Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC
Page 4
Pactolos River, Sardis and Dascyleium (395 B.c.)
The campaign against Elis would prove Agis' last as he passed away shortly thereafter. His brother, Agesilaos II, emerged from the succession dispute that followed to become king in 396. His first crisis would arise when word came from Asia that Tissaphernes was preparing a fleet whose destination was unknown. Lysander, a hero from the last stages of the conflict with Athens, advanced the idea that this armament was aimed at Sparta and it was decided to renew the war against Persia. Agesilaos took command and sailed out with 1,000 helot hoplites, 6,000 allied Peloponnesian spearmen and supplies for six months in the field. Gathering reinforcements in Asia (both Ionians and mercenaries, including Xenophon and the Cyreans) to the strength of 4,000 hoplites and 400 horsemen (Diodorus 14.79.2), he set up base at Ephesos. Tissaphernes stalled by discussing a truce even as he asked the Great King for more troops.
Tissaphernes had sent his cavalry up to the Ionian border along the Meander plain (flat country well suited to mounted operations) while keeping his infantry back in the Carian hills. But Agesilaos, though he had made preparations suggesting an imminent march on Carla, now set off toward Phrygia and was able to prosecute a profitable campaign of plunder with very little resistance. There was, however, a mounted skirmish near the town of Dascyleium in which a body of his Greek cavalry took a beating from Persian horsemen. This was a minor action to be sure, but one that made a strong impression on the savvy Spartan tactician. Agesilaos now judged that an improved mounted force would be needed on the broad Asian flats. When he returned to Ephesos that fall, he therefore went about gathering more cavalry from the wealthier of his local allies. He did this by allowing them to fulfill their personal levy obligation by substituting a competent man and horse in its stead.
Agesilaos marched out from Ephesos the next spring, making for the Lydian city of Sardis, capital for the Persian satrapy that included Ionia. This once more frustrated Tissaphernes' defenses, which had set up as before with infantry in the Carian rough and cavalry on post above in the valley of the Meander. The satrap was under great pressure to answer the Spartan's maneuver this time and he headed north to counter with a large army. (Diodorus puts Persian forces at 10,000 horsemen and 50,000 foot soldiers, probably reflecting nominal manpower of the units involved. If these were five divisions of foot plus ten companies of cavalry at a more reasonable 60 percent of establishment strength, then we're talking about some 30,000 footmen and 6,000 riders. And given at least one infantry division being light-armed skirmishers, this would yield 24,000 line fighters at a likely 4 to 1 ratio with their horsemen.)
Tissaphernes reached Sardis and sent out his cavalry to scout the approaching Greeks. The horsemen set up a forward base south of the city on the east side of the Pactolos River and then crossed to attack men engaged in plundering the countryside. After a good many of these had been killed, Agesilaos' newly upgraded mounted division came to the rescue and the Persians drew back to form a line of battle, standing before the Pactolos with their camp beyond. Agesilaos had arrived with his infantry by now and, when he saw no enemy footmen, sent out an advance wave of his cavalry, followed in order by peltasts at double speed and then the younger, swifter hoplites. He came marching behind these with the rest of his spearmen in phalanx. The Persians engaged the horsemen, but once the javelineers and hoplites arrived and the full phalanx with lowered spears began to close, they broke into flight. The Greeks gave chase and killed several at the back of the galloping mob as it crossed the river. With the rest of the beaten riders on the run, Agesilaus' men plundered their encampment.
This setback spurred Tissaphernes to march out of Sardis and take the field in full force. Outnumbered and unwilling to engage his more mobile foe on open ground, Agesilaos retreated in column with the Persians following to harry his rear guard. The Spartan king saw an ambush opportunity in this. He sent his cavalry commander Xenocles ahead with 1,400 men from the vanguard (likely 400 horsemen and 1,000 peltasts) to hide at a heavily forested site that had been scouted along the route. The next day, Agesilaos led his army past this spot just at dawn with Tissaphernes' column tailing close in his wake. Once on suitable ground beyond, the Greeks suddenly spun about and presented the startled Asians with a spear-brisling phalanx ready for battle. Frontage for Agesilaos' 11,000-man hoplite array could have been over 2.5km had it deployed only four shields deep as would seem probable.
