The Campaigns of Napoleon

by David G Chandler

  65

  THE SECOND ATTEMPT: WAGRAM

  It was never Napoleon’s custom to admit defeat, even to his closest confidants, but the fact that he remained in an indecisive daze for 36 hours after the battle’s close gives a clue to his innermost feelings at this time, as well as a measure of his exhaustion. It was only on the 24th that he recovered his habitual drive, dispatching orders to call up Vandamme to St. Polten, the rest of Davout’s troops to Vienna, and Bernadotte to Linz and Steyer. However, it was not until the 25th that the bridge from Lobau to the south bank could be finally repaired, so the temporary lapse had little effect on the situation, especially as the Austrians remained in a state of equally stunned inaction, hardly able to credit their good fortune, never mind exploit it.

  As soon as the bridge was open, Napoleon gave priority to the evacuation of the thousands of unfortunate wounded, who had been lying groaning in the open for more than 48 hours. Surgeon General Larrey had performed marvels, using discarded cuirasses as soup kettles and slaughtering the horses of even senior officers to provide the wounded with broth. Napoleon’s reply to the many complaints he received from his outraged generals was to make Larrey a baron on the spot. Once the 10,000 wounded had reached Vienna everything possible was done for them. The doctors from every unit of the army were drafted into the hospitals, and every day Imperial aides-de-camp would visit the wards to distribute largesse to the sufferers. It would appear that the Emperor was suffering from a rare fit of conscience.

  Napoleon knew, however, that a victory was still imperative. Not only were his extended lines of communications dangerously threatened by a renewed series of popular risings, but resistance movements all over Europe would undoubtedly receive fresh inspiration from the tidings of Aspern-Essling. If the whole of Germany was not to rise about his ears a salutary lesson had to be administered as soon as possible. However, he did not allow himself to be rushed into making a new premature attempt at a crossing. More than six weeks were taken up in planning and preparing for every possible contingency. First, he evacuated all the army save Massena’s corps from the island of Lobau and set about turning it into a regular entrenched camp, with good roads, strong fortifications armed with 129 guns and, above all, reliable links with the south bank. Before the end of June, two good bridges had been built linking Kaiser-Ebersdorf with the Schneidergrund islet, and beyond that point were three more onto Lobau itself. Solid stockades were piledriven into the river bed upstream to ward off floating obstructions; a flotilla of gunboats manned by the Marines of the Guard was brought into service to patrol the approaches, and a vast quantity of material was stockpiled on the island for bridging the last channel.

  At the same time the Emperor ordered considerable alterations in the organization of the army’s artillery. The allocation between corps was adjusted, Davout and Massena receiving a higher proportion of guns than the rest. Great efforts were also made to bring into service large numbers of captured Austrian cannon, most of them found in the Viennese arsenals. The aim was to provide each regiment with two guns apiece for close support, the main purpose of which appears to have been to inculcate confidence in the less experienced soldiers. Above all, Napoleon was determined to redress the inadequacy of French metal revealed in the recent battle. By the time of Wagram, no less than 500 guns were available.

  Meanwhile Napoleon was summoning up more and more troops to strengthen his army for the crossings. The cavalry were sent out in a wide screening operation to the south and east to conceal the movements. Eugène and Macdonald arrived in the region with 23,200 men and 100 cannon at the end of May, and defeated the Archduke John at the battle of Raab on the ninth anniversary of Marengo, driving him back toward Comoron in Hungary. A short while later Marmont arrived in Graz at the head of the 10,000 men of the XIth Corps. From June 28 the concentration became general. Only a minimum of troops, mostly German allies, were left to perform the secondary roles of watching the Danube and holding the ring. Bernadotte was brought up to Engerdorf, and Vandamme moved into Vienna. Eugène was summoned from Raab, Davout from Pressburg, Marmont from Graz, and by these measures close on 160,000 men were massed in the vicinity of the Austrian capital by the first day of July, and still more were on the way.

  What had the Austrians been doing since May 22? In fact, very little had transpired. Only Hiller and Klenau were left occupying Aspern-Essling to watch the island of Lobau, and immediately after the battle Charles had pulled back the greater part of his army behind the Russbach, while the Vth Corps retained its old position opposite Nussdorf. The Austrian command appears to have been waiting for a general German rising and the arrival of Archduke John’s army before taking more positive action, and the long days of May and June passed one after another with little to show except for the strengthening of the fortifications at Aspern and Essling, where extensive works were under preparation. Otherwise, Charles occupied his time incorporating 60,000 Landwehr and 200 more guns into his army or arguing with his generals about the best course to pursue if Napoleon ever tried to re-cross the Danube. He was also worried about Russian intentions toward Galicia, where the Archduke Ferdinand appeared incapable of dealing with the deteriorating situation—faced as he was by both Poniatowski’s Poles and the Tsar’s threatening (if largely quiescent) legions.* These distractions proved so engrossing that it was only on July I that Charles realized that something serious was again afoot on the south bank of the Danube.

