iGen

by Jean M. Twenge

  Figure B.13. Correlation between individualism and time to maturation in family roles, 58 countries, based on Twenge & Campbell (2017).

  Figure B.14. Correlation between individualism and time to maturation in work roles, 58 countries, based on Twenge & Campbell (2017).

  The pattern also holds across time in the United States. Individualism (measured by individualistic language, parents giving their children unique names, and other factors) rises at the same time that young adults take longer to achieve maturity in work and family roles (see Figure B.15). So both around the world and over time, individualism is linked to growing up more slowly.

  Figure B.15. Change over time in individualism, time to maturation in family roles, and time to maturation in work roles, United States, 1965–2015, based on Twenge & Campbell (2017).

  Teens are now less likely to fight with their parents.

  Figure B.16. Percentage of 12th graders who have gotten into three or more fights with their parents over the last year. Monitoring the Future, 1976–2015.

  Appendix C

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  Chapter 2 Extra Stuff

  Time spent online is very similar by social class—for example, by mother’s education. In fact, those with the most advantages—a mother with a college education—actually spend a little less time online. Thus it can no longer be argued that defining this generation by technology leaves out the less fortunate; kids from disadvantaged backgrounds spend just as much time online, if not more, than kids with more advantages. (Using father’s education produces very similar results.)

  Figure C.1. Hours a day spent on the Internet by 8th, 10th, and 12th graders, by mother’s level of education. Monitoring the Future, 2013–2015.

  Social media use is higher among girls, but boys have recently started to catch up—possibly due to the popularity of Snapchat among boys.

  Figure C.2. Percentage of 8th graders who use social networking sites every day or nearly every day, by sex. Monitoring the Future, 2009–2015.

  Girls now use electronic devices the same amount as boys.

  Figure C.3. Hours spent on electronic devices per day by 9th to 12th graders, by sex. Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System, 2003–2015.

  On this survey, the wording of the question about electronic devices may have something to do with the gender difference. In 2003 and 2005, the survey asked, “On an average school day, how many hours do you play video or computer games or use a computer for something that is not school work?” In 2007 and 2009, it asked, “On an average school day, how many hours do you play video or computer games or use a computer for something that is not school work? (Include activities such as Nintendo, Game Boy, PlayStation, Xbox, computer games, and the Internet.)” In 2011: “On an average school day, how many hours do you play video or computer games or use a computer for something that is not school work? (Include activities such as Xbox, PlayStation, Nintendo DS, iPod touch, Facebook, and the Internet.)” In 2013 and 2015, “On an average school day, how many hours do you play video or computer games or use a computer for something that is not school work? (Count time spent on things such as Xbox, PlayStation, an iPod, an iPad or other tablet, a smartphone, YouTube, Facebook or other social networking tools, and the Internet.)” The large increase for girls from 2011 to 2013 most likely occurred because smartphones and tablets were included for the first time.

  Differences based on other demographic variables are smaller, and the increases in social media and electronic device use appear across races and regions and in rural and urban locations. These trends have not left any groups untouched.

  Figure C.4. Percentage of 8th graders who use social networking sites every day or nearly every day, by race. Monitoring the Future, 2009–2015.

  Figure C.5. Hours spent on electronic devices, 9th to 12th graders, by race. Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System.

  The increase in social media use is nearly identical among socioeconomic status groups.

  Figure C.6. Percentage of 8th graders who use social networking sites every day or nearly every day, by socioeconomic status. Monitoring the Future, 2009–2015.

  It is also very similar by US region . . .

  Figure C.7. Percentage of 8th graders who use social networking sites every day or nearly every day, by region. Monitoring the Future, 2009–2015.

  . . . and based on whether students are in rural or urban locations.

  Figure C.8. Percentage of 8th graders who use social networking sites every day or nearly every day, by rural vs. urban location. Monitoring the Future, 2009–2015.

  The MtF survey asks about Internet use during leisure time—online time outside of that for school or work. As you might expect, iGen teens spend more time online than their Millennial predecessors did—12th graders in 2014 spent twice as many hours a week than in 2006 (fourteen hours vs. seven hours), 10th graders about five more hours, and 8th graders three and a half more hours.

  Figure C.9. Hours a day spent on the Internet by 8th, 10th, and 12th graders. Monitoring the Future, 2006–2015.

  Similar to electronic device use, the gender gap has disappeared; whereas 12th-grade boys in 2006 spent two more hours a week online than girls, by 2013 they spent about the same amount of time online. Although the Internet still has a male-dominated vibe in many corners, other places, such as most social networking sites, are now female-dominated spaces. Recall that girls spend about four hours a week more on these sites than do boys.

