Park Chung Hee Era
Page 102
Notes to Pages 425–436
705
Years’ History of Korean Foreign Policy: 1948–1978], (Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979), 30.
56. U.S. SACA, 1970, 1571.
57. Dong-Ju Choi, “The Political Economy of Korea’s Involvement in the Second Indo-China War,” 211.
58. Kyôngje kihoegwôn [Economic Planning Board], Kaebal yôndae-¤i kyôngje chôngch’aek: kyôngje kihoegwôn 20nyônsa [Economic Policy during the Developmental Decades: Twenty Years of the Economic Planning Board]
(Kwach’ôn: Kyôngje kihoegwôn [Economic Planning Board], 1982), 90.
59. Kukpang kunsa yôn’guso [Research Institute for Defense and Military History], Wôlnam p’abyông-gwa kukkabaljôn [The Dispatch of Troops to Vietnam and National Development], 250–251.
60. Kukbang Kunsa Yôn’gusa [Research Institute for Defense and Military History], Wôlnam p’apyông-gwa kukkabaljôn [The Dispatch of Troops to Vietnam and National Development], 266; Hô Chin, “Han’gukgun-¤i wôlnam ch’amjôn-gwa ch’amjôn kunin-¤i hyônsil” [The Participation of the Korean Troops in Vietnam and Their Reality], Han’guk Kunsa [Korean Military Affairs], no. 9 (Seoul: Korea Institute for Military Affairs, 1997), 51.
61. Yi Yông-h¤i, Pet¤nam chônjaeng: 30nyôn pet¤nam chônjaeng-¤i chôn’gae-wa chonggyôl [The Vietnam War: The Evolution and Conclusion of the Thirty Years’ Vietnam War] (Seoul: Ture, 1985).
62. Yi Yông-h¤i, a chaeya leader and also a journalist at the Chosun Ilbo during the Vietnam War, said that major daily newspapers were told not to report any negative news on the KFV troops in South Vietnam, although international news agencies reported atrocities committed by some South Korean troops during combat. “Yi Yông-h¤i sônsaeng’i hoegohan kwang’gi¤i pet¤nam chônjaeng” [Mr. Yi Yông-h¤i’s Recollection on the Insane Vietnam War], Hankyoreh 21, vol. 57 (May 4, 1995), 43.
15. Normalization of Relations with Japan:
Toward a New Partnership
1. During the first FYEDP years (1962–1966), the GNP grew at an average annual rate of 7.9 percent. By 1966, the GNP totaled $3.6 billion, $1.1 billion more than projected earlier by South Korea’s economic planners. See Paul. W.
Kuznets, “Korea’s Five-Year Plans,” in Practical Approaches to Development Planning: Korea’s Second Five-Year Plan, ed. Irma Adelman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), 66.
2. This is quoted in the third part of a series titled Samgong oegyo pihwa: k¤
yôksa k¤ Hyônjang [The Third Republic: The Hidden Diplomatic Stories], written by Yi Tong-wôn for Kukmin Ilbo. See Kukmin Ilbo, October 7, 1989.
3. Dong-A Ilbo, May 23, 1961.
4. Having attended the same college as Ikeda Hayato, Ohira Masayoshi, and Kosaka Zentaro, Yi Tong-hwan was counted on to facilitate South Korea’s lobbying efforts in Japan on the strength of his school background. Kim Tong-jo, Hoesang 30nyôn: Hanil hoedam [Recollecting Thirty Years: Korean-Japanese Talks] (Seoul: JoongAng Ilbosa, 1986), 212–213.
Notes to Pages 436–440
706
5. See John F. Kennedy’s remarks in Chicago on April 28, 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1962), 340–341.
6. Following his meeting with Park Chung Hee in Washington on November 14, 1961, Kennedy endorsed the “positive steps taken by [Park] in strengthening the nation against Communism and in eliminating corruption and other social evils.” Kennedy went on to assure Park that “the U.S. government would continue to extend all possible economic aid and cooperation to [South Korea] in order to further long range economic development,” which would in turn help to “maintain a strong anti-Communist posture in [South] Korea.” See the Kennedy-Park Joint Statement, ibid., 720–721.
7. U.S. House Committee on International Relations, Investigation of Korean-American Relations: Appendixes to the Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1978), 46.
8. In return for U.S. support, Park reiterated his earlier pledge to return the government to civilian control in the summer of 1963. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, vol. XLV, no. 1171 (December 4, 1961), 928–929.
9. Nikkan Kankei o Kenkyu Suru Kai, Shiryo: Nikkan kankei, I [Materials: Japanese-South Korean Relations vol. 1](Tokyo: Gendaishi Shuppankai, 1976), 36.
