Hunt the Bismarck

by Angus Konstam

  However, the clock on Hood’s bridge continued to tick on, and still no word came from Wake-Walker. 02.00 came and went, and darkness descended on them, but the British lookouts couldn’t see any sign of the enemy. It was clear that something had gone wrong in Holland’s calculations. The enemy weren’t where they should have been. That meant that they had altered course. It was unlikely they’d have altered to port, as that would place them closer to the warships of the Home Fleet, so the most likely thing was that they’d altered course to starboard and were still hugging the edge of the pack ice. If that were indeed the situation, then if Holland held his present course there was a good chance he’d miss the Germans altogether. At 02.03 he therefore ordered his capital ships to reverse course, and steer 200°, or south-south-west.7 At the same time, his three destroyers were ordered to continue on to the north, in an attempt to make contact with the enemy.

  Enemy in sight!

  Now, both groups of ships were heading towards the south, on slightly diverging courses. For Holland and all the sailors in the two British ships it was a tense time. They had all been keyed up for a battle – now there was a chance there mightn’t be a fight after all. Then, at 02.46, the radio receiver on board Hood crackled into life. It was a fresh contact report from Suffolk. 8 Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had changed course slightly during the night, from 190° to 220°, to conform to the gradual angling away of the Greenland pack ice. Now Holland knew where the enemy were and so he could work out how best to intercept them. As a gunnery expert, he realised that his run to the north had robbed him of his big tactical advantage. He would no longer be able to cross the enemy’s T. However, he felt that his two ships had more than sufficient firepower to deal with the Bismarck in a straightforward gunnery duel. Still, he held that course for a little longer, waiting for more contact reports to come in.

  Finally, at 03.21, he ordered another alteration to starboard, this time on to a new course of 240°.9 This change of course meant that the paths of the two pairs of ships were now converging slightly. While a few moments before the British crews had considered the possibility that there mightn’t be a battle after all, they now realised they would have to fight. However, that fight would be at least another two hours away. Just over 30 minutes later, at 03.53, Holland ordered an increase of speed to 28 knots. His four destroyers were still away to the north, and he now recalled them, ordering them to catch up at their best possible speed. This, however, meant that when contact was made, probably around dawn or slightly after, the destroyers would be too far away to intervene in the coming battle. A clash was coming – that now was fairly certain – but it would be a straightforward duel between two pairs of warships. By Holland’s calculations, the enemy were a little over 20 miles away to the north.

  About an hour later, shortly after 05.00, the first signs of a new dawn could be seen emerging over the eastern horizon. Earlier, Holland had hoped to use the sunset to his advantage, as it would silhouette the German ships, while his own would be harder to see. Now that position was reversed. When sunrise came, it would be the German gunners who would have the advantage. Regardless, Holland persevered and maintained his course and speed, guided by a renewed stream of contact reports coming from the two British cruisers. Minute by minute the tension was mounting. At 05.10, Holland signalled Prince of Wales, demanding her instant readiness for action. In response, Captain Leach went on the ship’s tannoy and announced that he expected the battleship would be in action in 15 minutes.10 To reinforce the point, the ship’s chaplain then gave a short prayer, finishing with the plea to the Almighty: ‘If we forget thee, do not thou forget us.’ Meanwhile, on both British ships, lookouts strained to be the first to spot the approaching enemy.

  Then, at 05.23, the latest radio message from Wake-Walker reported another German change of course. The Germans were now steering 170°, a little east of due south.11 That placed the two forces on a collision course. Throughout the past two days, the British admiral had pondered how he should bring the enemy to battle. He knew that the Bismarck represented the very latest in battleship design, although he had no real information about her fighting capability. Her speed was probably comparable to that of his two ships, and in theory her guns were no more powerful than those of Hood. The German battleship had spent a long time training her crew, while Hood was fresh from a gruelling series of Atlantic patrols. As for Prince of Wales, Holland had grave doubts about her fighting efficiency, both in terms of her largely inexperienced crew, or the new battleship’s technical reliability. After all, she still had civilian technicians on board, tinkering with her guns.