  However, watching TV goes the other direction. While the majority of 9th graders spent three or more hours a day watching TV in 1999, that was cut in half (to 26%) by 2015. The percentage of 12th graders who were heavy TV users stayed fairly constant from 1999 to 2013 and then dropped 19% from 2013 to 2015.

  Figure C.10. Percentage of 9th to 12th graders who watched three or more hours of TV on an average school day. Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System, 1999–2015.

  Appendix D

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  Chapter 3 Extra Stuff

  Driving around in a car just for fun is increasingly a thing of the past. The cruising glory days were the 1970s and 1980s, when nearly three out of four teens rode around with their friends every week. Cruising became less popular in the 1990s and declined the most during the Internet age (see Figure D.1). The number who never cruise has tripled, from 6% in 1989 to 18% in 2015. With fewer teens driving and more communication through screens, driving around with nothing to do has lost its appeal.

  Figure D.1. Percentage of 8th, 10th, and 12th graders “riding in a car—just for fun” once a week or more, Monitoring the Future, 1977–2015.

  Teens also spend more time alone than they used to—and it’s likely that alone time is spent looking at a screen.

  Figure D.2. Percentage of 8th, 10th, and 12th graders who spent an hour or more of leisure time alone nearly every day. Monitoring the Future, 1976–2015.

  As the figures in the main text show, a greater use of social media is linked to lower well-being. It is possible that the same types of teens are both unhappy and drawn to (for example) social media. Here, the major factor is gender: girls are more prone to being unhappy and also spend more time on social media. Other factors might be linked to both more social media use and more happiness, which would mean that the numbers in the chart are actually too low (called a suppressor effect). The main candidate there is spending more time with friends in person: teens who are social in person are also social online. Since in-person time leads to more happiness and social media to less, it’s worth looking at the unique effects of online interaction, controlling for in-person social interaction. When both gender and in-person social interaction are taken into account, the chances of being unhappy for heavy screen time users is about the same; accounting for gender lowers the relative risk for screen time predicting unhappiness, and including in-person social interaction increases it. Including other demographic factors, such as race, class, and region, barely budges the relative risks. The links between happiness and
activities are also about the same when examined within groups—say, among working-class teens or among Latino teens. Across the board, teens who hang out with their friends in person are happier, and teens who connect with their friends online more are less happy.

  The text reports the links between activities and happiness for 8th graders. The results for 10th graders are similar (see Figure D.3). The chart shows the data for 2013–2015 only because the questions on hours spent online, on games, on texting, and on social networking sites were asked beginning in 2013.

  Figure D.3. 10th graders’ relative risk of being unhappy related to time spent on screen and nonscreen activities. Monitoring the Future, 2013–2015.

  The text reports the links between activities and loneliness for 10th graders. The results for 8th graders are similar (see Figure D.4). Just as with happiness, the risk of loneliness from using social media decreases a little when gender is controlled for but then increases again once in-person social activities are controlled for.

  Figure D.4. 8th graders’ relative risk of loneliness related to time spent on screen (black bars) and nonscreen (gray bars) activities. Monitoring the Future, 2009–2015.

  The text reports the links between time spent on screen and nonscreen activities and depression for 8th graders. The results for 10th graders are similar (see Figure D.5).

  Figure D.5. 10th graders’ relative risk of high depressive symptoms related to time spent on screen (black bars) and nonscreen (gray bars) activities. Monitoring the Future, 2009–2015.

  Because in-person social interaction protects against depression more for 10th graders, controlling for it makes a bigger difference in the links among social networking sites, Internet news, and depression. Going out with friends and using social media are positively correlated, so we want to know the unique effect of time spent online, controlled for in-person social interaction. When it’s controlled for, along with demographic factors such as gender, race, and SES, teens who spend more time on social media and reading news online are significantly more likely to be depressed, though it’s a small effect (see Figure D.6). (This graph shows odds ratios, a different statistic from relative risk, that can be controlled for outside factors.)

  Figure D.6. 10th graders’ odds of high depressive symptoms related to time spent on screen (black bars) and nonscreen (gray bars) activities, with controls for demographic factors and in-person social interaction. Monitoring the Future, 2009–2015.

  Appendix E

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  Positive Self-Views, High Expectations, the Eroding Link Between Happiness and Age, and Everybody’s Favorite, Narcissism

  The relentless positivity encouraged in our society began long before the Internet. It has its roots in a fundamental shift in American culture, one that was bubbling below the surface for many decades before emerging during the 1960s: the growing focus on the individual self and the abandonment of social rules. Cross-cultural psychologists call this individualism; it emphasizes uniqueness, equality, and self-expression. (And thus, like many other trends, it is not all good or all bad. It just is.) Cultural individualism continued to grow only after the 1960s, taking on ever more self-focused forms and shaping GenX and especially Millennials (the subject of my previous book Generation Me). Many of these trends continue with iGen, but they are more Millennials’ story—thus their residence here in this appendix rather than in the main text.

