Jumpseat- A Tale of Twisted Fate

by E E Valenciana

There were red flags that were visible to other aviators in the company far in advance of October 31. Dieter's personal life was turning inside out. A strained divorce had forced his back against the wall. He lost twenty-two pounds. One individual stated,

  “He was becoming defensive concerning the world around him.” Company regulations meant little amidst the strain of a broken love. To make matters worse, he was scheduled to fly F/O to a prim and proper “fly by the book” captain. Other pilots saw the problem and whispers were overheard. Someone finally suggested that the check pilot should have a little talk with the pilots. McKay’s file indicated that Dieter had gotten into the habit of arriving for work without his uniform jacket and pilot's cap, which Carl seemed to resent. Other pilots saw a deeper layer.

  “They should not have been flying together,” a well-respected aviator stated in the aftermath. A conversation ensued between the Supervisor and each pilot individually. The Check Pilot was greeted by angry men who masked their true feelings as was pilot protocol. Neither would dare let it be known that one backed away from the other, a critical mistake.

  The moment I spotted sequence 190 in my Flight Attendant Schedule I knew that my body would be in for a hard night. One’s body can play games on you. By the time the three-and-a-half-hour flight arrived in Mexico City, one felt as though one had worked a Trans-Atlantic flight.

  Carl Herbert was 53. When a person’s body wants to sleep, it is unwilling to take no for an answer. The industry’s solution was to keep those coffee pots continually filled. Flight 2605 took off after a delay and equipment change.

  Captain Herbert guided his bird southward, a familiar route he had successfully completed to Mexico City 351 times prior. As the flight attendants prepared to serve the midnight snack, the cockpit crew sat back to what seemed like an ordinary flight. One pilot is heard on the CVR recording expressing the fact that he had not slept in three days.

  Regulation 1.2. 1-4 from the Flight Attendant Flight Manual states “Sleeping, dozing or action by the F/A that gives the impression of sleeping is cause for immediate dismissal.” One can assume that the regulation was even stricter for pilots.

  Dieter lived in Seattle and commuted to LAX for the all-nighter. Carl had spent the time prior to the assignment flying many hours on his personally owned aircraft. Fatigue joined disdain as an unwanted companion in the cockpit. But there was still the combined aviation skills and experience of the three men to take into account. Then, Mexican Air Traffic Control would throw a fatal wrench into the deadly mix.

  According to experts such as Captain Ron Banner, Runway 23-Left was the most desirable operating runway at Mexico City because it was the longest and widest, and had the only precision approach and approach light system (ALS) available. Approaching Mexico City as the CVR recording revealed, Mexican Air Traffic Control cleared the flight to descend to 13,000 ft. and proceed directly to the Tepexpan radio beacon. They were further told to expect an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Runway 23-Left. The Captain and First Officer agreed at the time that they would make a Tepexpan approach, which is actually the transition that leads to the ILS approach, 23-Left.

  Analyzing the cockpit recording and using Greenwich Mean Time, one can deduce that fatigue and disdain began to make their presence known. At 1134:07, after being guided toward Runway 23-Left, Second Officer Sam Wells had misgivings about the Captain’s planned approach. With reverence, he speaks up to question Carl.

  “Charlie, do you realize that you’re in INS?” When assurance was received from his commander, he became apologetic (1134:19 of the tape). “Just checking up old buddy, to make sure.” Conditions in the cockpit deteriorated rapidly. Procedures on the ground and instrumentation in the sky were part of the problem. Carl Herbert was being sucked into a “black hole” condition and no one spoke up. Almost six minutes and thirty seconds of crucial time passed before Carl correctly recognized the situation. At 1140:48 of the recording he inquired:

  “We’re cleared on the right, we’re cleared on the right, is that correct?” Both Dieter and Sam responded immediately. The First Officer reveals the information.

  “The other runway!” The Second Officer supported the verdict, “Yeah, the other runway.” Captain Herbert made the proper adjustments but by then it was too late. Who would have thought that construction workers would be allowed to park their trucks on an on-again-off-again runway, to take a “siesta”?

  The replacement control tower operator had mistakenly reported visibility at two and a half miles. Reality was that visibility was at zero. The fog had crept in from the dried lake bed to camouflage the dump truck that stood parked right on 2605's path.

  Did resentment between the captain and first officer restrain them from utilizing their full potential? I must consider such a possibility after what I experienced in my visit to the cockpit during the flight. Sam Wells may have suspected the fast developing dilemma but may have been reluctant to speak because of cockpit etiquette. Did Dieter's resentment toward the captain keep him from speaking up? If so, it may have cost him his life. Of course, any theory regarding to what extent their conflict contributed to the demise of the DC-10 would remain hypothetical. These are just the questions and opinions of the surviving flight attendant.

  Carl Herbert relied heavily on those skills he keenly sharpened over the many years in the sky. He played by the rules but was unaware that the rules had changed. He struggled to save his magnificent ship to the very last second. This time his skills were not enough. One man was not enough to guide the DC-10 down safely that cold October morning. Three men might have done the job but the company failed to recognize that in some rare situations it takes all three, working in compatibility. The airline and the lords that guided the company dictated policy in cliques. The printed laws of the industry are impressive as stated in the manual. Regulation 1.3-E “In conjunction with the Captain’s authority and the established chain in command, each crew member has the direct responsibility to perform their duties as a team to insure a safe and comfortable flight.” Seldom is the real world so harmonious. The needed regulation and those like it were often tossed by the wayside by a caste system that existed in the skies. Up to that time the industry seemed to fail to see the power of an individual to rise to a challenge. The airlines were solely to blame, management in particular, and rarely did the scenario ever change.

  My beloved airline, a company with an excellent safety record found itself in deep shit. Once it was made clear that Mexico would dictate the agenda and final decision, the airline scrambled to salvage what they could. They would cooperate with the game plan that was formulated. There would be those individuals who would seek truth only to be silenced by conclusions concocted soon after the incident occurred. There were many in the industry who felt the company was later granted a key advantage for expansion of its system as a result of the terrible accident. Valued destinations on the Mexican Riviera were a consolation once all the lawsuits were settled.

  The United States Government in the form of the NTSB sent their skilled investigators down to the Mexican Federal District but none were ever permitted to speak to various ground crews. Civilian witnesses were segregated from the Norte Americanos. No real evaluation could be conducted. “Higher ups” in Washington would restrain their questioning.

  “This should be a Mexican show,” reliable sources would quote. Besides, the U.S. had just received a much-needed agreement with Mexico allowing her to be the recipient of the country's newly discovered wealth of oil and natural gas. The deaths of passengers and crew were not much incentive to stop U.S. political leaders from turning their heads the other way on this one.

  Many facts the experts (representing interested parties) discovered were immediately brought to the attention of El Servicio a La Navegacion en el Espacio Aero Mexicano (SENEAM). In fact, representatives of the U.S. agencies remained in Mexico City for some time to help correct obvious faults in Benito Juarez's flawed systems. The airport was not a pilot�
��s prime choice. Mexican airspace, for that matter will always test the skill of the most experienced aviator.

  Why didn’t the crew see the trouble mounting? One reason, the crew was visually blinded in their attempt to locate the runway. The last report they received stated that there was one-mile visibility. Neither Los Angeles Flight Control nor the Mexican Air Traffic Control Center at Mazatlan or Mexico City ever tried to update the reports for 2605. At 1135:15 of the CVR recording, the cockpit finally received an update from the Mexico City Terminal Arrival Center.

  “Two six zero five, tower advises, ah, ground fog….the runway and two miles visibility.” It was the wrong information. The instrumentation for weather at Benito Juarez was situated in an extremely awkward spot. It took time to secure a proper reading. The fact of the matter was that the fog rolled in two miles away from the instruments and locked in the approach area.

  Benito Juarez had been designated with the infamous “black star” rating from ALPA. The dishonor is reserved for the worst facilities. It was also a common practice to keep only one air traffic controller on duty all night in El Distrito Federal. Senor Estrada’s testimony concerning himself and Senor Rodriguez could not initially be confirmed at the time of the incident. Officials saw to it that the tower log book was altered and no one was permitted to question the discrepancy.

  Why did Carl Herbert land on a closed runway? On the 18th of October, SENEAM released a summary of Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) in relation to the closure of Runway 23-Left.

  “23-Left will be closed for construction work until further advised.” Later that same day, they revised the message.

  “23-Left open all length.” The work on the runway was sporadic in days leading up to Halloween. On Captain Herbert’s prior flight into Mexico City, he was cleared to land on Runway 23-Left although there had been evidence of continuing work on the site. First Officer Dieter Reimann guided the DC-10 into Mexico City via 23-Left on the 19th and 24th of October while Carl was off sick. Even though there were continuous closings of 23-Left, planes were landing on that runway.

  Were the approach lights illuminated on 23-Left the morning of the crash? The control box for such lighting was located quite far from the tower. The controller had to call a technician who would then walk some distance to the control box. Seeing the cables sliced as I did while accompanied by Diego, showed evidence of tampering. One U.S. investigators discovered the cables in the same disgusting condition. Mexican officials calmly advised the investigators that the lights had been inoperable since the 24th or 25th of October. In an adjoining area, large numbers of runway edge light fixtures lay. The same officials assured the Norte Americanos the equipment had been removed long before the tragic episode. U.S. investigators were given a statement signed by the Technical Deputy Manager of Mexico City Airport stating that the lights on 23-Left had been removed along with all approach light systems well before the accident. On the CVR Recording, controller Senor Rodriguez could be heard telling the cockpit crew that “the lights are on Runway 23-Left.”

  Why didn’t the captain use his instruments aboard the DC-10 to bring the craft down safely? The McDonnel-Douglas DC-10 is equipped to practically land itself. The CVR recording clearly reveals that the Mexico Air Traffic Control Center told 2605 they should expect a landing on “two three left.” Later Mexico Tower requested that 2605 report over Mike Echo, the normal ILS, 23-Left final approach fix. This is the only runway at Benito Juarez so equipped. Under extreme conditions, Carl did land. He landed the craft half on and half off 23-Left. His last minute decision to abort the landing took the spaceship airborne once again. If there had not been the truck but ten feet further down the runway, all that has been disclosed would not have occurred. Upon investigation of the airport, U.S. representatives discovered the ILS 23-Left localizer and glide slope did not correspond with the instrumented final approach course of 23-Left. With American assistance, the course was later corrected by four degrees.

  The angle by which 2605 touched down initially caused a rumor related to the pilot error verdict, to further condemn the captain. Some Mexican officials claimed that Carl was in the middle of a “side-step maneuver,” a landing simply consisting of the using two runways. A pilot may bring an aircraft with instrument assistance onto one runway, bounce back up and manually skip it over to actually land on another. Prior to the incident, there was no existence of such a maneuver at Benito Juarez in the Jeppesen Flight Manual carried by all U.S. commercial pilots in the cockpit at all times. After the accident, such a procedure was worked out.

  Representatives of McDonnel-Douglas, the maker of the destroyed DC-10, arrived in the Mexican Federal District to see to their interests. Was the aircraft a contributing factor in the incident? Perhaps more about the aircraft would have been discovered if investigators had been permitted to examine the accident site. Yet again, the CVR recording revealed a hint at what may have been a definite problem. At 1139:15, the captain is heard complaining of radio failure, “the whole thing just quit!” One company investigator did disclose that navigational instruments in the cockpit were giving erroneous information. The DC-10 had its detractors. Insiders had complained that on impact the entire cabin floor simply gave way due to rapid decompression. Upon releasing myself from my harness at what was once door 4-R, I found myself in the midst of an inferno of rubble at ground level.

