6William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, New York, 1990, p. 668.
7Chuev et al., Molotov Remembers, p. 24.
8Aleksandr Moiseevich Nekrich et al., Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German–Soviet Relations, 1922–1941, New York, p. 123.
9Nekrich et al., Pariahs, Partners, Predators, pp. 128–9.
10Steven J. Zaloga, and Howard Gerrard, Poland 1939: The Birth of Blitzkrieg, Oxford, 2002, p. 8
11Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-121-0011A-22, Polen, Siegesparade, Guderian, Kriwoschein.
12Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, p. 384.
13Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, pp. 267–8.
14General Ivan Proskurov, director April 1939–July 1940.
15Fesyun, Documents, Doc. 38, pp. 55–6, pp. 48–9.
16Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 3, p. 176.
17Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, p. 110.
18Prange et al., Target Tokyo, p. 332.
19Tokyo Advertiser, 3 February 1938.
20Joseph Newman, Goodbye Japan, New York, 1942, pp. 161, 163.
21Prange interview with Saito, 23 January 1965, Target Tokyo.
22Prange interview with Saito, 23 January 1965, Target Tokyo.
23Prange interview with Saito, 23 January 1965, Target Tokyo.
24Prange interview with Hanako, 7 January 1965, Target Tokyo.
25Interview with Shigeru Aoyama conducted on behalf of Prange by Ms Chi Harada, 1965, Target Tokyo.
26Hanako Ishii, Ningen Zoruge, pp. 60–1.
27Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 3, p. 5.
28Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 3, p. viii.
29Guerin and Chatel, Camarade Sorge, p. 268.
30Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, p. 132.
31Prange interview with Suzuki, 18 January 1965, Target Tokyo.
32Prange interview with Hanako, 7 January 1965, Target Tokyo.
33Guerin and Chatel, Camarade Sorge, p. 268.
34‘Extracts’, Clausen testimony, p. 10.
35‘Extracts’, Clausen testimony, p. 10.
36Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 3, pp. 159, 227.
37Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, p. 135.
38‘Extracts’, Clausen testimony, p. 41.
39Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 3, p. 108.
40‘Extracts’, Clausen testimony, p. 41.
41Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 3, pp. 226–8, 65.
42Deakin and Storrey, Case of Richard Sorge, p. 135.
43‘Extracts’, Clausen testimony, p. 561; Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 3, p. 64–5.
44Prange interview with Hanako, 7 January 1965, Target Tokyo.
45Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 3, pp. 8, 234.
CHAPTER 15
1Sorge, Die Weltwoche, 11 December 1964.
2Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, p. 119.
3Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, p. 242.
4Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, p. 243.
5Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, p. 243.
6Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, p. 243.
7Der Spiegel, 15 August 1951, p. 31.
8Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, pp. 260, 435.
9Prange et al., Target Tokyo, p. 355.
10Deakin and Storrey, Case of Richard Sorge, pp. 204–06.
11Sorge Memoir, Pt 2, p. 23.
12Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, pp. 390, 403.
13Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, p. 452.
14Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 3, p. 182; Vol. 1, p. 452.
15David E. Murphy, What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa, New Haven and London, 2005, p. 141.
16Murphy, What Stalin Knew, p. 138.
17Article II in Kinjiro Nakamura, Entire Picture, p. 24.
18Article II in Kinjiro Nakamura, Entire Picture, p. 24.
19Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, p. 177.
20Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, p. 232.
21Guerin and Chatel, Camarade Sorge, p. 92.
22Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, p. 176.
23Herbert Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan, Princeton, NJ, 1971, 2015, p. 78.
24Prange et al., Target Tokyo, p. 367.
25Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, p. 113.
26Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 3, p. 173.
27Cornelia Schmitz-Berning, Vokabular des Nationalsozialismus, Berlin, 2007, p. 745.
28Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, p. 116.
29‘Three-Power Pact Between Germany, Italy, and Japan, Signed at Berlin, September 27, 1940’, Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Avalon Law Project.
30Fesyun, Documents, p. 144.
31Fesyun, Documents, p. 145.
32Fesyun, Documents, p. 145.
33In notable contrast to the various tragicomically inept commercial ven-tures that Moscow had financed as cover operations in Shanghai that had included a cannery, and a tyre import business.
34‘Extracts,’ Clausen Testimony, p. 566; Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 3, pp. 160, 195, 224.
35Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 3, p. 234.
