Stalin's Nemesis

by Michael James Melnyk

  On the same day we arrived near Radkersburg. It was raining and we were soaked. The 1 company was billeted in a large barn. The next day on 6 April we were ordered to move into the second line. We advanced for about two kms across flat fields until we came to some positions where we found some trenches had been dug and machine gun nests prepared. On either side of our position was a hill and to the left a small forest about 300 metres away. We had a good field of view but no tree cover. We were ordered to remain in place and not to fire so as not to alert the enemy to our presence.

  About 300 metres in front of our positions a farmer had made several heaps of manure. In the afternoon at about 15–1600 hrs we waited we caught sight of a group of about a dozen Wehrmacht soldiers who were exposed as they walked round the manure heaps towards us. Suddenly we heard a salvo of fire from mortars and the whole group fell.

  The same day at about 1800 hrs we received the order to leave our positions and move to Radkersburg. We advanced across some fields in a zig-zag pattern according to our training with five yards between each man, crossed the railway line and moved towards our new positions a few kilometres to the east of the town. On the way we passed Wehrmacht soldiers retreating from the front line carrying their wounded.

  The Soviets opened up with fire which wounded six of our men including Waffen-Oberscharführer Stefan Babiak. Waffen-Grenadier Wasyl Semegen was hit by shrapnel through the heart and was killed. Later he was buried in a nearby cemetery by Waffen-Unterscharfüher Michael Noskiv.

  We moved into position in the forest and had to dig trenches. The night of 6–7 April passed quietly. Just before dawn at around 0400 hrs suddenly we started to receive enemy fire. The commander of the 2 platoon Waffen-Untersturmführer Constantine Aleksewych and five other men were lightly wounded (a Volksdeutsch Unterscharführer Josef Daschner took over command of 2 platoon) while Waffen-Grenadier Stephan Sonchak was badly wounded in the stomach. I found him later when the firing stopped in the bushes clutching his stomach and holding in his intestines. I looked around for help from the company medic Waffen-Sturmmann Pavlo Tataryn but couldn’t find him. Eventually I found him in a position about 50–100 metres to the rear talking with some other soldiers including the company commander Waffen-Untersturmführer Ivan Sarytsky. I was in a rage because they did not know Sonchak was badly wounded and I shouted at the medic to come and help him immediately. I left him to be attended to by the medic and I returned to my platoon. Later I learned he had died of his wounds.

  At approximately 1330 hrs on the 7 April the entire unit was preparing to attack. The Jagdzug was to lead the way but shortly after it moved forward it ran into well camouflaged Soviet positions and received heavy fire from light automatic weapons during which a further four or five men were wounded. After ordering the retreat, Waffen-Untersturmführer Orest Liashevych who was himself very badly wounded during the attack, refused the help of his comrades and shot himself.

  I was standing by a big oak tree waiting for the order to advance when we came under mortar fire and I was hit by a splinter in my right wrist. The order to advance was cancelled and I reported to the company commander and said that I wanted to stay with my platoon but because of the wound I would not be able to take part in hand to hand combat. The company commander ordered me to get my wound bandaged by Waffen-Sturmmann Pavlo Tataryn and then go back to receive proper treatment. I handed over my automatic and together some of the other walking wounded, I left the front lines and walked for about an hour and a half until we reached Radkersburg, where we found a Wehrmacht ambulance which took us to a hospital about 15 kms away.[…]311

  W.Ustuf. Volodymyr Kudla from 4 company recalled:

  […] The 1 company together with the Jagdzug, supported by our heavy mortars launched their attack against an enemy occupied hill. Because of acute ammunition shortages normally I had to have permission to fire the heavy mortars but a few days earlier I had come across some wagons belonging to a Wehrmacht unit full of heavy mortar shells for which they had no mortars.312 I asked if I could have them and they let me take them. The enemy had no heavy weapons in that sector only light mortars. I was at my observation post nearby watching the attack progress through binoculars when Waffen-Untersturmführer Orest Liashevych reached the top of the hill. I saw him cut down by machine gun fire.[…]313

  After heavy fighting, the fusiliers had almost taken the Soviet positions when they received an abrupt order to retreat beyond their initial starting positions.314 Then, together with German and Hungarian troops and Cossack Cavalry who were in the vicinity315 the detachment pulled back to the west to a position south of Purkla before eventually reaching Mureck where they were used to fill the gap in the line left by the Wehrmacht crossing the River Mur and continued to engage Red Army units for not quite a full week. The fusiliers were then sent for one week’s rest near Gleichenberg, where they were reunited with the 2 and 3 companies.

