Park Chung Hee Era

by Byung-kook Kim

  By the time of the U.S. presidential election campaign in 1976, human rights activists had succeeded in persuading many U.S. politicians that blind support for Park could trap the United States in another unwanted war in Asia. Park’s opponents argued that because his rule-by-decree had destabilized South Korea, he had provided the North with an opportunity for armed attack. Once the North invaded, the United States would have to intervene because of the “human trip-wire” role that its Second Army Division, stationed near the demilitarized zone (and on the likely route that invading North Korean troops would take), played. Reverend James Sinnott of the Maryknoll Order, who had served as a missionary in South Korea, advised linking the troop withdrawal with the human rights issue and making future aid conditional upon improvement in that situation.27

  By championing the liberal-idealist side of U.S. foreign policy, Carter declared that human rights constituted “a standard within the community of nations” and that the United States’ endorsement of human rights as a moral principle signified the “exertion of American power and influence.”28 In his inaugural address, Carter declared that “because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere . . . [O]ur commitment to human rights must be absolute.”29 In his memoir, Carter recollected that “[as] President, I hoped and believed that the expansion of human rights might be the wave of the future throughout the world, and I wanted the United States to be on the crest of this movement.”30 In

  The Human Rights Conundrum 467

  the eyes of national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s human rights policy aimed at bringing the conduct of foreign affairs in line with American political values. However, Brzezinski also viewed human rights policy as a pragmatic instrument of U.S. hegemony that could meet the “Soviet ideological challenge” and “shape a world more congenial to American values and more compatible with American national interests.”31

  Carter’s Strategic Reviews

  Initially Carter’s South Korea policy harnessed the issues of troop withdrawal and human rights to move Park in a direction that was compatible with both U.S. values and U.S. interests. Heading a country that endorsed democratic values and survived on U.S. military support, Park saw the two-track pressure as highly damaging to his political rule. Of the two components of Carter’s South Korea policy, it was the human rights component that took Carter more time to develop, whereas his decision to withdraw U.S. military forces from the South virtually came with the inauguration. On February 1, 1977, Vice President Walter F. Mondale stated in a Tokyo news conference that the United States was phasing out ground military troops in South Korea in “close consultation and cooperation”

  with both Japan and South Korea. Next, in a press interview on March 9, shortly before his meeting with South Korean foreign minister Pak Tong-jin, Carter unilaterally announced his intention to withdraw all U.S.

  ground troops from the South in four to five years. In his meeting with Pak, Carter focused more on his concern for human rights violations than on the issue of military withdrawal. For Carter, the policy of military withdrawal was a fait accompli that the South had to accommodate. All that minister Pak could demand was South Korea’s right to prior consultation before any decision on the specifics of troop withdrawal was made.32

  Carter’s plan for troop withdrawal was based on the Presidential Review Memorandum 13 (PRM-13), which Brzezinski had signed on January 26, 1977. PRM-13 was still in the early stages of its formal drafting by the National Security Council (NSC), but the core concept of the policy change was already decided. Reaffirming his campaign promise, Carter made it clear that the principle of troop withdrawal was not to be questioned and that the task of the Policy Review Committee (PRC) was limited to designing the specifics of the implementation of his election pledge.33 Moreover, the PRC was instructed not to “examine the consequences of partial or complete troop withdrawal.”34 On February 18, Carter directed Brzezinski to “examine the alternative national objectives

  International Relations 468

  and strategies” outlined in another memorandum, PRM-10. Drawn up to guide and ensure the strategic flexibility of the United States, PRM-10 examined, among other key issues, the withdrawal of military troops from South Korea.35 The PRM-10 Force Posture Study presented a cautious but generally optimistic view of the reduction of U.S. military forces deployed in South Korea, encouraging Carter to continue on the track of withdrawal.

  Carter’s policy of troop withdrawal was conceived of as an integral part of his larger regional strategy of military disengagement from the East Asian continent. Optimistically viewing the regional security situation in East Asia, PRM-10 defined the primary objective of the United States in the region as maintaining the status quo among the great powers rather than the containment of communist threats.36 In its eyes, the U.S. defense posture was moving toward “an offshore military posture which avoid[ed]

  automatic involvement” on the Asian continent.37 To foreshadow intense bilateral conflict, PRM-10 de facto assumed a dramatically altered role for South Korea in U.S. military policy, emphasizing the United States’ strategic need to secure “flexibility” in the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, in contrast to the traditional policy of waging a massive counterattack on the North after the first stage of repelling the North in the event of war, PRM-10 mainly concentrated on necessary measures to offset North Korea’s initial armed attack.

  The U.S. Security Community’s Opposition Opposition to Carter’s policy of troop withdrawal, however, was already visible in the early stage of reviewing the new policies within the U.S. security community. Fortunately for Park, the support for Carter’s policy of troop withdrawal was not strong within the United States. Basing his decision on PRM-10 and PRM-13, without consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Carter saw many in his own administration oppose his South Korea policy. These included not only the Department of Defense and the three armed services but also many personnel on the Policy Review Committee.