10. See Yi To-hyông, H¤kmak: Hanil kyosôp pihwa [Black Screen: The Secret Stories of the Korean-Japanese Talks] (Seoul: Chosun Ilbosa, 1987), 108–109.
11. See Ooka Eppei, “Jiyu Kankoku o mamoru: Nikkan kaidan no mondaiten o sagaru” [Defend Free Korea: Searching for the Problems of Japanese-South Korean Talks], Chuo Koron (January 1962): 284.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 288.
14. Sugi was KÃno’s leading financial backer from the Kansai area. For a discussion of Sugi’s selection as the chief delegate, see ibid. For full details on the sixth round of talks, see the South Korean Foreign Ministry’s “Che yukch’a hanil hoedam hoe¤irok 1,2,3,4” [Official Records on the Sixth Round of Talks 1,2,3 & 4], (ROK Foreign Ministry, 1962).
15. For an overview of the position the Japanese leftists took on the South Korean-Japanese talks, see Kawakami Jotaro (chairman of the JSP and a moderate), “Party Stand on Japan-ROK Normalization Talks,” Japan Socialist Review (October 1, 1962), 7–18.
16. For details on the background of the mutual defense treaties concluded by North Korea, see Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 205–206.
17. See Yamamoto Tsuyoshi, Nikkan Kankei [Japanese-Korean Relations] (Tokyo: Kyoikusha, 1978), 67–68.
18. Ekonomisuto, November 21, 1961.
19. Asahi Shimbun, July 20, 1961.
20. President Syngman Rhee visited Japan on several occasions, but none of them were in an official capacity.
21. Dong-A Ilbo, November 12, 1961.
Notes to Pages 441–445
707
22. Kim Tong-jo, Hoesang 30nyô n [Recollecting Thirty Years], 225.
23. Ishii Mitsujiro, Kaiso hachij_hachinen [Recollecting Eighty-eight Years] (Tokyo: Karucha Shuppansha, 1976), 441–442.
24. Asahi Shimbun, November 14, 1961.
25. Interview with Pae £i-hwan, chief delegate to the sixth round of talks (May 22, 1992).
26. The “Peace Line” refers to South Korean territorial waters unilaterally declared by Syngman Rhee. Some of these waters were claimed by Japan as well, causing much conflict and tension between the two countries.
27. See an article series called Nikkan kosho hiwa [The Secret Stories of Japan-ROK Negotiations], contributed by Shimamoto Kanero in Yomiuri Shimbun, January 21, 1992.
28. Japan Times, January 20, 1962.
29. “Hanil hoedam-¤i kyôngwi” [The Circumstances of Korean-Japanese Talks], in Hanil hoedam paeksô [The White Papers on the Korean-Japanese Talks]
(Seoul: Government of the Republic of Korea, 1965), 156–157.
30. For Kennedy’s meeting with Yoshida Shigeru, see Asahi Shimbun, May 12, 1962.
31. Ikeda’s reply to Okada Haruo, a left-wing member of the JSP, at the lower house’s Foreign Affairs Committee meeting on August 29, 1962, as reported by Japan Times, August 30, 1962.
32. In the LDP national convention held on July 14, 1962, Ikeda reemerged as the head of the party, receiving 391 votes out of 466 cast. Asahi Shimbun, July 15, 1962.
33. Yi To-Hyông, H¤kmak [Black Screen], 138–139.
34. Taking into consideration Japan’s limited foreign exchange reserves ($1.4 billion), Kim Chong-p’il is said to have advised against demanding high payments if Park was serious about bringing an end to the claims issue. Interview with Pae £i-hwan (May 22, 1992).
35. See Yi Wôn-dôk, Hanil kwagôsa ch’ ôri- ui wônjôm: Ilbon-¤i chônhuch’ ôri oegyo-wa hanil hoedam [The Starting Point for Korea and Japan’s Settlement of the Past: Japanese Post war Diplomacy and Korea-Japan Normali
zation], 172. (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1996).
36. See Yi Sôk-ryôl and Cho Kyu-ha, “Hanil hoedam chônmalsô” [An Account of the Korean-Japanese Talks], Shindong-A (June 1965), 114.
37. The Japanese foreign affairs and finance ministries’ proposal was released just prior to the bilateral foreign ministerial meeting in March 1962, prompting the South Korean side to dismiss it as “preposterous” and threaten to discontinue the talks. See Mainichi Shimbun, March 9, 1962; and Dong-A Ilbo, March 10, 1962.
