[South Korea’s Business Groups], ed. South Korea Economic Research Institute (Seoul: South Korea Economic Research Institute, 1995), 43.
20. Donald Kirk, Korean Dynasty: Hyundai and Chông Chu-yông (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).
21. Eun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State, 132.
22. Chông Chu-yông, Yi ttang-e t’aeônasô [Born in South Korea].
23. David Cole and Y. C. Park, Financial Development in South Korea, 1945–
1978 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).
24. Bank of Korea, Flow of Funds Account.
25. Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook.
26. Eun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State, 147.
Notes to Pages 284–292
687
27. Kim In-yông, Han’guk-¤i kyôngje sôngjang: kukka chudoron-gwa kiôp chudoron [South Korea’s Economic Development: State-Led Arguments and Corporate-Led Arguments] (Seoul: Chayugiôp Center), 105.
28. Ibid., 104.
29. Kim Yong-hwan, Imja, chane-ga saryônggwan anin’ga: Kim Yong-hwan hoegorok: kyôngjegaebalgyehoek-butô IMF oehwan wigi-kkaji kyôktonggi-¤i han’guk kyôngjesa [You are the Real Commander: Memoir of Kim Yong-hwan: A History of the Rapidly Changing Korean Economy from the Five Year Economic Development Plans (FYEDP) to the IMF Foreign Exchange Crisis] (Seoul: Maeilgyôngje sinmunsa, 2002).
30. Eun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State, 149.
31. Bank of Korea, 8.3 Kin’g¤p kyôngjejoch’i chonghap pogosô [Full report on the president’s Emergency Decree of August 3, 1972] (Seoul: Bank of South Korea, 1973); Kim Chông-ryôm, Han’guk kyôngje chôngch’aek 30nyônsa: Kim Chông-ryôm hoegorok [A 30-Year History of Korea’s Economic Policy: The Recollections of Kim Chông-ryôm] (Seoul: JoongAng Ilbosa, 1990), 269; Eun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State.
32. Eun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State, 147.
33. Sô Chae-jin, Han’guk-¤i chabon’ga kyeg¤p [Capitalist Class of South Korea]
(Seoul: Nanam, 1991), 3.
34. Eun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 146, 157.
37. Interview with Yi Chun-lim.
38. South Korean Economic Research Institute, Han’guk-¤i kiôp chiptan [South Korea’s Business Groups] (Seoul: South Korean Economic Research Institute, 1995).
39. See Kim Yun-t’ae, Chaebol-gwa kwôllyôk [ Chaebol and Power] (Seoul: Saeroun saramd¤l, 2000), 125; and Seok Ki Kim, “Business Concentration and Government Policy: A Study of the Phenomenon of Business Groups in South Korea, 1945–1985,” D.B.A. dissertation, Harvard University (1987).
40. Eun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.,161–164.
43. Ibid.
44. Alice Amsden , Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
45. Myoung-Han Kang, The Korean Business Conglomerate: Chaebol Then and Now, Korea Research Monograph (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1960), 180.
46. Ibid.
47. Richard M. Steers, Made in South Korea: Chung Ju Young and the Rise of Hyundai (London: Routledge, 1999), 109–110.
48. Haeoe kônsôl hyôphoe [International Contractors Association of Korea], Haeoe kônsôl hyôphoe 5nyônsa [5 Years of the Foreign Construction Committee] (Seoul: International Contractors Association of Korea, 1982).
49. Interview with a former executive of Daewoo on December 22, 2000.
Notes to Pages 292–308
688
50. Seok-Jin Lew, “Bringing Capital Back in: A Case Study of the South Korean Automobile Industrialization,” Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University (1992).
51. South Korean Economic Research Institute, Han’gug¤i kiôpchiptan [South Korea’s Business Groups].
52. Samsung’s Secretarial Office, Samsung 60nyônsa [Sixty Years of Samsung]
(Seoul: Samsung’s Secretarial Office, 1998).
53. Samsung’s Secretarial Office, Samsung 60nyônsa [Sixty Years of Samsung]; Hyundai Engineering and Construction, Hyundai kônsôl 50nyônsa [Fifty-Year History of Hyundai Engineering and Construction] (Seoul: Hyundai Engineering and Construction, 1997); Ssangyong, Ssangyong 50nyônsa
[Ssangyong’s Fifty Years] (Seoul: Ssangyong, 1989); Sôn’gyông’s Public Relations Office, Sôn’gyông 40nyônsa [Sôn’gyông’s Forty-Year History] (Seoul: Sôn’gyông’s Public Relations Office, 1993).
