Stalin's Nemesis

by Michael James Melnyk

  Signature illegible

  1a SS Sturmbannführer u.Major. i.g.d.Pol

  The Division’s units were quartered in barracks or public buildings secured by the Vorkommando. In the more remote areas, circumstances dictated some companies were lodged with civilians, especially in mountain villages. In both cases finding appropriate billeting was not without its own hazards as Waffen-Untersturmführer Roman Kolisnyk of 3./.I/WRG 31 later wrote:

  I was given a group of soldiers under the command of Waffen-Unterscharführer V. Davydiak. Our mission: to find and secure suitable accommodation for our battalion. We went by train to the city of Maribor (Marburg an der Drau). The Division followed on foot.[…] We arrived in Maribor which was subject to constant air raids. Vorkommandos from other battalions and regiments arrived and we were billeted in some bombed-out barracks. From Maribor we had to go to the region where the companies would be stationed and find accommodation for them.

  Finally we came to Division headquarters to discuss the situation. We were given bikes and my group of ten soldiers went by train to where our battalion command would be located. Then we rode bikes or walked from village to village to search for suitable quarters for the companies. Of course it was usually school buildings. Often we marked it, but a few days later the partisans had set fire to it so we gave up marking and just reported to the local authority.

  […] Waffen-Obersturmführer Michael Karpynec’s 1 company had it worse. They were assigned to a village in the mountains. Their horses could not pull the heavy field kitchen and the supply carts and they had to borrow oxen from the local inhabitants. Hence, the company arrived late at night, when it was dark. Immediately they came under fire. The fire fight lasted quite a long time, until finally somehow they learned that some regular Wehrmacht soldiers were staying in the same village. Fortunately, there were no casualties.44

  The efforts of the Vorkommando ensured an easier transition for the relocation of the main body of the Division. In his memoirs Waffen-Untersturmführer Zenon Kuk the commander of the 5./II/WGR 30 remembered his company arrived dead-tired after the long march on 28 February 1945, at a location between Šoštanj [Schonstein] and Velenje:

  […] By 1100 hrs the company was quartered. The soldiers went to sleep; only stewards were bringing their stuff into their storage areas. Immediately in the afternoon of 28 February I was called to the battalion commander for a company commander meeting. SS-Sturmbannführer Czermin was obviously satisfied but on his face one could see fear. Czermin told us about the disposition of the battalion and its tasks. Training exercises were to be minimal and we were to be ready for action at all times [he told us] don’t give the men a hard time and give them a chance to get plenty of rest.45

  On the Austrian side in the Deutschlandsberg area where the Training and Reserve Regiment was based, initially heated disputes arose with the German civilian administration46 over the provision of food supplies. Here to compensate for the diminished Heimat (Home) rations which were issued, several companies had arbitrarily requisitioned food from the local population which by this stage of the war was already subject to considerable privation.47 Notwithstanding this, relations with the civilian authorities in Austria were generally correct and in some cases cordial.

  The bulk of the Division was encamped across the border in Slovenia where the existing German occupation forces controlled by HSSPF Rösener were woefully inadequate. The establishment of any normal administration in the region had been impossible for many months with Government officials living in fear for their lives, copiously armed in fortified houses.48 In his memoirs a Jagdzug commander with WGR 31 Waffen-Untersturmführer Roman Hawrylak noted that in the new operational area: ‘[…] all German outposts and other military and administrative buildings were circled with barbed wire, machine gun nests all around with sentries everywhere in a high state of alert’.49

  The forces at Rösener’s disposal held the principal cities and towns and were largely confined to heavily fortified outposts.50 Although they patrolled the connecting main road and rail links, they were unable to ensure the protection of the main transportation routes night or day and seldom, if ever, ventured into the villages and countryside. Here, the mountainous landscape with its deep river valleys and numerous dense, impenetrable forests was left to the partisans who were effectively able to control all movement on principal roads. The terrain was ideal for them with many narrow roads and passages. From selected vantage points, in some instances a single well-positioned sniper could tie down an entire unit. Groups of partisans moved constantly in an unpredictable manner and effective surveillance from the air was impossible.