  The commander of the 23 Panzer Division later reported that while under his command, the performance of the Ukrainian fusiliers had been commendable.316 Amongst those who received the Iron Cross II. Class for their bravery were Waffen-Untersturmführer Volodymyr Malynovych,317 Waffen-Sturmmann Pavlo Tataryn and eight fusiliers from 1 company including Waffen-Grenadier Dyrkaczoh. Additional decorations were also awarded to others such as Petro Cisarsky who received the Nahkampfspange (Close Combat Clasp) and Verwundetenabzeichen in Schwarz (Wound Badge in Black).

  The Front Stabilises

  In the Galician Division’s sector the front was now stabilised along the west side of the Sulzbach Valley, but the cost of this accomplishment was considerable in both killed and wounded which bore ample testimony to the ferocity of the combat. The Division’s casualty rate has been conservatively estimated at approximately 1,600 killed and wounded,318 in just over two weeks which equates to over 11 per cent of its fighting strength of 14,000.319

  In this period in which the Division suffered heavy losses, the commander of WGR 31 SS-Standartenführer Pannier was wounded and later so was the commander of WGR 29 SS-Standartenführer Dern. Their replacements, SS-Sturmbannführer Friedrich Wittenmeyer and SS-Obersturmbannführer Karl Wildner respectively, both enjoyed a good relationship with the Ukrainians and went on to have many successes with their regiments.320 Wildner’s replacement as battalion commander in WGR 29 was SS-Hauptsturmführer Hans Ditze.

  Significant fatalities during this period included two key battalion commanders SS-Hauptsturmführer Ludwig Kuchta321 (III./WGR 31) and his replacement SS-Sturmbannführer Wilhelm Podlesch (III./WGR 31) who was killed the following day.322 Several Ukrainian officers were also killed including Waffen-Untersturmführers’ Andrij Pytlar and Alexander Podolynsky. For the most part, makeshift graves were dug for the dead who were often buried without ceremony close to where they fell, in graves marked with a simple wooded cross on which their helmets were hung.

  The wounded were evacuated, some to sanitary points and others to the Division’s field hospital in Völkermarkt,323 while the more serious cases were later transferred for treatment to bigger military hospitals in Austria. These were largely overcrowded and reflecting the general state of the German war effort under staffed and deficient in virtually all types of medication. Anaesthetics were short supply and in extreme cases the only medication available for the treatment of infection after a gunshot wound was aspirin.

  The constant changes in the situation at the front which had pushed the Division over towards the left flank of 1 Cavalry Corps necessitated some regrouping. In its distinguished capture of Gleichenberg, WGR 29 had suffered heavy losses as had WGR 30 in the fighting around Stradner Kögel and both regiments were therefore pulled out of action to secondary positions for rest and for refitting and received replacements from the 14.Feld Ersatz Bataillon. Even so because of excessive casualties both had to be temporarily reduced from three to two battalions.324

  Neither Gleichenberg nor Stradner Kögels had any strategic significance, consequently control of both heights
was finally relinquished to the Soviets and no further attempts were made to recapture them.

  The Division’s new right hand neighbour was the 4 Cavalry Division (1 Cavalry Corps), while to the left was the 5 ‘Wiking’ Division (6 Army).

  The Burden

  On 9 April 1945,325 just as the fighting around Gleichenberg and Stradner Kögels was reaching its climax, the uncertainty surrounding the fate of the Division was finally ended. On this day the SS Liaison Officer to the Army High Command noted in the Verordnungsblatt der Waffen-SS:

  The 14 Waffen Gren.Div. der SS (Ukr Nr.1) is not to be disarmed. German personnel will be reinforced by inclusion of 3–4,000 soldiers (ground crew) of the Luftwaffe. The Division is to remain part of the Waffen-SS.

  The following day this translated into a new secret order from the SS-Ops HQ that read:

  10 April 1945,

  To 14 Waffen Gren. Div. of SS (UKRAINE No. 1), Secret!

