The Campaigns of Napoleon

by David G Chandler

  Meanwhile, the French forces were hard at work trying to make good the unwonted delays of the morning’s deployment over the Sambre. About 3:30

  P.M. Marshal Ney arrived at the front (somewhat belatedly) to be given command of the left wing by the Emperor on the spot; for the rest, as the afternoon wore on, the Armée du Nord was gradually recovering its poise and consolidating its foothold on the north bank of the Sambre with commendable application. It was also in midafternoon that Napoleon issued verbal orders to both Ney and Grouchy; the former was to take the 1st and IInd Corps (together with Lefebvre-Desnouettes’ Guard cavalry) and press forward up the Brussels road while the latter (with IIIrd and IVth Corps under command together with more cavalry) moved up the Fleurus road to take Sombreffe. The reserve (VIth Corps and the Imperial Guard) were meanwhile to close up on Charleroi, once the columns of Grouchy’s wing had cleared the town. Whether or not Ney was specifically ordered to take Quatre Bras is open to conjecture; the fact that the Order of the Day issued late on the 15th included the sentence—“The Emperor has given command of the left to the Prince of Moskowa, who this very evening establishes his headquarters at Quatre-Chemins on the Brussels road”10—would seem to indicate that Napoleon did mention such a move, but in any case an advance by the left wing was wholly dependent on an equal degree of progress being made on the right; and there can be no doubt that it was Grouchy who was most guilty of holding up the development of the offensive throughout the late afternoon and evening of the 15th. Indeed, so exasperated did the Emperor become with Grouchy’s slow progress toward Fleurus that he rode over to Gilly in person to instil some measure of life into the right wing’s operations (5:30

  P.M.). As always, le Tondu’s presence had the desired effect, and within a short space of time the outskirts of Fleurus were taken from Ziethen after a stiff fight.

  About the same hour, Reille’s corps, heading Ney’s column, cleared the foe’s outposts from Gosselies. But then a deadening inaction seems to have settled over the entire French army. Instead of pressing on with all available troops toward Frasnes and Quatre Bras, Marshal Ney decided to halt Reille’s corps north of Gosselies in order to await the arrival of d’Erlon; he also desired some indication of how matters were faring away on the right before advancing further. Consequently only Lefebvre-Desnouëttes’ cavalry was sent on ahead toward Frasnes to spy out the lie of the land. As the 2,000 horsemen approached the town they came suddenly under fire from an unidentified force that retired northward out of the town. Lefebvre-Desnouëttes cautiously followed the enemy up towards Quatre Bras, but soon came under heavier fire from a battery of eight guns and an unspecified number of infantry stationed along both sides of the main road. Although Marshal Ney sent up an infantry battalion at his request, the height of the corn in the vicinity at that time made it impossible to estimate even the approximate strength of their opponents, and so Lefebvre-Desnouettes decided to call off the action. By 8:00

  P.M. Ney had authorized his men to camp for the night, and very soon a long line of cantonments and bivouacs stretched the entire length of the road from Frasnes to Gosselies and thence to Marchienne.

  About the same time Grouchy’s ardor also dimmed, and by late dusk his infantry and cavalry were similarly encamped along the roadsides from south of Fleurus to Châtelet, though a sizeable proportion of Gérard’s IVth Corps spent the night on the southern bank of the River Sambre. Linking the two wings were the cavalry of General Piré (near Neppignies) and Girard’s division of Reille’s IInd Corps (close by Wangenies). The reserve, meantime, was ordered to bivouac as follows: the Imperial Guard between Charleroi and Gilly; the Grand Parks and Lobau’s corps on the southern bank of the Sambre, the latter indeed being four or five miles back from the river.