  The constant threat of attack by partisans meant that security was paramount and in all localities where the Division’s units were based, if they didn’t already exist, small fortifications and defensive emplacements were quickly erected in strategic places. Waffen-Untersturmführer Eugene Shypailo from 13./WGR 30 wrote: ‘Machine gun nests and rifle pits were established around the perimeter of our quarters, [we had to] march at night and be on guard at all times. […] It was not permitted to walk alone, only in pairs’.51 To maintain communication, telephone phone lines were laid, but these were regularly cut, sometimes daily.52

  With few exceptions, the local Slovene population sympathised with and actively supported the partisans and those who failed to grasp that they were no longer among well-wishing Slovaks, often paid for their naivety with their lives. Amongst the first casualties were two soldiers (one of whom had his ear cut off) from the Vorkommando of WGR 30.53 In the first few days it was not uncommon for individual soldiers or small groups who ventured into the woods not to return. Particularly vulnerable to the partisan ambush tactics were supply and support personnel such as supply stewards, clerks, drivers, cooks or horse grooms. whose dead bodies would often be found days later stripped to their underwear as the partisan units experienced a critical lack of clothing which was always in short supply. Occasionally the bodies would be mutilated.54

  The area in which the Division was now based was divided into security zones, (Schutzgebiete) one of which was assigned to it. The neighbouring zones to the south and south west contained a Polizei unit55 and a Wehrmacht formation Gebirgs-Jäger-Regiment Treeck, respectively whilst to the north and west there were defence units.

  In order to re-establish security, the centre of the Division’s deployment was the partisan infested mountainous forests of the Pohorje [Ger. Bachern/Bacherngebirge] south of the River Drava. A further influencing factor on determining the tactical disposition of its units was the proximity and eventual anticipated deployment to the eastern front, therefore, after some discussion its command decided to place two infantry regiments reinforced by detachments of artillery west of Maribor in a line north to south. All heavy weaponry and anti-tank detachments were stationed in the vicinity of the city which was a main communications and transportation hub the aim being to ensure mobility in all directions and for all eventualities.

  An initial temporary deployment was arranged as follows:

  Headquarters: (Administration section) in Selnica ob Dravi (Zellnitz am Drau).

  Waffen-Grenadier-Regiment 29 south and s/w Maribor: Regimental HQ Slovenske Konjice (Gonobitz).

  Waffen-Grenadier-Regiment 30—s/e Slovenj Gradec (Windisch-Graz): HQ Velenje (Wöllan).

  Waffen-Grenadier-Regiment 31—in the Drava Valley at Ruše (Reiffing), Fala (Fall), Radlje ob Dravi (Radl); HQ Lovrenc na Pohorju (St Lorenzen).

  Waffen-Fusilier Battalion—in Slovenska Bistrica (HQ Ob Pulsgau).

  Waffen-Artillery Regiment- HQ, 1 and 4 Abtl. at Slovenska Bistrica: 2 Abtl. with WGR 30; 3 Abtl. with WGR 31.

  Panzerjäger Abteilung—HQ Slovenska Bistrica (Windisch-Feistritz)/Ptujska Gora.

  Waffen-Pioneer Battalion—Marenberg (Hohenmauthen).

  Communications Detachment—Ruše.

  Supply Detachment—HQ Leibnitz/Spielfeld.

  Transport Detachment—HQ Slivnica.

 
14.Feld Ersatz Bataillon—HQ Spielfeld.56

  Training and Reserve Regiment—HQ Deutschlandsberg.

  The Division’s Field Hospital—Maribor (temporarily) then Celje (Cilli).57

  The headquarters of all sub-units were located close to the main rail supply point at Pragersko (Prager Hof) to facilitate re-supply. Throughout its stay in Slovenia the location of units changed a number of times in accordance with the existing situation and each time a unit relocated a Nachkommando remained behind to ensure the vacated area was left in good order.