  William H. Gleysteen, destined to serve as the U.S. ambassador to South Korea during 1978–1981, was one such official caught by surprise by Carter’s troop withdrawal policy. A core member of the interagency group that had prepared PRM-13, Gleysteen later recalled that at the initial stage of planning, most of the officials in the group opposed Carter’s plan.38

  Troop withdrawal was unpopular in the State Department and especially in the Defense Department, but Carter’s adamant position on the issue rendered any substantive debate nearly impossible at this early stage.39

  The Human Rights Conundrum 469

  On May 19, 1977, Major General John K. Singlaub, the chief of staff of the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK), openly criticized Carter’s withdrawal policy in an interview with the Washington Post, warning that the policy, if carried out, would lead to another war on the Korean Peninsula. Although his action was interpreted as open insubordination, Singlaub felt justified in opposing Carter given the USFK’s recent reassessment of North Korea’s enhanced military capabilities. In effect, Singlaub claimed that Carter’s decision was based on outdated intelligence reports. The president recalled Singlaub immediately, but Carter’s action galvanized the opposition even more, especially in Congress and among the military. The House Armed Services Committee responded by holding hearings on the Singlaub incident six days later, on May 25.

  Carter was not deterred. He issued Presidential Directive 12 on May 27

  to withdraw one brigade (6,000 soldiers) by 1978 and another brigade no later than June 1980. The final stage of ground troop withdrawal was to be decided later in consultation with Congress and allies in East Asia.40

  Twenty days earlier, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had recommended a phased, partial reduction of 7,000 troops through 1982. Carter rejected this recommendation in favor of his more sweeping withdrawal plan when he issued Presidential Directive 12.41 The directive was drawn up unilaterally without prior consultation with South Korea. The United States later explained C
arter’s decision as based on the reassessment of “military balance, [South Korean] capabilities, and the international situation,” but this did not alleviate Park’s sense of betrayal.42

  Park’s Response

  To prevent Park from protesting Presidential Directive 12, which would strengthen the hand of Carter’s opponents in Congress, Philip C. Habib, under secretary of state for political affairs, and General George S. Brown, chairman of the JCS, were dispatched to South Korea in May 1977. Habib and Brown conveyed Carter’s plan to complete the withdrawal of USFK

  ground troops within the next five years. Because Park had already expressed his concern over the declining credibility of the U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea in his letter to Carter on February 26, Park chose not to question the wisdom of the directive, but the timing of Carter’s decision to implement his 1976 election pledge was disturbing. The mood within Park’s inner policy circle at the Blue House was far worse than what Park conveyed in his meeting with Habib and Brown. In private, Park’s key national security advisers strongly opposed Carter’s troop withdrawal policy, warning that it would put the U.S.–South Korean secu-

  International Relations 470

  rity alliance in a precarious state. Aware of Carter’s commitment to the new policy, Park focused on limiting the damage rather than reversing the decision. To Habib and Brown, after explaining the crucial role the USFK

  played as a deterrent against the Soviet Union and North Korea, Park requested that the United States reaffirm its commitment to the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty and sought an increase in military assistance programs to fill the vacuum created by the staged withdrawal of USFK ground troops.

  In addition, Park urged that the United States maintain the headquarters of the Second Infantry Division in South Korea despite the withdrawal of its brigades, with the goal of demonstrating the United States’ support for the defense of South Korea. Park also hoped for the continued deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea.43

  At the Tenth Annual Bilateral Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) held on July 26, 1977, the two allies agreed on compensatory measures.

  Secretary of defense Harold Brown had to modify the timetable for troop withdrawal in the face of opposition by South Korean defense minister Sô Chong-ch’ôl, delaying the withdrawal of the Second Infantry Division’s two combat brigades from 1978 to 1981. The South Koreans argued that the withdrawal of these brigades would severely damage deterrence unless the South Korean military was given time to catch up with the North and take on the role of trip-wire previously handled by the American troops in the western front. As a measure to counterbalance the effect of U.S.

  troop withdrawal, Sô Chong-ch’ôl demanded the sale of cutting-edge fighter planes as well as the establishment of a Combined Forces Command (CFC) prior to the withdrawal of USFK ground troops.44 The United States agreed to launch the CFC as the war-fighting headquarters because CFC not only satisfied South Korea’s desire to secure a U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea in the uncertain era of troop withdrawal, but also enabled the USFK to continue maintaining operational control over the 600,000-men-strong South Korean armed forces.

  To secure Park’s consent, the United States agreed to a $1.9 billion program of compensatory military assistance, which included the transfer of USFK-owned military weapons systems ($500 million), support for the South Korean armed forces’ modernization plan ($300 million), and commercial sales of military weapons ($1.1 billion).45 Park thus used the U.S.

  troop withdrawal as an opportunity for upgrading South Korean military capabilities. There was also an agreement to hold annual joint military exercises in order to ready the two allies’ military troops for coordinated military action in the event of war. As a result of his negotiations, Park not only earned time to prepare the South for the troop withdrawal, but also built the institution (CFC) and the means (military weapons systems) to enhance his country’s alliance with the United States.