  About 9:00

  P.M. a weary Napoleon rode back to headquarters in Charleroi; the day’s efforts had kept him in the saddle for no less than fifteen hours with barely a break. However, the Emperor had reasonable cause for satisfaction; nightfall found his army neatly encamped in three closely integrated columns, the entire force covering an area of little over 100 square miles—although a larger proportion of the troops still remained south of the Sambre than had been originally intended. Moreover, most initial objectives had been attained (save only the town of Fleurus and the crossroads at Quatre Bras), the Prussian 1st Corps had been given a rough handling, and the Sambre bridges had been secured intact. Thus l’Armée du Nord was well placed at the very hinge of the Prussian and Allied spheres of influence, and within a few hours on the morrow the strategic penetration would be completed. Napoleon also retained full liberty to make his main effort on whichever flank presented the maximum advantage, the reserve’s central location being ideally suited for intervention on either wing; there were also indications that the Prussians were still deliberately advancing as if to embrace their doom, and as there were still no certain signs of Wellington’s proximity to the critical area it was quite probable that Blücher would be caught in isolation. Comforted by these reflections the Emperor retired to bed shortly after nine o’clock, leaving orders that he was to be called at midnight.

  What, meanwhile, was happening on the Allied side to counter these French moves? Wellington deserves little credit for the part he played in attempting to thwart Napoleon’s plans on June 15. His first order, as we have seen, was to prepare his men for a march away from the critical area. And although later that evening a belated dispatch from Blücher at last revealed that the Prussians were marching on Sombreffe in force, these tidings did not cause the Duke to alter his basic dispositions immediately. Indeed, at 10:00

  P.M., shortly before setting out to attend the celebrated ball given by the Duchess of Richmond in Brussels, Wellington issued a set of further instructions which, in general, confirmed the concentration towards the outer flank, although it closed the various divisions into a somewhat tighter compass. Alten’s 3rd Division was ordered to Nivelles, Cooke’s Ist to Braine-le-Comte, Colville’s 4th and Uxbridge’s cavalry to Enghien. The reserve was again warned to be ready to march on Mont-St.-Jean at short notice should that prove necessary. This meant that whatever orders Wellington might subsequently issue, at least half his force would be beyond effective supporting distance of Quatre Bras on the morrow. The Duke was still obsessed with the need to protect the roads leading from Mons and Ath to Brussels.

  In none of these orders was there any mention of a force being detached to hold the crucial crossroads. That the French cavalry encountered opposition between Frasnes and Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th was entirely due to the initiative of a couple of intelligent Allied officers who were prepared to risk Wellington’s wrath and disobey the letter of his orders in order to pursue a course of action they felt more justified on account of their completer knowledge of local events.

  About 2:00

  P.M. in the afternoon of the 15th, the Prince of Orange’s chief of staff, General Constant de Rebecque, had authorized General Count Perponcher-Sedlnitzberg to move one of his brigades (commanded by Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar) to Quatre Bras and beyond. So it happened that Prince Bernhard’s advanced battalion and a single battery of horse artillery were in position to challenge Lefebvre-Desnouëttes’ advance on Frasnes, and subsequently the whole brigade of Nassauers (4,000 infantry and eight guns) were drawn into the action as the exposed battalion retired on the main position along the edge of the Bossu woods, a little over a mile south of Quatre Bras.

  On receiving news of this engagement, Constant de Rebecque took a second important step when at 8:00

  P.M. he authorized Brigadier-General Bylandt to march up from Nivelles to support Bernhard. Shortly after this instruction had been sent out, Wellington’s afternoon order reached Ist Corps headquarters, ordering Perponcher’s division in its entirety to concentrate at Nivelles, some eight miles away from Quatre Bras. This missive the chief of staff showed to Perponcher without comment, and the latter, on his own initiative, decided to disregard his com
mander in chief’s specific order and to continue the occupation and reinforcement of the Quatre Bras position. As General Fuller describes it, “this act of intelligent disobedience saved Blücher”11 the next day, for it prevented Ney’s unhindered occupation of the vital junction on the lateral road.