  By that time Napoleon’s plans were reaching maturity. On the last day of June, Legrand’s division was pushed over into the Mühlau salient, covered by the fire of 36 guns, to serve as a distraction. Over the next two days, Oudinot’s corps joined Massena on Lobau, and Napoleon inconspicuously transferred his headquarters from the Schönbrunn to the southwest corner of the island. These various moves, duly reported to Charles by his invaluable observatory on the Bissamberg, served to confirm his conviction that Napoleon intended to repeat in every detail his earlier crossing. In fact, nothing was further from the truth; Charles was falling for the bait. Napoleon had no intention of crossing into the teeth of prepared positions; instead, he now planned to move the bulk of his army from the east side of Lobau island through and to the south of Alexander Island (so named in honor of the clerkly Berthier), thus bypassing the enemy fortifications at Aspern, Essling and Enzersdorf, and placing the French in position to fall upon the Austrian left flank in the hope of breaking through it and thus separating Charles from Archduke John’s approaching army, recently reported to have reached Pressburg.

  As in May, much would depend on the success of the actual crossing operation. No pains were spared to acquire exact information about the proposed bridging sites. On one occasion, Marbot tells us, the Emperor and Massena dressed themselves in sergeants’ greatcoats and strolled nonchalantly to within a hundred paces of the Austrian outposts, escorted by only one colonel. “There, the colonel took all his clothes off and went into the water, while Napoleon and Massena also removed their greatcoats as if they, too, proposed to bathe … and thus they examined at their leisure the place where they wished to throw the bridges and carry out the crossing. The Austrians were so used to seeing small groups of our soldiers swimming in the area that they stayed peacefully lying on the grass.”30

  A great deal also depended on the observance of an exact timetable for the initial crossings into Lobau, for the building of the bridges—more than a dozen of them were planned—and finally for the assault-crossing itself. The schedule was approximately as follows.

  Only stores and matériel were to pass over onto the island (in the interests of secrecy) during July 2 and most of the following day, but the Imperial Guard was to cross into Lobau at 8:30

  P.M. on the 3rd, followed three hours later by the 18,000 men of the IXth Corps. These troops were to make for the northwest of the island as if presaging a full attack through the Mühlau salient. Most of the 4th was then to be spent transporting stores and guns; but once again after dark, Davout was to cr
oss onto Lobau with his 35,000 men and head for the east side to take up a position between Massena and Oudinot. At 1:00

  A.M. on the 5th, the Army of Italy, followed by the light cavalry at 3:00 o’clock and the rest of the mounted arm an hour later, would make the crossing in their turn. Marmont was to bring up the rear with the XIth Corps later that morning, if and when he arrived from Graz. In the meantime, by early morning on the 5th, the bridging program should almost be completed; besides the bridges already in position for Legrand’s use, a further four were to be openly constructed on the northern side of Lobau as measures devised to delude the enemy. Another ten, however, would reach out from the east bank of Lobau in the vicinity of Alexander Island ready to carry the main attacking forces. The first of the assault troops would cross to the north bank shortly before dawn on the 5th, Oudinot moving first on the far right through the Hänsel Grund to secure the flank of the crossing operation, Davout moving more directly toward Wittau in the center with Massena on his left. By midday, the whole army (less Marmont) should be over the Danube and formed up as follows: front line from left to right (between Gross-Enzersdorf and Wittau), Massena, Oudinot and Davout, with most of the light cavalry on the extreme right searching for signs of the Archduke John, the rest being on Massena’s left; second line—the IXth, the Guard, the XIth and the Army of Italy—drawn up in that order between Gross-Enzersdorf and Mühleuten; in rear of the second line—the cavalry reserve. All should then be ready to pivot on Gross-Enzersdorf for the onslaught against the Austrian left. This would follow the breakout from the bridgehead late on the 5th or early on the 6th, according to circumstances. Napoleon, on this occasion, excelled himself by drawing up precise and intelligible orders, and the high degree of success that attended the early stages of the operation is largely due to this fact.31

  Although it was clear that a fairly major move was in progress from June 30 onward, opinion in the Austrian camp remained divided as to the best counter-measures to adopt. Charles wavered uncertainly from one course of possible action to another. It was some time before he could be persuaded that Napoleon was, in fact, on the point of mounting a full-scale operation. There had been several scares during the previous weeks, but all had come to naught. If anything did transpire, Charles, at first, favored a forward concentration of his army in support of the Aspern-Essling position, held by the VIth Corps, which since May 26 had been under the command of General Klenau, the unlamented Hiller having resigned his command on grounds of ill health. On July 1, the Austrians did indeed move forward en masse over the Marchfeld toward these forward positions, to Napoleon’s great satisfaction, but this did not prove permanent. Generals Wimpfen and Grünne, who felt certain that the army would be better placed further back, namely between the Russbach and the Bissamberg, and had been arguing in favor of this position for several weeks, suddenly found Charles veering toward their opinion. “After spending the whole of July 2 near Gross-Enzersdorf, and observing the heavy French batteries posted on the north side of the island, he came to the conclusion that it would be advisable to fight farther back. The unfortunate consequence of this indecision was that only half measures were taken.”32 It may seem amazing, but even at this late stage with a major action impending, Charles still believed that Napoleon would accept the offer of a negotiated settlement. Accordingly, during July 3, the greater part of the Austrians pulled back to their old positions stretching from Gerasdorf to Wagram and along the Russbach. No steps, however, were taken to fortify this line. This meant that there would no longer be an opportunity for Napoleon to outflank the whole enemy army immediately after the crossing as originally planned. On the other hand, there was now less prospect of direct enemy intervention during the actual crossing.

