Stalin's Nemesis

by Michael James Melnyk

  […] Whenever a new division was formed, existing divisions were required to transfer to it a number of their officers to provide a nucleus. Naturally no divisional commander was ever prepared to part with his best officers and consequently transferred either those who were in his bad books or those who were generally not thought much of—in short the officers he could best spare. Thus it happened that the leadership was at its worse in these new, non-German SS-Divisions. There were exceptions of course but these did no more than prove the rule. Anyway it was certainly true of the ‘Galizien’ Division .[…]44

  In this instance the best example of an inappropriate posting was the most senior of the replacements, SS-Standartenführer Rudolph Pannier, 45 who ironically replaced the Division’s best regimental commander Obersturmbannführer Paul Herms as the commander of WGR 31 as of 13 September 1944. Holder of the highly prestigious Ritterkreuz or ‘Knights Cross to the Iron Cross’, Pannier was already known to Freitag from the 4.Polizei Division where they had previously served together. As a result of his injuries sustained in combat he had become addicted to morphine and was regarded as something of a liability. In any event it was a posting that even Freitag was against. In a letter to the senior SS Judge, he later wrote:

  To the Reichsführer’s senior SS judge

  ‘On the o.a [above mentioned] I am writing to inform you that I already know Pannier who was formerly with me as a battalion commander. Particularly, of the characteristics stated in the letter, e.g. exaggerated reports and his inclination to drugs which had already appeared.

  I also know that Pannier was rejected in old comrade’s circles of the Polizei Division. I was horrified when Pannier was transferred to my division as a regiment commander. [Author’s emphasis]

  I have also pointed this out with the SS-FHA, (SS Brigadeführer KATZ).

  I am thankful for the references pointed out to me about Pannier and will also especially keep an eye on him as a result.46

  Freitag

  SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Waffen SS Division Commander.

  Not all the appointments were however of Pannier’s low calibre. SS-Hauptsturmführer Werner Heinz47 also transferred from the 4.SS-Polizei Division and took over as commander of the Signals Detachment from SS-Hauptsturmführer Wolfgang Wuttig, who was captured on 22 July.48 The only other significant change with regard to principal positions of command was the appointment of an experienced combat veteran SS-Obersturmbannführer Carl Marks49 as the new commander of the Training and Reserve Regiment (effective 15 August 1944).

  Of this group, as before, the ethnic German officers and NCOs, especially the Slovak Volksdeutsche were best suited to the Division. Four were subsequently made battalion commanders the most senior of whom was SS-Obersturmbannführer Karl Wildner,50 whose appointment was effective 21 August 1944, as was that of another experienced veteran SS-Hauptsturmführer Ludwig Kuchta51 both of whom were assigned to WGR 29. SS-Sturmbannführer Albert Czermin52 was posted to WGR 30 whilst SS-Sturmbannführer Elemer Scholtz53 and SS-Sturmbannführer Wilhelm Podlesch54 became battalion commanders in WGR 31. With their common Slavic backgrounds along with some of the Romanian Volksdeutsch, they soon developed good relations with the Ukrainians.

  Conversely, as had previously been the case in the original formation, a significant number of the German NCOs who came directly from various Polizei formations did not adapt easily as they often lacked the necessary combat experience. Further, their service prior to joining was either inappropriate or not conducive for conducting a successful training programme in a combat formation.55 The personnel of two rifle battalions made up mainly of Romanian Volksdeutsche which were incorporated into the Division at this time also largely proved to be unsuited.56

  Despite their often inferior quality, the sheer number of Germans posted to the Division fulfilled all Freitag’s expectations and eventually became so prolific that all command positions at battalion and company level could have been filled by them with one or two NCOs available for each company. With so many Germans at his disposal, Freitag therefore planned to create a reserve of German officers and NCOs. This evinced considerable dissatisfaction amongst the trained Ukrainians, especially the Brody veterans who frequently had to give up their commands in favour of inexperienced Germans and be reassigned as trainers to the Training and Reserve Regiment, the 14.Feld Ersatz Bataillon or be relegated to postings within the supply and support services.57