  This act of insubordination also saved Wellington’s reputation. Although his attendance at the Duchess of Richmond’s ball was by no means an indication of a careless or frivolous attitude toward events (indeed, his prime reason for going was to instil a little confidence into the apprehensive citizenry of Brussels), it was not until early on the morning of the 16th that Wellington at last awoke to the reality of the situation. A messenger arrived from General Dornberg, commanding Wellington’s cavalry screen, operating from Oudenarde, reporting that there were no signs whatsoever of enemy troop movements toward Mons. Presumably, therefore, the early appearances of a French drive in that direction had been no more than a feint—and Dornburg was further able to confirm that the great mass of Napoleon’s army was moving through Charleroi. The arrival of further tidings from Saxe-Weimar at Quatre Bras and from Marshal Blücher at Sombreffe finally clarified the position. As Captain George Bowles of the Coldstream Guards recorded, the duke acted with great coolness on receipt of these disturbing tidings. “The Prince of Orange came back suddenly, just as the Duke of Wellington had taken his place at the supper table, and whispered some minutes to his Grace…. The Duke of Wellington remained nearly twenty minutes after this, and then said to the Duke of Richmond, ‘I think it is time for me to go to bed likewise’; and then, whilst wishing him goodnight, whispered to ask him if he had a good map in the house. The Duke of Richmond said that he had, and took him into his dressing room…. The Duke of Wellington shut the door and said: ‘Napoleon had humbugged me, by G—d! He has gained twenty-four hours’ march on me.’ The Duke of Richmond said, ‘What do you intend doing?’ The Duke of Wellington replied: ‘I have ordered the army to concentrate at Quatre Bras; but we shall not stop him there, and if so, I must fight him here’ (at the same time passing his thumb-nail over the position of Waterloo). He then said adieu, and left the house by another way out.”12

  And so it was that spurring messengers bore off a third set of orders to the harassed and sweating formations of the Allied army. At last the full concentration on the inner flank was authorized. However such marching and countermarching was doing little to maintain good order or a sense of purpose in Wellington’s army as a whole, and many of the units found themselves taken by surprise by the sudden spate of contradictory orders. The celebrated Captain Mercer, officer commanding “G” Troop, Royal Horse Artillery, whose diary forms a most valuable record of the campaign’s events as seen by a relatively junior officer, was sound asleep when his servant woke him with a start to deliver a letter from the deputy-assistant quartermaster-general ordering him to move with his men and guns without delay to Enghien. “The suddenness of it, and the importance of arriving quickly at the appointed place, rather alarmed me, for upon reflection I remembered that I had been guilty of two or three imprudences. First, all my officers were absent; secondly, all my country waggons were absent; thirdly, a whole division (one third of my troop) was absent at Yseringen. ‘Send the Sergeant Major here’ was the first order as I drew on my stockings. ‘Send for Mr. Coates’ (my commissariat officer) the second as I got one leg into my overalls; ‘William, make haste and get breakfast’ the third as I buttoned them up.”13 However, little by little the confusion in Mercer’s troop—and in the entire Allied army—sorted itself out, and Wellington’s divisions at last set out along the right road. The main question now remaining was whether they could arrive in time. Much depended on the degree of alertness and drive shown by Marshal Ney in launching his attack on the crossroads—and even more on the steadiness of the mere 8,000 men, 16 guns and 50 Silesian hussars of Perponcher’s two brigades constituting the only allied forces holding the point of impending crisis. Reinforcements were soon on their way, however, for shortly after 7:30

  A.M. on June 16, the “Iron Duke” quitted his quarters and set off down the road for Quatre Bras, the reserve preceding him along the highway from Brussels toward Mont-St.-Jean.

  In terms of unit strength, the respective French and Allied formations were as follows:

  Battalions Squadrons Batteries

  French: 175 180 50

  English: 133 109 34

  Prussian: 136 137 41

  For a detailed analysis of the French Order of Battle, see Appendix.

  89

  A POUNDING FOR BLÜCHER

  The early part of the night passed quietly for the Emperor at Charleroi. He was called at midnight when Marshal Ney rode in to describe the day’s events on his sector and receive his orders for the 16th. After a long discussion, during which it is inconceivable that Napoleon did not press upon his subordinate the vital urgency of occupying the Quatre Bras crossroads at the earliest possible moment, the two took a late supper together. Then, after reading the latest reports submitted by the corps, Napoleon returned to his private apartments for the rest of the night.