  Within the Division’s assigned district, two types of partisans were present. The first smaller group were known as ‘Chetniks’ who were under the overall command of Colonel Dragoljub ‘Draža’ Mihailović, and were royalist, pro Allies and anti-Communist. The detachment which was active in Lower Styria was led by Jože Melaher-Zmagoslav was organised in small organised and disciplined squads which were active east of Maribor and for the most part they were uniformed and relatively well armed. They had established a temporary modus vivendi with the Germans and consequently as a rule posed no immediate threat to the Division.

  The common enemy of both the Chetniks and the Galician Division were the second far larger and more formidable group, the Communist partisans. Commanded by Marshal Josip Broz-‘Tito’, this insurgent army, known as the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOVJ = Narodnoosvobodilna vojska Jugoslavije), had waged a bitter and protracted war against the Germans since June 1941. Some of Tito’s partisan formations grew to strengths of in excess of 30,000 and included men of all ages, women (in both combatant and non-combatant roles58) and even children. They operated exceptionally well from heavily fortified camps located in remote forests, caves and wooded mountains where they assembled, sometimes in broad daylight, to receive air-dropped weapons and supplies from the British and Americans. Highly motivated, they were very difficult to identify as they wore no common uniform and for purposes of deception often used captured German uniforms. Their local numerical superiority (supplemented by support from the indigenous population) was nonetheless partly offset by their poor level of training and armament. Avoiding large scale confrontations, they conducted frequent surprise raids on exposed targets such as individual drivers, resting places, troop and supply trains, headquarters units and ammunition and supply dumps.

  Active in this district which was known as the ‘4 Operative Zone’ [4. operativna cona], Tito’s principle force consisted of the ‘14 Partisan Division’ which was composed of a Headquarters together with the Šercer, Bračič and Tomšič Brigades. Additionally there were two independent brigades—VI Šlander’ and XI ‘Zidanšek’ as well as the 4 btl. of III. Brigade of NO (Narodna Obramba/(National Defence), which was formed from the most experienced partisans and was considered to be a ‘crack unit’. They wore German uniforms and according to Franc Sever Franta who commanded all the partisan forces on the Menina planina, this was the best-equipped unit under his command.59 These men were fresh, aged between 19–23, mostly equipped with automatic weapons, exceptionally well-organised, trained and ready to fight.60

  In early March 1945, these units were still engaged in attempting to cross into the Dolenjska region situated on the right bank of the Sava River south of Ljubljana (an area which encompasses the towns of Grosuplje, Trebnje, and Novo Mesto), having previously failed to do so and were dispersed over a wide area. In preparation for a renewed effort to be made in two or more parts at timed intervals, they were ordered to employ mainly defensive tactics and avoid large frontal battles with enemy units.61

  Combating the partisans was the Division’s priority but their encirclement and complete destruction proved to be a virtually impossible task. Instead its command had to content itself with continual harassment so that they were forced onto the defensive, lost confidence and moved into another area. The same established strategy which had been in place in Slovakia was again adopted in Slovenia with each of its sub-units assigned to a locality in which they were responsible for combating partisans and maintaining security. This task was made harder by virtue of the fact that houses in the villages were seldom centralised and often scattered over a wide area in the remote hills.

  From the moment of their arrival all the Division’s units were engaged in either defensive or offensive activities through which every soldier was to become acquainted with the unmistakable nature of the war in the Balkans. Waffen-Grenadier Volodymyr Keczun remembered: ‘[…] Once we entered Yugoslavia we were warned to be careful, because there were two different groups of partisans:—Mikhailovich Royalists—whom we tried to ignore if possible and Tito’s Communist-partisans who we were fighting. How do you recognise them? A partisan is a partisan!’.[…]

  Defensive measures therefore concentrated on clearing the main transport and communication arteries around the towns where the various units were stationed. An additional priority was the more mundane and routine duty of the provision of security for vital industrial installations, mines, power plants, bridges and other strategic objectives.