The Persians are unlikely to have had time for any fine adjustments to their own formation. They thus probably spread out in standard order ten men deep with a span much like that on the other side if the foregoing guesswork on their having around 24,000 line infantry is correct. With barely enough time to scramble into fighting order, the Great King's men must have met the ensuing Greek advance with considerable uncertainty as a "sharp battle" (Diodorus) commenced. But no sooner had this action gotten well underway than Xenocles and his ambush party came up on signal to hit the Persian rear. Caught front and back, the imperials fell apart, with Tissaphernes and his troops running for their lives. Agesilaos' men gave hard chase and killed 6,000 while capturing a large number as well per Diodorus. The fatalities (20 percent of 30,000 foot soldiers) are about what one would expect from a thorough pursuit. (Note that there is a great deal of controversy as to whether this engagement and the previous one at Pactolos River are actually duplicate reports on the same action by Xenophon [Hellenica 3.4.21-24] and Diodorus [14.80.2-5]. Plutarch [Vol. II Agesilaos, 46] has an account more like Xenophon's while that of the Oxyrhynchus Historian [6.4-6] leans toward Diodorus. Given the marked differences in particulars in the two descriptions and Diodorus' clear implication that there was more than one encounter at this time [14.80.6] despite his giving details on only one, the foregoing scenario of separate battles is considered the more likely case.)
There was major fallout from the Persian defeat at Sardis. King Artaxerxes II sent out Tithraustes to execute and replace Tissaphernes. The new Persian commander then tried to arrange a truce with Agesilaos, putting the blame for all past problems between the Empire and Sparta upon his predecessor's severed head in hopes that a reconciliation could be reached. However, once it became obvious that Agesilaos was not to be dissuaded from continuing his campaign, Tithraustes took another tack. Sending money into Greece, he now sought to induce several poleis to bedevil Sparta. If the Spartans couldn't be driven from Asia, maybe they would draw off to deal with trouble at home.
Agesilaos had by fall moved into Phrygia to lay it waste and close on Dascyleium, where Pharnabazus was headquartered. Here, the Spartan had a small reverse. Some of his men were scouring about in search of supplies when Pharnabazus caught one of the raiding parties with a force of 400 horsemen supported by two chariots fitted with scythes that extended on each side from the axle. The 700-man Greek contingent quickly prepared to face a mounted attack by drawing together into a tight body. This was a mixed-arms formation, most likely a square that had the hoplites on the outside and light-armed men in the middle. Such an arrangement would let the well-armored spearmen use their aspides to fend off enemy missiles all around while their protected skirmisher comrades at center hurled javelins at any approaching horsemen. (The Greeks' darts could hit home before the riders even got into range to use their own weapons, since they couldn't hurl a javelin nearly as far sitting on a saddle.) But Pharnabazus negated this otherwise sound scheme by charging with the chariots in front of his cavalry. Seeing these fearsome engines closing fast, the Greeks lost nerve and scattered rather than meet their spinning blades. The Persian horsemen then rode among their fleeing foes to lance and slash down a hundred as the rest ran away. Bad as it was, this slaughter would have been even worse but for the arrival of Agesilaos with a large contingent of hoplites that had by chance been nearby. Pharnabazus and his riders prudently withdrew in the face of these reinforcements, content with the damage already dealt.
Shortly thereafter, a meeting between Agesilaos and Pharnabazus produced yet another truc
e and the Spartan withdrew that he might prepare a march on Tithraustes to the south. But this campaign never got going, as word now arrived from Sparta that Persia's meddling back in Greece was finally paying off in combination with the sorts of inter-polls disputes and rivalries that were always present even during the best of times in that highly fragmented land. The Spartans were on the verge of going to war with a coalition of Greek states and needed both their warrior king and his army to return and defend the homeland. Agesilaos forthwith appointed Euxenus as governor for Ionia and, leaving him with a garrison of 4,000 men, set off with whatever other troops he could take on the long trip back to Sparta.
The Corinthian War I
It was a triangle of tensions between Greece's leading city-states of Sparta, Thebes and Athens that set off what would come to be known as the Corinthian War. The Thebans, perhaps inspired at least in part by money flowing from Persia, had influenced the Opuntian Locrians on their west to expand upon a land dispute they were having on their southern border with neighboring Phocis, which was an ally of Sparta. The Locrians levied cash payments from the contested area and triggered a Phocian invasion in retaliation. Locris then asked for help from Thebes and the Thebans launched a counter-invasion against Phocis, ravaging the country before pulling back to Boeotia. Phocis immediately called for and got a pledge of aid from the Spartans. The final major player in this three-cornered game entered at this point as Athens, fearful of Spartan intentions outside of the Peloponnese, formed an alliance with the Thebans.