10. The Automobile Industry
1. Douglas Bennett and Kenneth Sharpe, Transnational Corporations versus the State: The Political Economy of the Mexican Auto Industry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Rhys Jenkins, Transnational Corporations and the Latin American Automobile Industry (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987).
2. Korean
Automobile
Industries
Cooperative
Association
(KAICA),
Chadongch’a chohap 20 nyœnsa [The Twenty-Year History of the Korean Automobile Industries Cooperative] (Seoul: KAICA, 1983).
3. Chuk-Kyo Kim and Chul-Huei Lee, “Ancillary Firm Development in the Korean Automobile Industry,” in The Motor Vehicle Industry in Asia: A Study of Ancillary Firm Development, ed. Konosuke Odaka (Singapore: Singapore National University, 1983).
4. Hyung-Wook Kim and Saul Park, KCIA Chief’s Testimony: Revolution and Idol, vol. 1 (New York: Korean Independent Monitor, 1984), 195–197.
5. The three scandals included KCIA-orchestrated stock market speculation, the irregular construction of Walker Hill Hotel, and the illegal operation of slot machines. Like the Saenara debacle, they were caused by Kim Chong-p’il’s efforts to finance Park’s entry into the 1963 presidential election on the ticket of the yet-to-be organized DRP. Ibid., 1:193–198.
6. Dal-Joong Chang, Economic Control and Political Authoritarianism: The Role of Japanese Corporations in Korean Politics, 1965–1979 (Seoul: Sogang University, 1985), 118–132.
7. Dong-A Ilbo, August 26, 1965.
8. Sindonga, (November 1984), 420–421; Sindonga, (March 1989), 309–314.
9. Dal-Joong Chang , Economic Control and Political Authoritarianism, 127.
10. O Wôn-Ch’ôl, Han’gukhyông kyôngje kônsôl: enjiniôring ôp’¤roch’i 4 [Korean-Style Economic Development: An Engineering Approach, vol. 4] (Seoul: Kia kyôngje yôn’guso, 1996), 118.
11. Ibid., 4:119–135.
12. Korea Institute of Science and Technology, On the Foundation of the Heavy
Notes to Pages 308–324
689
Industry Development: The Analysis of the Machinery and Material Industry (Seoul: KIST, 1970).
13. Seok-Jin Lew, “Bringing Capital Back In: A Case Study of the South Korean Automobile Industrialization” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1992), chap. 4.
14. Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Changgi chadongch’a kong’ôp jinh¤ng kyehoek: han’gukhyông sohyôngs¤ngyongch’a-¤i yangsanhwa [Long-term Plan for the Promotion of the Automobile Industry: Mass Production of Compact Korean Automobiles] (Seoul: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 1974), 301; Byung-Kook Kim, “Bringing and Managing Socioeconomic Change: The State in Korea and Mexico” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1987), 221–
229.
15. Jung-En Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).
16. O Wôn-ch’ôl, Han’gukhyông kyôngje kônsôl: enjiniôring ôp’¤roch’i 4 [Korean-Style Economic Development: An Engineering Approach, vol.4], 164–
165.
17. Alice Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 291–318.
18. Jeff Frieden, “Third World Indebted Industrialization: International Finance and State Capitalism in Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, and South Korea,” International Organization 35 (Summer 1981).
19. Kyu-Uc
k Lee, Industrial Development Policies and Issues (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1986).
20. Hyundai Motors, Hyundai chadongch’a isimnyônsa [Twenty Years of Hyundai Motors] (Seoul: Hyundai Motors, 1988), 382–384.
21. On the industrial relations of the South Korean automobile industry, see Korea Institute of Labor, Chadongch’a kong’ôp-¤i nosa kwan’gye [Labor Relations in the Auto Industry] (Seoul: Han’guk nodong yônguwôn, 1989); and Kyu-Han Bae, Automobile Workers in Korea (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1987).
22. John Krafcik, “A First Look at Performance Levels at New Entrants Assembly Plants,” research manuscript, International Motor Vehicle Project, MIT, 1991.
23. On the organizational features of the chaebol, see Richard Steers et al., Chaebols: Korea’s New Industrial Might (New York: Harper & Row, 1989); and S. Yoo and S. M. Lee, “Management Style and Practice in Korean Chaebols,” California Management Review 29 (1987).