  It is fairly clear from an examination of the Correspondance that until at least 8:00

  A.M. on the 16th the Emperor was convinced in his own mind that Blücher would retreat; it seemed beyond the bounds of reason that the Prussian commander in chief, for all his well-known “hussar habits,” would deliberately court battle in the exposed position around the villages of St. Amand and Ligny. Napoleon was further convinced that Wellington, too, would fall back in the general direction of Brussels, attempting to place a little space in both distance and time between his men and “I’Armée du Nord” before risking action. Weighing up the military factors, the Emperor therefore now decided that he would strain every nerve and sinew to try conclusions with “Monsieur Villainton” first, with the design of inflicting a heavy defeat upon him or, at the very least, of driving the Allied army away from Blücher. However, as it was equally important to ensure that Blücher was prevented from moving to his colleague’s assistance, it was also necessary for Grouchy’s wing to make a preliminary advance to seize Gembloux and Sombreffe, thus severing the crucial allied line of lateral intercommunication.

  About six in the morning the Emperor dictated two important dispatches to his subordinates. The first, addressed to Grouchy, outlined the impending operations as they would affect the French right wing. Grouchy was to advance boldly on Sombreffe and Gembloux, engaging any Prussians he might find there. At a later moment, presently unspecified, he was to swing part of his force down the lateral road to assist Ney in the main day’s conflict against Wellington. “If the enemy is at Sombreffe, I want him attacked; I want the same to happen at Gembloux—and that place captured as well—my intention being to operate with my left wing, which is commanded by Marshal Ney, against the English…. All the reports that have reached me reveal that the Prussians can only oppose 40,000 men against us.”14 A second dispatch was sent to the Prince of the Moskowa. After repeating the gist of Grouchy’s instructions, this missive went on to order Ney to hold himself in readiness for an immediate advance toward Brussels (probably that evening)—once the reserve reached him, and once the Emperor’s mind was finally made up.

  It is quite probable that the unaccountable lethargy of Marshal Ney throughout the morning of the 16th stems from the ambiguous phrases. For the time being, Napoleon continued, Ney was to place one division five miles northwest of Quatre Bras, retain six at Quatre Bras itself, and send one more out toward Marbais (east) to serve as a link with Grouchy. For administrative reasons, Ney was also informed that Kellermann’s cavalry formation would be sent up to replace Lefebvre-Desnouëttes, who properly belonged with the Imperial Guard. Finally, in an attempt to make everything clear to the slow-witted and shellshocked Prince of the Moskowa, the Emperor appended the celebrated passage revealing the basic strategical and grand tactical concept underlying his plan of campaign. “For this campaign I have adopted the follo
wing general principle—to divide my army into two wings and a reserve…. The Guard will form the reserve, and I shall bring it into action on either wing as circumstances may dictate…. Also, according to circumstances, I shall draw troops from one wing to strengthen my reserve.” After hinting that “certain things would happen” (the Emperor’s coy way of forecasting the probability of a major engagement), Napoleon ordered his subordinate to remain constantly on the alert, ready “to take the road at once and march rapidly and unhindered on Brussels.”15

  It was two hours before these dispatches had been prepared by the staff, signed and sent on their way, but hardly had the aides left Imperial Headquarters than a message from Grouchy arrived reporting that his cavalry screen had spotted strong columns of Prussian troops advancing toward Sombreffe from the general direction of Namur. Still hardly able to credit the news that Blücher was deliberately courting battle in strength in so exposed a position, Napoleon at first discounted this information as probably inaccurate and proceeded with his intention of traveling to Fleurus. Once arrived there, Napoleon reasoned, he would be in a position to see for himself and then dictate any changes of plan that might be necessary. And so it was that by 11:00 o’clock the Imperial “little headquarters” had joined Vandamme’s corps, which was drawn up facing Ziethen’s troops in the vicinity of St. Amand. Although he still considered the Prussian force to be only a rear guard corps left behind by Blücher to shield a general concentration further to the rear, Napoleon decided to attack it as soon as possible. At once the overall French plan of action was altered. Blücher—since he had so obligingly placed part of his army within Napoleon’s grasp—should receive the main attention of the French on the 16th; Ney’s operations against Brussels and Wellington would be subordinated at least for the time being to those about to be launched against the Prussians. The big event of the day would, therefore, take place on the French right instead of on the left as hitherto assumed.