36Prange interview with Hanako, 7 January 1965, Target Tokyo.
37Geoffrey Regan, Book of Military Anecdotes, London, 1992, p. 210.
38Admiral Karl Dönitz, Memoirs, London, 1958; 1997, p. 114.
39Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War: 1939–1945, New York, 1968, p. 32. There is some debate about whether Hitler actually ever intended to invade Britain. Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, believed the invasion could not succeed and doubted whether the German air force would be able to win control of the skies; nevertheless he hoped that an early victory in the Battle of Britain would force the British government to negotiate, without any need for an invasion. Adolf Galland, commander of Luftwaffe fighters at the time, claimed invasion plans were not serious and that there was a palpable sense of relief in the Wehrmacht when it was finally called off. Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt also took this view and thought that Hitler never seriously intended to invade Britain and the whole thing was a bluff to put pressure on the British government to come to terms following the Fall of France (see David Shears on the German invasion plans in Richard Cox (ed.), Operation Sea Lion, London, 1975, p. 158, and Richard Overy, The Battle of Britain: Myth and Reality, London, 2010).
40Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain, London, 2009, p. 337.
41John Lukacs, The Duel: Hitler vs. Churchill 10 May–31 July 1940, London, 2000, chapter 7.
42Stephen Fritz, Ostkrieg: Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East, Lexington, 2011, p. 51.
43Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, p. 271.
44James P. Duffy, Hitler’s Secret Pirate Fleet: The Deadliest Ships of World War II, Lincoln, Nebraska, 2005, pp. 22–4.
45James Rusbridger, and Eric Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor, New York, 1991, p. 311.
46For his feat, after the fall of Singapore in 1942, Captain Rogge received from the Emperor of Japan a samurai sword of honour, that been given to only two other Germans, Hermann Göring and Erwin Rommel.
47John W. M. Chapman, The Price of Admiralty: The War Diary of the German Attaché in Japan 1939–1943, Lewes, Sussex, 1989, chapter 5.
48Ken Kotani, Japanese Intelligence in World War II, Osprey, Oxford, 2009, p. 102.
49Wenneker’s diary recalls: ‘[Vice-Admiral] Kondo repeatedly expressed to me how valuable the information in the [British] War Cabinet mem-orandum was for the [Japanese] Navy. Such a significant weakening of the British Empire could not have been identified from outward appearances.’ Rusbridger and Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor, p. 212.
50Reiss, Total Espionage, pp. 203–04.
51Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, p. 277.
52Toshi
to (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 3, p. 272.
53Sorge Memoir, Pt 2, p. 18.
54Hanako Ishii, Ningen Zoruge, pp. 100–01; Prange interview with Hanako, 7 January 1965, Target Tokyo.
55Viktor Anfilov, Doroga k Tragedii Sorok Pervogo Goda, Moscow, 1997, p. 195.
56Ovidy Gorchakov, ‘Nakanune ili Tragedia Kassandry’, Gorizont, No. 6, 1988, p. 31.
57Fesyun, Documents, No. 11.
CHAPTER 16
1Walter Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, London, 1956, p. 177 (known in later editions as The Labyrinth).
2Schellenberg, Memoirs, p. 160.
3Schellenberg, Memoirs, p. 161.
4Schellenberg was sentenced to six years in jail and died in Italy in 1952.
5Chunikhin, Richard Sorge: Notes, p. 121.
6John W. M. Chapman, ‘A Dance on Eggs: Intelligence and the “Anti-Comintern”’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 22, No. 2, Intelligence Services during the Second World War, April 1987, pp. 333–72.
7Eta Harich-Schneider, Charaktere und Katastrophen, Berlin, 1978, p. 203.
8Michael Wildt, Generation des Unbedingten, Hamburg, 2003, p. 478.
9‘Swiss Neutral Claims Nazis are Still on the Loose in Japan’, Spartanburg Herald-Journal, 12 May 1946, p. A5.
10Schellenberg, Memoirs, p. 160.
11Schellenberg, Memoirs, p. 161.
12Harich-Schneider, Charaktere und Katastrophen, p. 206.
13Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, p. 152.
14Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, pp. 270–72.
15Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, pp. 146–7.
16Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 2, p. 272.
17Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, Boston, 1950, pp. 162–63, 361.
18Chuev et al., Molotov Remembers, pp. 44–6.
19Deakin and Storrey, Case of Richard Sorge, p. 226.
20Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, p. 272.
21Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, p. 392.
22Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, p. 391.
23Deakin and Storrey, Case of Richard Sorge, p. 227.
24Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 2, p. 345.
25Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, p. 349.
26Document Nr. 103202/06. After Georgy Zhukov became Chief of the General Staff in February 1941, the plan was renamed ‘MP 41’ (Mobilisatsyonni Plan 41). ZAMO, f. 15A, op. 2154, d.4,l. 199–287. See Igor Bunich, Operatsia Groza, 3 vols, 1994–2004.
27Meretskov was a remarkable survivor. He was arrested by the NKVD as a member of an alleged anti-Soviet military conspiracy on 23 July 1941. After being subjected to two months of torture, including being beaten with rubber truncheons, in the Lubyanka, Meretskov signed a written confession that was used against other commanders arrested in May–July 1941, who were executed on the order of NKVD chief Lavrenty Beria near Kuybyshev on 28 October 1941. Meretskov was released in September 1941, presented to Stalin in full army uniform, and given command of the 7th Army. He helped to break the Siege of Leningrad, and in April 1945 led a Soviet invasion of Japanese Manchuria. He died, a decorated Hero of the Soviet Union, in 1968.
28See Bunich, Operatsia Groza.
29See ‘Unquestionable Facts of the War’s Beginning’, in Voenno-istorichesky Zhournal, the official military-historical journal of the Russian forces, February 1992,
30Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 2, p. 175; Vol. 1, pp. 247–9.
31Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 2, p. 175; Vol. 1, pp. 247–9.
32Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis of Power, pp. 127–29, 611–12 n.
33Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, p. 274.
34Murphy, What Stalin Knew, p. 144.
35Murphy, What Stalin Knew, p 145.
36Murphy, What Stalin Knew, pp. 146–7.
37Murphy, What Stalin Knew, p. 147.
38Anne Nelson, Red Orchestra: The Story of the Berlin Underground and the Circle of Friends Who Resisted Hitler, New York, 2009 pp. 189–92.
39Nelson, Red Orchestra, pp. 189–92.
40Nelson, Red Orchestra, pp. 189–92.
41Konstantin Umansky.
42Murphy, What Stalin Knew, pp. 147–8.
43Murphy, What Stalin Knew, p. 149.
44Herrnstadt had been working for the Soviets since the early 1930s, and after his expulsion from the USSR, along with most other German correspondents, he moved to Warsaw, where he developed a Sorge-like relationship with the German ambassador Hans-Adolf von Moltke, who frequently sought his advice and through whom he was able to meet, assess, and recruit several individuals who would produce outstanding intelligence reports.
45Murphy, What Stalin Knew, p. 147, ‘Proskurov Sets Stalin Straight’, chapter 3.
46When the invasion actually came, Leeb commanded Army Group North (Leningrad), Bock Army Group Centre (Moscow), and Rundstedt Army Group South (Kiev).
47Murphy, What Stalin Knew, p. 147, chapter 3.
48Rodric Braithwaite, Moscow 1941: A City and its People at War, London, 2007, p. 58.
CHAPTER 17
1Harich-Schneider, Charaktere und Katastrophen, p. 245.
2Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 3, pp. 109, 164.
3Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 3, p. 190.
4Fesyun, Documents, No. 148, Decoded Telegram No. 8298 to the Chief of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army General Staff, Tokyo, 19 May 1941.
5Ovidy Gorchakov, ‘Nakanune ili Tragedia Kassandry’, Gorizont, No. 6, 1988, pp. 31, 43.
6Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 3, pp. 164, 197.
7Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 3, pp. 164, 197, 109, 164, 178.
8Erich Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten, Stuttgart, 1950, p. 426.
9Spy Week lasted from 11–17 May, placing Sorge’s conversation with Kordt just after his meeting with Scholl.
10Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten, p. 427.
11Guerin and Chatel, Camarade Sorge, pp. 87–8.
12Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, p. 184.
13Hanako Ishii, Ningen Zoruge, p. 109.
14Hanako Ishii, Ningen Zoruge, p. 109; Prange Interview with Hanako, 7 January 1965, Target Tokyo.
15Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, p. 153.
16Schellenberg, Memoirs, p. 177.
17Hanako Ishii, Ningen Zoruge, p. 112.
18Der Spiegel, 5 September 1951.