38. Seizaburo Sato, Ken’ichi Koyama, and Shunpei Kumon, ed., Postwar Politician: The Life of Former Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira (English translation by William R. Carter of the Japanese biography Ohira Masayoshi: hito to shiso) (Tokyo and New York: Kodansha International, 1990), 202.
39. Yi Sôk-Ryôl and Cho Kyu-ha, “Hanil hoedam chônmalsô” [An Account of the Korean-Japanese Talks], 118.
Notes to Pages 445–449
708
40. Ibid., 118.
41. In comparison, Japan’s reparations payment to the Philippines (1956) amounted to $550 million in goods and services plus $250 million in commercial loans. The settled amount for Indonesia (1958) was $223 million in goods and services plus $400 million in commercial loans. For Burma, it was $200
million plus $50 million (1954). See Lawrence Olson, Japan in Postwar Asia (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), 13–32.
42. ROK Foreign Ministry, Hanil hoedam ryaksa [Short History of the Korean-Japanese Talks] (Seoul: Asian Bureau, Foreign Ministry, Republic of Korea, 1984), 97.
43. For Ohira’s public revelation of the secret agreement on property claims, see Mainichi Shimbun, January 30, 1963.
44. Kennedy opposed Park’s proposed extension of military rule, but he was careful not to make this a public U.S. stand. In a news conference held in April 1963, Kennedy stated that the leadership situation in South Korea was ultimately a judgment that the people and the responsible officials of South Korea had to make. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F.
Kennedy, 1963, 305. The State Department, however, did warn that “the military junta’s effort to continue military rule for four more years could constitute a threat to stable and effective government.” U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, vol. XLVI, no. 1198 (June 11, 1962), 573.
45. Quoted in George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United States in Vietnam, rev. ed. (New York: Dell, 1969), 152.
46. Series no. 46, Kukmin Ilbo, October 25, 1989.
47. Ibid.
48. George F. Kennan, “Japanese Security and American Policy,” Foreign Affairs 43, no. 1 (October 1964): 19–20.
49. South Korea’s Foreign Ministry, Hanil hoedam ryaksa [Short History of the Korean-Japanese Talks].
50. Asahi Shimbun, November 11, 1964.
51. For an analytic comparison of Kishi Nobusuke and Sato Eisaku, see Pak Kyông-sôk, Ilbon chamindang: kyô lsô ng-gwa chidojad¤l [Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party: Its Formation and Its Leaders] (Seoul: Hyôndae Chisiksa, 1990), 79–84.
52. Shiina Etsusaburo Tsuitoroku Kankokai, Kiroku Shiina Etsusaburo [A Record: Etsusaburo Shiina] (Tokyo: Record Issuance Committee of Etsusaburo Shiina, 1982) ,35–36.
53. Interview with Shiina Motoo (October 26, 1992).
54. If anything, Shiina was more an ultranationalist who was proud of Japan’s colonial past. During a no-confidence motion against Shiina in the Diet on February 15, 1965, a JSP member accused Shiina of being a former imperialist and therefore unfit to preside over the South Korea–Japan negotiations. In one of his earlier writings, Toka to Seiji, Shiina wrote: “If Japan’s annexation of Korea constituted in any way an act of imperialism, then it was a ‘glorious imperialism.’” See South Korea’s Foreign Ministry, Hanil hoedam ryaksa [A Brief History of the Korea-Japan Talks], 105.
Notes to Pages 449–462
709
55. Quoted in Shiina Etsusaburo Tsuitoroku Kankokai, Kiroku Shiina Etsusaburo
[A Record: Etsusaburo Shiina], 49.
56. After the official luncheon on the day of his arrival, Park told Yi Tong-wôn that “Shiina appears sincere enough for us to trust and work with.” Quoted in Series no. 53, Kukmin Ilbo, November 2, 1989.
57. The inevitable discrepancy in the two countries’ interpretation of Articles II and III was to become a source of political friction in the future.
58. Dong-A Ilbo, April 15, 1965.
59. Jung-Hoon Lee, “Korean-Japanese Relations: The Past, Present and Future,”
Korea Observer 21, no. 2 (Summer 1990), 171.
60. Chong-sik Lee, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), 100–101.
16. The Security, Political, and Human
Rights Conundrum, 1974–1979
1. See the testimony of Yi Hu-rak, then the director of the Korea Central Intelligence Agency, in Kim Dae-jung napch’i sagôn chinsang [The True Story behind the Kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung], ed. Kim Dae-jung napch’i sagôn-ui chinsang kyumyông-¤l wihan simin-¤i moim [A Citizen Meeting to Find Truth about the Kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung] (Seoul: P’ur¤n namu, 1995), 143, and Kim Chông-ryôm, A! Park Chung Hee: Kim Chông-ryôm chôngch’i hoegorok [Ah! Park Chung Hee: Kim Chông-ryôm’s reflections on politics]
(Seoul: JoongAng M&B, 1997), 168.