  In the first instance offensive actions were undertaken by assault groups and mobile patrols which immediately began combing through the woods in the Bachern mountain range (Pohorje plateau) south of the River Drava, day and night searching for the bases of the ‘Bachern Brigade’.62 These actions met with varying degrees of success as well as highlighting some of the intractable internal problems within the Division as illustrated in the following account of Waffen-Untersturmführer Roman Hawrylak who commanded a Jagdzug in WGR 31:

  […] My assault platoon was assigned to St Lorenzen, a small village south of the River Drava at the foot of the Pohorje mountain range, where according to the intelligence obtained from the previous German garrison, Tito’s partisans had a stronghold. Before we had a chance to find appropriate billeting, the regimental commander SS-Standartenführer Pannier sent us on an armed reconnaissance mission deep into the Pohorje. We were to report our findings and receive our further orders by radio. We took along enough ammunition, hand grenades and rations for a few days and passwords, which were changed daily. Previous German garrisons did not venture into the mountains so the terrain and situation were completely unknown to us.

  Group of cavalry from the Galician Division in Slovenia, March 1945. Second from right is Waffen-Hauptsturmführer Roman Dolynsky.

  Two unidentified officers from the Galician Division, both of whom have combat decorations in Slovenia, March, 1945.

  Two unidentified NCO’s Slovenia March 1945.

  After an exhausting day-long march we arrived almost at our assigned location in the centre of the Pohorje, without having encountered the enemy. I ordered a short break and tried to make radio contact with our regimental headquarters but was unable to do so because of the distance and mountainous terrain. I therefore had to act on my own initiative. We continued to advance for about 400 metres when I noticed an empty stand behind the bushes. Fresh tracks indicated the recent presence of an enemy sentry. A little further ahead a mountain farmstead became visible. I ordered my troops to take up attack formation as we approached the buildings. The houses were empty but in the hearth the fire was still burning and in two large cauldrons some soup was boiling. Judging by their size the meal was for 200 people or more. We searched all the farm buildings but found nothing except evidence that a large number of people had been living there for some time. While we had been resting nearby the partisans must have been alerted and had left taking everything with them. After several unsuccessful attempts to make radio contact with regimental headquarters, I decided to occupy the partisan camp and await further developments. Despite its delicious smell I ordered the soup to be thrown away as it could have been poisoned. Having worked out comprehensive defence plans, I placed sentries at strategic locations including the empty sentry post. After an evening meal from our rations, we rested weapons in hands. The night passed without incident.

  In the morning I ordered my troops outside to rehearse our defence plans
. Suddenly I saw some troops in mixed German uniforms together with some civilians coming towards us following the same path that we had used. I immediately realised that they were partisans, raised my sub-machine gun and shouted: Hands up! Drop your weapons! My soldiers followed my example and within seconds they had been disarmed without a shot. There were about fifteen men in German uniforms of various services who were returning to their stronghold, unaware of our presence. They had mistaken our sentry for their own as their previous sentry had also worn a German uniform. Our sentry who did not speak German, seeing German uniforms and as they spoke to him in a foreign language which he did not understand, let them pass. By way of this mutual misunderstanding the partisans had come straight into our hands. Later I tried to interrogate them, but without success, since I didn’t understand Slovenian, and they didn’t understand German. That afternoon Waffen-Untersturmführer Zenko Kozak arrived with some reinforcements having been sent by Pannier to assist us. Kozak agreed to escort all captives back to regimental headquarters with his group, while I remained behind with my platoon to continue our mission.

  We resumed our positions and posted reinforced sentries. During the night we heard some shots coming from the direction of our sentry. We ran outside and in the dark I saw visible flashes of discharges coming from the nearby woods. I took up position with one squad opposite the area where enemy fire was coming from and sent the other two squads to the flanks. There was an intense exchange of fire and we threw some hand grenades in their direction, after which we heard branches being broken as they fled. We gave chase for a short distance firing in the dark and then retreated to our compound suspecting a diversionary manoeuvre. In the fighting one of our men had been wounded. On our way back we found one enemy dead in the woods whom we left, intending to inspect him and the battlefield in the morning. We prepared for renewed enemy attacks but none came.