  Then there was the question of protection. Again, while Holland had no intelligence reports to draw upon, he expected Bismarck to be superbly well armoured. By contrast, while Prince of Wales was brand new, and relatively well protected, Hood was a mere battlecruiser, and more than a quarter of a century old. Holland knew her armour wasn’t really up to the job. That was especially true of her deck armour. As a gunnery expert, he understood perfectly well that at long ranges, due to the necessarily high elevation of the guns, shells flew in a curve, almost like a mortar shell, before plunging down on their target, dropping at a steep angle. That meant that at extreme ranges, shells were more likely to hit the deck of a target ship than its sides. At closer ranges, the trajectory was much flatter and the shells were far more likely to strike the hull or superstructure of the target. Therefore, to avoid exposing Hood to plunging fire, he had to close the range as quickly as possible.

  At the moment, however, he had one major advantage. The Germans were to the north of Holland’s ships and were heading almost due south. By contrast, the British were steaming towards the south-west, so when the Germans appeared they would probably do so off Hood’s starboard beam. That meant that despite all their night-time manoeuvring, the chances were that Holland might be able to cross the enemy’s T after all. That gave him a significant tactical edge, but it still didn’t solve the problem of Hood’s vulnerability at long range. Visibility that morning was expected to be pretty good, and dawn was now breaking. So, he could expect to spot the enemy when they were a little under 20 miles away. While in theory Hood’s 15in. guns could hit a target 15 miles away, her maximum effective range was around 25,000 yards (12.5 miles). Then, the closer they got, the more chance there was of hitting the target.

  Another factor was penetration. The closer the target was, the more likely the shells were to penetrate its armour. Also, given Holland’s estimation of Bismarck’s protective armoured belt, he expected that for his shells to be truly effective, he needed to close the range to around 18,000 yards (9 miles). As for Prince of Wales, her 14in. guns were a new design, and unlike the 15in. guns of the kind mounted in Hood, their effectiveness hadn’t been tested in battle. Still, he expected a roughly similar level of effectiveness from them, albeit with slightly less penetrative power. That meant the Prince of Wales might need to close to within 16,000 yards (8 miles) before her shells could smash their way through Bismarck’s armoured belt. Also, to be fully invulnerable to plunging fire, Hood needed to be within 12,000 yards (6 miles) of the enemy.

  Unfortunately, all this meant that even though he might enjoy a superior position at the moment, when the enemy finally appeared he would have to close the range with both ships as quickly as possible, and so surrender this slim tactical advantage. Each of his two ships had slightly different advantages and disadvantages, and the British Admiralty needed to weigh these up before they opened fire. Then, he had the problem of coordinating the fire of his two capital ships, carrying guns of different calibres. By firing on the same target this would lead to problems when it came to observing the fall of shot, when his gunnery director teams watched the salvo land and corrected their aim until their shells were hitting the target. With two ships firing at the same enemy ship, this job would be a little harder. However, as a ballistics expert he was certain that closing the range was the thing to do. So, as dawn broke, and the lookouts and rad
ar scanned the northern horizon, Holland had a lot to think about.

  Two dozen miles to the north, just after 05.25, the Prinz Eugen’s hydrophone operator detected the sound of fast-moving propellers somewhere off the port bow.12 The report reached Captain Brinkmann on the cruiser’s bridge, by which time the sound of not one but two ships had been identified. Something was out there in the pre-dawn darkness, to the east-south-east. That made sense. If the enemy did appear at dawn, then it would probably be in the south-east quadrant, which was where the lookouts on the two German ships were concentrating their gaze as the ships raced on towards the south-west, with Prinz Eugen steaming ahead of the battleship. The report was signalled to Bismarck, and the two ships continued on their way. By now, though, it was pretty clear to both sides that action was imminent.