Haliartus and Naryx (395 B.c.)
The Spartans had sent Lysander to Phocis to gather a force from local supporters. This he did, collecting Phocian hoplites (perhaps 1,000) and cavalry (a few hundred at least). He also got spearmen (up to 1,000) from the Spartan colony at Heraclea (to the northeast at the base of the pass of Thermopylae) and Malis (farther north in Thessaly), the latter likely contributing skirmishers as well. To these he added a possible 500-1,000 in light infantry from Aenis in the Thessalian highlands. He marched into Boeotia with these men and camped in the vicinity of Haliartus, a town on the south side of ancient Lake Copais about midway between the poleis of Thebes to the east and Orchomenos to the west. Lysander was under orders to wait there for Pausanius, Agesilaos' partner king, who would shortly be marching out with the rest of the polls army and a full levy from the Peloponnesian allies. While he waited, the Spartan general took advantage of long-standing enmity between Thebes and Orchomenos to add the latter's 2,000 hoplites and 200 horsemen (plus perhaps 700 foot skirmishers) to his expedition.
When Pausanius didn't arrive on schedule, Lysander decided to go on the offensive by himself. He led his allied force of around 4,000 hoplites, 1,500 light footmen and 700 cavalry close to the walls of Haliartus and urged those inside to join Orchomenos in revolt. As it turned out, the place was possessed of a Theban garrison and refused. The Thebans, meanwhile, arrived in force and a battle ensued. Xenophon's account (Hellenica 3.5.18-21) is uncertain whether Lysander was even able to deploy, and neither Diodorus (14.81.1-3) nor Nepos (6.3.4) gives details to resolve the issue. In fact, light fatalities among those beaten (comparable to those of the victors at around 200) seem more in tune with a surprise attack in which Lysander's men took off before the enemy got close, leaving him and a few Spartan companions to be taken down by the Theban advance. Lysander thus died beneath the walls of Haliartus while most of those lost among his army fell in flight beyond the battlefield. However, once on nearby high, broken terrain, skirmishers in the fleeing crowd turned and let loose a hail of javelins. This killed several men leading the pursuit and encouraged others among those beaten to roll down stones and otherwise fight back. Their resistance cost the Thebans the aforementioned 200 or so dead before they gave up the chase. In fact, at day's end, there was considerable despondency on the winning side at having fared no better in the casualty department than the losers.
Theban spirits picked up the next morning when it became clear the Phocians and others that had come with the fallen Lysander were leaving. But this satisfaction proved short-lived when Pausanius finally showed up at Haliartus only a day later. The Spartan king had 6,000 hoplites in tow (Diodorus 14.81.1), likely including a couple of much feared Spartan regiments (morai, mora singular) of some 1,000 men each (see "Manpower" discussion Chapter II under Leuctra in 371) along with 4,000 Peloponnesians. The outnumbered Thebans weren't eager to fight, nor were the Spartans due to the fact that they didn't have as many hoplites as originally planned (with the loss of Lysander's division and Corinth's refusal to honor its alliance obligations) and had very few horsemen of any sort (the Phocian cavalry on which they had counted having fled). As a result, a pact was negotiated that ended what Diodorus called the "Boeotian" War, but is better characterized as the opening round of the Corinthian War.
The summer of 395 saw Thebes and Athens join with the Spartans' long-time foe Argos and their increasingly hostile nominal ally Corinth to form a grand alliance. Setting up a council at Corinth to direct joint activities, one of the allies' first acts was to send 2,000 Boeotian and Argive hoplites north into Thessaly to aid Medius, dictator of Larissa, in a war against his fellow tyrant, Lycophron of Pherae. Inland Larissa and coastal Pherae were rivals of old for leadership of Thessaly and the latter was allied with the Spartans. These troops helped Medius seize Pherae and then departed on their own to capture the Spartan outpost at Heraclea to the south.