24. Korea Institute for Economics and Technology (KIET), Chadongch’a sanôp changgi palchôn kusang [Long-Term Plan of the Auto Industry] (Seoul: Korea Institute for Economics and Technology, 1990), 68.
11. Pohang Iron & Steel Company
1. Park Chung Hee, Kukka-wa hyôngmyông-gwa na [The Nation, the Revolution, and I] (Seoul: Hyangmunsa, 1963), 114.
2. Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of
Notes to Pages 325–334
690
Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 319; World Bank, Korea: Managing the Industrial Transition, 1
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1987), 45.
3. POSCO Weekly, May 31, 2001.
4. For developmental state theories, see Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Chalmers Johnson, “Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,”
in The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, ed. Frederic C.
Deyo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
5. Dong-A Ilbo, January 31, 1961.
6. “Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy: Accomplishment of American Investment Group Headed by General Van Fleet in Korea (June 19, 1962),” National Security File, John F. Kennedy Library [hereafter JFKL].
7. “From Berger and Killen to Secretary of State” (July 30, 1962), National Security File, JFKL.
8. Department of State, “Japan: Department of State Guidelines for Policy and Operations (October 1961),” Thompson Papers, Box 17, JFKL.
9. Beginning in 1969, the United States put in place voluntary export restraint (VER) arrangements with Japan and Europe in the steel industry.
10. Pak T’ae-jun, “Pak T’ae-jun hoegorok: bulch’ôrôm salda” [Pak T’ae-jun Memoir: Living like Fire], Sindonga, June 1992, 465.
11. The IECOK was formed in 1966 to finance the South Korean Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan.
12. Pohang chonghapchech’ôl chusikhoesa, Pohang chech’ôl 20nyônsa [History of POSCO: 20 Years] (Pohang: Pohang chonghapchech’ôl chusikhoesa, 1989), 136–137.
13. In 1956, Taiwan also made an attempt to push a heavy and chemical industrialization drive by constructing an iron mill, but gave up the project because the United States refused to support the construction, stating that it was an ex-travagance (Noble, Collective Action in East Asia) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 73.
14. Ho-sôp Kim, “Policy-Making of Japanese Official Development Assistance to the Republic of Korea, 1965–1983” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1987), 133–134.
15. Ibid.
16. While Pak T’ae-jun was approaching Japan for the use of reparation funds, the EPB was also trying to reverse the United States Export-Import Bank’s decision between February and May 1969.
17. Interview with Ariga Toshihiko by Sang-young, Tokyo, January 29, 1993.
18. Fuji Steel and Yawata Steel combined in March 1970 to form Nippon Steel.
19. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 23, 1969.
20. Mainichi Shimbun, August 28, 1969.
21. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, September 6, 1969. To be sure, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai’s 1970 declaration of the “Four Principles” was to have a chilling effect on South Korean–Japanese economic ties during the early 1970s by getting Japanese companies to readjust downward the importance of trading relations
Notes to Pages 334–345
691
with South Korea and Taiwan in order to increase economic transactions with China. The Four Principles even made Toyota Motors divest and withdraw from the South Korean market in 1972 (see Chapter 10). The Japanese steel industry, however, was largely unaffected by the Chinese Four Principles, and the POSCO project was able to proceed with the support of Japan’s business and political leaders.
22. Mainichi Shimbun, August 28, 1969.
23. Kim Chông-ryôm, Han’guk kyôngje chôngch’aek 30nyônsa: Kim Chông-ryôm hoegorok [A 30-Year History of Korea’s Economic Policy: the Recollections of Kim Chông-ryôm] (Seoul: JoonAng Ilbosa, 1990), 36. In sharp contrast, Taiwan’s Kuomintang regime refused to construct a large integrated steel mill for fear of upsetting the steel industry it then had, dominated by small- and medium-sized enterprises. The Taiwanese Kuomintang regime did not want to undermine its monopoly of political power by creating chaebol-
like industrial conglomerates. See Gregory W. Noble, Collective Action in East Asia: How Ruling Parties Shape Industrial Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 72–92.
24. O Wôn-ch’ôl, “Sanôp chôllyak k¤ndaesa 120” [History of Industrial Strategy], Han’guk kyôngje sinmun [Korean Economic Daily], May 24, 1993.