19Hanako Ishii, Ningen Zoruge, p. 125.
20Der Spiegel, 5 September 1951.
21Der Spiegel, 5 September 1951.
22Robert Whymant interview with Harich-Schneider, Stalin’s Spy, p. 158; also Harich-Schneider, Charaktere und Katastrophen, p. 228.
23Sorge was not present at the welcome dinner held at the embassy in honour of Lt Col. Erwin Scholl on 20 May, which he would surely have attended if he had still been in Tokyo. Sorge’s absence suggests that the two old friends just missed each other, and that their reunion occurred after Sorge’s return from Shanghai. See Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, p. 164.
24Erwin Wickert, Mut und Übermut: Geschichten aus meinem Leben Gebundene Ausgabe, Stuttgart, 1992, pp. 177–8.
25Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, p. 278.
26Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, p. 337 n. 27; also Wickert, Mut und Übermut, p. 178.
27Harich-Schneider, Charaktere und Katastrophen, p. 243.
28Harich-Schneider, Charaktere und Katastrophen, p. 245.
29Harich-Schneider, Charaktere und Katastrophen, p. 246.
30Harich-Schneider, Charaktere und Katastrophen, p. 247.
31Harich-Schneider, Charaktere und Katastrophen, p. 248.
32Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, p. 163.
33Fesyun, Documents, No. 151, Decoded Telegrams Nos 8914, 8915.
34Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 1, pp. 249, 274.
35Toshito (ed.), Gendai-shi Shiryo, Vol. 3, pp. 164, 197.
36The dish consists of a beaten sirloin steak marinated in grated onion. Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, p. 166.
37Fesyun
, Documents, No. 151, Decoded Telegrams Nos 8914, 8915.
CHAPTER 18
1Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, p. 170.
2Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, p. 170.
3Harich-Schneider, Charaktere und Katastrophen, p. 255.
4Harich-Schneider, Charaktere und Katastrophen, p. 256.
5Harich-Schneider, Charaktere und Katastrophen, p. 257.
6Harich-Schneider, Charaktere und Katastrophen, p. 258.
7Harich-Schneider, Charaktere und Katastrophen, p. 258.
8Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, p. 173.
9Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, p. 174.
10Fesyun, Documents, No. 152.
11Fesyun, Documents, No. 153, Decoded Telegram No. 9917 to the Chief of the Intelligence Directorate, Red Army General Staff, Tokyo, 15 June 1941.
12Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, p. 174.
13Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, p. 174.
14Fesyun, Documents, No. 154, Decoded Telegram No. 10216. Tokyo, 20 June 1941.
15A collection of interviews which would later be published as Chuev et al., Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics.
16Murphy, What Stalin Knew, p. 186.
17Major General M. Ivanov of the central apparat of military intelligence confirmed that Poskrybyshev ordered up Sorge’s file ‘one night in 1940’ for Stalin to examine, Asia and Africa Today, No. 2, 2000, p. 48.
18Chuev et al., Molotov Remembers, pp. 34, 66, 69.
19Chuev et al., Molotov Remembers, pp. 34, 66, 69.
20Fesyun, Documents, Decoded Telegram No. 9917, Tokyo, 15 June 1941.
21Murphy, What Stalin Knew, p. 186.
22Murphy, What Stalin Knew, p. 186.
23Murphy, What Stalin Knew, p. 186.
24Murphy, What Stalin Knew, p. 186.
25Murphy, What Stalin Knew, p. 179.
26In a 1969 article entitled ‘The Lessons of War’, Golikov insisted that the most important of all reports was ‘Report No. 5’ of 15 June 1941, which gave precise figures for the German troops facing each of our border regions – Baltic, Western, and Kiev – from 400 kilometres deep into German territory. ‘We also knew the strength of the German troops in Romania and Finland,’ Golikov continued: ‘From the RU intelligence reports we knew the date of the invasion, and every time Hitler put it off (mainly because his troops were not ready), we reported this to our leaders. We found out and reported all the strategic blueprints for the attack against the USSR drafted by the German General Staff, the main one being the notorious Barbarossa plan.’ As there is no archival reference to ‘Report No. 5’, it seems probable that it is a creature of Golikov’s imagination. Likewise, his claim for its handling, given his usual treatment of Fourth Department reporting (see Murphy, What Stalin Knew, p. 210).
An Impeccable Spy Page 48