  Prior to Brody Ukrainian personnel had occupied a handful of staff positions and also accounted for two battalion commanders in combat units (Waffen-Hauptsturmführer Brygidyr Kdr. I./WGR 29, and Waffen-Sturmbannführer Palienko Kdr. IV.Art.Rgt.) and almost all company and battery commanders. After Brody a large number of these positions were given to Germans.58 A few notable exceptions who retained or were appointed to higher positions were; Waffen-Obersturmführer Lubomyr Makarushka59 who as Paliiv’s successor served on its staff as liaison officer between the Division and the Military Board, Waffen-Hauptsturmführer Dmytro Ferkuniak who continued to serve in Section Ic (Intelligence/political matters), Waffen-Untersturmführer Father Levenetz who served as Divisional chaplain and Waffen-Sturmbannführer Pobihushtschyi who served with the Training and Reserve Regiment.

  SS-Sturmbannführer Bristot’s Fusilier Battalion was the only independent unit which had previously had Ukrainians commanding all four of its companies before Brody and which went on to retain three Ukrainian company commanders after Brody. This is especially noteworthy as it was considered an elite unit within the Division which uniquely accepted volunteers only. The first company was commanded by Waffen-Untersturmführer Ivan Zarycky, the second by SS-Untersturmführer Franz Kraus (a Volksdeutsch), the third by Waffen-Obersturmführer Stefan Hulak and the fourth by Waffen-Obersturmführer Roman Bojcun.

  Generally speaking Ukrainian officers were permitted to keep their company commands, the rest were given subordinate positions as platoon commanders. This also applied to the two hundred Ukrainian officers and NCOs who in September 1944, had successfully graduated from their respective German academies, having met their exacting standards and returned to the Division. While the best graduates stayed on for a further four weeks to complete the Kompanieführerlehrgang (company commanders course) at Kienschlag, the rest took up posts as platoon commanders. None were appointed to, or ever held any position higher than that of company commander and no Ukrainian officer over 40 years of age was allowed to command a combat unit.60 This discriminatory policy also manifest itself within the ranks of the NCOs, the higher positions again often going to Germans or Volksdeutsch personnel.61 In any case, the distinct dearth of sufficient numbers of both officers and NCOs which had been apparent when the Division was formed, remained throughout its existence.

  By 10 September 1944, with the influx of new recruits, the Division’s depleted ranks had expanded to 148 officers, 572 NCOs and 5,796 men totalling 6,516.62 As of this date it’s Training and Reserve Regiment listed a total of 7,534 men of all ranks.63

  Ukrainians during officer training at Posen Treskau. Training included extensive theoretical and practical instruction for the officer candidates pictured here with their instructor during a map reading and orienteering session.

  Young Ukrainian officer candidates undergoing pioneer training at Hradischko. During NCO training at Pikovice instruction was given by Ukrainians whilst at Hradischko it was delivered exclusively by Germans many of who were wounded and classified as ‘unfit for combat. Left to right: German Junker (name unknown), SS-Untersturmführer Schweiger’ a decorated Totenkopf veteran, Bohdan Kutny, Bohdan Onyszkewycz and Bohdan Romanovsky.

  After Brody the rebuilding process was assisted by the influx of over 250 graduates from officer and NCO courses. Here Waffen-Standartenjunkers are returning from Hradischko, 1 September 1944. Left to right: Bohdan Romanovsky, Myroslav Kotys, Taras Kaczmarchuk, Bohdan Kutny; Bohdan Onyszkewycz, Jaroslav Benzal, Jaroslav Chomyn, Jaroslav Fenyk, Oleh Harmatij. These men often equalled or surp
assed their German counterparts.

  Waffen-Standartenjunkers Bohdan Kutny and Oleh Harmatij from the Pioneer Battalion in Neuhammer, September 1944.