25. POSCO, POSCO I Visited: Its Secret of Success (Pohang: POSCO, 1994), 94.
26. Their friendship went back to 1948, when then-cadet Pak T’ae-jun met then-instructor Park Chung Hee at the Korea Military Academy. On the eve of the military coup in May 1961, Park Chung Hee even entrusted the lives of his family to Pak. In addition to this unequivocal support from South Korea’s highest political authority, Pak’s experience gained from operating Korea Tungsten Corporation, a state enterprise, for four years before joining POSCO as its CEO in 1968 prepared Pak well for his managerial tasks at POSCO.
27. Kim Chông-ryôm, Han’guk kyôngje chôngch’aek 30nyônsa [A 30-Year History of Korea’s Economic Policy], 135.
28. Interview with Pak T’ae-jun by Sang-young Rhyn, Seoul, March 29, 2001.
29. POSCO I Visited, 1994, 414–418.
30. Procurement for the construction of POSCO was carried out without kick-backs. Pak T’ae-jun received a written mandate directly from the president that he used to block pressure from domestic and foreign lobbyists. POSCO, Pohang chech’ôl 20nyônsa [History of POSCO 20 Years] (Seoul: POSCO, 1989), 168–170; interview with Pak T’ae-jun, Tokyo, January 27, 1993.
31. Ken-ichi Imai, “Japan’s Corporate Networks,” in The Political Economy of Japan 3: Cultural and Social Dynamics, ed. Shumpei Kumon and Henry Rosovsky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 229.
32. Interview with Pak T’ae-jun by Sang-young Rhyn, Tokyo, January 27, 1993.
12. The Countryside
1. Jae-On Kim and B. C. Koh, “The Dynamics of Electoral Politics,” in Political Participation in Korea, ed. Chong Lim Kim (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Clio Books 1980), 67–68.
Notes to Pages 345–349
692
2. Yun Ch’ôn-ju, “£pmin-¤i t’up’yo haengt’ae: ¤p-¤i kônsôl-¤n minjujôngch’i hyangsang-¤l ¤imihanda” [The Voting Behavior of Townspeople: Improving Democratic Politics through Developing Towns], Aseayôn’gu [ Asian Studies]
7 (June 1961).
3. Chong Lim Kim, Young Whan Kihl, and Seong-Tong Pai, “The Modes of Citizen Participation: An Analysis of Nation-Wide Survey Results,” in Political Participation in Korea, ed. Chong Lim Kim (California: Clio Books, 1980).
5. See Park Chung Hee, Uri minjok-¤i nagal gil: sahoejaegôn- ¤i inyôm [Our Nation’s Path: The Ideology of Social Reconstruction] (Seoul: Tonga ch’ulp’ansa, 1962); and Kukka-wa hyôngmyông-gwa na [The Nation, the Revolution, and I] (Seoul: Hyangmunsa, 1963). Also consult James Palais, “‘Democracy’ in South Korea, 1948–72,” in Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship since 1945, ed. Frank Baldwin (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 332; and Joungwon Alexander Kim, The Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945–72 (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1975), 248.
6. Park Chung Hee, Kukka-wa hyôngmyông-gwa na [The Nation, the Revolution, and I], 177.
7. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF), as quoted in Chosun Ilbo, June 21,1961: 1. According to a field study of Ch’ungju and Chôngwôn, North Ch’ungch’ông Province, commissioned by the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM), 88 percent of the rural households were owner-farmers; 8 percent, part owner-part tenants; and the remaining 4 percent, pure tenants. Statistics: Chosun Ilbo, March 5, 1961, 4.
8. The rural household owned less than one hectare (that is, less than 2.47 acres) of farmland on average, which produced barely enough to sustain a family of six members. Chosun Ilbo, June 21, 1961, 1.
9. See S. H. Ban et al., Rural Development: Studies in the Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 1945–1975 (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1980), 234–245.
10. For example, in 1960, the government purchase price of an 80 kg bag of rice was 1,059 wôn, about 81 percent of the production cost. Ibid., 240.
11. Ibid., 237.
12. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 74–75.
13. For details of administrative control in the Park era, see Sô Chu-sôk, “Park Chung Hee sidae-¤i kungmint’ongje: haengjôngch’echer¤l chungsim¤ro”
[Citizen Control in the Park Chung Hee Era: With Reference to Administrative System], paper presented at a special conference on the Park Chung Hee era, organized by the Korean Political Science Association, April 7, 2000.
14. The village heads (ijang) in the rural area and the block heads (t’ongjang) in the cities were not government officials in the formal sense. However, they were virtual extensions of and appendages to the local administration. As such, they were paid various “allowances” in return for their services.
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