Leaving the Argives to garrison Heraclea, the allied commander, Ismenias, took his Boeotians as well as recruits from the region thereabout and moved on Phocis. He had a little less than 6,000 men in all (Diodorus 14.82.7-10). A possible breakdown of these might be 1,000 Boeotian hoplites, 2,000 northern allied spearmen and nearly 3,000 light footmen and horsemen combined, with the latter including 100 riders from Boeotia. The Phocians, led by Sparta's Aleisthenes, came against Ismenias after he camped on their northern border at Naryx in Opuntian Locris. We have no figure for Phocian manpower, but by calling in allies like the Malians there might have been some 2,000 hoplites, 1,000 foot skirmishers and 400-500 horsemen. The ensuing battle was "sharp and protracted" per Diodorus, claiming high casualties on both sides before turning at last in Ismenias' favor. This most likely came on the superior quality of his famously fit Boeotian spearmen. These hardy fighters might have turned one enemy wing (the left?) against hoplites of lesser stamina (possibly the Malians). The ensuing pursuit essentially doubled the losers' death toll to nearly 1,000 men. Still, Ismenias had also paid a high price, the long, hard action having claimed around 500 men on his side as well. The Spartans now saw their united foes collect troops at Corinth, prompting them to recall Agesilaos and prepare for a fight.
Nemea River (394 B.C.)
Agesilaos began his journey back to Greece in the spring of 394, but events in the Peloponnese weren't waiting. With a large allied force already gathering against them, the Spartans called up their muster and those of their allies to create a powerful army. They had some 18,500 hoplites, 300 expert bowmen from the island of Crete and 400 slingers plus 700 horsemen (Xenophon [Hellenica4.2.16], though Diodorus [15.83.1] says only 500 riders). There must have been non-Spartan javelinmen present as well, perhaps 3,500 to bring the infantry into line with Diodorus' sum of 23,000. The Spartans had 6,000 of their own hoplites, either all six morai or (if a mora documented shortly thereafter at Orchomenos had been posted after the engagement at Haliartus the year before) five morai and 1,000 freed helots. Their allied spearmen included almost 3,000 from Elis and elsewhere in the northwestern Peloponnese, another 3,000 from the southeast and 1,500 from Sicyon. There were also around 5,000 Arcadian and Achaean hoplites. (These last were not described in detail by Xenophon. See a good review of this issue in Sabin [2007, 111].) The Spartans' army moved to approach Corinth from the west along the coast of the Corinthian Gulf, having shifted to this more open path after harassment from enemy peltasts and archers in the hills inland. It set up camp in the territory of Sicyon just short of the Ne
mea River, which marked the Corinthian border. The enemy host, meanwhile, had also come up and went into camp across a river (perhaps the Nemea, but possibly the Rachiani farther east).
The allied army was considerably larger than that of Sparta in all categories. Its hoplites totaled around 24,000, including 6,000 from Athens, 5,000 from Boeotia (sans the Orchomenians), 3,000 from Corinth and another 3,000 from all across the large island of Euboa just off the eastern coast of Greece. Xenophon also reported 7,000 spearmen from Argos (though he appears to have been somewhat less certain of this and it does seem high, perhaps representing more than just Argives). Mounted forces included 800 Boeotians, 600 Athenians, 100 Euboans and 50 Opuntian Locrians. Light infantry came not only from the foregoing poleis (especially those also providing cavalry) but also from Ozolian Locris (below Phocis), Malls and Acarnania (in northwestern Greece). In all, the foot skirmishers might have reached 7,000-8,000. (Note that Diodorus gave alternative figures for the allies. However, these lack detail and seem less reliable, indicating a much smaller force of 15,000 infantry and 500 cavalry.)
The allies crossed the Nemea and both armies set up for a fight on the coastal plain. What followed would prove to be the largest battle of the Corinthian War. The allies spent some time discussing depth of array, wanting to take advantage of their superior heavy manpower with longer files at 16 shields over a 1,500m front, but concerned about getting too deep lest the enemy overlap and roll around the end of an overly shortened line. This was a definite risk should their foes file at under twelve men (as deep as they could go and still equal the allied width). A major concern here was the Boeotian contingent, among which stood the Thebans who had a history of lining up at extreme depths. Originally assigned to the left wing, where the Spartans would undoubtedly stand in the opposing post of honor, there was concern that they would mass too deeply against those elite foes and jeopardize the rest of the phalanx. They thus were switched to the right wing against the Sicyonians etc. with the Athenians taking their place on the left. As it turned out, once the phalanxes began to close, fear about the enemy's depth was alleviated (it was twelve as expected), but the Thebans did misbehave, stacking much deeper than 16 (perhaps 25) and veering markedly rightward as they closed. The latter looked to outflank the opposition left; however, it forced the rest of the allies to move that way as well. This put the Athenians at risk of envelopment from the Spartans, who were also drifting right.