  The Human Rights Conundrum 471

  For Carter, the primary objective was to phase out the Second Infantry Division’s human trip-wire role, thus reducing the danger of getting trapped in an unwanted war on the Asian continent.46 As recommended by Brzezinski, Carter was emphasizing political and economic coordination among the advanced democracies in Western Europe and Japan, at the expense of late developers like Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

  Dissension over Human Rights Issues

  The other half of Carter’s South Korea policy, human rights activism, was more directly inherited from the congressional activities of the mid-1970s.

  As secretary of state Cyrus R. Vance once recognized, Carter’s human rights policy was “framed in collaboration and consultation with Congress.”47 Positing human rights as the basic tenet of his foreign policy, Carter dramatically moved away from the traditional security-first stand to a position of human rights activism. The shift was made possible by the rapidly altering status of South Korea in U.S. strategic calculations.

  With troop withdrawal, Carter could deal with human rights issues more strictly as human rights issues without fearing adverse geopolitical implications. Ironically, however, the troop withdrawal strengthened Park’s leverage as well. Given Carter’s determination to fulfill his campaign pledge to withdraw ground troops, Park had less incentive to heed the United States’ concern over human rights abuses. On the contrary, Park bluntly accused Carter of unjustly intervening in South Korea’s domestic politics.

  The Carter administration created a “human rights bureau” in the State Department and placed it under the leadership of assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs Patricia Derian. The new bureau adopted an activist posture, arguing that “human rights conditions had to be met before security aid could be given.”48 Particularly during Carter’s first year in office, his activist human rights policy came into conflict with regional bureaus in the State Department as well as with the Department of Defense, failing to make much progress. The Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance was established to resolve bureaucratic struggles on April 1, 1977, but to no avail. The interagency group came to be known as the Christopher Group, after its chair, deputy secretary of state Warren M. Christopher, and became an “arena of debate.” However, it was unsuccessful, unable to carry out its mission of resolving interagency conflicts over the proper place of human rights in U.S. foreign policy.49

  Linking human rights directly with military security policy constituted a key element in the liberal critique of American foreign policy in congressional debates. Again Fraser led the liberal camp, arguing that military as-

  International Relations 472

  sistance to South Korea should be decided by the yushin regime’s human rights practices. In this sense, Fraser was a critic of Carter, who initially pushed for troop withdrawal without framing it as a sanction on Park’s human rights abuses. Carter’s PRM-13 did call for investigation of human rights issues, but the thrust of its policy recommendations dealt with troop withdrawal as a narrowly conceived security issue.50 In Fraser’s eyes, this perspective was precisely the problem with Carter’s South Korea policy. Fraser urged Carter to make the troop withdrawal conditional, to be reversed if the human rights situation improved. For Fraser, removing ground troops was the last option to take after all others were exhausted.

  But contrary to Fraser’s position, Carter had decided to withdraw USFK

  ground troops even before formulating his human rights policy.

  The military pullout was implemented in a unilateral way, precluding any attempt to “use [it] as leverage to gain concessions” on human rights issues.51 To Carter’s political opponents in Congress, the policy of military withdrawal only revealed his obstinate desire to deliver on his election pledge, because there appeared to be no urgent strategic imperatives to pull out the ground troops in such a hurry. Nor did the economics of military retrenchment make any sense, since the Unit
ed States had to pay for South Korea’s military modernization in return for its Asian ally’s acquiescence. The lack of coordination between human rights and security policy, moreover, meant that the United States lost an opportunity to improve the South Korean human rights situation.52 When the Carter administration justified its withdrawal policy as a change brought on by the economic growth of South Korea and the coming of détente with the Soviet Union and China, many security experts in Congress pointed to the continued military rivalry among the great powers and cautioned against any abrupt changes in American foreign policy.53 Although Congress, often led by Democrats critical of Park, urged Carter to use the issue of troop withdrawal to gain Park’s concessions on human rights, Vance expressed caution in applying the principle of human rights in the conduct of foreign policy, urging Congress “to be flexible and pragmatic in dealing with specific cases that might affect [American] national security.” He championed

  “flexibility rather than rigidity in implementing foreign policy.”54

  Park did not budge. Not only did he denounce Carter’s human rights policy as interference in South Korea’s domestic affairs,55 but his aides criticized the policy as hypocritical and insensitive, turning a blind eye to the deplorable human rights conditions in the totalitarian communist countries while “crucifying” America’s friendly South Korean ally that suffered under a serious security threat. At a Blue House reception, Park asserted that “the protection and the survival of the thirty-six million [South] Ko-

  The Human Rights Conundrum 473

  rean people [constitutes] the highest [possible] form of [protecting] freedom, human rights, and democracy.”56 Still, Park conceded to some U.S.