegation, echoed the optimism, praising the successes of Chang Myôn and encouraging the Japanese Diet to have confidence in his ability to see through the normalization talks.10 Naturally, the news of the coup was not taken well by these South Korea watchers, who were busy convincing their government to work with Chang Myôn to bring about wider economic cooperation with South Korea. Also, like Kennedy, Ikeda Hayato was not happy to see a democratically elected civilian government forcibly displaced by a military coup. Reports of Park’s earlier involvement in communist-inspired political activities did not help, either. Concerned about the future course of South Korea and the possible negative fallout for Japanese security, Ikeda anxiously gathered what information there was on Park, then a relatively unknown leader.

  Soon the new South Korean leader’s diplomatic overtures shifted the mood in Japan in Park’s favor. For many Japanese politician
s and bureaucrats, the military coup came to be seen as a window of opportunity to pursue the normalization talks on the basis of pragmatism. Whereas Chang Myôn had proved to be politically too weak to shake off the constraints of South Korean public opinion, Park seemed capable of overcom-

  International Relations 438

  ing the sociopolitical hurdles in the normalization of relations between the two countries in order to achieve success for his ambitious economic development programs. Such views were given much credence when Park used force to clamp down on the press, political parties, intelligentsia, and interest groups to implement his vision of modernization. Former prime minister Kishi Nobusuke once observed: “Fortunately, South Korea is under a military regime where Park Chung Hee and a handful of leaders can decide things on their own . . . We [need to] persuade Park. [We] can expect him to deliver, [especially since] there is no National Assembly to