2. See Cho In-wôn, Kukka-wa sônt’aek [The State and Choice] (Seoul: Nanam, 1998) and Chapters 5, 7, and 8 above.
3. U.S. House of Representatives, Investigation of Korean-American Relations (October 31, 1978), 39. Hereafter Investigation of Korean-American Relations.
4. See Kim Dae-jung napch’i sagôn-ui chinsang kyumyông-¤l wihan simin-¤i moim [A Citizen Meeting to Find Truth about the Kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung].
5. See Investigation of Korean-American Relations, 149.
6. Hak-Kyu Sohn, “Political Opposition and the Yushin Regime: Radicalisation in South Korea, 1972–79” (Ph.D. diss., Oxford University, 1988), 121.
7. Yi Sang-u, Pirok Park Chung Hee sidae [Hidden Record of the Park Chung Hee Era], vol. 3 (Seoul: Chungwônmunhwa, 1985), 61; Sohn, “Political Opposition and the Yushin Regime,” 24.
8. Sohn, “Political Opposition and the Yushin Regime,” 127.
9. See Chung-in Moon et al., Alliance under Tension: The Evolution of South Korean-U.S. Relations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), chap. 5, 118–119.
10. Chae-Jin Lee and H. Sato, U.S. Policy toward Japan and Korea: A Changing Influence Relationship (New York: Praeger, 1982), 90.
11. Robert Boettcher , Gifts of Deceit: Sun Myung Moon, Tong-sun Park and the Korean Scandal (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980), 232.
12. Ibid.
Notes to Pages 462–468
710
13. Human Rights in South Korea and Philippines: Implications for U.S. Policy, hearings by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, May-June 1975, 11–12. Hereafter Human Rights Hearings, 1975.
14. Mun Ch’ang-g¤k, Hanmi kald¤ng-ui haebu [Anatomy of Korea-U.S. Conflicts] (Seoul: Nanam, 1994), 276.
15. Human Rights Hearings, 1975, 75 and 234–235.
16. Lee and Sato, U.S. Policy toward Japan and Korea, 92. See Boettcher, Gifts of Deceit, 142, 34.
17. Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea, Korean translation (Seoul: Hanul, 1993), 112–113.
18. War History Compilation Committee, Kukpang choyakchip [The Treaties of National Defense] (Joint Communiqué of Ford-Park Summit Meeting) (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1981), 755.
19. Lee and Sato, U.S. Policy toward Japan and Korea, 92.
20. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 1997), 63.
21. Ibid., 71–72; Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg, 285–286.
22. A letter from Bishop Paul Washburn and T. Jones to President Ford, March 25, 1976. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library (hereafter Ford Library).
23. A letter from Donald Fraser and another 118 congressmen to President Ford, April 2
, 1976. Ford Library.
24. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 85–86.
25. Lee and Sato, U.S. Policy toward Japan and Korea, 92.
26. The Helsinki agreement’s basket three clause dealt with freedom of travel, marriage between citizens of different states, and reunion of families. Kenneth Thompson, Morality and Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1980), 73.
27. Human Rights Hearings, 1975, 94–95.
28. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 143.
29. Zbigniew Brzezinski , Power and Principle: Memoir of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), 125.
30. Carter, Keeping Faith, 144.
31. Brzezinski , Power and Principle, 123.
32. Pak Tong-jin, Kil-¤n môlôdo tt¤t-¤n hana 9 [A Long Road but One Wish, a Memoir] (Seoul: Dong-A Ch’ulp’ansa, 1992), 106.
33. Lee and Sato, U.S. Policy toward Japan and Korea, 108.
34. William Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1999), 23.
35. See Presidential Review Memorandum [PRM]/NSC-10, February 18, 1977, and Harold Brown’s memorandum as well as the Final Report of Military Strategy and Force Posture Review at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library.
Hereafter Carter Library.
36. PRM/NSC-10, February 18, 1977, 29.
37. PRM/NSC-10, 32 and IV-23.
38. Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence, 23.
Notes to Pages 469–473
711
39. Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 129.
40. “Transfer of Defense Articles to the Republic of Korea: Message from the President,” Department of State Bulletin, December 12, 1977, 853.
41. Lee and Sato, U.S. Policy toward Japan and Korea, 109; Senators H.
Humphrey and J. Glenn, U.S. Troop Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea, a Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C., January 9, 1978), 19–20.
42. Philip C. Habib, “Withdrawal of U.S. Ground Forces from South Korea,” Department of State Bulletin, July 11, 1977.