  The passage of the Danube onto the island of Lobau by the French Army (July 3, 1809) prior to the Battle of Wagram

  The success of the second crossing operation was as complete as could be hoped. In addition to Legrand’s earlier feint on the Mühlau, a second diversionary attack was launched against the town of Stadlau on the 2nd, and this served to increase the bewilderment of Austrian headquarters. Frequent squalls of unseasonable rain and a series of thunderstorms also helped to disguise the magnitude of the move onto Lobau island from the keen watchers stationed atop the Bissam. By late evening on the 4th, everything was practically ready. Then, covered by a convenient thunderstorm, the leading elements of Oudinot’s assault troops crossed by boat into the Hänsel Grund between nine and ten o’clock, and soon succeeded in overwhelming the Austrian posts stationed there. The moment firing opened on the eastern flank, massed French batteries poured devastating bombardment in the direction of Aspern, Essling and Gross-Enzersdorf, and this, together with the storm, disguised from the Austrians what was afoot. Massena’s crossing was equally successful; the first boatloads passed over at ten and immediately thereafter a prepared bridge made up of 14 pontoons was swung in one piece across the gap of 178 yards. This was no mean feat of engineering, and Napoleon in person supervised the last steps. “How long do you require for the swinging?” he asked Captain Heckmann, commanding the sappers. “A quarter of an hour, Sire,” was the reply. “I give you five minutes. Bertrand—your watch!”33 The first attempt was crowned with success, and before the last ropes and anchors had been made secure, Napoleon was hounding Massena’s infantry over the planks. Massena himself crossed over in a light coach; a short time before he had suffered the misfortune of a heavy fall from his horse which badly injured his legs.

  The Battle of Wagram, July 5-6, 1809: the first day—the morning crossing and the evening battle

  The operation continued as if by clockwork. Oudinot pressed on for the village of Mühleuten driving all before him, while Massena made short work of the Austrian garrison in the Ufer Haus. Shortly after two in the morning of the 5th, Davout’s four infantry divisions followed by three of cavalry began to cross their appointed bridges and the buildup of troops on the northern bank was proceeding according to schedule. The only hitch of any note occurred when it was realized that Oudinot’s corps would have to cross Davout’s communications to take up its assigned battle position in the center of the first line. Fortunately a combination of inactivity on the part of the Austrians and the skill of the French officers on the spot enabled this problem to be overcome, and as Jomini says, “The army escaped all disorder, except that arising from a few detachments following corps to which they did not belong.”34 No effective Austrian resistance was encountered throughout the whole of this time, although the garrison of the castle at Mühleuten hung onto their positions until dawn.

  All things considered, the French had every reason for self-congratulation; not a bridge had parted and hardly a man had lost his life. Surprise was also achieved. Charles was not even informed that the final crossing was in progress until 5:00

  A.M.; his reaction was then very belatedly to order the fortification of the Russbach, for he still had no intention of fighting a major battle close by the Danube. Although he sent off an order to his brother John (in the vicinity of Pressburg), summoning him to join his left, he indicated that this junction should take place at Markgrafneusiedl behind the Russbach. Only at 9:30 did Charles begin to take the situation seriously.

  By 9:00

  A.M. Napoleon was satisfied that his bridgehead was reasonably secure. On the left, Massena’s divisions, drawn up in a long line running inland but facing to their left, had successfully driven the outlying units of the Austrian VIth Corps back into Gross-Enzersdorf before proceeding to capture both the town and nearby Pouzet Island. This enabled a new bridge to be thrown to the north bank (completed by 9:00 the same evening). Davout, meantime, was well on his way toward Wittau, and by 8:00

  A.M. Oudinot had attained his designated position between the IVth and IIIrd Corps.

  Thus Napoleon’s first line was complete with the vital pivot of Gross-Enzersdorf safely in his possession. All morning and afternoon the passage of troops continued in a steady stream, Eugène
reaching his position around midday, Bernadotte about 2:00, the Guard after 4:00 o’clock. On Napoleon’s order, the leading formations were already pushing forward to enlarge the bridgehead. Davout moved steadily toward Glinzendorf supported by Eugène, and Oudinot also made steady progress toward Baumersdorf (followed by Bernadotte’s Saxons), but the most spectacular advance was that of Massena on the extreme left. As early as 2:30