  1. Countermanding all previous orders, arms belonging to Waffen Gren. Div. of SS (UKRAINE No 1) are NOT to be given up.

  2. Since German cadre personnel of 14 Waffen Gren. Div. of SS (UKRAINE No. 1) amount to approximately 2,000 officers, NCOs and men, reinforcements will be effected by the absorption of 3–4000 GAF [German Air force] military ground personnel

  3. 14 Waffen Gren. Div. of SS (UKRAINE No. 1) will remain a unit of the Waffen-SS.326

  Signed Blume

  Significantly, no mention was made of the ‘Ukrainian National Army’, which was in the process of being formed under the auspices of the recently officially recognised ‘Ukrainian National Committee’ headed by General Shandruk. Instead, it is implicit from point three that the Division’s continued direct affiliation to the Waffen-SS was regarded at least by Himmler and the SS-FHA as a sine qua non.

  This order was symptomatic of just how powerless Hitler had become, remote from reality trapped in his bunker in Berlin and so, after weeks of confusion the pantomime finally came to an end. Following receipt of the order, approximately 2,500 surplus German Luftwaffe personnel who were originally destined for the 10 Fallschirmjager Division, reported for service,327 a figure somewhat less than the originally proposed number of 3 to 4000 men. In a twist of supreme irony, the Galician Division which Hitler had considered a ‘liability’ now absorbed 2,500 surplus untrained German Luftwaffe personnel, the vast majority of whom brought with them neither weapons nor uniforms and were themselves a liability to the Division.

  Nonetheless, the influx of such a large number of German soldiers, only days after the routing of the Ukrainians on the Stradner Kögel provided Freitag with the inspiration for a radical solution to stiffen the resilience of his Division. To do this, he intended to assimilate the ‘reliable’ German personnel at once, in one of two ways; Since the inexperienced Luftwaffe men were predominantly NCOs holding ranks from corporal to sergeants major, (their number also included around 70 officers whose ranks ranged from ensign to captain),328 in the first option Freitag envisaged immediately incorporating them as platoon or squad leaders in fighting units. According to this plan, they would replace the equivalent number of Ukrainian soldiers who were currently holding those positions, who once disarmed, would then be sent to ‘military labour battalions’.

  A second alternative was to regroup the Division so that each regiment contained an entirely German battalion, thus creating an exclusively German element within each of its major combat units.329

  Under different circumstances Freitag may well have implemented either plan but the insurmountable organisational difficulties involved with the Division at the front, prevented him from doing so.330 Furthermore, the Luftwaffe men who were mostly former ground crew (and a few pilots) had not been re-trained as infantry and lacked vital combat experience. To compound matters they had no weapons and many were distrustful of the Ukrainians whose loyalty they suspected.331

  After protracted deliberations it was decided that they should undergo a period of intensive basic infantry training before being included into the combat elements, forcing Freitag with considerable reluctance to temporarily abandon his plans. The maximum number of 1,200 men were subsequently assigned to the 14.Feld Ersatz Bataillon and the remainder were sent directly to different companies within the Division, where they often formed separate platoons. Here ironically, they received their instruction from Ukrainians such as Fedir Tsymbaliuk a former NCO of the Volhynian Legion and now platoon commander in 5./II./WGR 30. His platoon was assigned ten Luftwaffe for re-training, but to complicate matters Tsymbaliuk spoke no German and did not know the appropriate German commands, obligating him and other Ukrainians who found themselves in similar circumstances to make extensive use of interpreters.

  The remainder were sent to its other sub-units to replenish the losses which brought the total number of Germans serving with the Division to an estimated 3,600.332 The commander of WGR 29, SS-Obersturmbannführer Karl Wildner opposed the inclusion of the Luftwaffe men into his regiment. In complete contrast the commander of WGR 30, SS-Obersturmbannführer Forstreuter who wanted the largest possible contingent assigned to him according to his former Ordonnanz Offizier, because he simply ‘didn’t trust the Ukrainians’.333 As an experiment, Forstreuter was allocated enough of the new German personnel to reconstitute a third battalion within WGR 30. The other two regiments had already received replacements from reserve units and were also able to reform a third battalion.334 Because of the continual dearth of communications specialists (radio and telephone operators) and other technicians, those with the requisite skill were quickly absorbed by the relevant sections whilst the rest were sent to different companies where they were given administrative or non-combatant roles. As a rule they did not mix with the Ukrainians and were neither happy with their new postings nor their transfer to the Waffen-SS.335 Generally they seem to have done their best to avoid receiving combat postings and ‘spent their time milling around the command post and playing cards’.336