  Ten days later, quantitatively all the necessary personnel was available to begin the reformation process; a strength return as of 20 September 1944, listed 261 officers, 673 NCOs and 11,967 men, a total of 12,901, although this was still short of its authorised strength of 14,689 all ranks.64 The bulk of the additional recruits absorbed by the Division were drawn directly from the Training and Reserve Regiment and had undergone very little, if any training, for example 1./I/WGR 30 was reformed from former personnel of 9 company of the Reserve Regiment, most of whom were newly enlisted.65

  To comply with the deadline set by the SS-FHA which required the Division to be ready for deployment by the end of the year, a planned, intensive retraining programme recommenced at once, but progress was impeded by several factors. Firstly, there was a dearth of qualified training instructors among the recent intake of German officers and NCOs which meant that the burden of basic training rested mainly with the Training and Reserve Regiment (which was officially incorporated into the Division66) and the instructors assigned to it.

  Secondly, while unlike other Waffen-SS formations, the Galician Division did not suffer from a shortage of recruits, there was a noticeable difference between those from the first formation, the nucleus of whom had been volunteers, and the new intake. It should be noted that these replacements were no longer exclusively west Ukrainians from Galicia and included refugees from both east and west Ukraine, most of whom had enlisted to escape Soviet occupation and inevitable conscription into the advancing Red Army.67 This influx of east Ukrainians brought with it political schisms hitherto unknown within the Division, which eventually became a considerable cause of concern for the west Ukrainian nationalist contingent.68

  There were also those who had been mobilised by force by the Germans and pressed into military service. During the German retreat from western Ukraine in the spring and summer of 1944, German and Hungarian soldiers cordoned off villages and rounded up all the able bodied males (and in some cases females) between the ages of 15-50.69 In this way thousands of young Ukrainians were drafted into the depleted ranks of the Galician Division or other Waffen-SS and Army formations.70 Those drafted into the Galician Division under these circumstances were sent directly to its Training and Reserve Regiment straight from civilian life. Some were later found to be unfit for service but could not be discharged and allowed to return home as the whole of Ukraine was now under Soviet occupation and were therefore kept on but assigned light duties.71

  Additional draftees came from men who had been taken for forced labour in Germany, former members of Polizei and Schutzmannschaft detachments previously used to guard industrial installations and Ukrainians who had served with the Red Army and become prisoners of war. These men, unlike those who had been recruited into the first formation, were not tattooed with their blood group under the left armpit.

  The use of conscripts proved to a certain extent, to be counter-productive as they lacked the enthusiasm and the positive attitude towards military life of their predecessors. The ardent Ukrainian nationalist survivors of the original formation, could at least draw remote inspiration from the possibility that the Galician Division could be a decisive factor in the creation of an independent Ukrainian state, in the anticipated chaos that would occur after the expected German defeat. Moreover this non-discriminatory policy meant that from this point on, the composition and fighting value of its component units varied greatly from regiment to regiment and even company to company. Waffen-Unterscharführer Jurij Ferencevych wrote:

  […] There were seventeen members of the 13 company that returned to Neuhammer after the battle of Brody, (205 went to Brody, I was ‘chief of staff’ of the 13./WGR 31). There were only two NCOs, myself plus my friend who was in Breslau Lissa but returned early from the officers course as an NCO, as for some reason he did not finish the school. I received 164 recruits age 18 to 44. A number of them wanted to be my orderly but I did not need one. In the morning 65 reported sick, they wanted to see a doctor. Ok, I sent them. Most of them came back as d.v.f., dienst verwendung fähig [suitable for service]. It kept happening day after day so I decided to cut the number of those who reported sick. When somebody went 3 times to see a doctor and returned as d.v.f., I just ignored his plea. But anyway I had approximately twenty ‘sick’ for a long time.72

  A third problem was the negative atmosphere in the camp73 caused by the deterioration of German/Ukrainian relations. The Military Board identified this development and cited two main reasons for it; firstly ‘the German NCOs do not respect the Ukrainian officers’ and secondly that there was ‘no common ground between the Germans and the Ukrainians’.74 As before, the main cause was the anti-Ukrainian disposition of SS-Brigadeführer Freitag and some members of his staff. Freitag’s uncompromisingly critical attitude (as expounded to the Ukrainian officer candidates at Kienschlag), ostensibly underwent something of a radical change after 30 September 1944, when he was unexpectedly awarded the highly coveted and much esteemed Ritterkreuz or ‘Knights Cross’, for the Division’s part in the battle of Brody.75 The award was made on the basis of a report submitted by the commander of the 3 Panzer Army Generaloberst Raus. It is accompanied by a short introductory note in which Raus seeks to exonerate himself for having had any part in it, stating that ‘In view of the short period during which the [14 Galician Division] was part of the 1 Panzer Army, it is not possible for me to make a definite and exhaustive assessment’. [Author’s emphasis]76

  Awarding of the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross

  Award Date 30.9.44

  A.H.Qu., 23.8.1944

  Der Oberbefehlshaber

  der 3. Panzerarmee

  (nominated on)

  Review

  concerning

  SS-Brigadeführer F r e i t a g

  Kdr. 14. Waffen-Gren.-Div. der SS (galiz.Nr.1)

  In view of the short period during which the [14 Galician Division] was part of the 1 Panzer Army, it is not possible for me to make a definite and exhaustive assessment.

  Impression: Circumspect, self-assured, leader. Great personal bravery, eager for action. He made enthusiastic efforts to get the best out of his Galician SS-Division. He distinguished himself while breaking through the surrounding forces at Zolochiv, by virtue of his leading, dynamic approach and tough action against weaklings.

  Raus Generaloberst

  SS-Brigadeführer Freitag demonstrated exemplary and total personal preparedness for action, under uniquely difficult combat conditions in the Brody pocket.

  His Division in this instance was not made up of German soldiers prepared to fight to the last in combat, but of Ukrainians of the Galician region, innately weak and apt to waver, lacking any of the manly or fighting virtues of the Germans.

  Keeping together and leading men, so unfamiliar with war and so averse to hardship, in the carrying out of the most difficult of orders (such as in the Battle in the Brody pocket) requires ultimate and unique involvement on the part of the leader responsible.

  Because of the particular circumstances, as of the 12.7.44, the Division was placed at the decisive position in the battle in the pocket, and received as its first combat-impression, the retreat of German units.

  When the reinforced Gren. Rgt. 30 looked as though it was going to get dragged into this retreat, it was the Division commander who with the regiment commander immediately re-secured the situation in that area and prevented the threatened breakthrough [of enemy forces].

  When later in the battle numerous ‘volunteers’ of the Division deserted due to innate cowardice and in some cases even turned their weapons on their own officers and NCOs, it was in the main the Division commander who there and then restored order with unhesitating personal action and took the appropriate brutal measures against the miserable wretches.

  The Division fulfilled its orders, under the most diffic
ult circumstances, up to the 19.7.44. This was achieved with Ukrainians, who, with few exceptions are not inherently disposed as fighters, supported only by a handful of German personnel.

  The recognised achievements of the Division when deployed in the crucial point of the battle, must be credited solely to the German leadership and ultimately to the Division commander. [The achievements] rest mainly on their personal actions during the focal point of the battle.

  The tragic thing about the deployment of the Division is that despite the exemplary conduct of the Division commander a decisive success in battle was denied.

  After the shattering of the Division in the Brody pocket, the Division commander made himself available to the leader of the rear guard troops—Generalmajor Lindemann—and after his heroic death, despite being wounded himself, he was the last general to leave the pocket cautiously and safely leading all remaining troops out of the first encirclement.

  In the late afternoon of the 22.7.44 the Division commander gathered about 4,000 men of all divisions of the XIII.A.K. and personally decided to break through the encirclement, which had been renewed by the enemy, to the south-west.

  In contrast to other combat units that attempted to breakout towards the west and the south and in the main fell victim to the enemy at Zaskow and Peremyshliany, he led his combat unit out of the encirclement despite the exhaustion of his men.

  SS-Brigadeführer Freitag has been deployed at the front since the start of this war, and since the end of 1941 he has been almost continuously deployed in the east (Eastern Front). He has fought in the mid-sector of the Eastern Front, as a regimental commander at Wolchow and outside Leningrad, and has proved himself as a troop leader.

  Raus’s citation was disingenuous to say the least. No mention was made of the fact that Freitag resigned his command, neither was any indication given of the sources upon which the report was based. Moreover there was not a single name of any witnesses to his alleged ‘heroism’ and he certainly did not ‘gather 4,000 men about him’ and lead them out of the pocket.