  One of the core values of individualism is equality; we explored that in chapter 9, “Inclusive,” on tolerance and acceptance. Here we’ll focus on the impact of individualism on views of the self—how the emphasis on thinking highly of yourself is not the unmitigated boon it’s often assumed to be.

  One somewhat extreme manifestation of increased individualism is a nearly relentless overconfidence—an emphasis on thinking highly of oneself no matter what. Those ideas began to pervade the culture beginning in the 1980s. For example, the graph below shows the growth of the phrase “I’m the best” in books published in the United States between 1960 and 2008 from the Google Books database (which contains the full text of 5 million books; 2008 is the most recent year available).

  Figure E.1. Appearance of the phrase “I’m the best” in American books. Google Books database, 1960–2008.

  Song lyrics show these trends as well, shifting away from the dippy but highly prosocial love songs of the 1980s to more antisocial and narcissistic themes by the 2000s, such as Justin Timberlake’s song that singlehandedly brought “Sexy Back.” This overwhelming self-positivity has shaped iGen’ers, just as it did Millennials. As a result, more believe that they are superior to their peers in important skills (see Figure E.2).

  Figure E.2. Percentage of entering college students who believe they are above average compared to others their age in their drive to achieve, leadership ability, and academic ability. American Freshman Survey, 1966–2016.

  Since students are comparing themselves to others their age, they aren’t actually any better (any increase in ability would be constant in the comparison). In addition, students are not in fact any smarter; SAT scores and other standardized test scores are either lower than or about the same as they were in years past. Demographic shifts, such as the larger numbers of women, Latinos, and Asian Americans in college now, would push those numbers down instead of up, as those three groups score lower on self-ratings of abilities. And with more students going to college recently than in the past, the students filling out the survey are a less select portion of people their age, another force that should push the numbers down. So why do they go up?

  Probably because feeling good about yourself is so emphasized and positive feedback (such as participation trophies) are so common. The academic equivalent of “everyone gets a trophy” is “everyone gets an A,” so if thinking highly of yourself has become institutionalized, we should see significant grade inflation. And we do.

  Figure E.3. Percentage of students who graduate from high school with an A, B, or C or D average, entering college students, American Freshman Survey, 1966–2016.

  No wonder college students think that their abilities are superior: the majority of them are A students. With more students entering college thinking of themselves as A students, it’s no wonder that more are shocked when they receive B’s or, God forbid, C’s, their first year in college. Grade inflation has continued, and even ticked up, after iGen entered college in 2012.

  Grade inflation also appears among high school seniors, ruling out any effects of colleges becoming more (or less) selective.

  Figure E.4. Percentage of students who graduate from high school with an A, B, or C or D average, 12th graders, Monitoring the Future, 1976–2015.

  This emphasis on praise has occurred at the same time that students’ expectations for their future lives have soared. Perhaps because more students think of themselves as academically superior, more expect to graduate from college. Only about half of students in the late 1970s thought they would get a bachelor’s degree, but by the 2010s about 85% thought they would. However, the percentage of Americans in their late twenties who hold college degrees has barely budged (see Figure E.5). Expectations have taken flight while reality has changed very little. Here, the big rise is during the GenX and Millennial years, with iGen continuing but not further increasing the number who expect to finish a bachelor’s degree.

  Figure E.5. Percentage of 12th graders who expect to earn a four-year college degree (Monitoring the Future) and percentage of 25- to 29-year-olds who have earned a four-year college degree (Current Population Survey), 1976–2015.

  The contrast between expectations and reality is even starker for the most vulnerable students, the shrinking population who graduate from high school with a C or D average. More and more of these students believe they will graduate from college even as the number of them who enroll in four-year colleges dwindles to almost zero (see Figure E.6). Yes, a few high school C and D students will get college degrees, but encouraging them to expect to do so might very we
ll be setting them up for failure and disappointment.

  Figure E.6. Percentage of students with a C or D average who expect to earn a college degree, 12th graders, Monitoring the Future, 1976–2015, and percentage of entering college students with a C or D average, American Freshman Survey, 1966–2016.

  Could it be a good thing to have self-confidence, even if it is unrealistic? According to most research, no. Self-confidence doesn’t improve grades or performance. It doesn’t necessarily hurt, but it doesn’t help, either, and it’s certainly no substitute for hard work. Here’s one concrete example: Which ethnic group in the United States has the lowest self-esteem? It’s Asian Americans, who achieve the best academic performance. That result alone negates the idea that self-confidence is the key to success. Instead of focusing on self-confidence, Asian American culture tends to focus on hard work, so it’s really no surprise that their academic performance is higher on average.

  Individualism: Great When You’re Young, Not So Much When You’re Older