  4

  The Final Act

  The Last Weeks of the War

  By 18 April the 1 Cavalry Corps held a line that ran from north to south from Feldbach–Gleichenberg–then (to the west of the following): Trautmannsdorf–Waldsberg–Dirnbach–Stainz–Straden–Karla–Radochen.1

  The Galician Division was now assigned to the defence of its own sector of the front which stretched from the outskirts of Feldbach on the extreme left flank to the village of Gleichenberg on the right flank, a distance of approximately 8 kms. It also continued to occupy Gleichenberg Schloss, which cut through the enemy lines and formed a pivotal point of resistance in its line of defence. The three infantry regiments were deployed in a linear disposition; WGR 30 to the north (HQ near Brundlegg), WGR 31 in the centre (HQ near Hof) and WGR 29 (HQ near Katzendorf) covered the southern sector adjoining 4 Cavalry Division.2 Between them due to the mountainous terrain, the frontline zigzagged along the entire front.

  With the resultant re-positioning of its infantry, the Division’s HQ and that of the Artillery Regiment were relocated west to the village of Obergnas. The individual batteries of the Artillery Regiment were evenly distributed and deployed so as to provide cover for the entire sector and a detailed fire plan was produced that took the capabilities of the heavy artillery into account.

  The 2 and 3 companies of the Fusilier Battalion held the line north of Gleichenberg Schloss while 1 and 4 were kept in reserve.3 Situated to the rear was the Divisional reserve which comprised of the 14.Feld Ersatz Bataillon and the Pioneer Battalion. The latter in accordance with orders, was withdrawn from the front and utilised only for technical pioneer work,4 its most important tasks being the construction of two temporary bridges and a large ferry to assist with the anticipated withdrawal. These were situated about five miles apart either side of the existing permanent concrete bridge spanning the River Mur in the vicinity of Karlsdorf. The successful completion of this undertaking was made significantly harder by a lack of heavy specialist equipment and a strong current in this section
of the river. The first bridge was under construction by the 1 company and the second by the 2 company,5 whose commander SS-Obersturmführer Dzillum later wrote:

  […] After a day of rest for my company in Karlsdorf, I received an order from the battalion commander SS-Sturmbannführer Remberger, to set up a temporary bridge across the Mur and to construct a big ferry. Both objects were to be camouflaged against air-reconnaissance. The locality was very favourable for this project because the terrain on both sides of the Mur was wooded. Furthermore the existing road bridge across the river was prepared for demolition.

  The building of the bridge and ferry was a very difficult project because we only had light pioneer equipment like cross-cut saws, axes, spades, shovels, sledge hammers and ropes at our disposal. Floating supports and pontoons were not available. The pioneer equipment was pitiful. We used punts that we managed to find in the area to ram beams into the river. All the men involved, officers, NCOs and grenadiers received the highest praise for their accomplishment of this project with the most primitive tools.[…]6

  The Pioneer Battalion also carried out special tasks, for example on request of two Burgermeistern (mayors) in the area of Kalsdorf, a bomb disposal unit of the 2 company successfully defused three unexploded bombs without any difficulty, one of which had to be dug up from between two houses where it had landed before being taken into open terrain and exploded.7

  Snipers

  As the front line was quiet and had settled into static defence positions, the troops were finally able to consolidate their emplacements. The frontal positions consisted mainly of MG 42 nests between which were foxholes for riflemen which were connected by shallow trenches in the terrain. Outposts were used only during the night to give early warning in case of an enemy attack. At the same time, the troops used the cover of darkness to change positions so as not to alert the enemy to their locations. The whereabouts of all the main Soviet positions were well known but the strength and intentions of the enemy forces was not. Those holding the frontal positions remained largely confined to their dug-outs and foxholes because of the prolific Soviet use of mortars and snipers who concealed themselves in trees or buildings in ‘no mans land’ between the opposing fronts. Waffen-Grenadier Volodymyr Keczun: