Commandos and Rangers of World War II

by James D. Ladd

  Pacific

  Amphibious raiding has been a role of marines since they were first raised as sea soldiers towards the end of the 17th century. More than two hundred years later, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) practised their raiding with three Provisional Rubber Boat Companies, a development of 1930s’ raiding innovations and tried out on the Atlantic coast in the Fleet Landing Exercise Flex-7 10 months before Pearl Harbour. This showed some of the problems in special service units, but their success in the exercise was encouraging enough for the Marine Corps to follow through with further companies formed on the West Coast.

  When war came, President Roosevelt wanted commando-like formations. He was influenced in this by Prime Minister Churchill and, no doubt, by Captain James Roosevelt USMC (the President’s son), who, in January 1942, wrote to his Commandant proposing marine units of commandos, stressing in his letter the value of guerrillas in China as well as British experience. The Corps, however, had already made a study of the British commandos when Captains Samuel B. Griffith II and W. M. Greene Jr visited Scotland. Largely on the basis of their report the 1st and 2nd Separate Battalions—later renamed Raider Battalions—were formed on 6 January and 4 February 1942 (see Appendix 7 for these units’ histories). The 1st Raiders were formerly boat companies of the 1st Battalion 5th Marine Regiment on the East Coast and now became part of the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet. Boat Companies on the West Coast, reinforced by a company from the 1st Raiders, formed the 2nd Raiders. Their roles included ‘landing on beaches generally thought inaccessible, raids requiring … surprise and high speed, and … guerrilla operations for protracted periods behind enemy lines’. The commando parallels are clear. However, the Commandant, Major-General Thomas Halcomb, directed that ‘Marine’ in these battalions’ title covered these roles ‘and the injection of … Commando … is superfluous’.

  There was also some confusion of aims not uncommon in the politics of Special Forces, although in Marine Corps saw the amphibious limitations for raiders. Captain James Roosevelt suggested, however, among other raids the possibility of landings ‘on Japan proper from Mito north to Aomari (as these) would certainly demoralise the enemy’. The Commandant was also under pressure from a ‘very high authority’—presumably the President—to accept Colonel William Donovan of the American army as a brigadier-general commanding the raiding project. These intentions seem to imply a force with aspirations closer to the Chinese guerrillas’ style of warfare than the British uniformed commando raids. But General Halcomb resisted the political pressure, although the Marine Corps were to some extent forced into forming raider units even if ‘all amphibious force marines were considered as commandos’. Colonel Donovan subsequently became head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

  The American marines were prepared for the campaigns across the countless islands and atolls in the Pacific, where amphibious landings would need exceptional logistics in carrying supplies thousands of miles, and careful reasoning in the selection of stepping-stones around the stronger enemy bases to set up a chain of airfields flighted towards Japan. The Americans’ landing exercise Flex-7 had shown the six Rubber Boat Companies of the 5th Marines, with 100 men to a company, were neither ‘fish nor fowl’, their special weapons (see Appendix 2) making their use difficult in other roles for regular marine battalions. This was one reason contributing to their eventual formation as a separate battalion. In the longer term, preparations for a Pacific war had been made in the personal reconnaissances of the 1920s by Major Earl H. Ellis USMC, whose detailed notes on Japanese occupied islands became the basis the Marine Corps strategy in the pacific. Many of his ideas and practical suggestions proved invaluable in the 1940s, including his idea of beach obstacle demolition by swimmers placing charges. This became a reality of 1943-44, but the Major had died in mysterious circumstances 20 years earlier while on Japanese-held islands of Palau.

  The colonels appointed to command the Raiders were both men of exceptional experience. Lieutenant-Colonel Merritt A. Edson commanding the 1st Raiders was a quietly aggressive World War I veteran, a pilot, and captain of the Corps’ Rifle and Pistol team. He had seen the Japanese in action around Chapei, China, in the late 1930s. Lieutenant-Colonel Evand F. Carlson commanding the 2nd Raiders also had first-hand knowledge of the Japanese, having travelled widely with the communist Chinese Eighth Route Army studying guerrilla tactics. The colonels handpicked their officers, supplementing those of volunteers formed into Raiders, and annoying the devil out of the general commanding the USMC 1 Division, for this levy—as he described Merritt Edson’s recruiting—came at a critical time six weeks after Pearl Harbour.

  A great deal of thought was given to the way the Raiders should be armed; problems already seen briefly in the overloading of 4 Commando’s LCAs approaching the Varengeville beach near Dieppe being one example of the many logistical problems of amphibious raids (see Appendix 3, weight details). An analysis of one American assault team showed seven men carried loads in excess of 100lb (45kg), five carried 75lb (34kg), and the other seven had at least 50lb (22kg) on their backs. Such weights limited the numbers that could be landed in one assault craft and the weapons that might be taken aboard their carrier, for with larger mortars the weight of ammunition was a major factor in loading even an Auxiliary Personnel Destroyer (APD) carrying raiders’ craft to a beach area—points sometimes over-looked by war-gamers in the 1970s. There were also more obvious restrictions ashore where the heavier mortar’s ammunition could not be moved quickly without motor transport during a sustained advance. Merritt Edson, in a letter of 7 April 1942, explained these considerations and his preference therefore for the 60mm (2.4in) mortar (see Appendix 3), despite the more effective fire of the 81 mm (3.1in) mortar. A compromise might be made by carrying larger mortars without their specially trained crews, much in the way early Commandos used their 3-inch (76mm) mortars, allowing riflemen to fire these specialist weapons. Otherwise, elements of an 81 mm Weapons Platoon could be carried only on an APD destroyer by seriously reducing the number of riflemen. The risk of losing heavy weapons if too many were in one transport had also to be taken into account. There were further compromises in balancing the weight of equipment landed against effective firepower, with Merritt Edson’s 60mm mortar squads’ leaders each carrying the mortar base-plate, a pistol or M-1 carbine with its ammunition, the cleaning brush, and field glasses, loads which prevented them carrying the more powerful Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) of their counterparts in regular marine platoons.

  Although the organisation of Raider battalions was flexible, their operations were based on a company of fewer than 143 all ranks—the cargo-personnel capacity of an APD. Whether these companies might include all mortar teams (see Appendix 2), or whether this fire-power might in part be under battalion control with the 81 mm Weapon Company together on one carrier, was one of several problems resolved in different ways by the 1st and 2nd Raiders during their training in February 1942. Six months later the ideas were put to the test in battle.

  The 1st Raiders made the initial landings on Tulagi, while the main marine assault was made 20 miles (32km) to the south across Iron Bottom Sound, where the 1st and 5th Marines landed at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal in the first counter-stroke ashore against the Japanese. The landings were planned for 7 August, despite the lack of landbased air cover, although three carriers deployed 250 navy planes in support of the assaults. These were unable to isolate the Japanese from their reinforcements, and for some time the outcome on Guadalcanal was in the balance, swinging against the Americans in the early stages because a cardinal principle of amphibious warfare had been neglected in the planning: the sea passages for forces building up the bridgehead were not entirely secure. Tulagi—the planners at first had difficulty finding the island on their maps—lies in the Gavutu Harbour of Florida Island, a small island on a north-west/south-east axis which is only two miles (3km) long and about half a mile wide.


  The leading two companies of the 1st Raiders landed over heavy coral outcrops on the western tip of the island at 0800 hours on 7 August. This beach was undefended, probably because it seemed an impossible landing point, and boats from the four APD-USS Calhoun, USS Gregory, USS Little, and USS McKean—hung on reefs 30 to 100 yards off the beach, forcing the marines to wade chest deep to the shore. The three follow-up companies—five companies landed from four carriers, overloaded despite the theoretical limitations—came ashore and little resistance was met until the marines reached the saddle between the island’s hills. Merritt Edson had his men dig in for the first of many nights that American marines would stand-to in the Pacific. Four separate attacks on the Raiders failed to exploit minor penetrations through the companies’ defences, and by daybreak the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Marines had come ashore. Their 81mm mortars with the Raiders 60mm teams put down a concentrated barrage on the enemy’s main defence position in a ravine, before this was cleared by the Raiders early that afternoon, and the whole island was secured by nightfall (8 August). At the end of the month the 1st Raiders were taken across to Guadalcanal.

  Meanwhile, on 17-18 August, elements of the 2nd Raiders had carried out a diversion raid on Makin Atoll in the Gilberts 1,000 miles (1,600 + km) northeast of Guadalcanal. This battalion was organised in a slightly different way (see Appendix 2) to the 1st Raiders, for Evans Carlson based their formations on a fire group of three men: a scout with a Garand rifle and two tommy-gunners. Three of these groups usually made a corporal’s squad of nine men with one BAR man replacing a tommy-gunner. ‘A squad so armed’, the Colonel wrote, ‘can cover a front from 100 to 300 yards long against the 50 yards covered by an orthodox infantry (rifle) squad’. On Makin they were to prove the value of their fire-power, although the ammunition needed to sustain it might prove a logistical headache without strict lire discipline. A later report by Colonel Carlson states ‘very, very seldon were automatic weapons placed on full automatic … one machine gunner fired only single shots getting a Japanese with each’. In these later patrols raiders set out carrying 224 rounds per rifle, 1,000 rounds for the .30-calibre machine guns and 24 bombs for the 60mm (2.4in) mortars. These rounds for the machine guns were a four-man load and two men could carry the mortar bombs.

  USMC Raider Battalions’ principle actions on Guadalcanal, September to December 1942.

  DIARY OF KEY EVENTS:

  1st Raider Bn (Edson)

  8 Sept Three coys landed at Tasimboka and were joined by paramarines in an attack on the rear of Japanese positions, the enemy withdrew leaving a bivouac area the Raiders destroyed.

  12 Sept Raiders with para-companies took positions on ‘Edson’s ridge’ south of airfield.

  13 Sept Dug in on ridge before heavy attacks after nightfall, Raiders hold out during 10 hours close combat.

  14 Sept Remnants of Japanese assault force withdrew.

  15 Sept Raiders relieved from ridge positions they had held with support of artillery and divisional troops.

  2nd Raider Bn (Carlson)

  4 Nov Landed Aolo with elements of 147th Inf Regmt and 5th Defence Bn.

  6 Nov Detachments of 2nd Raiders moved out carrying 5 units of fire at start of a month behind enemy lines.

  7 Nov By-passed Koilotumaria where enemy concentrations reported.

  8 Nov Fought off ambush by small enemy force at Reko.

  9 Nov Binu base established and supplied by LCP(L), men usually cooked individually their rations of dehydrated foods, tea and rice.

  11 Nov Raiders engaged by bn of Japanese near Asamana and succeeded in forcing this enemy away from thier intended concentration area.

  12 Nov Occupied Japanese defence positions etc. killing many messengers and others coming into Asamana area.

  13 Nov Raiders directed artillery fire in breaking up five attacks by Japanese columns, before returning to Binu.

  14 Nov F Coy patrol destroyed 15-man outpost in narrow valley near Binu. During the next two days small groups of enemy stragglers mopped up, ammo and food captured.

  15 Nov Moved base to Asamana at end of first phase of operation.

  17 Nov Ordered to take artillery position shelling Henderson Field and find any enemy bases south and west of upper Tenaru river.

  18 Nov Bn moved in two stages camping on the upper Malimbiu river (not shown on map) before reaching base on Tenaru. Col Carlson made a personal recon each day to select camp sites etc. during these moves.

  23 Nov Joined by A Company landed from transport.

  24 Nov Base for patrolling established on upper Tenaru.

  29 Nov Moved base to position nearer Japanese trail from Lunga lines concentrating patrols higher up Tenaru valley.

  30 Nov Entire bn crossed ridge using ropes to scale cliff before surprising Japanese killing 75 and destroying 75mm mountain gun that had been shelling airfield, enemy camp sites were destroyed, one 9-man Raider squad catching some 100 enemy unprepared.

  4 Dec Raiders entered 1 Marine Div lines—approx 175 enemy had been killed for the loss of 6 marines in a month of patrolling.

  The intention of the Makin raid was to divert Japanese reinforcements from Guadalcanal, and as the approaches to Makin were patrolled by enemy sea and air forces, the Raiders were taken in two 2,700 ton submarine cruisers, USS Nautilus and USS Argonaut for the eight-day passage from Pearl Harbour. Nautilus carried out a periscope reconnaissance of the target beaches on the afternoon of 16 August, and that night the two submarines made their rendezvous in a heavy rain squall. By 0300 hours early next morning they were 500 yards (450m) off the southern beach of Butaritari Island which forms the base of the atoll’s triangle of islands around its lagoon. Here a one to one and a half knots (2.7kph) current pushed them westward towards a reef, making station-keeping difficult because the submarines had constantly to keep going astern. The pounding of heavy surf drowned any shouted commands, but all 13 officers and 208 men—two rifle companies each less one Section—followed Evans Carlson towards the beach. Some outboards on their inflatable assault boats broke down, and these rubber boats then had to be paddled or towed; in the resulting confusion all boats were ordered to one landing beach, not the two as planned.

  Butaritari is three miles (4.8km) long and less than half a mile (800m) wide, covered from shore to shore by a thick growth of coconut palms. Despite the surf on the exposed southern shore, 15 of the boats reached the target beach; two landed a mile north-east of this point but the men joined up with the others, while a third boat drifted westward, coming ashore behind a line of Japanese defences protecting the rear of the island’s Government House and wharves on the north shore facing the lagoon. Some 70 to 80 infantry, with at least four machine-guns, a flame-thrower, two hand-grenade launchers, and automatic weapons defended these installations, and were bumped by A Company going across the island at first light—0600 hours. They captured the Government House without opposition and moved south-west down the lagoon road. Reinforced by B Company which broke through the defences about 1130, Sergeant Clyde Thomason’s gallantry in this action being recognised by a posthumous award of the Medal of Honour. The enemy continued to snipe at the marines by firing from coconut trees, where their positions were only exposed by sawing off the palm fronds with machine gun fire. Some support from the submarines’ single 6-inch (152 mm) guns was given early in the battle but the raiders lost radio contact with the submarines about 0716 hours. A little later ‘false plane contacts’ caused them to dive and they did not resurface until 1000 hours. Enemy activity around the atoll was increasing, however, and the American submarines sank a small transport (3,500 tons) and a patrol craft (1,500 tons) by gunfire. These actions brought Japanese reconnaissance planes, and early in the afternoon 12 aircraft spent an hour dropping occasional bombs and strafing the likely American positions. The last air attack fell where the Raiders had held positions before Evans Carlson withdrew his right flank. By this move he hoped he would draw out some of the Japanese, which he did, some being caught by bomb
s; but as night would fall quickly on this tropical island, the Colonel now pivoted his flank platoons, moving the men back to the boats, which were launched at 1930 hours.

  Despite their extensive training in surf, the Raiders were caught in a rapid succession of great waves that swamped outboards and drove many boats back against the beach. A few got beyond the breakers, with flailing paddles and props screaming as they were thrown clear of the water during the boats’ short trip to the submarines. For others the struggle was ‘so intense and so futile … it will forever remain a ghastly nightmare’, with four or so boats unable to get off the beach. They had lost most of their gear and some weapons in the hour’s struggle to get beyond the breakers, and those boats that were not swamped in sea water were filled by heavy rain. By dawn the surf was still high, great walls of water crashing against the exposed beach, and after repeated air alerts the submarines were forced to withdraw, having arranged a rendezvous for that night.

  The day ashore was spent in patrolling for Japanese weapons to replace the Raiders’ losses and for food. Few enemy were found alive on the island; 1,000 barrels of aviation petrol (avgas) were destroyed, and some documents were taken from the Japanese headquarters before the Americans withdrew. That night the rubber boats were carried across the island and launched on the smoother waters of the lagoon, where they were lashed to a native outrigger. In eight minutes the outboards brought this makeshift raft alongside the Nautilus off the entrance to the lagoon at 2308 hours.

  The Raiders had lost 30 men, 14 killed in action, seven drowned, and nine whose fate was unknown until after the war. The nine were possibly in a boat that drifted westward trying to come off the beach on 17 August and after a brief captivity they were executed by the reinforcements the Japanese sent to the island. Reference has already been made to one authoritative view of the raid’s adverse effect in stiffening Japanese defences. However, these were early days in the Americans’ war, and the Japanese certainly diverted forces to Makin Atoll and the defence of other islands, tying up men, materials, and shipping when—as happened on Timor—these resources might have been diverted to militarily more profitable ventures. However, there was no way the Japanese could control all or many of the Pacific islands unless they retained air and sea superiority, a lesson they would first learn in the Solomons.