  Two minutes later, at 05.27, a lookout on board the Prinz Eugen spotted two smudges on the southern horizon.13 The officer of the watch that morning was Kapitänleutnant Paul Schmalenbach, the cruiser’s second gunnery officer. Everyone with binoculars peered at the southern horizon, lighting up now with the rising sun. Then, two minutes later, just as Captain Brinkmann came on to the bridge, Schmalenbach saw them for himself – two distinct columns of smoke. He immediately sounded Action Stations, and signalled news of the sighting to Bismarck, following a half-mile astern of the cruiser. Two minutes later and 15 miles to the south, a teenage seaman, ‘Knocker’ White, was perched in the mast of Prince of Wales when he spotted something on the starboard beam. Again, it was a plume of smoke. He yelled the news down to the deck, and on the battleship’s bridge everyone peered in the direction the youth’s arm was pointing. At first nobody saw anything. Then, gradually, the watchers on the bridge saw the smoke too. By then, White could clearly see the masts of a ship, and the smoke of a second vessel astern of her. At 05.35 he repeated his first cry – ‘Enemy in Sight!’14

  Opening salvos

  So, both pairs of ships had spotted each other. As they were still 15 miles apart, neither side could make out what the enemy ships were, but at least the British knew they were facing Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. By contrast, the appearance of these two ships came as a complete surprise to the Germans. On Prinz Eugen, 1.4 miles ahead of the Bismarck, they had a better view of them than they did on the battleship, and Captain Brinkmann thought the approaching ships were enemy light cruisers. In fact, at 05.32 he signalled Lütjens, suggesting exactly that. Lt Jasper, his first gunnery officer, was less certain. He thought at least one of the approaching ships might be a battleship. All four ships were at Action Stations now, the crews tense, alert and waiting for orders. Another 15 miles astern of Bismarck, Wake-Walker’s two cruisers were still following the Germans from a safe distance. They would play no part in the coming battle, but if called on, they could at least take on the Prinz Eugen. The German cruiser might be more modern, but they each matched her in firepower, and they outnumbered her two to one.

  At 05.32, Admiral Lütjens ordered his squadron to turn 50 degrees to starboard, on to a new course of 220°.15 He now had plenty of room between his ships and the outer edge of the pack ice, so by turning away it not only allowed his aftermost guns to bear, but it also reduced the rate at which both sides were closing with each other. Whoever these enemy ships were to the south, they would now take longer to reach the Germans. This change of course was soon picked up on Suffolk’s radar and the news passed to V. Adm. Holland on the Hood. By now, the lookouts on the battlecruiser could make out the Germans, too – their masts were just appearing over the horizon. This change of course ruined Holland’s well-laid plans. At that angle, the two sides would close too slowly, and Hood would remain vulnerable to plunging fire for longer than he wanted. It also meant that any chance of crossing the enemy’s T had now gone. He thus had to alter course to close the range more rapidly. So, at 05.37 Holland ordered Hood to alter 40 degrees to starboard, on to a new course of 280°, or just a little north of due west. Prince of Wales duly followed her, keeping her position 800 yards (0.4 miles) astern of the flagship.

  Until that turn, Lütjens had seen that the approaching ships were on an almost parallel course to his own – they were steering 240° while the Germans were on a course of 220°. This implied that they didn’t pose much of an immediate threat – something that encouraged the idea that they were cruisers, sent to reinforce the two already patrolling the Denmark Strait. This change of course, however, set alarm bells ringing:16 the two ships were heading almost directly towards him. This was far more confrontational, and suggested the enemy actually wanted to engage him – not something a pair of light cruisers would do. Two minutes later, at 05.39, the German commander ordered his own ships to turn to starboard, on to a new course of 265°. That meant the enemy weren’t closing with him quite so quickly and it gave him more time to evaluate the threat they posed. After all, he still didn’t know what kind of ships they were.