  How did the plane crash? Once the craft was airborne, after the captain called for a missed-approach, the plane’s right landing gear struck the first dump truck, snapping the gear backward and off along with much of the right horizontal stabilizer. Flight 2605 was doomed at that moment. At the same instance, it can be speculated that the Second Officer proposed a much more logical solution than the one made. He wanted Carl “take it straight down the runway” and ride it out, “Carl cut the …...” Instead, the captain tried to take the wounded bird back up into the heavens, away from the danger. The power in the engines increased to one hundred percent but it would only be a matter of time before the craft would come crashing down. The aircraft proceeded down the runway in mid-air. The continuing path led directly to the main terminal building. Suddenly, the right wing that was dipping twelve degrees clipped an operator cage area on a backhoe excavator that lie dormant aside the runway. The jumbo jet was once again redirected. The wing would again be struck by a stationary telephone junction box. The first of a thousand fires was sparked. Flight 2605 then collided with a garage, ground vehicles, parked trucks, an airport parking area. There was instantaneous combustion. The huge sleek bird finally impacted into a concrete steel reinforced building. The wreckage continued. Undetermined numbers of buildings and vehicles were destroyed. A wing flew into an adjacent neighborhood and combusted. The entire incident took 28 seconds.

  “The noise, I am still afraid of the noise,” I stated in an interview. Through all my training nothing had prepared me to deal with the volume of dissonance created by the crash.

  Thus the evil cloak of “error de piloto” was bestowed upon Captain Carl Herbert, Sr.

  “It was his ship, it was his command,” the words of the foolish uttered. Where does the blame belong? It lies with us all. To quench the hunger for economic profitability, or mere survival in a vicious industry looking to cut corners, segments of the paying public might look the other way for the right price on a cheap ticket. But each time a craft takes to the air, the dormant subject (of safety) is hidden in the back of our minds.

  “Will it be today?” The voice may persist.

  Finally, just days after the tragic crash, fate played another cruel joke. The Iran Hostage saga began. Its effect was to eliminate any legitimate journalistic scrutiny upon the investigation and the eventual final report presented by SENEAM. The tense siege at the U.S. Embassy half a world away allowed the accident to be neatly swept away and forgotten by the media. Many months later the airline and U.S. Government had the opportunity dictated by international law to challenge the final conclusion based on the many incon
sistencies. They had the right to ask for a new investigation but no challenge was made. Why not? Politics and money.

  Kurt Lappert sat speechless, struck by what he heard his lower jaw dropped slightly. The following days were spent helping him digest eight years of information.

  “We're cleared on the right, we're cleared on the right. No! This is the approach to the ###damn left!” I assumed that in his foreign assignments Mr. Lappert had been witness to some awful events. He was familiar with the dealings of Muerto, perhaps by a different interpretation and name. Still, the CVR tape can bore a hole through the thickest of mental armor, right to the core of one's soul.

  “Ouch,” was the only expression Kurt could mutter at times. He spent much of his time reading, and then there were the questions, the same ones I had answered numerous times in the past.

  “Why did they accuse you of serving liquor to the pilots?”

  “Because in the midst of total confusion, government representatives panicked and tried to grasp any opportunity to shift the blame elsewhere.”

  “Even though the runway had been declared closed, they were still allowing planes to land there?”

  “A Mexicana DC-10 flight landed on 23-Left just twenty minutes before we arrived.” So many questions, yet in responding to his inquiries I felt that this time my words carried more weight. The Senior Producer would take it all in. He would stare in deep thought then put his nose back into any given document. He worked at not reacting positively or negatively regarding my answers. I could not deduce an opinion one way or the other whether the journalist agreed with my conclusions.

  “I believe much of what you have presented, Ed.” The statement seemed to come out of nowhere as I sat patiently in the hotel room. The New Yorker was fascinated by the story. I could see a twinkle in his eye as he suddenly strained to conceal his excitement. “What about the Herbert family? Have you spoken to them,” Kurt was formulating a plan.