  It took a minute before the two British ships steadied on their new course. At that angle, the rear turrets of both British ships could still bear on the enemy, but only if they were pointed as far forwards as possible. Holland was closing the range now – something he considered vital if he were to avoid undue risk to his flagship. Still, after pondering the situation for a few minutes he decided the range wasn’t dropping fast enough. So, at 05.49 the British commander ordered Hood and Prince of Wales behind her to turn another 20 degrees to starboard, on to a new course of 300°. At the same time, he sent a signal to Captain Leach of the Prince of Wales, ordering him to stay close to Hood and to follow the flagship’s lead.

  Holland was determined to concentrate his force’s fire on Bismarck, which he and the bridge staff on Hood still identified as the leading enemy ship. The Prince of Wales, however, had better rangefinder optics than the Hood, and her crew had already identified that the leading ship was a cruiser, and the Bismarck was behind her. From their perspective, she was the ship on the right. So, Captain Leach ignored his admiral’s orders and instead ordered the battleship to prepare to shoot at the right-hand ship.

  Part of the problem was that at such a long range, and at that particular angle, the silhouettes of both German warships looked remarkably similar. Holland was also seeing them against a still-dark sky, while the dawn light made his own ships stand out clearly to the Germans. It was only after Hood fired her first few salvos at the enemy cruiser that V. Adm. Holland and Captain Kerr realised their mistake. The cruiser was no real threat to them. Their real target was the German battleship. So, eventually, Holland ordered Hood to switch her fire to Bismarck – the right-hand target. For some reason, though, this all-important order took several minutes to be passed on to the gunnery teams. By the time they’d produced a new firing solution for this fresh target it was too late.

  As the British ships turned, the gun direction teams on all four ships prepared for action, feeding in all those vital pieces of information – course speed and bearing of target and firer – as analogue computers mechanically calculated the right firing solution. This information was duly relayed to the guns, which were subsequently trained and elevated. Only then could the respective captains give the order to open fire. In the end, Captain Kerr was the first of the four captains to give the order. With his admiral’s blessing he passed on the command to his gunnery officer, and the directive ‘Shoot’ was given. Then, at 05.52, Hood’s two forward turrets erupted in simultaneous orange flashes, and the 15in. shells began screaming their way towards their target.17 The range was now 25,000 yards (12.5 miles), and so the shells would take roughly 44 seconds to reach their target. Eventually, they saw four huge shell splashes erupt in front of their target. They were 1,000 yards (0.5 mile) short.

  The flashes were seen from the German ships. The enemy ships were almost bow on to the Germans, making it hard to identify them. The fact they’d opened fire though suggested they weren’t cruisers, since their guns wouldn’t have the range. Any lingering doubts about just what the Germans were facing were dispelled when the en
emy salvo landed in the water in front of the Prinz Eugen. Before they even landed the Prince of Wales opened fire too, at 05.53. She was a little astern of Hood, and so the range for her six forward 14in. guns was 26,500 yards (13 miles). Some 49 seconds later the salvo landed, nicely grouped, but almost 2,000 yards (1 mile) to the right of Bismarck. That was pretty poor shooting, probably the result of an inexperienced rangefinding team.

  Worse, the left-hand gun of ‘A’ turret malfunctioned after firing, which meant that when Prince of Wales fired again, about 30 seconds after unleashing her first salvo, she was down to just five guns. The direction team also hadn’t adjusted their fall of shot yet, as the first salvo was in flight, so that went wide too. Meanwhile, Hood’s second salvo also fell short again. On both ships, the gunners now adjusted their aim, based on the fall of shot of their first salvo, so in theory their accuracy was bound to improve. For some reason, however, the gun director team on board Hood never really got their eye in before catastrophe overtook them. They also kept shooting at the Prinz Eugen, firing a total of ten salvos at her, and missing every time. By contrast, the less experienced gunnery teams on board Prince of Wales proved much more effective at ranging in on their target.